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I. INTRODUCTION 
  
 The goal of this thesis is to show why inclusive legal positivism is the best theory 
that captures what the law in Brazil is. Inclusive legal positivism allows the inclusion of 
moral standards in the criteria of legality.1 It essentially asserts that the “legality of norms 
can sometimes depend on their substantive merits, not just their pedigree or social source.”2 
Brazilian legal norms and practices fit and sample the inclusive legal positivism framework. 
3  Calling attention to this fact can provide great contribution for the country’s legal system, 
because it throws light upon the system’s upsides, but also makes clear what are the most 
relevant downsides. Highlighting these positive and negative features is relevant because 
they are not evident and, therefore, are not usually noticed. 
 The fact is that Brazilian legal theory is in a turmoil stage. Being part of a civil law 
family country, Brazilian jurists still have a high regard for written laws. Only laws enacted 
by legislative bodies justify coercion according to the text of Brazil’s Federal Constitution 
[C.F.].4 Separation of powers, considered to be a nuclear principle of government5 and an 
immutable constitutional clause, is reflected in the idea that rules are created by legislative 
bodies.6 Legal certainty is seen as inherent to the idea of rule of law7 and is embodied in the 
notion of enacted laws as the major source of law.8 These facts may create the impression 
that Brazil has a classically positivistic legal system,9 in which (a) only norms identifiable 
through historical social facts are legal,10 (b) a top-down11 ideal of precise rules prevails,12 
                                                          
1 See Jules L. Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis, in Hart's 
postscript, in ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 102 (Oxford, 2001). 
2 Id. at 100. 
3 See WIL WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM (Clarendon Press, 1994).  
4 According to item article 5, II, of the Brazilian Federal Constitution [C.F.], “no one shall be obligated to 
do or refrain from doing something except by virtue of [enacted] law.” CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] 
[CONSTITUTION] art. 5, II (Braz.) (trans. Brazilian Federal Senate). 
5 As per article 2 of the C.F., “[t]he Legislative, the Executive and the Judicial, independent and harmonious 
among themselves, are the powers of the Union.” CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 2 (Braz.) 
(trans. Brazilian Federal Senate). 
6 Article 60 § 4, of the C.F. states that “[n]o proposal of amendment shall be considered which is aimed at 
abolishing: [...] III – the separation of the Government Powers.” CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] 
[CONSTITUTION] art. 60, III (Braz.) (trans. Brazilian Federal Senate). 
7 See generally S.T.F., MS No. 22.357, Relator: Min. Gilmar Mendes, 27.05.2004, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA 
[D.J.], 05.11.2004 (Braz.).  
8 See generally S.T.F., HC No. 95.483, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, 15.09.2009, DIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO DA 
JUSTIÇA [D.J.e.], 29.10.2009 (Braz.). 
9 According to Raymond Wacks, classical positivism refers to the comprehension that “all knowledge rests 
on logical inference from simple ‘protocol sentence’ grounded in empirical, observable facts.” See RAYMOND 
WACKS, UNDERSTANDING JURISPRUDENCE, 69 (Oxford, 4th ed. 2015). This is the concept that I adopt for making 
the reference above. Also, the Italian author Norberto Bobbio contends that “legal positivism, also admitting a 
plurality of sources of knowledge, claims the existence of one sole source of qualification and identifies this 
source with the [enacted] law.” See NORBERTO BOBBIO, O POSITIVISMO JURÍDICO – LIÇÕES DE FILOSOFIA DO 
DIREITO 166 (Ícone Editora, 2006). See also JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE – IN DEFENCE OF A 
PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 120 (Oxford, 2003). The use of the concept “classical legal 
positivism” does not have the intention to refer to the positivistic view contended by John Austin, which is 
designed as the “command theory.” See WACKS, Id., at 91. 
10 DENISE MEYERSON, UNDERSTANDING JURISPRUDENCE 51 (Routledge, 2007). 
11  See Denise Reaume, Of Pigeonholes and Principles: A Reconsideration of Discrimination Law, 40 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 113,144 (2002). 
12 As Carlos Santiago Nino asserts, “the expression ‘legal positivism’ is used in many different senses 
referring to clearly distinguishable and sometimes mutually incompatible thesis.” The most common statement 
that represents the Brazilian way of picturing positivism is the one Nino describes as “(7) The law consists only 
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and (c) norms are announced in advance and unequivocally provide the solutions adopted 
by Courts in adjudication.13 Indeed, some authors have acknowledged that, for decades, the 
most solid legal doctrine in Brazil was legal positivism.14 
 Brazilian legal texts, however, have commonly been enacted using open textured 
language.15 Legal precepts are generally written in broad terms, often employing moral 
                                                          
of standards explicitly enacted by centralized organs (i.e. statutes).” Carlos Santiago Nino, Dworkin and Legal 
Positivism, 89, MIND, NEW SERIES, No. 356, 519 (1980). 
13 Wil Waluchow contends that the formalist ideal of precise rules takes place when jurists consider that all 
laws are announced in advance and applied without the need of law-creating activity. WIL WALUCHOW, A 
COMMON LAW THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 205 (Cambridge, 2009).  
14 Dimitri Dimoulis states that “[f]or decades, in Brazil, legal positivism was considered the most solid, 
plausible, truthful to the legislator’s will and stability, rationality and previsibility warrantor, which are usually 
designated by the term ‘legal certainty’.” Dimitri Dimoulis, Introduction to NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART, 
XVI (Elsevier, 2010). Translation mine.  
15 For definitions of “open texture” and its distinction from “vagueness”, I borrow Friedrich Waismann’s 
theory: “[v]agueness should be distinguished from open texture. A word which is actually used in a fluctuating 
way (such as 'heap' or 'pink') is said to be vague; a term like 'gold', though its actual use may not be vague, is 
non-exhaustive or of an open texture in that we can never fill up all the possible gaps through which a doubt 
may seep in. Open texture, then, is something like possibility of vagueness. Vagueness can be remedied by 
giving more accurate rules, open texture cannot. An alternative way of stating this would be to say that 
definitions of open terms are always corrigible or emendable. 
Open texture is a very fundamental characteristic of most, though not of all, empirical concepts, and it is 
this texture which prevents us from verifying conclusively most of our empirical statements. Take any material 
object statement. The terms which occur in it are non-exhaustive; that means that we cannot foresee completely 
all possible conditions in which they are to be used; there will always remain a possibility, however faint, that 
we have not taken into account something or other that may be relevant to their usage; and that means that we 
cannot foresee completely all the possible circumstances in which the statement is true or in which it is false. 
There will always remain a margin of uncertainty. Thus, the absence of a conclusive verification is directly due 
to the open texture of the terms concerned.  
This has an important consequence. Phenomenalists have tried to translate what we mean by a material 
object statement into terms of sense experience. Now this a translation would be possible only if the terms of a 
material object statement were completely definable. For only then could we describe completely all the 
possible evidences which would make the statement true or false. As this condition is not fulfilled, the 
programme of phenomenalism falls flat, and in consequence the attempts at analysing chairs and tables into 
patterns of sense-data -- which has become something of a national sport in this country -- are doomed to fail. 
Similar remarks apply to certain psychological statements such as ‘He is an intelligent person’; here again it is 
due to the open texture of a term like ‘intelligent’ that the statement cannot be reduced to a conjunction or 
disjunction of statements which specify the way a man would behave in such-and-such circumstances.” 
Friedrich Waismann, Verifiability, in ANTONY FLEW, LOGIC AND LANGUAGE (Oxford, 1951), 
http://www.ditext.com/waismann/verifiability.html. See also WALUCHOW, supra note 13 at 196. An example 
of vagueness is given by the Legal Theory Lexicon Blog: “What does it mean to say that a concept, term, or 
phrase is vague?  Let's start with some examples and then try for an elucidation of the concept.  ‘Tall’ is a good 
example of a vague concept.  Some humans are definitely not tall--Danny DeVito, for example.  Others 
definitely are tall--Shaquille O’Neal, for one.  But the term ‘tall’ is vague.  5'11 is almost definitely tall for a 
woman in the United States, but might be a borderline case for men.  ‘Tall’ is not the sort of quality for which 
there are definite criteria that sort the world into ‘tall’ things and ‘not tall’ things.  In other words, ‘tall’ is vague. 
There are lots of terms that are like tall: short, strong, weak, beautiful, ugly, heavy, light, warm, and cool--all 
of these are terms that seem to have borderline cases.” 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2006/08/legal_theory_le.html.  
An example of open texture given by the Oxford Dictionary is given using the term ‘mother’: “[t]he term 
‘mother’ is not vague, but its open texture is revealed if through technological advance differences open up 
between the mother that produces the ovum, the mother that carries the foetus to term, and the mother that rears 
the baby. It will then be fruitless to pursue the question of which is the ‘real’ mother, since the term is not 
adapted to giving a decision in the new circumstances.” 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100251341 
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standards, like morality, efficiency, loyalty, among others.16 It is uncommon to find written 
rules that fit the all-or-nothing fashion pattern, at least in a “plain fact” manner.17 The use of 
the so-called indeterminate legal concepts is highly encouraged, sometimes even in some 
punishment cases.18  
 Legal principles also take part of the legal debate. Their supplementary character has 
evolved into being at the center of the legal system.19 With few exceptions,20 there is a 
prevalent practice among jurists that principles should interact with rules or other principles 
in a balancing process, to assist judges, when adjudicating a case, to reach a solution that 
intends to take into account all values in the best possible way. Principles are seen as 
“reflexive norms, which enable limiting, construing or reconstruing the rules.” 21  Their 
source, nevertheless, may be written norms, not “a sense of appropriateness” developed in 
the profession and the public over time.22  
 The situation gets more controversial because courts have established that the content 
of the norms set forth in Brazilian statutes should be found taking into consideration 
normative principles written in the constitutional text. 23  The C.F., enacted in 1988, is 
understood as having inaugurated a new phase of the history of Brazilian law, since it 
textually enunciated fundamental rights and gave them prominent role in the system. 
Scholars argue that “constitutionalism, and especially the process of law in Brazil, [has] 
incorporate[d] as fundamental a right, a guarantee to access […] a just and fair judicial 
order.”24 Neoconstitutionalism is the name of this new perspective and is conventionally 
                                                          
16 Article 37 of the Federal Constitution for example, states that “[t]he governmental entities and entities 
owned by the Government in any of the powers of the Union, the states, the Federal District and the 
Municipalities shall obey the principles of legality, impersonality, morality, publicity, and efficiency […]”. 
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 37 (Braz.); Lei No. 8.666, de 21 de Junho de 1993. DIÁRIO 
OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U] de 6.7.1993 (Braz.). Article 3º. “Public biddings shall be conducted in order to 
assure the observance of the constitutional principle of equality, the selection of the most profitable proposal 
for the Government, and the promotion of national sustainable development, and will be processed and 
adjudicated in strict conformity with basic principles of legality, impersonality, morality, equality, publicity, 
administrative probity, observation of bid notice terms, objective judgment, and others that are linked to them.”; 
LEI No. 8.429, de 2 de Junho de 1992. DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U] de 3.06.1992 (Braz.). Article 4º. 
“Public agents of any level or hierarchy are obliged to ensure that the principles of lawfulness, impersonality, 
morality and publicity, and efficiency are strictly enforced in the matters that relates to their positions.” 
17 See, generally, Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules I, 35 U. CHI. L. REV, 14, 25 (1967). “All-or-nothing 
fashion” rules are usually present in procedural, securities and some parts of civil, administrative and criminal 
laws, such as the precepts that deal with statute of limitations. 
18  Maria Sylvia Zanella Di Pietro, for example, talking about disciplinary punishments states that “in 
administrative law, vagueness prevails. There are few infractions described by the law, as it happens with 
‘public employment abandonment’. Most of the infractions are left to administrative discretion when dealing 
with a concrete case; it is the sentencing authority that will frame the act as ‘serious fault’, ‘irregular 
proceeding’, ‘service inefficiency’, ‘public disobedience’, or other infractions set forth in an indefinite manner 
by the statutory legislation. For this purpose, the severity of the breach and the consequences for the public 
service should be taken into account.” MARIA SYLVIA ZANELLA DI PIETRO, DIREITO ADMINISTRATIVO 515, 
(Atlas, 19. ed. 2006). Translation mine. See also subchapter III.3. 
19 Article 4 of the Introductory Act to the Brazilian Norms sets forth that “when there is a gap in the law, 
the judge shall decide the case resorting to analogy, customs and general principles of law.” LEI DE INTRODUÇÃO 
ÀS NORMAS DO DIREITO BRASILEIRO [L.I.N.D.B.] [INTRODUCTORY ACT TO THE BRAZILIAN NORMS] art. 4. 
Translation mine. 
20 See subchapter III.5.6. 
21 MARCELO NEVES, ENTRE HIDRA E HÉRCULES 103 (Martins Fontes, 2nd ed. 2014). Translation mine. 
22 Dworkin, supra note 17, at 41. 
23 See subchapter III.5.7. 
24 Paulo Roberto Pereira de Souza, Constitutionalism in Brazil, 16 FLA. J. INT’L. L., 155, 156 (2004). 
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accepted by the majority of judges as the best way to interpret the C.F..25 Constitutional 
norms have gained the status of enforceable norms. Their compliance has become 
imperative, especially in fundamental rights cases, which deal not only with the assurance 
of formal equality, but also with accomplishing social (substantive) equality.26 If not obeyed, 
constitutional norms can prompt government coercion. 27  This assertion is also true for 
programmatic constitutional norms.28 Judges can largely recognize causes of action directly 
from the text. Lawyers file suits and judges decide cases based on readings of the 
constitutional principles and on interpretations of the enumerated rights, even if these 
readings are not grounded on any historical document or precedent, sometimes based on 
their personal readings of the text. Convention and some legal norms demand that judges, 
when deciding a case either in criminal, civil or administrative law, among others, should 
take into account broad constitutional principles to provide the appropriate [or correct] 
outcome: “[i]f it is possible to interpret a statutory provision in more than one way, the 
interpretation most congruent with the [C]onstitution is to be preferred.”29 The canon of 
constitutional avoidance30 is widely rejected and decisions are rarely minimalists.31 On the 
contrary, the phenomenon of constitutionalization of civil, criminal and administrative law, 
                                                          
25 See Tecla Mazzarese, Towards a Positivist Reading of Neo-constitutionalism, JURA GENTIUM (Nov. 15, 
2017, 11:35 AM), http://www.juragentium.org/topics/rights/en/mazzares.htm.  
26 As Gustavo Zabrebelsky notes “[t]he constitutions in force in Europe [and the C.F.] contain numerous 
provisions that enshrine principles and that do not directly concern individual rights but rather require the latter 
to conform to general interests. Article 3 of the Italian Constitution, for example, proclaims and defines two 
concepts of equality in a programmatic way. First, legal equality (‘all citizens have equal social dignity and are 
equal before the law, without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, of political opinion, of personal and 
social conditions’), in the sense adopted by Dworkin; and, second, as the duty of the public powers to provide 
equality in the distribution of collective resources (‘it is the task of the Republic to remove obstacles of a social 
and economic kind, which, by limiting the freedom and the equality of the citizens, prevent the full development 
of the human person and the effective participation of all the workers in the political, economic and social 
organization of the Country’). A list of social rights follows these programmatic description, such as the right 
to education, to health, to social assistance and security; these social rights constitute both guidelines for 
government action and rights enforceable by the courts and ultimately by the Constitutional Court. These social 
rights obviously require more than equilibrium among individual rights guaranteed by the courts. They also 
require pursuit of public policies, which, while also guaranteed by the courts, are likely to limit individual 
rights. The most characteristic examples include the constitutional constraints imposed on corporate law, 
which—as a whole—may not be contrary to ‘social usefulness’ and may be directed toward ‘social ends’ (art. 
41), and the right of property, which is recognized but may be limited in order to guarantee its ‘social function’ 
(art. 42), while property rights in land are subject to limit that guarantee ‘equitable social relations’ (art. 44).” 
Gustavo Zabrebelsky, Ronald Dworkin’s Principle Based Constitutionalism: An Italian Point of View 
Roundtable, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 621, 642-643 (2003). 
27 See LUÍS ROBERTO BARROSO, O NOVO DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL BRASILEIRO, 193 (Editora Fórum, 1st 
ed. 2014). 
28 See Zagrebelsky, supra note 26, at 643. 
29 Friedrich Muller, Basic Questions of Constitutional Concretization, 31 Rutgers L.J. 325, 331 (1999-
2000).  
30 The U.S. Supreme Court [SCOTUS] has stated that “[t]he Court will not pass upon a constitutional 
question, although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the 
case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either 
of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general 
law, the Court will decide only the latter.” Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936). 
31 According to Cass Sunstein, “[m]any judges are minimalists. They favor rulings that are narrow, in the 
sense that they govern only the circumstances of the particular case, and also shallow, in the sense that they do 
not accept a deep theory of the legal provision at issue. In law, narrow and shallow decisions have real 
advantages insofar as they reduce both decision costs and error costs; make space for democratic engagement 
on fundamental questions; and reflect a norm of civic respect.” Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism 
(John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 432, 2008). 
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among other areas, is largely recognized.32 Constitutionalization of law and constitutional 
avoidance may be inconsistent with one another.  
 Regarding the application of constitutional norms, scholars also note that they are 
different from other legal norms. They assert that these norms, being more political, open-
ended and less complete, need to be concretized and not interpreted. 33 The solution of the 
case will not be provided by the text, but by a dialectic process of “creatively determining 
results in conformity with, but not determinable by, the Constitution.”34 The judicial branch, 
grounded on the application of constitutional norms, has declared important new rights.35 
Most of lawyers and the press may appreciate these decisions, but they are also criticized by 
few more traditional scholars as being, in some cases, judicial activism.36 
 Taking all these aspects into account, the prevalent school of jurisprudence, that aims 
to describe law in Brazil, is post-positivism. Justice Luís Roberto Barroso, a member of 
Brazil’s highest court, the Supremo Tribunal Federal [S.T.F.], argues that “[t]he debate 
surrounding [the] characterization [of post-positivism] lies in the convergence of two major 
currents of thought offering opposite views of law: natural law and positivism—opposite, 
but sometimes uniquely complementary. Society’s competing demands for legal certainty 
and objectivity (on the one hand), and for legitimacy and justice (on the other) have expanded 
beyond the confines of the ‘pure’ and ‘encompassing models.’” 37  Barroso observes, 
however, that this new “broad and diffused set of ideas are still in their systematization 
phase.”38 He claims that “[i]n a way, post-positivism is a third path between positivism and 
the natural law tradition. Post-positivist thinking does not ignore the importance of the law's 
demands for clarity, certainty, and objectivity, but neither does it conceive of the law as 
being unconnected to a moral and political philosophy.”39 
  This new comprehension of Brazilian law description advanced by post-positivist 
scholars has made the process of identifying what the law requires more complex, not only 
for judges, but for public employees and for the population in general. In fact, the post-
positivist approach, which advocates that enacted rules (positivistic side) shall be construed 
in conformity with broad constitutional principles (natural law side), often makes the 
identification of what the enacted law demands less certain and objective, qualities that 
should be pursued by a system of law to offer better guidance.40 The lack of clarity is 
precisely at odds with the goals of a system of written norms and top-down methodology. 
While empirical disagreement among judges on identifying legal applicable norms is not 
usually a problem, theoretical disagreement about the content of these rules is pervasive. It 
                                                          
32 See generally Luís Roberto Barroso, Neoconstitucionalismo e Constitucionalização do Direito (O Triunfo 
tardio do direito constitucional no Brasil) 30-43, http://www.luisrobertobarroso.com.br/wp-
content/themes/LRB/pdf/neoconstitucionalismo_e_constitucionalizacao_do_direito_pt.pdf.  
33 Winfried Brugger, Legal Interpretation, School of Jurisprudence, and Anthropology: Some Remarks 
From a German Point of View, 42 Am. J. Comp. L. 395, 398 (1994). 
34 Id.  
35 Examples of fundamental rights proclaimed by judicial rulings of the S.T.F. are provided in subchapter 
IV.8. 
36 See William Douglas, STF quis reescrever Constituição, Consultor Jurídico (May 13, 2011, 6:02 AM), 
http://www.conjur.com.br/2011-mai-13/stf-quis-reescrever-constituicao-votar-uniao-homoafetiva. 
37 Luís Roberto Barroso, The Americanization of Constitutional Law and Its Paradoxes: Constitutional 
Theory and Constitutional Jurisdiction in the Contemporary World, 16, ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 579, 585-
586 (2010). 
38 Id.  
39 Id. 
40 The Lei Complementar No. 95/98, which establishes rules for the creation and consolidation of statutes 
in Brazil, sets forth that “legal precepts should be written with clarity, precision and logical order.” LEI 
COMPLEMENTAR no. 95, de DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U] de 27.2.1998 (Braz.). 
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can be hard to identify which practical reasons for action Brazilian law demands, since, even 
in the presence of clear rules, judges may consider a citizen’s conduct illegal, if, in their 
opinion, the citizen complied with the literal terms of the rule but did not balance it with 
some abstract constitutional principle.41 
 In this sense, one may note that even the traditional concept of legality is in some 
sort modified, since most of solutions are not preestablished in the written law. 
Unquestionably, there is room for subjective judgment and discretion to decide what is legal 
and what is illegal. However, the vast majority of Brazilian judges still do not acknowledge 
judicial lawmaking. Although concretization involves the reaching of a result not 
determinable by the text, it is still seen as a process of merely attributing sense to posited 
norms. All in all, the main goal of this thesis is to point out that the Anglo-American doctrine 
of inclusive legal positivism is able to explain and to justify what is the law in Brazil.  
 The Brazilian concept of law has been expanded to also include rules and principles 
whose meaning is not sometimes clearly established by social sources, but which courts must 
resort to when deciding cases.42 This view comes close to the notion of the inclusive legal 
positivistic approach, being in the core of the Hart-Waluchow soft-positivism idea, whereas 
morality can be a condition of validity of norms in a specific legal system.43 Brazilian law, 
as described and noted by Justice Barroso, has undoubtedly opened itself to moral reasoning. 
One issue to be examined is if this opening is an inherent characteristic of the Brazilian legal 
system or is merely contingent.44  
 The second goal of this thesis is to criticize the basic concepts of post-positivism as 
understood by Brazilian scholars, to show that this view is not the appropriate view to 
describe what the law is in Brazil. I will argue that post-positivism is mistaken when it adopts 
as true some propositions about legal positivism that are not accurate. Indeed, the main flaw 
of post-positivism is the merging of two important theories that were correctly separated by 
Herbert Hart in his classic book The Concept of Law: the theory of law as a descriptive 
enterprise and the theory of adjudication.45 I will advocate that this merger is not a recent 
phenomenon and has its roots from the civil law traditions of (i) considering legal only the 
norms posited by the legislator; (ii) considering enacted law always binding—a practice 
called ideological positivism; (iii) at the same time, recognizing the practical incapacity of 
written texts to solve all legal problems, but making decisions that supposedly are merely a 
                                                          
41 The S.T.F. Justice Ricardo Lewandowski, for example, in a court opinion, citing Maria Sylvia Zanella Di 
Pietro, one of Brazil’s leading administrative law scholars, stated that “the administrative official conduct, may 
be […] in conformity with the literal meaning of ‘the law, but if it is revealed to be offensive to morality, to 
good behavior, to the power-duty of probity, to the ideas of justice and equity and to the common sense of 
honesty, will be in evident confrontation with the constitutional principle of administrative morality. Indeed, as 
the romans affirmed, non omne quod licet honestum est [not all that is permitted is honorable]” S.T.F., R.E. 
No. 579.951/RN, Relator: Min. Ricardo Lewandowski, 20.08.2008, DIÁRIO DE JUSTIÇA [D.J], 18.12.2009 
(Braz.). Translation mine. 
42 Cristóbal Orrego, Natural Law under Other Names: De Nominibus Non est Disputandum, 52 AM J Juris 
83 (2007); David Lyons, Justification and Judicial Responsibility, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 178, 188 (1984). 
43 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (Oxford: 2d ed. 1994); WALUCHOW, W.J., supra note 3; see also 
Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. Legal Stud. 139 (1982). 
44 Even in some constitutional law fundamental rights cases, the S.T.F. sometimes adopts approaches that 
can be considered formalist. See, for example, S.T.F., R.E. No. 397.762, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, 
03.06.2008, 865, DIÁRIO DE JUSTIÇA [D.J], 11.09.2008, 611 (Braz.). (denying the request of a concubine, which 
took part on a stable polygamic relationship, to divide, among her and the legal spouse, pension fund rights 
inherited from their “common husband,” due to lack of posited norms on the matter).  
45 As Cristóbal Orrego points out, “Herbert Hart proposed a new interpretation of analytical legal positivism. 
After him, several authors have accepted this new interpretation: […] David Brink, Jules Coleman, Joseph Raz 
and Mathew Kramer. They separate the theory of adjudication from the theory of law as a descriptive 
enterprise.” Orrego, see note 42, at 77. 
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logical-deduction of what is written [a mechanical approach], even when the existence of 
creativity is evident.  
 I will articulate that Hart’s descriptive-explanatory view, as noted by Benjamin 
Zipursky,46 provides veracity, clarity and candor in legal interpretation and helps to show 
when judges are incorporating their moral or political goals into law, without being locked 
to mechanistic practices. While I believe that Brazilian social conventions, in many 
situations, allow judges to decide what the law should become—through the process of 
concretization of written principles, for example—I will argue that the descriptive-
explanatory evaluation of the law puts light on important issues such as on “questions as to 
whether the law should be respected or reviled, renewed, revised, or rejected.”47  
 Moreover, a third goal of the thesis will be to acknowledge that neoconstitutionalism 
is the dominant normative adjudication theory in Brazil and is the conventionally accepted 
way of interpreting/concretizing the constitutional text adopted by most lawyers, scholars 
and judges. This view has contributed to the development of the Brazilian constitutional law 
by attributing an emancipatory character for the C.F. norms and, hence, has allowed the 
discovery of new fundamental rights and a broader control of government actions by the 
Judiciary, in the sense there is more checks and balances. There is nothing in this view that 
makes it incompatible with our Brazilian inclusive legal positivist system since it merely 
reflects legal conventions and source-based rules—rules of adjudication in Hart’s sense48—
that allow the judge to refer to moral principles when adjudicating a case. My recognition of 
neoconstitutionalism, therefore, is consistent with my view that one must not confuse what 
the law says with what judges effectively do.49 
 Finally, the fourth goal of this thesis is to describe the main problems of that inclusive 
legal positivism in relation to the purpose and efficacy of what can be considered a “better” 
legal system, particularly in terms of the trouble in law identification and comprehension. I 
will point out that some of Lon Fuller’s eight basic principles of a legal system and of law 
should be observed in public law’s adjudication in the country, especially in cases involving 
the imposition of sanctions. I will take the position that in many cases judges should take 
into account that the determination of what the law demands has become a hard issue in 
Brazil, due to the complexities of the identification of the social sources involved. In this 
view, I will argue that Brazilian law should evolve to adopt approaches similar to doctrines 
of fair notice, rule of lenity and qualified immunity. Regarding the latter, the decisions 
rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court [SCOTUS], for example, in City and County of San 
Francisco v. Sheehan,50 among other, is an important benchmark. In these cases, the Court, 
dealing with public officials’ immunity from suits, reaffirmed the orientation that “[p]ublic 
officials are immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 unless they have ‘violated a statutory 
or constitutional right that was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct”.51 
                                                          
46 Benjamin C. Zipursky. Practical Positivism versus Practical Perfectionism: The Hart-Fuller Debate at 
Fifty 83, N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1170 (2008). 
47 Id.  
48 According to H.L.A. Hart, “[t]he third supplement to the simple regime of primary rules, intended to 
remedy the inefficiency of its diffused social pressure, consists of secondary rules empowering individuals to 
make authoritative determinations of the question as to whether, on a particular occasion, a primary rule has 
been broken. The minimal form of adjudication consists in such determinations, and we shall call the secondary 
rules which confer the power to make them ‘rules of adjudication’. Besides identifying the individuals who are 
to adjudicate, such rules also define the procedure to be followed.” HART, CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 43, at 
96-97. 
49 According to Orrego, David Brink writes that “one must not confuse what the law requires with what the 
judges ought to do”. Orrego, see note 42, at 85.  
50 City and County of San Francisco, California, et al v. Sheehan, 575 US _ , 2 (2015).  
51 Id. at 2. 
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The opinion added that “[a]n officer ‘cannot be said to have violated a clearly established 
right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in [his] 
shoes would have understood that he was violating it, […] meaning that ‘existing precedent’ 
[…] placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”52 
 The adoption of solutions like the clearly established law, fair notice and rule of 
lenity approaches for cases that involve punishment may help to solve problems of injustice 
related to uncertainty and retroactivity of adjudication, while, at the same time, allow Courts 
to develop the law, concretizing constitutional principles, as sought by the 
neoconstitutionalist approach. In this view, Fuller’s ‘inner morality of law’ principles of 
generality, prospectivity, clarity, consistency, compliability, constancy, congruence, could 
be important benchmarks. I will show how some of these moral principles find shelter in 
works of both Hart and Dworkin. I will also point out that the clearly established law 
approach, although not largely developed in the Brazilian legal system, find light in some 
legal provisions and precedents.53 
 Therefore, after stating the four goals of this thesis in this Chapter I, it is time to 
summarize what will be the next steps of this dissertation. 
 Chapter II will provide a basic overview of the mainstream view of Brazilian law. 
The basic purpose of the chapter is to call into the attention of the reader how moral reasoning 
comes into the Brazilian legal discourse. At first, three recent cases that made the news in 
the country, all of which dealing with controversial moral questions, will be analyzed. The 
fact that Brazilian judges, even though resorting to moral arguments to decide the cases, 
justify their conclusions in written rules, will be called into attention. Moreover, the chapter 
will demonstrate the tools civil law judges use to deny law creating but, at the same time, 
justify their creative and intelligible decisions. 
 Chapter III will shortly describe the basic Anglo-Saxon theories that analyze the 
relationship between legality and morality—inclusive legal positivism, exclusive legal 
positivism, modern natural law and interpretivism—and will offer arguments to show why 
inclusive legal positivism is able to explain law and why the Brazilian legal system helps to 
demonstrate that this assertion is true. Inclusive legal positivism, as noted, “allows that 
morality can be a condition of legality.”54 It essentially states that the “legality of norms can 
sometimes depend on their substantive (moral) merits, not just their pedigree or social 
source.”55 There may be doubts as to what will be the substantive requisites to achieve 
legality, since moral standards are usually controversial. The controversial aspect of some 
norms without pedigree may limit their ability to guide society effectively on what are the 
legal and illegal actions. But this is a practical problem, not a conceptual or theoretical 
matter.56 Problems of coordination of conduct among citizens may exist; the legal system 
may not be a very efficient one in this respect, but it would still be a positivist system for the 
                                                          
52 Id. at 11. 
53 See, for example, Artigo 2, Sole Paragraph, XIII, Lei No. 9.784, de 29 de Janeiro de 1999, DIÁRIO OFICIAL 
DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 01.02.1999 (Braz.). “In administrative proceedings, it should be observed, among others, 
the criteria of interpretation of the administrative norm in the manner that best assures the public interest that it 
pursued, being prohibited the retroactive application of the new interpretation.” Translation mine. See also 
S.T.J., REsp No. 1.244.182/PB, Relator: Min. Benedito Gonçalves, 03.06.2008, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA 
ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e], 19.10.2012, (Braz.) (when Government mistakenly interprets a statute, resulting in an 
undue payment for the public employee, a false expectation that the received values are legal and definite is 
created, and this fact entitles the public employees, who were in good faith, to keep the payment). 
54 COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 100. 
55 Id.  
56 Id. at 102. 
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proponents of this theory.57 All in all, inclusive legal positivism shows that the Brazilian 
legal system is a legal system. 
 Chapter IV will criticize the Brazilian post-positivistic approach on the ground that 
it blunts the process of identifying the current state of the law in some areas, the need for 
law development and the process of adjudicating a case, in which judges may, in some 
situations due to our social conventions, convert moral principles into legal ones.58 It will 
also argue that neoconstitutionalism creates this convention and, therefore, is a correct form 
of constitutional interpretation in Brazil, being grounded in our inclusive positivistic system. 
Neoconstitutionalism is simply an “evidence of the existence of a social practice among 
judges of resolving [constitutional] disputes in a particular way” in Brazil.59 This particular 
way depicts pre-commitments of the Brazilian society, instead of final solutions, reveals a 
bottom-up model of case-by-case analysis aiming toward the development of the law, which 
Brazilian scholars are not used to due to their civil law tradition.60 
 Chapter V will concentrate on the problems of guidance that an inclusive positivist 
system raises, since, in some situations, due to uncertainty on the source-based criteria, 
Brazilian law may be unable to furnish clear practical reasons for citizens to act in many 
situations. This aspect may not be a problem for cases in which fundamental rights are being 
enforced, but it may be a concern in cases that involve the imposition of punishments, for 
example, since creative adjudication is essentially retrospective.61 Of course, “judge-made 
changes in the law rarely comes out of a blue sky,”62 but it will relevant to analyze, for 
example, doctrines of clearly established law, fair notice and rule of lenity, and try to 
demonstrate why they provide important ideas for idealizing solutions for this problem when 
legal changes were not rationally foreseeable. It will show that these solutions are in 
conformity with Fuller’s basic principles of a legal system, which, although may be a wrong 
approach to describe the nature of law, are important to assure a functional and effective 
legal system. As Gustavo Zagrebelsky observes, “[t]he concretization of the principles take 
place in the course of the work either of the legislator, through a rule that looks to future 
events, or of the judge, through a decision that looks back to past events.”63 Lord Diplock, 
asserts that “[t]he rule that a new precedent applies to acts done before it was laid down is 
not an essential feature of the judicial process. It is a consequence of a legal fiction that the 
Courts merely expound the law as it has always been. The time has come, I suggest, to reflect 
whether we should discard this fiction.”64  
 Finally, Chapter VI will provide conclusions for the ideas expressed in the previous 
chapters.  
                                                          
57 Id. 
58 I agree with Tommaso Pavone: “[l]itigants and lawyers may reference the [moral principles] to achieve 
their legalization; judges may invoke them as guides when faced with open-textured law; and legislators may 
codify them via their inclusion in a civil code or a statute. But until these acts bestow legal status upon them, it 
is illusory to speak of the existence of legal principles as opposed to moral principles. Tommaso Pavone, A 
Critical Adjudication of the Hart-Dworkin Debate, (Sep. 10, 2014), https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/ 
files/tpavone/files/hart-dworkin_debate_critical_review.pdf. 
59 Coleman, supra note 43, at 160. 
60 See Reaume, supra note 11 at 144. 
61 According to Mario Cappelletti, “the creative adjudication is supposed to be retrospective, for a new 
doctrine applies also to situations which had occurred previously. Since it has retroactive effect, creative 
adjudication runs counter to the values of certainty and predictability, indeed, it is ‘unfair’, for it catches the 
party by surprise.” MAURO CAPPELLETTI, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, 36 (Belknap 
Harvard, 1st ed. 1986). 
62 Lord Patrick Devlin, Judges and Lawmakers, 39 Mod. L. Rev., 1, 16 (1976). 
63 Gustavo Zagrebelsky, see note 26, at 631. See also article 489 of Lei No. 13.105, de 16 de março de 2015, 
DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 17.03.2015 (Braz.).  
64 See CAPPELLETTI, supra note 61, at 37. 
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II. THE MAINSTREAM VIEW OF BRAZILIAN LAW 
 
II.1. Short Explanation of Chapter Goals 
  
 In this chapter, I will offer a broad overview of the Brazilian legal system. I intend 
to describe and explain the basic answers that are commonly given to three philosophical 
questions about Brazilian law: (a) what is considered to be law in Brazil? (b) What is the 
role of rules and principles in Brazilian law? And, (c) is there a predominant criterion judges 
employ when adjudicating cases in Brazil? 
 In doing so, I will describe the country’s current legal practices. Although my 
purpose if to offer a descriptive-explanatory view, there may be situations in which I will be 
normatively providing my own opinions. These opinions may be criticized by readers who 
disagree with my understandings. The mere choice of citations and themes may be a point 
of divergence. I will try, inasmuch as I can, not to advance these normative views at this 
moment. This is the reason why I will use more quotes than usual. I would truly prefer to set 
a common ground of practices to better allow a truthful debate. I hope I will accomplish this 
task. 
 As previously noted, one of the goals of this thesis is to prove that inclusive legal 
positivism is the most appropriate theory to describe law and that the Brazilian legal system 
is an excellent example for this theory contenders. Therefore, throughout the chapter I will 
essentially describe cases, methods and techniques that employ moral reasoning. I will, 
therefore, anticipate how this moral reasoning enters the Brazilian legal discourse. 
 As the reader may note, I will show that the Brazilian discourse, being grounded in 
the civil law roots, acknowledges the role of enacted law as the main source of laws.  
Nevertheless, moral reasoning has always made its way in the country’s legal practices.  
 At last, even though my conclusions will be regarding the Brazilian legal practices, 
I will make reference to several authors that are not Brazilians, mostly from civil law 
countries, but whose works I believe meet and well explain the legal practices that are 
currently performed there. 
 
II.2. Introductory Notes 
 
 I will start this subchapter by providing the description of three controversial disputes 
that took place in Brazil in recent times. They all involve situations in which moral reasoning 
was employed to decide the outcomes. These cases will be helpful throughout the chapter 
because I intend to refer to their conclusions when answering the philosophical questions 
above specified.  
 
II.2.1. Nepotism 
 
The S.T.F. ruling of 2008 that held nepotism unconstitutional was very controversial. 
To argue the constitutionality of Resolution No. 7, of the Conselho Nacional de Justiça 
[C.N.J.], 65  enacted in 2005, which forbade the practice of nepotism—appointment of 
relatives to positions of confidence—within the Judiciary, the Associação dos Magistrados 
Brasileiros—A.M.B.—filed a declaratory action of constitutionality [A.D.C.], before the 
                                                          
65 The C.N.J. is the country’s top governmental council to regulate administrative affairs within the Judiciary 
branch.   
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S.T.F.66 Several entities—including associations of judges67—filed amicus curiae briefs 
requiring the Court either to uphold or to strike down the regulation.  
The Court of Appeals of the State of Rio de Janeiro [T.J.R.J.] was among those who 
sustained the unconstitutionality of the C.N.J. resolution and also filed an amicus curiae 
brief. 68  This shows that the matter was not apparently all clear; even judges showed 
disagreement as to whether nepotism was per se an unconstitutional practice or not within 
Brazilian law.69 The simple fact that the S.T.F. agreed to hear an abstract review action,70 
whose main purpose was to uphold the constitutionality of a norm, shows the controversy 
over the issue, since the existence of divergent decisions from different courts is a 
requirement for the admissibility of this action.71 
Although neither the C.F. nor any statute had ever expressly outlawed the practice of 
nepotism, the S.T.F., in both actions, ruled that the prohibition derived from the republican 
principles of morality, impersonality (neutrality), equality and efficiency, which are set forth 
in article 37 of the constitutional text.72  
There is no doubt that the members of the T.J.R.J. had also read these constitutional 
principles, but in their view these principles did not forbid nepotism. For A.M.B. members, 
on the other hand, the very same principles supported the prohibition and, hence, Resolution 
No. 7 was within C.N.J.’s powers and did not offend article 5, II, of the C.F., which sets 
forth that “no one shall be obligated to do or refrain from doing something except by virtue 
of law.”73  
                                                          
66 S.T.F, A.D.C. No. 12, Rel. Min. Carlos Britto, 20.08.2008, 1, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e.], 
17.12.2009, 1 (Braz.). The Declaratory Action of Constitutionality (A.D.C.) “is an instrument directed to 
declare constitutional any law or federal norm about which there is controversy or relevant doubt as to the 
interpretation of the Constitution.” In 
http://www2.stf.jus.br/portalStfInternacional/cms/verConteudo.php?sigla=portalStfSobreCorte_en_us&idCon
teudo=120647. 
67 The National Association of State Judges – ANAMAGES filed a brief sustaining the unconstitutionality, 
due to procedural violations. The Association of Labor Law Judges – ANAMATRA also petitioned before the 
Court but argued for the constitutionality. See A.D.C. 12, case files, p. 363-369. 
68 See A.D.C. 12, case files, p. 93-130. 
69 The Rio de Janeiro Court of Appeals, among other allegations, sustained that it is ingenuous the view that 
the “appointment of relatives for commission offices and trust positions violates the principles of impersonality 
and administrative morality, in spite of the good intentions of its supporters. This position undoubtedly reveals 
ingenuity, which is a product of an entirely distorted vision and of a pure demagogic posture, which comes 
pervaded of strong discriminatory weight. It may be said that it is a result of a simplistic view of the problem 
that it purposes to combat.” For the Court, “to consider immoral the appointment of a person to perform a 
function for which she is capable, because she fulfills all necessary requirements, specially the trust and 
efficiency requirements, solely because such person is a parent of her superior, is a demonstration of all human 
discredit, and, in special, on those that presented themselves to occupy relevant posts in the nation. […] It is 
the physiologism that must be condemned. The appointments of person that are evidently inapt and of the 
famous “ghosts” are the ones that must be object of the Administration’s moralizing action.” See A.D.C. 12, 
case files, p. 126-127. Only in the Rio de Janeiro Court of Appeals, 90 relatives of judges had to be dismissed 
due to the enactment of Resolution 7 of the CNJ. See TJ do Rio vai exonerar cerca de 90 parentes de juízes 
(Oct. 24, 2005, 7:23 PM), http://www.conjur.com.br/2005-out-24/tj_rio_exonerar_cerca_90_parentes_juizes. 
70 See infra text accompanying note 368. 
71 See supra note 66. 
72 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 37 (Braz.). 
73 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5, II (Braz.). AMB arguments were very strong: (i) 
most of Brazilian Courts had declared that they would enforce the Resolution; (ii) the creation of the C.N.J. by 
a constitutional amendment had recently been upheld by the Supreme Court and, hence, did not represent an 
interference with the Judiciary Branch powers of self-governance; (iii) within the powers given by the C.F. to 
the C.N.J. was the authority to enforce the Constitution’s Article 37 principles, in which impersonality and 
morality are established. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 103-B (Braz.). 
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On the very same day this decision was rendered, the S.T.F. also banned nepotism in 
the Executive Branch. Despite the fact that Resolution No. 7 only applied to the Judiciary, 
the Court unanimously concluded that no statute banning the practice was required to rule 
nepotism illegal, because the prohibition derived directly from the constitutional principles 
of morality and impersonality (neutrality).74  
The mayor of Agua Nova, a city in the northeastern State of Rio Grande do Norte, 
who had appointed his vice-mayor’s brother to be a municipal driver and, for this reason, 
was sued, may have read the same constitutional principles in article 37. He most probably 
disagreed with the conclusion that these principles ruled out the appointments of family 
members for the city government. His legal counselors may have advised him that the 
enactment of a statute law was necessary to ban the practice and this prohibition, in their 
understanding, could not be simply inferred from the constitutional principles of morality 
and impersonality. He could have been aware that even judges thought the practice was 
permitted—since apparently not formally forbidden—and appointed their own relatives for 
Court similar positions. In this case, can these claims be considered a plausible or a truthful 
reading of the C.F. text, independently of their beliefs or personal desires? If not, should the 
Agua Nova mayor be punished for having committed an administrative improbity act 
because he made this unconstitutional (immoral) appointment? These questions will be 
answered in chapter V. 
 
II.2.2. Cruelty Against Animals 
 
The S.T.F. Justices also disagreed on the meaning of the constitutional text when 
they, by 6 to 5, held unconstitutional a statute from the State of Ceara that permitted the 
practice of the vaquejada. “The vaquejada is a type of sport typical to the Northeastern 
region of Brazil, in which two cowboys ("vaqueiros") on horseback pursue a bull, seeking 
to pin it between the two horses and direct it to a goal (often consisting of chalk marks), 
where the animal is then knocked over.”75 Article 225, paragraph first, item VII, of the C.F. 
establishes that “it is incumbent upon the Government to protect the fauna and the flora, with 
prohibition, in the manner set forth by law, of all practices which represent a risk to their 
ecological function, cause the extinction of species or subject animals to cruelty.”76 The 
majority concluded that the vaquejada violated this article since it subjects animals to cruelty 
and represents “an intolerable human practice.”77  
 Yet, the five minority Justices reasoned that, although the vaquejada hurts the ox tail 
and hooves, and may even hurt its bone marrow, it is a cultural practice and a festive activity, 
which is carried out in obedience to regulations and techniques since the 19th Century78 and 
cultural practices are protected by the C.F..79 The professional vaqueiros are the only ones 
                                                          
74 S.T.F., R.E. No. 579.951/RN, Relator: Min. Ricardo Lewandowski, 20.08.2008, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA 
[D.J], 18.12.2009 (Braz.).  
75  S.T.F., A.D.I. no. 4.983/CE, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, 06.08.2016, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO 
ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e], 27.4.2017, (Braz.). 
76 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 225, § 1º, VII, (Braz.). 
77  S.T.F., STF julga inconstitucional lei cearense que regulamenta vaquejada, 
http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=326838 
78 S.T.F., A.D.I. No. 4.983/CE, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, 6.8.2016, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO 
[D.J.e], 27.4.2017, (Braz.). (Justice Dias Toffoli vote cited Euclides da Cunha who, in the famous Brazilian 
book “Os Sertões”, confirmed that the vaquejada “was a method incorporated to the activities of the vaqueiro, 
of the horseback rider, since the 19th Century.” 
79 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 215, § 1º (Braz.) (asserting that “[t]he National 
Government shall protect expressions of popular, indigenous and Afro-Brazilian cultures and those of other 
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allowed to practice the vaquejada. The minority mentioned that the vaquejada has brought 
social and economic prosperity in the poorest region of Brazil, the Northeast, since it 
employs around 720.000 persons, directly and indirectly, and generate revenues of US$ 150 
million a year.80  
 Of course, all Justices are aware of the text of article 225 of the C.F.. Their 
disagreement rested on what the provision actually means, since its wording is not 
conclusive to say as to whether or not it bans the vaquejada. The C.F., indeed, forbids 
practices that subject animals to cruelty. However, article 225 expressly states that a statute 
law should regulate the subject. Does that mean that the enacted statute may tolerate cruelty 
in some cases? If so, does the Judiciary have to defer to any legislative choice? The Ceara 
statute was enacted with this purpose. Also, the Constitution protects the performance of 
historical and cultural practices. 
 Nevertheless, the S.T.F. ruled that the practice was cruel. The Court, in weighing the 
cruelty of the vaquejada against the benefits of the cultural practice, decided that the cruelty 
against the animals came first and stroke down the statute. This balance test may also have 
been done by the State of Ceara legislators when they enacted the statute that authorized the 
practice, but they had reached a different conclusion. After this ruling, the National Congress 
passed a Constitutional Amendment with the purpose of reversing the S.T.F.’s decision and 
allowing the vaquejada.81 Following, the Chief Prosecutor of Brazil filed a new abstract 
action before the S.T.F. with the purpose of declaring the constitutional amendment 
unconstitutional. The argument is that the constitutional amendment offends the entrenched 
clauses that establishes that amendments aimed to abolish individual rights and separation 
of powers shall not be considered.82 The right of an ecological balanced environment is 
considered to be a social right in Brazil and the proponents argue that it should also be 
understood as an individual right. This new case has not yet been decided.83  
 
II.2.3. Party Loyalty 
 
 A third example of a controversial case took place when the Brazilian Social 
Democracy Party—P.S.D.B. filed a writ of mandamus before the S.T.F., grounded on an 
abstract decision issued by the Superior Electoral Court [T.S.E.]. The electoral court, 
construing the principles of democracy, party pluralism and proportional representation, had 
asserted the duty of politicians to be loyal to the parties they were affiliated to when elected. 
The party also sought to regain the seats that it had lost when former members, elected to 
                                                          
participant groups in the process of national civilization.”) Translated by Keith Rosenn, Constituteproject.org 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2014.pdf. 
80  Isabel Vilar, Legalização das Vaquejadas divide opiniões, (Nov. 1, 2016, 7:52 PM), 
http://www12.senado.leg.br/noticias/materias/2016/11/01/legalizacao-das-vaquejadas-divide-opinioes. 
81 The new text of art. 225, § 7°, of the C.F., which was inserted by Constitutional Amendment No. 96, 
states that: “For the ends of the final part of item VII of § 1° of this article, sports practices that use animals are 
not considered cruel, as long as they represent cultural manifestations, in conformity with § 1° of art. 215 of 
this Federal Constitution, and they are registered as goods of immaterial nature that take part of the Brazilian 
cultural heritage and shall be regulated by a specific statute that assures the well-being of the animals.” 
CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 225, § 7º, (Braz.). 
82 Article 60, §4°, of the C.F. says that “[n]o proposed constitutional amendment shall be considered that is 
aimed at abolishing the following: I. the federalist form of the National Government; II. direct, secret, universal 
and periodic suffrage; III. separation of powers; IV. individual rights and guarantees. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL 
[C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 60, § 4º, I-IV (Braz.). Translated by Keith Rosenn, Constituteproject.org 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2014.pdf. 
83 S.T.F., A.D.I. no. 5.772/DF, Relator: Min. Roberto Barroso, (filed Sept. 12, 2017). 
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Congress, switched to different political parties. Other opposition parties—the Partido 
Popular Socialista and the Democratas—filed similar actions.  
 The S.T.F. upheld the T.S.E. decision and confirmed the understanding that a 
member of the Local or State legislatives or of the Federal Chamber of Deputies cannot 
change her political party affiliation during her term, apart from exceptional situations.84 If 
she so proceeds, she shall lose her seat in the house. This opinion, rendered in 2007, 
consolidated the rule that, except for the seats and offices earned in majority elections,85 the 
parliamentary seat belongs to the party, not to the elected member.86 At the time, Brazil had 
more than 20 political parties and party switching was a very common practice.87 This 
decision represented an overruling in the case law regarding the matter. In a previous case, 
decided in 1989, the Court ruled that the Constitution did not impose party loyalty to 
Deputies.88 
 The Court took this step because it understood that the “demand for political loyalty 
represents and reflects a constitutional value of high political and juridical meaning, which 
compliance […] represents an expression of respect both to voters and to the parties, by 
                                                          
84 As an explanatory note, the Brazilian system of representation in the Federal Chamber of Deputies and 
in State and Municipal Assemblies is ‘proportional’ and not ‘district vote’. Therefore, candidates are awarded 
votes by the whole state or municipal population. Such candidates are compelled to be affiliated to a political 
party. Independent candidacies, up to this moment, are still not allowed in the country. The parties may form 
electoral coalitions with other parties. Voters cast votes to candidates but also to the parties and, indirectly, to 
the party coalition. The parties and the coalitions are awarded seats in conformity with the number of votes they 
receive, and the elected candidates are the ones that have the greater number of votes within such party or 
coalition. 
85 Elections to the President, Governor and Mayor’s offices and to the Senate are considered majority 
elections.  
86 S.T.F., MS No. 26.603-1/DF, Relator: Min. Celso de Mello, 03.10.2007, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA ELETRÔNICO 
[D.J.e.], 17.12.2009, 318 (Braz.). Justice Celso de Mello, in his opinion, stated: “[…] PARTY UNLOYALTY 
AS A GESTURE OF DISRESPECT FOR THE DEMOCRATIC POSTULATE. – The demand for party loyalty 
expresses and reflects a constitutional value impregnated of high political-legal meaning, which compliance, 
by the elected office holders, represents an expression of respect to the voters that elected them (popular bond), 
inasmuch as to the political parties that permitted their candidacies (political party bond). – The infidelity act, 
being such unloyalty to the party or to the citizen-voter, is a serious ethical-political deviation, and also 
represents inadmissible outrage to the democratic principles and to the lawful exercise of power, in the sense 
that unexpected party switching, not always motivated by fair reasons, do not only surprise the very own 
electoral body and the parties – undermining the representativeness that they conquer in elections -, but also 
gives room for an arbitrary disequilibrium of forces in Congress, resulting, even, to cause a clear fraud to the 
popular will and a frontal violation to the proportional electoral system, which suffocates, as a consequence of 
the number of representatives, the full exercise of political opposition. The practice of party unloyalty, 
performed by congressional seat holders, for violating the proportional system, mutilates the rights of social 
minorities, depriving them of representativeness in their legislative bodies, and offend their essential rights – 
notably the right of opposition – which derive from the foundations that give legitimizing support to own Legal 
Democratic State, such as popular sovereign, citizenship and political pluralism (C.F., art. 1°, I, II e V). – The 
jurisdictional repulse to the party unloyalty, besides honoring an eminently constitutional value (C.F., art. 17, 
§ 1º, "in fine"), (a) preserves the legitimacy of the electoral process, (b) provides respect to the citizen’s 
sovereign will, (c) prevents the deformation of the popular representation model, (d) complies with the purpose 
of the proportional electoral system, (e) enriches and strengthens the party organizations, and (f) gives 
precedence to the elected representative’s fidelity which shall by him be obey in relation to the electoral body 
and to the party by which he ran the election. […]” Translation mine.  
87 In the 2003-2006 legislature, up to September 2006, out of 513 Federal Deputies, 193 had changed their 
political party affiliation. See Contas Abertas, Ameaça à democracia: 193 deputados mudaram de partido desde 
2003 (Sep. 8, 2006), http://www.contasabertas.com.br/website/arquivos/3288.  
88  See S.T.F., M.S. No. 20.927, Rel. Min. Moreira Alves, 11.10.1989, 1, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA [D.J.], 
15.04.1994, 130 (Braz.). 
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which they were elected.”89 According to the opinion, “the unloyalty act […] represents a 
serious political-ethical deviation, and also an inadmissible violation of the democratic 
principle and of the lawful exercise of power, because unexpected switch from/to political 
parties […] surprises voters and parties and takes away the party representativeness earned 
in the election.”90 The Court also stated that the practice jeopardizes the “full exercise of 
political opposition,”91 due to the depletion of the party’s representation in the Chamber of 
Deputies. 
 It is hard to say that all members of Congress—aware of the constitutional text that 
establishes that Brazil is a democratic country—share the same understanding of the new 
S.T.F.’s ruling regarding political party loyalty. To many of them, switching political parties 
was not an illegal practice, as it was not expressly forbidden by the Constitution nor 
challenged democracy. They probably agreed with the view stated in the 1989 S.T.F.’s 
precedent, and that is why some had switched party affiliation. However, to the S.T.F., the 
practice offended the democratic principle entrusted in the Constitution. Switching parties, 
therefore, was declared an unconstitutional practice and might result in the loss of the 
parliamentary seat. Congress has accepted the decision and did not take any step to reverse 
it through constitutional amendment.  
 Nevertheless, most Chamber of Deputies’ members that had changed party affiliation 
before this decision did not lose their seat. The S.T.F. decided to establish that the new 
interpretation would only apply to those who had switched after March 27, 2007, because 
this was the date that the T.S.E. decided the first case which asserted the need for party 
loyalty in disagreement with the previous S.T.F. precedent.92 This basically means that only 
representatives that changed their party after the first T.S.E. ruling could lose their seat.  
 
II.3. Notes on the Dominant View about the Brazilian Legal Sources 
 
 In this subchapter, I will essentially cover what criteria Brazilians employ to ascertain 
that a rule is law or is not law in Brazil and these criteria are adopted—the origins of it. I 
will show that the dominant legal discourse generally depicts Brazilian law as being a 
product of social facts. Following, I will point out that this comprehension of factual sources 
of law is a result of the country’s civil law tradition.  
 
II.3.1. Written Law as the Major Source of Rights and Duties 
 
 All cases referred in the previous subchapter are similar in at least two respects. First, 
they all dealt with matters that raised disagreement among legal scholars, politicians and 
judges regarding the meaning of Brazilian law. Second, the justifications of the decisions, 
although not founded in rules that provided unequivocal instructions, were supposedly based 
on specific dispositions of Brazilian enacted law. For the S.T.F., nepotism is unconstitutional 
due to article 37 of the constitutional text, which states that the Government shall obey the 
principles of lawfulness, impersonality (neutrality) and morality. The prohibition of the 
vaquejada was grounded on article 225, Item VII, of the C.F., which bans practices that 
subject animals to cruelty, in the form defined in a statute. And the democratic principle, 
                                                          
89 S.T.F., M.S. No. 26.603, Relator: Min. Celso de Mello, 03.10.2007, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO 
[D.J.e.], 17.12.2009, 326 (Braz.). 
90 Id.  
91 Id. 
92 Id.  
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which is mentioned in article 1 of the C.F., was the main reason for the S.T.F. to disallow 
the loose hopping of political parties among Chamber of Deputies members.  
 Indeed, it is common in Brazil to read passages like the following written by 
Alexandre de Moraes, a S.T.F. member: “[o]nly through statutes duly enacted, it is possible 
to create obligations to the individual, because they are the expression of the general will.”93 
Moraes adds that “[w]ith the rule of [enacted] law, the privilege of the power holder’s 
capricious will ceases on behalf of the law, guaranteeing the citizen the possibility to 
confront state coercion that is not imposed by legislative due process.”94 
 José Afonso da Silva argues that: 
 
“[t]he principle of legality is an essential note of the rule of 
law. It is, also, therefore, a basic principle of the Legal 
Democratic State, […] because it is of the essence of its 
concept to subject the government to the Constitution and 
ground it in democratic legality. […] All its activity remains 
subject to the law, understood as an expression of the general 
will, which only materializes in a regime of powers divided 
among branches in which the law is the act created by the 
popular representatives, through the legislative process 
established in the Constitution. It is in this sense that one may 
understand the statement that the government, or the public 
power, or the administrators cannot demand any action, nor 
impose any abstention, nor also ban any citizens’ conduct, 
except due to the virtue of law.”95  
  
 Manuel Gonçalves Ferreira Filho lectures that “[the] principle—no one shall be 
obliged to do or refrain from doing except by virtue of law—intends to oppose the arbitrary 
power and is linked to the concept of law written in the French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen of 1789. Only [enacted] law may create an obligation for the 
individual because it is the general expression of the general will. Expression of the general 
will by its body, the Parliament. Expression of the general will that governs everyone in 
democracy.” 96 
 These comments, as seen, are usually made when explaining the content of article 5, 
II, of the C.F., which sets forth that “no one shall be obliged to do or refrain from doing 
except by virtue of law.”97 They are also referred to when discussing article 5, XXXIX, of 
the C.F., which establishes that  “there are no crimes unless defined in prior law, nor are 
there any penalties unless previously imposed by law.”98 The word “law” in these provisions 
should be understood as meaning “enacted law,” since, in the cited authors’ views, state 
                                                          
93 ALEXANDRE DE MORAES, CONSTITUIÇÃO DO BRASIL INTERPRETADA, 197 (Jurídico Atlas, 2nd ed. 2003). 
Translation mine.  
94 Id.  
95 JOSÉ AFONSO DA SILVA, CURSO DE DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL POSITIVO, 420 (Malheiros, 24th ed. 2005). 
Translation mine. 
96 MANOEL GONÇALVES FERREIRA FILHO, CURSO DE DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL, 244 (Saraiva, 23th ed. 
1996). Ferreira Filho also observes that “[t]he principle of legality in which law is solely the act approved by 
Parliament, representing the people, expresses democracy, in the sense that it subjects the individual behavior 
only and solely to the will manifested by the popular representation bodies.” Id. Translation mine.  
97 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5, II (Braz.) (trans. Brazilian Federal Senate). 
98 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5, XXXIX (Braz.) Translated by Keith Rosenn, 
Constituteproject.org https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2014.pdf. 
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coercion is only justified by norms approved by the legislative process. For all of those 
authors, therefore, solely through the enactment of a written law, which expresses the general 
will, the Government can create an obligation for the individual in Brazil. 
 There are some opinions from the S.T.F. that sustain this comprehension. According 
to the Court, “[t]he principle of [enacted] law reservation operates as an expressive 
constitutional limitation to the government power, whose regulatory authority, for that 
reason, is not sufficiently legally trustworthy to constrain rights or to create obligations. No 
regulation may impose obligations or restrict rights, because it would trespass a 
constitutional area which is substantially reserved for formal enacted law.”99 
 In these opinions, the Court explicitly acknowledged the role of statute law as the 
only mean of creating law admitted in the country. Regulations are understood to simply 
specify obligations which are created by Congress through enacted laws. Agencies have no 
lawmaking power, at least formally speaking. Judges supposedly decide cases solely 
applying written law commands.  
 In a case ruled by the State of Sao Paulo Court of Appeals,100 this Court stated that 
the “image of the ‘judge makes law’ is incompatible with the tri-division of Powers, because 
it results in the practice of arbitrary acts by the Judiciary, with the overstepping into the 
legislative sphere, other branch’s attribution […].”101 The decision ends by asking “where 
will the certainty of law go to if every judge becomes a legislator?”102 
 Regarding the C.F., the mainstream view among Brazilian courts and scholars is that, 
during the 20th Century, a great change took place in the way we should understand it. 
Constitutional norms gained the status of enforceable norms. Their observance became 
imperative. If not obeyed, constitutional norms can prompt government coercion.103 The last 
century European model, in which the constitutions were seen as an essentially political 
document, a mere invitation to the political powers to act, has been superseded. This new 
view argues that there is normative force in the constitutional text.104 All opinions that were 
referred to in the introduction of this section conferred meaning to written constitutional 
provisions to decide the cases. 
                                                          
99  S.T.F., Q.O. no AgR. na A.C. No. 1033, Relator: Min. Celso de Mello, 03.10.2007, DIÁRIO DO 
JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e.], 17.12.2009, 318 (Braz.). Likewise, the following passage of another S.T.F. 
ruling: “The constitutional principle of formal law reservation reflects a limitation to the exercise of State 
administrative and jurisdictional activities. The law reservation—examined under such perspective—
constitutes a postulate endowed of exclusionary function, of negative character, because it prohibits, in matters 
which are subjected to such principle, any normative interventions of non-legislative public entities at a primary 
level. This constitutional clause, therefore, projects itself in a positive dimension, due to the fact that its 
incidence reinforces such principle, which, founded on the authority of the Constitution, imposes the necessary 
submission of the administration and of the jurisdiction to the commands exclusively enacted by the legislator. 
S.T.F., A.D.I. No. 2.075 MC, Relator: Min. Celso de Mello, j. 07.02.2001, Diário da Justiça [D.J.], 27.26.2003, 
238 (Braz.). 
100 Such case was cited in a famous casebook that is popular among lawyers. See NERY JÚNIOR, NELSON; 
NERY, ROSA MARIA DE ANDRADE. CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL COMENTADO E LEGISLAÇÃO EXTRAVAGANTE. 
9. ed. rev., atual. e ampl. São Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunais, 2006, p. 476. 
101 RT 604/43.  
102 Id.  
103 BARROSO, supra note 27, at 193 (Editora Fórum, 1st ed, 2014). Translation mine. 
104 The classic book about the matter, which became famous in Brazil, is “The Normative Force of the 
Constitution” (Die normative Kraft der Verfassung) written by the former judge of the Supreme Administrative 
Court of Germany. See KONRAD HESSE, A FORÇA NORMATIVA DA CONSTITUIÇÃO, (Sergio Antonio Fabris 
Editor, 1st, 1991). For information regarding this view in Spanish Law see ENRIQUE ÁLVARES CONDE, CURSO 
DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL VOL. I, 137 (Tecnos, 5th ed, 2005).  
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 Legality, in this sense, is understood by the mainstream view of the Brazilian legal 
system as the necessity of enacted legislation, both constitutional and/or ordinary, to justify 
coercion. This traditional view, although questioned nowadays,105 is still prevalent. 
 
II.3.2. Civil Law Roots 
 
 This way of describing the basis of Brazilian law is typical of countries that have 
their roots in the civil law system. As Joseph Daniow points out, legislation is the main 
source or basis of the law in civil law jurisdictions. That is the reason why some have argued 
that “the function of a civil law court is to merely apply the written law.”106 
  Gustavo Zagrebelsky, who served in the Italian Constitutional Court, talking about 
his country, states that “the concept of law as a collection of norms of behavior exclusively 
proposed by the legislator (both constitutional and ordinary) is still prevalent among legal 
academics, judges and lawyers.”107  
 The French author René David mentions that in his country, “[f]ormally, only loi 
[written law] is accredited as a source of French positive law. This emphasis is particularly 
strong in criminal law where the adage, ‘[n]ullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege’ expresses 
the general requirement that only a statute can define crime and penalty. But the spirit of 
statutory reference also pervades the entire body of the private law.”108 
 Nino adds that “the adhesion to legislation as a primary source of law in the exegesis 
[school]109 had constituted a rational acceptance, grounded on the coincidence of the new 
codes with the formal and axiological ideals of the systems advocated by the juridical 
philosophers.”110 A phrase attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte states that “public morals are 
natural complements of all laws; they are by themselves an entire code.”111 Nino, however, 
adds that “contrariwise, in the current juridical science, [the adhesion to legislation] is a 
dogmatic devotion based on the fact that norms have been sanctioned by certain state bodies 
endowed with general efficacy, not in the evaluative acceptance of the juridical norms’ 
content or its logical qualities.”112  
                                                          
105 For example, it is worth citing a speech given by Sergio Cavalieri Filho, a former President of the Court 
of Appeals of the State of Rio de Janeiro, in his presidential swearing in ceremony: “IV – The Sources of 
Justice. Everyone acknowledges that the Judiciary branch is the “Guardian of the Constitution” and of the laws. 
Few understand, however, this mission’s extent. In reality, it is much wider than most of people notice, because 
the Judiciary is the guardian of Justice itself, which sources, that should be preserved, go beyond the 
Constitution and the laws; they reach ethical, moral and spiritual values, which govern society. This is why the 
modern Judiciary is not limited to only apply blindly and mechanically the laws to concrete cases, it is not just 
the mouth of the law anymore, as the orthodox positivists used to proclaim. Its mission is much wider in the 
sense that it has to interpret and adjust laws to the real necessities of the society. […] That is why some people 
say that the judge is the co-author with the legislator.” Sergio Cavalieri Filho, Speech made at his swearing in 
ceremony as President of the Rio de Janeiro Court of Appeals (Feb. 1, 2005).  
106 Joseph Dainow, The Civil Law and The Common Law: Some Points of Comparison, 15 Am. J. Comp. L. 
419, 424, 426 (1966-1967). 
107 Zagrebelsky, supra note 26, at 622. 
108 RENE DAVID & HENRY P. DE VRIES, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL LAW 
SYSTEMS, 86 (Oceana Publications, 1958). 
109 According to Carlos Santiago Nino, the exegesis school is known for “considering legislation the sole 
legitimate source of law and the only valid recourse to interpret the law is given by the legislator’s intent.” 
CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, INTRODUÇÃO À ANÁLISE DO DIREITO 383 (Martins Fontes, 2010). Translation mine. 
This school is considered surpassed. 
110 Id.  
111 NEIL BOYD, CANADIAN LAW 3 (Nelson Education, 4th, 2007). 
112 Id. at 383. 
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 This comprehension of legality in a formal way, as anticipated by Nino, incorporates 
the traditional notion that enacted law fulfills general requirements of generality, equality of 
application and certainty, and respects the separation of powers.113  
 Hardly anyone denies the need for the enacted law to be interpreted. But there is still 
a widespread notion that interpretation is a “logical operation, of technical character, through 
which one investigates the exact meaning of a juridical norm, not always clear or precise.”114 
 Regarding this notion, Gustavo Zagrebelsky mentions that, in Italy, “[it is still] 
dominant […] the idea of adjudication as a logical-deductive operation consisting in the 
objective application of the law to a particular case in point, by way of a normative and 
legalistic syllogism and without any need to look beyond the four corners of the law.”115  He 
also points out that “[t]he practical impossibility of decision making exclusively inferred 
from the law does not shake this conviction, though it does induce resentment against the 
legislator and criticism of [flaws] in legislation. Rationalist aspiration to mechanistic 
jurisprudence stands firmly in place, as the product of a need of certainty.”116  
 In Brazil, even well-known judges and scholars that argue for a constructive 
interpretation of legal texts—especially of the constitutional text—, such as the S.T.F. 
Justice Luís Roberto Barroso, claim that the traditional logical-deductive operation notion is 
still important for the resolution of easy cases: 
 
“The traditional constitutional interpretation relies on a model 
of rules, applicable by subsumption, in which it is up to the 
interpreter to reveal the meaning of the norms and apply them 
in the case under analysis. The judgments he makes are of fact, 
not of value. For this reason, there is no creativity, but merely 
a technical activity. This conventional perspective is still of 
great importance for the resolution of a great part of legal 
problems, but it is not always sufficient to deal with 
constitutional questions, notably in situations of fundamental 
rights collisions.”117 
 
 However, even for hard cases, in which, pursuant to Barroso’s view, the logical-
deductive operation would not be applied, the grounds for decision are found in 
constitutional principles. In his opinion, “these principles have a minimal meaning and 
range, an essential core, to which they are similar to rules. From a certain point, nonetheless, 
the interpreter enters into a realm of indeterminacy, in which its content definition will be 
subject to the interpreter’s ideological or philosophical conception.”118 
 According to Barroso’s quote, even when the interpreter enters into a realm of 
indeterminacy to define the content of the principle, he is still trying to provide the meaning 
for a principle which has a social source, a known pedigree: the Brazilian Constitution. He 
will not acknowledge law creation, but mere application of the text.119 
                                                          
113 See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW, 119 (New York, Cambridge, 2004). 
114 PAULO BONAVIDES, CURSO DE DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL, 437 (Malheiros, 22th ed., 2008).  
115 Zagrebelsky, supra note 26.  
116 Id. at 623. 
117 BARROSO, supra note 27, at 153. 
118 Id. at 151. 
119 The same opinion is shared by Paulo Pereira de Souza, former Dean of the State University of Maringa, 
in the South of Brazil. According to Pereira de Souza even though the new constitutionalism inaugurated with 
the 1988 Constitution represents the beginning of a new era of comprehension of law in Brazil, Brazilian judges 
are still too tied to the enacted law: “In Brazil after 1988 we approved a new constitution and a new phase was 
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 Even for the S.T.F. to hear a case, the party generally must specify which particular 
constitutional article was not observed. This is a constitutional requirement for extraordinary 
appeal cases, in which the Court incidentally reviews a lower court ruling on constitutional 
interpretation and an implicit requirement for abstract cases directly heard, in which the 
S.T.F. has original jurisdiction to examine the constitutionality of federal and state statute 
laws.120  If the party seeking the case review argues that an implied principle has been 
violated, she commonly informs which precise constitutional provision gives ground to this 
implied principle, at least rhetorically.121 
 Based on these comments, although I have not yet analyzed the role of principles in 
Brazilian law, it is not too soon to state that the Brazilian legal classic discourse, grounded 
on the civil law tradition, incorporates a social fact view of the source of rights and 
obligations and, therefore, of the law. According to this traditional view, the social fact that 
distinguishes law from non-law is the enactment of legislation, either constitutional or 
statutory. As per article 5, item II, of the C.F., the citizen may only be coerced by the public 
forces to act in a certain way if the government enacts a statute with this determination. 
Coercion will always be justified by means of interpreting enacted rules and principles. 
Precedents usually have a mere persuasive role, 122  but generally there is no 
acknowledgement of law creation. This view basically reflects an idea of legislative 
                                                          
inaugurated in the history of our law. This constitutionalism, and especially the process of law in Brazil, 
incorporates as fundamental a right and a guarantee to access, not only to justice, but to a just and fair judicial 
order. This protects not only the guarantee to access from the point of view of the insufficiently provided for, 
the poorer populations, which require free access to law, but it allows an adaptation of the judicial system to 
the social, political, and economic reality of the country. The implementation of this new vision of access to 
justice is based on giving more power to the judges, which rejects a dogmatic and positivist vision of the law. 
This new vision has made its mark during the last few decades and sees processes in a more effective, agile, 
and fairer type of law. This type of vision is very difficult to implement in Brazil in view of the judicial system 
adopted, which is the European civil law system, a heritage left by our Portuguese colonizers. Contrary to the 
system of common law, where the freedom of the judge is much higher, the Brazilian judge is too tied to the 
law, or as Montesquieu said, the judge is ‘the mouth of the law.’” Souza, supra note 24, at 156. 
120 For information regarding the types of appeals and actions heard by the Brazilian Supreme Court, see 
http://www2.stf.jus.br/portalStfInternacional/cms/verConteudo.php?sigla=portalStfSobreCorte_en_us&idCon
teudo=120199.  
121 See, e.g., S.T.F., AgR-R.E. No. 200.844, Relator: Min. Celso de Mello, j. 25.06.2002, Diário da Justiça 
[D.J.], 16.8.2002, 234 (Braz.). 
122 There are exceptions to this affirmation in the Brazilian system. When a case is decided in an abstract 
review proceeding, the Constitution expressly states that the decision has binding effect. See CONSTITUIÇÃO 
FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 102, par. 2º, VII, (Braz.). “Final decisions on merits, pronounced by the 
Supreme Federal Court, in direct actions of unconstitutionality and declaratory actions of constitutionality shall 
have force against all, as well as a binding effect, as regards the other bodies of the Judicial Power and the 
governmental entities and entities owned by the Federal Government, in the federal, state, and local levels” 
(Official Translation from the Brazilian Senate). Also, according to Article 103-A of the C.F., [t]he Federal 
Supreme Court may, ex-officio or upon request, upon decision of two thirds of its members, and following 
reiterated judicial decisions on constitutional matter, issue a summula (restatement of case law) which, as from 
publication in the official press, shall have a binding effect upon the lower bodies of the Judicial Power and the 
direct and indirect public administration, in the federal, state, and local levels, and which may also be reviewed 
or revoked, as set forth in law.” See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 103-A (Braz.) 
(Official Translation from the Brazilian Senate). In addition, with the enactment the new Civil Procedure Code 
in 2015, a new rule (Article 926) has been established obliging judges to uniformize their decisions, keeping it 
stable, consistent and coherent. Some authors have argued that this new rule confer binding effects to some 
precedents. See Lenio Luiz Streck, Jurisdição, fundamentação e dever de coerência e integridade no novo 
CPC, CONSULTOR JURÍDICO (Apr. 23, 2016, 08:00 AM), https://www.conjur.com.br/2016-abr-23/observatorio-
constitucional-jurisdicao-fundamentacao-dever-coerencia-integridade-cpc. 
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positivism123 to describe the sources of rights and duties in a legal system and of juridical 
mechanicism, which presupposes that the law system offers solutions for any conceivable 
case.124 
 
II.4. Civil Law Systems: Theory and Reality   
 
 In this subchapter, I will cover the problems of the written law criterion for legality 
and how it is introduced by judges through practices that allow non-legal reasons, especially 
moral reasons, enter into the legal discourse. As one may note, moral reasons always took 
part of the civil law, but the manner these values played a role changed considerably. The 
subchapter will show that moral arguments have always entered the scene due to the need of 
interpreting the more general terms that are commonly employed in civil law statutes, 
especially if compared to statutes enacted in common law countries. In addition, the civil 
law judge has also accepted some specific dogmatic characteristics in law identification and 
application that have allowed him to update and reformulate the law, proposing certainty to 
its vague terms, filling its gaps, solving its incoherencies and adjusting its norms to 
determined axiological ideals. These dogmatic properties open the door to moral reasoning. 
 As seen, the written law, in a general sense, is still the major source of law in civil 
law systems. This means that in these countries, when examining a legal question, jurists 
consider primarily legislative and regulatory sources, trying to discover, by the application 
of different methods of interpretation, the solution which in each case corresponds to the 
intention of the legislators.125 In using the written law as their major source, courts in civil 
law systems are adhering to their tradition. 
 When referring to the techniques and policies of precedents in the civil law tradition, 
René David observes that courts and jurists of the civil law family are not comfortable unless 
they can invoke provisions of enacted law to justify or support the legal solution they chose 
to apply.126 “It may sometimes even be necessary to demonstrate that a legislative provision 
has been violated for the court to be seized at all or for there to be recourse to a higher 
court.”127 David adds that this attitude may pass the impression that the law and the written 
texts are still considered to be one and the same in the civil law countries.128 
 Mauro Cappelletti, when addressing the distinctions between the judicial career in 
civil and common law jurisdictions, argues that judges in the civil law world are sworn in 
very young, after passing high competitive exams, and generally do it without much practical 
experience. Their legal education usually focuses on how to manage the technical tools, 
instead of adopting value and policy-oriented solutions. So, civil law judges usually do not 
like to bring attention to any law creation. Their decisions tend to appear as a mere technical, 
almost mechanical, application of the law.129  
                                                          
123  JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION, 24 (Stanford 
University Press, 3rd. 2007). According to Merryman, legislative positivism is the concept that "only statutes 
enacted by the legislative power could be law." The author adds that "the accepted theory of sources of law in 
the civil law tradition recognizes only statutes, regulations, and customs [customary law] as sources of law." 
Therefore, the judge “cannot turn to… prior judicial decisions for the law.” See Raj Bhala, The Myth about 
Stare Decisis and International TradeLaw (Part One of a Trilogy), 14 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 845, 907, (1999). 
See note 177. Also, see NINO, supra note 109, at 41. 
124 Id. 
125 RENÉ DAVID & JOHN E. C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY, 94 (Stevens & 
Sons, 2nd, 1978).  
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 97. 
128 Id. 
129 See MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JUÍZES LEGISLADORES? 120, 121 (Sergio Antonio Fabris Editor, 1993) 
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 The following paragraph, which is part of a S.T.F. opinion written by Justice Marco 
Aurélio Mello may confirm this view of the importance of posited norm to the civil law 
judge: 
 
“[…] since the first days of my legal career, I have understood 
that the judge, when facing a case, should idealize the fairest 
solution to the controversy, using, in this first stage, only his 
humanistic background. Following, hence, with great respect 
to legal certainty, he examines the legal precepts that are 
pertinent to the situation. If he concludes for the harmony 
between the fairest result and the posited juridical order, he 
applies it, in which case, he will materialize justice in its widest 
conception. If he does not find support in the dogmatic, he will 
disregard the solution that seems the fairest one to him and will 
decide in compliance with the statute’s will.”130 
 
 Hence, according to Mello, even if the judge identifies a fairer solution for the case, 
according to his intuition or hunch,131 if this solution is not supported by the posited juridical 
order, he cannot adjudicate the case in that direction. 
 But how do judges consider that enacted law is the major source for solving most of 
the cases, given the unclarity of the text and the circumstance of profound political 
disagreement? Is this rationally possible? This question will be answered in the following 
subsections. Firstly, I will examine the civil law legislation style and some problems that 
emerge from its drafting practices. Secondly, I will show the techniques that judges employ 
to make this convention possible. 
 
II.4.1. Civil Law Legislation Style  
 
 The legislation style differs in civil law and in common law countries. William 
Burnham notes that “[c]ommon law judges see statutes as containing specific rules of law 
that will be applied fairly according to their terms, but not beyond. […] Any judicial effort 
                                                          
130  S.T.F., R.E. No. 140265, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, j. 20.10.1992, Diário da Justiça [D.J.], 
28.05.1993, (Braz.); S.T.F., AgR-R.E. No. 200.844, Relator: Min. Celso de Mello, j. 25.06.2002, Diário da 
Justiça [D.J.], 16.08.2002, 234 (Braz.). 
131See Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decisions, 
14 Corn LQ 274 (1928) (taking the position that general propositions of law do not decide concrete cases. This 
decision will depend on a judgment or intuition subtler than any articulate major premise). Luhmann also writes 
something similar. According to Thomas Vesting, citing Luhmann, “it remains incorporated in all legal 
interpretation the mysterious and enigmatic element of the decision, an informulable element (should we say: 
divine). This explains why the legal sentiment, the pre-judgment, is considered up to this date to be an 
‘indispensable compass’ for the good jurist.” THOMAS VESTING, TEORIA DO DIREITO – UMA INTRODUÇÃO. 227 
(Gercélia Mendes trans., Saraiva, 2015). Translation mine. However, according to Hart, “[i]t is possible that, 
in a given society, judges might always reach their decisions intuitively or ‘by hunches’, and then merely choose 
from a catalogue of legal rules one which, they pretended, resembled the case in hand; they might then claim 
that this was the rule which they regarded as requiring their decision, although nothing else in their actions or 
words suggested that they regarded it as a rule binding on them. Some judicial decisions may be like this, but 
it is surely evident that for the most decisions, like the chess-player’s moves, are reached either by genuine 
effort to conform to rules consciously taken as guiding standards of decision or, if intuitively reached, are 
justified by rules which the judge was antecedently dispose to observe and whose relevance to the case in hand 
would generally be acknowledged. HART, supra note 43, at 141. (Concept of law) 
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to extend a statute beyond a fair reading of its text would add something to the statute that 
the legislative apparently did not wish to be there.”132  
 Burnham points out that common law statutes are usually much longer and detailed 
in comparison to civil law statutes.133 According to him, “[a] quick glance at a federal or 
state statute books will disclose that U.S. statutes are longer and infinitely more complex 
than the average civil law code or even most ‘special legislation’ that has grown up in civil 
law countries outside the codes.”134 He also contends that common law judges do not fill 
“[…] any statutory gaps by extending the reach of the statute. Any gaps have already been 
filled by the common law. Enacting a statute in a common law system, then, is like placing 
a rock in a bucket of water. The rock displaces the water as far as it goes, but the water rushes 
in to fill any holes or crack in the rock. Judges deciding a case not covered by the statute 
simple resort to the common law. As a result, common law judges faced with gaps in a statute 
need not to resort to a highly flexible interpretation of statutory language, such as reasoning 
by analogy, or germination of rules from the statutory principles.”135  
 This view expressed by Burnham would probably be questioned nowadays by 
textualism defenders.136 Nevertheless, some early 20th Century Anglo-American scholarship 
proves that this view was traditionally adopted. Ernest Bruncken, in an article published in 
the Yale Law Journal, in 1929, describing the difference in statutes in common law and civil 
law countries, stated that “[i]n the common-law countries, the customary law, defined and 
developed by courts, is the foundation on which the legal edifice is reared. All statutes, large 
and small, whether called codes or not, are but modifications of the customary law and must 
be interpreted with a constant regard to this underlying foundation.”137 He added that this 
                                                          
132 See WILLIAM BURNHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES, 
50, 51 (West, 4th ed., 2006). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id.  
136 The reference to textualism is based on the following comments made by William N. Eskridge et al.: “In 
the 1980s, a group of judges and executive officials developed a more constrained version of the plain meaning 
rule than that followed in cases like Griffin and TVA v. Hill. For example, Judge Frank Easterbrook’s Statutes’ 
Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533 (1983), insisted that courts have no authority even to apply a statute to a 
problem unless the statute’s language clearly targets that problem. Judge Easterbrook’s Legal Interpretation 
and the Power of the Judiciary, 7 Harv. J L. & Pub. Pol’y 87 (1984), argued that courts interpreting statutes 
have no business figuring out legislative intent, which is an incoherent concept, largely for reasons suggested 
in 1930 by Professor Radin, but updated to reflect modern public choice theory. Justice Antonin Scalia delivered 
a series of speeches in 1985-86, urging courts to abandon virtually any reference to legislative history, 
especially the committee reports referred to in Griffin and TVA v. Hill. The Department of Justice’s Office of 
Legal Policy endorsed and developed these views in a document drafted by Stephen Markman, Using and 
Misusing Legislative History: A Re-Evaluation of the Status of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation 
(1989). 
 What we call “the new textualism” is an approach to statutory interpretation developed by these judges and 
scholars. Although its proponents draw from legal process theory for their own purposes, their approach to 
statutory interpretation differs from that supported by Professor Hart, Sacks, and Fuller. Also, new textualist 
construction is different from the “soft” plain meaning rule of TVA v. Hill and Griffin, as suggested by the 
exchanges in the cases that follow.” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT AND 
JAMES J. BRUDNEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION – STATUTES AND THE 
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 568-569 (West, 5th, 2014). 
137 Ernest Bruncken, The Common Law and Statutes, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 29, No. 5, 516 (Mar., 
1920). In regard to civil law countries, Bruncken argues that “the relation between statutes and other forms of 
law are precisely the opposite. There, every statute or rule analogous to a statute, from the most comprehensive 
code to the pettiest regulation, is an original statement of the law on the subject to which it relates. Unwritten 
law may indeed modify the written in particular instances, but only as under the English system a special custom 
may modify the general ones. It always remains an exception, usually confined to the narrowest proportion 
which a reasonable interpretation may give to it, and the very existence of a custom has to be proven under 
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assertion was true even for jurisdictions like California, in which the codes provided 
expressly that they were “not amendments of existing law, but an independent statement of 
the law of the state.”138 According to him, “these provisions have for the most part remained 
ineffective.”139 
 In the civil law system, the concept of the legal rule is different. Rene David affirms 
that the “legal rule […] is the fundamental basis of codification such as it is conceived in 
continental Europe. A code would be no more than a mere compilation, and more or less 
successful as such, if one were to see a legal rule in every judicial decision and only at the 
level of such decisions. According to the Romano-Germanic notion, a code should not 
attempt to provide rules that are immediately applicable to every conceivable concrete case; 
but rather an organized system of general rules from which a solution may be easily deduced 
by as simple a process as possible.”140 
 David adds that “[t]he Romano-Germanic legal rule [lies] between the judicial 
decision in dispute, which is seen as a concrete application of the rule, and the more general 
principle of which the rule itself may be considered the application [of the principle]. In the 
Romano-Germanic countries, the art of the jurist consists in finding and formulating the rule 
at this point of equilibrium. It must not be too general, for then it would no longer be a 
sufficiently certain practical guide; on the other hand, the rule must be general enough to 
cover a certain series of types of situations rather than merely apply to some particular 
situations as does the judicial decision.”141  
 This point of balance varies according to the specific area of law; criminal and tax 
laws should be more specific and discretion should be limited inasmuch as possible. 142 
“Greater generalization, on the contrary, may be preferable in certain other and more fluid 
areas where it is intended that the rigor of legal solutions be less strictly imposed.”143 
 David argues that “the generality of the legal rule explains why the task of lawyers 
in these countries is conceived essentially one of interpreting legislative provisions and is 
thus unlike that of [c]ommon law countries where the legal technique is characterized by the 
process of distinguishing judicial decisions.”144 He explains that “the ‘right’ legal rule itself 
is not thought of in the same manner: in [c]ommon law countries the judge is expected to 
formulate, as precisely as possible, the rule which provides a solution [for] the dispute; in the 
Romano-Germanic countries, on the contrary, because its function is simply to establish the 
framework of the law and to furnish the judge with guidelines for decision-making, it is 
considered desirable that the legal rule leave him a certain margin of discretion.”145 
                                                          
exacting conditions. Whoever under this system asserts a right is expected primarily to cite the precise section 
of a statute on which it is based. Even where, before the modern codes, such a statute covering his case was 
absent and he relied on the Roman Law as a subsidiary source, he was in many jurisdictions required to cite the 
precise passage in the Justinian Code or the Gloss, which was held to be of the same nature as a statute. 
Invariably the statute is the rule, every other form of law the special exception.” See Id at 516-517. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 DAVID & DE VRIES, note 108, at 88. 
141 Id. at 89. 
142 Id. See also Zagrebelsky, note 52. “In certain determined fields, [a decision that looks back to past events] 
is expressly excluded. This is predominantly the case in criminal law, where it is preferable that the legislator 
establish crimes and punishment through prospective and predictable rules.” See also Benjamin C Zipursky, The 
Inner Morality of Private Law, 58 Am J Juris 27 (2013) (arguing that Tort law is essentially “implicit, 
retroactive, intrinsically incapable of multiple competing interpretations, and often limited to particular fact 
patterns”). 
143 Id.  
144 Id. at 90.  
145 Id. 
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 Nino asserts that “in countries with our legal tradition it is wrong to consider a code 
or a statute as part of the law isolated from theoretical constructions that were developed 
around it.”146 For that reason, David is right when he says that in civil law systems, the 
generality of the rule is considered a positive property because of the assumption that the 
judge or the legislator will never be able to foresee all possible cases in which the rule must 
govern. 
 Taking these ideas into account, one may observe that the sort of social fact required 
to satisfy legality in common law or civil law countries is very different. Brazil, following 
this tradition of civil law drafting, does not have well-developed theories of fair notice, 
vagueness or overbreadth, for example. For a legal rule to satisfy the requisite of legality, it 
will not really matter if its terms are vague, broad or may not offer good guidance to the 
citizens. There is a sort of general understanding—or convention—that the terms will be 
made clear through a process of interpretation or concretization. The fact that some 
applications of the rule will not find support in the legislative history or even in the original 
intent of the drafters is not generally a problem. The social fact has taken place, there is 
written law on the general issue and what the Judiciary extracts from the text—in a process 
that may also take into account constitutional principles, as we will see—is considered within 
the legitimate authority of Courts—if it is understood that its action does not contradict the 
Constitution. 
 A good comparison of the way statutes are generally drafted in Brazil and in the U.S. 
may be found in the regulation of the crime of passive corruption, which takes place when a 
public official receives a bribe. In Brazil, the matter is disciplined by article 317 of the Penal 
Code, which states:  
 
“Passive Corruption 
Art. 317 – Request or receive, for himself or other, directly or 
indirectly, even when not in office or before swearing in, but 
because of the official position, undue advantage, or accept a 
promise of this advantage:  
Sanction – incarceration, from 2 (two) to 12 (twelve) years, 
and fine. ”147 
 
 In the U.S., for the Federal Government, Chapter 18, Section 201, of the US Code 
establishes the crime:  
 
“(a) For the purpose of this section— 
 
[…] 
 
(3) the term “official act” means any decision or action on any 
question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which 
may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought 
before any public official, in this official’s official capacity, or 
in this official’s place of trust or profit. 
 
[…] 
 
                                                          
146 NINO, see note 109, at 399. 
147 CÓDIGO PENAL [C.P.] [CRIMINAL CODE] art. 327 (Braz.). Translation mine.  
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(2) being a public official or person selected to be a public 
official, directly or indirectly, corruptly demands, seeks, 
receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept anything of 
value personally or for any other person or entity, in return for: 
 
(A) being influenced in the performance of any official act; 
 
(B) being influenced to commit or aid in committing, or to 
collude in, or allow, any fraud, or make opportunity for the 
commission of any fraud, on the United States; or 
 
(C) being induced to do or omit to do any act in violation of 
the official duty of such official or person; 
 
[…] 
 
(c) Whoever— 
 
(1) otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge 
of official duty— 
 
[…] 
 
(B) being a public official, former public official, or person 
selected to be a public official, otherwise than as provided by 
law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or 
indirectly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to 
receive or accept anything of value personally for or because 
of any official act performed or to be performed by this official 
or person;” 
 
 It is easy to note a difference in the drafting and style, as well as the purposes of the 
statute. There seems to be more concern with clarity and on anticipating possible conflicts of 
interpretation in the U.S. Federal Code. Undeniably, the American judge is more constrained 
to interpret the statute than the Brazilian judge, who may construe vague terms, like “undue 
advantage.” In fact, there is still an ongoing debate as to whether the practice of an “official 
act” is necessary for characterize the crime in Brazil and the statute was enacted in 1940.148 
                                                          
148 Former President Fernando Collor de Mello was acquitted by the Supreme Court for corruption charges, 
in 1994, on the grounds that he had not performed any official act in exchange for undue advantage. The S.T.F. 
asserted the practice of official act was necessary for configuring corruption. See S.T.F., A.P. No. 307, Relator: 
Min. Ilmar Galvão, 13.12.1994, Diário da Justiça [D.J.], 13.10.1995 (Braz.). But, in 2017, when former 
President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva was convicted for corruption charges, Judge Sergio Moro asserted that the 
question as to whether the performance of an official act was a necessary requisite for configuring corruption 
is still an issue under debate on Brazilian criminal law. He cited a recent precedent from the Superior Tribunal 
de Justiça, the highest court for settling statutory interpretation in Brazil and claimed that the official act 
requirement does not have to be precisely delimitated. See TRF-4, A.P. No. 5046512-94.2016.4.04.7000/PR, 
Juiz Sergio Moro, https://abrilveja.files.wordpress.com/2017/07/sentenc3a7a-lula.pdf. See also S.T.J., R.H.C. 
No. 48.400, Relator: Min. Gurgel de Faria, 17.03.2017, Diário da Justiça eletrônico 30.3.2015 (Braz.) (taking 
the position that the effective practice of a specific official act is not necessary to configure the crime of passive 
corruption. There is no need to individuate the official act because the public function trade takes place in a 
diffuse manner, through a plurality of acts which are of hard individualization). 
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A close reading of article 317 of the Penal Code shows that it does not say whether the 
practice of an official act is necessary.  
 Also, since doctrines of vagueness or fair notice are more developed in the U.S., 
American judges are more likely to worry about the possibility that the existence of vague 
terms in the statute may result in lack of limits on law enforcement. It is rare to see these 
concerns in Brazil, because judges consider that the statute merely needs to be interpreted 
and that the limits, if necessary, will be established through adjudication. 
 In McDonnell v. United States,149 for example, the SCOTUS vacated a conviction of 
a former Virginia Governor, Robert McDonnel, and his wife, Maureen McDonnell, on honest 
services fraud and Hobbs Act extortion charges related to their acceptance of $175,000 in 
loans, gifts, and other benefits from a Virginia businessman. The SCOTUS basically held 
that “the jury instructions on the statute term ‘official act’ were expansive and raised 
significant constitutional concerns.”150 The Chief Justice, writing for a unanimous Court, 
stated that “[t]here [was] no doubt that this case [was] distasteful; it may be worse than that. 
But [their] concern is not with tawdry tales of Ferraris, Rolexes, and ball gowns. It is instead 
with the broader legal implications of the Government’s boundless interpretation of the 
federal bribery statute. A more limited interpretation of the term “official act” leaves ample 
room for prosecuting corruption, while comporting with the text of the statute and the 
precedent of this Court.”151 
 In Germany, there have been criticisms regarding the use of indeterminate legal 
concepts to define criminal sanctions, which is constitutionally permitted.152 Giacomolli and 
Aflen point out that the article 104, 1, of the Basic Norm establishes that “only through 
formal law a sanction of incarceration may be applied.” They complain that “the 
generalization of the criminal statutes represents a risk to legal certainty, because it is a result 
of the excessive use of general clauses, objectively distinctive, which void the guarantee 
function of the criminal law.” 153 They mention that German authors claim that legislators 
have been neglecting this legality postulate, by “creating penal norms that, even for experts, 
are not the most comprehensible. Rules in which it is hard to distinguish the punishable 
conduct to a lawful one.”154 
 To sustain their point of view, these scholars cite a precedent from the German 
Constitutional Court: 
 
“The art. 103, item 2, of the Basic Norm demands the legislator 
to circumscribe the punishable elements in a concrete manner, 
in the sense the ambit of application and the reach of criminal 
rules result from the content of the statute, or, in any case, may 
be obtained through interpretation. This does not exclude, 
however, the use of concepts that need in a certain way be 
interpreted by the judge. Also, in criminal law, the legislator 
faces the necessity of taking into account life’s multiform. In 
addition, it is due to the criminal rules inevitable generality and 
abstraction that, in the concrete case, it is doubted that a 
conduct is still prohibited by the criminal law. Nevertheless, 
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in all cases, the norm’s recipient shall be able to foresee, from 
the legal precept, if a conduct is punishable. In borderline 
cases, it must be calculated at least the possibility of 
sanction.”155 
 
 In light of this precedent, they state that “this […] has contributed, decisively, for the 
criminal law be guided by indeterminate legal concepts.”156 And they conclude that “the 
classic postulates of the legality principle, which form the base of criminal law, in practice, 
have been considered an unreachable ideal, an ideal that may be forgotten if the citizen falls 
within the hands of the criminal law.”157 
 Indeed, in some civil law countries, this regulation of criminal acts through the use 
of principles is still criticized. Zagrebelsky, for example, asserts the following: 
 
“[t]he interesting logical difference, from a practical 
standpoint, is that in order for the principle to work in practice, 
its ‘concretization’ is required; in other words, it must be 
reducible to a formula containing a case in point relevant to a 
historical event and the consequence must derive from it. The 
concretization of the principle takes place in the course of the 
work either of the legislator, through a rule that looks to future 
events, or of the judge, through a decision that looks back to 
past events. In certain determined fields, the second option is 
expressly excluded. That is predominantly the case in criminal 
law, where it is preferable that the legislator establish crimes 
and punishment through prospective and predictable rules. 
Beyond this exception, however, rules and principles often 
operate jointly and in parallel fashion.”158 
 
 A final important issue to point out is an argument regarding the length of the C.F. 
text. Brazil is said to have a very analytical constitution, as opposed to the U.S. Constitution, 
which is qualified as synthetical. This assertion is true, the C.F. has more than 250 articles, 
some of which also have many items and paragraphs. It deals with a vast number of subjects 
which are not considered traditional constitutional issues, 159  such as tax, family, 
environmental and health law. But this fact does not undermine the point made regarding the 
style of norms in Brazil. Most of the C.F. precepts are written in a synthetic manner and do 
not have the ambition of regulating the whole matter they deal with, leaving great room for 
construction. About this issue, Patrícia Perrone, a law clerk and professor in Brazil, states:  
 
“the 1988 constitutional text employs, in its provisions, 
undetermined legal concepts, fundamental rights and/or 
principles, which meanings, to solve cases, demand the judge’s 
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evaluative and, many times, creative attitude. Examples of 
undetermined legal concepts included in the Constitution: 
“political party plurality”, which is a foundation of the 
Brazilian State; the “social function” to be accomplished 
through property; “the imminent public danger”, which 
authorizes the Government to use a private good; the “threat 
of violence” against freedom of locomotion, which is protected 
by habeas corpus.”160 
 
 Saulo Ramos, former Ministry of Justice, made a similar comment in a book: 
 
“It was not possible, however, to improve the whole congress 
bill of the constitutional text. A constitutional assembly always 
becomes a pressure cooker, and the Brazilian politicians, when 
writing the text of a constitution, have a tendency to create 
things that look like recreation center by-laws. They include 
details, smallness, artistic, sports and financial directors’ 
competences, and end up mixing up rules that interlace and are 
contradictory among themselves, some ridiculous, others 
audacious, but nearly all a product of unreflected fruits of non-
digested ideological confrontations. These extravagances 
hallucinate ordinary legislators, and also make interpreters and 
hermeneuts crazy.”161 
 
 Examples to prove this point can be extracted from the cases cited in subchapter II.2. 
above. Article 225, paragraph first, item VII, of the C.F. establishes that “it is incumbent 
upon the Government to protect the fauna and the flora, with prohibition, in the manner set 
forth by law, of all practices which represent a risk to their ecological function, cause the 
extinction of species or subject animals to cruelty.” This provision sets a goal to be pursued, 
but, at the same time, leaves ample room for statute regulation and judicial construction. 
 
II.4.2. Civil Law Legislation Dogmas  
 
 This view that enacted law is what constitutes the sole source of law for the solution 
of most cases in the civil law world is supported due to some specific dogmatic 
characteristics in law identification and application. There are certain ideological attitudes 
and rational ideals regarding the comprehension of statutes and of the C.F. that judges 
articulate when reaching a decision, while still thinking they are simply following the 
enacted law.162 That is the reason civil law jurists call legal dogmatic the method that allows 
the finding of legal solutions.163 
 Although Santiago Nino calls the dogmatic predicates a fiction, he observes that they 
serve the relevant function of reformulating the law, proposing certainty to its vague terms, 
filling its gaps, solving its incoherencies and adjusting its norms to determined axiological 
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ideals. The juridical dogmatic, therefore, is essential to the administration of justice and to 
the development of the law, although it presupposes to only be applying what is already 
law. 164  It has the important purpose of moving the civil law judge away from a 
literalist/mechanicist approach of law. 
 Nino notes, also, that the singularity of the dogmatic is that the judge’s activity of 
reconstruing and developing the law is not done in a clear, candor way, but in a feint manner, 
using rhetorically the conceptual apparatus to pass the impression that the original solutions 
emerge as if they merely derive from posited law.165 The applied techniques “perform the 
important mission to adapt the law to certain rational and axiological ideals [and], at the 
same time, provide a feeling of preserving legal certainty by allowing to affirm that the 
proposed solutions derive implicitly from posited law and are not modifying it.”166 
 I will now go over the most common dogmatic predicates, which are: (a) unity, 
coherency, consistency and completeness; (b) adhesion to the legislation; and (c) the rational 
legislator. 
 
II.4.2.1. Unity, Coherency, Consistency and Completeness 
 
 At first, the enacted law is understood as being a unitary system, totally coherent, 
consistent, and complete. 167 The civil law jurist considers that the conjugation of these 
attributes is what makes the law a system, something distinct from a group of scattered 
norms.168 
 The legal system is understood as a unitary system because there is a general 
convention that all rules are posited—directly by the legislature or indirectly through 
administrative regulation—by the same authority. All enacted laws, in this sense, come from 
the same source, which is the legitimated power to make the law.169 Hans Kelsen’s basic 
norm (grundnorm), which traditionally offers an underlying basis for the legal system and 
whose existence is presupposed by the civil law jurist, provides the authority to the 
legislator.170 
 According to the University of Heidelberg Professor Winfried Brugger, 
“[c]onsistency or legal coherence entails that all of the law—its purposes, principles, and 
rules—should form a bond of unity; of mutual coordination, accommodation, and 
clarification.”171 He adds that “laws should avoid contradiction and excessive vagueness, 
and judges should do their best to read the law as a ‘rational continuum’ in order to promote 
clarity and consonance.”172 
 Brugger adds that “this [attempt to read the law as a ‘rational continuum’] is more 
realistic in modern pluralistic societies, whose legal systems must integrate many different 
values, and where the democratic process usually is not compelled by a constitutional 
mandate to proceed consistently; furthermore, legislatures often evade their responsibility to 
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take difficult (read: politically potentially damaging) decisions by intentionally using open-
ended language that leaves the burden of decision-making on the judiciary.”173  
 Both Hans Kelsen and Norberto Bobbio assert that the dogma of completeness means 
that the legal system is capable of providing a solution for all cases. The legal system, in this 
sense, has no gaps.174 
 As Thomas Vesting notes, “either the quaestio juris of a circumstance of life is 
already anticipated by the law of the jurists or by the political legislative activity or, if this 
is not the case, at least, the adjudicator may solve it through literal, logic, gap-filling or, 
eventually, analogic interpretation, in the deductive sense employed. The system always has 
the prompt response, at least ideally.”175 
 The attributes of coherence and completeness, according to Francesco Carnelutti, are 
pertinent because the law may have two defects: an excess defect (exuberance), when there 
are more rules than there should be and they conflict with each other, and an emptiness defect 
(deficiency), in which case there is a gap. When the excess defect takes place, the jurist will 
have to expurgate it from the legal system, that is, to eliminate the extra norm; in the second 
case, she will integrate the legal system.176 The gap, in this sense, would not be one of the 
legal system, but of rules, because the system would always have a solution.177 
 Brazilian law is written in a way that incorporates the dogmas of coherence and 
completeness. Even when facing a gap, the Brazilian judge has to decide the case 
(prohibition of non liquet). Article 140 of the Civil Procedure Code sets forth that “the judge 
may not exempt himself to decide a case under the argument that there is a gap or an 
obscurity in the legal system.”178 Brazilian statute law determines that, in these cases, the 
judge shall rule by applying analogy, customs or general principles of law.179 She may not 
decide the case applying equity, except when authorized by statute law. 180  Therefore, 
Brazilian law acknowledges the existence of normative gaps, but also considers itself 
complete in a way that in these cases judges will resort to an inclusive general norm, through 
which judges will decide non-regulated cases to the discipline of similar regulated cases.181 
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 These solutions are different from the ones adopted by the Swiss Civil Code, for 
example. Although the Swiss Code also has an inclusive legal norm, it authorizes the judge 
to behave as a legislator when facing a gap, which may denote that he is expressly authorized 
to go beyond the legal system to find the best solution that suits him.182 Alfred E. von 
Overbeck contends that because of this provision the Swiss Code “deliberately rejects the 
idea that it could be complete and give an answer to every conceivable question.”183 
 Nonetheless, when deciding cases that do not have a solution in the system, grounded 
in the closure rule, judges do not seem themselves legislating, because, adopting Kelsen’s 
view, they will only be authorized to “create an individual norm, valid for the single, present 
case.”184 
 Coherence and unity are dogmas that allow the presence of contradictory instructions 
to exist in the system (exuberance). As observed above, for example, the Brazilian statute 
law instructs the judge to decide following the enacted norms and only to apply analogy, 
customs or general principles of law when facing gaps in the system. But, at the same time, 
Brazilian law tells him to apply the law observing the social ends and the needs of common 
well-being.185 Also, as noted before, open-textured constitutional principles also must be 
taken into account by judges when adjudicating most statutory law cases, a practice known 
as constitutionalization of statute law.186 
 When defining the range of factual situations covered by broader and open-textured 
constitutional provisions, Brazilian legal practice adopts similar notions of system coherency 
and unity. Brugger notes that the “[t]he prevailing view holds that the Constitution differs 
from statutes in that it is more political, more open-ended, and less complete. From that it 
follows, according to this view, that vague constitutional provisions cannot be 'construed' 
(ausgelegt) but must be 'actualized' (aktualisiert) or 'concretized' (konkretisiert); the 
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difference being that a strict 'construction' reveals a solution already inherent in the text, 
whereas an 'actualization' or 'concretization' entails a dialectic process of creatively 
determining results in conformity with, but not determinable by, the Constitution.”187 
 Brugger explains that Konrad Hesse, a former member of the German Constitutional 
Court and the most influential proponent of this view, lectures that the goal of creating 
constitutional law is reached by adhering to five points of reference for constitutional 
interpretation, which reflect the dogmas of coherence and unity:  
 
“(1) Each interpretation must support the unity of the 
constitution;  
(2) In cases of tension or conflict, the principle of practical 
concordance (praktische konkordanz) must be employed to 
harmonize conflicting provisions;  
(3) All governmental organs must respect the functional 
differentiation of the Constitution, that is, their respective tasks 
and powers in the separation of powers scheme;  
(4) Each interpretation must try to create an integrative effect 
with regard to both the various parties of a constitutional 
dispute as well as to social and political cohesion;  
(5) These points together lead to the legitimating function of 
the Constitution: [e]ach interpretation shall attempt to 
optimize all the aforementioned elements.” 188 
 
 To assure practical concordance, civil law jurists understand that the constitutional 
provisions must be optimized when in conflict, preserving the constitution’s unity. As 
Professor Konrad Hesse stated, “[t]he principle of the constitution’s unity requires the 
optimization of [values in conflict]: [b]oth legal values need to be limited so that each can 
attain its optimal effect. In each concrete case, therefore, the limitations must satisfy the 
principle of proportionality; that is, they may not go any further than necessary to produce a 
concordance of both legal values.”189 
 Therefore, civil law jurists when interpreting constitutional texts use similar dogmas 
as to when they interpret statutory law. Although they may acknowledge a different attitude 
and a more developed method, the process also considers the dogmas of unity, practical 
concordance and integration of posited norms. 
 An example of the application of the civil law dogmas of the unity, coherence and 
consistency regarding the constitutionality of death penalty in the U.S. is offered by 
Professor Bernard Schlink:  
 
“For German constitutional understanding, incidentally, it is 
not the intentions and expectations of the constitution’s 
authors that make the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee—that life 
cannot be taken without due process of law—important in 
interpreting the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 
The fact that a life can only be taken with or without due 
process of law if a death penalty exists—that is, where the 
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guarantee that the life cannot be taken without due process of 
law assumes the admissibility of the death penalty, and that it 
cannot, at the same time, be an inadmissible cruel and unusual 
punishment—has to do with a concept of constitution as a 
logical whole free of contradictions, in which no provision is 
without function and all are functionality coordinated with 
each other. This systematic interpretation is, in fact, based not 
on the subjectivity of the constitution’s authors, which could 
include inconsistencies and contradictions; rather it takes 
seriously the constitution’s claim to principles and 
objectivity.”190 
  
II.4.2.2. Adhesion to Legislation 
(Ideological Positivism) 
 
 The second dogma is the attitude of adhesion to the legislation, either statutory or 
constitutional. Legislation is seen as the major source of law and any judicial decision that 
disregards it openly is repudiated.191 There is, among civil law jurists, a dogmatic acceptance 
of positive law’s mandatory force. In the legal discourse, civil law jurists assert that their 
mission is to describe the law de lege lata (latin for “existing law”) and not to propose 
solutions de lege ferenda (latin for “what the law should be”), which shall explain norms as 
they are, regardless of their personal preferences.192 
 As Santiago Nino points out, this attitude of adhesion to enacted law and of 
confidence in its formal qualities was dogmatically adopted by contemporary juridical 
science.193 Nino explains that this shows “the apparent incoherence among the natural law 
ideals exposed by the dogmatic and their supposedly positivist statements, when they face 
the task of proposing legal solutions.” 194   He notes that the dogmatic is intensively 
impregnated with the ideology, called by Alfred Ross pseudo-positivism and by Bobbio 
ideological positivism. This ideology consists in recognizing compulsory force in all positive 
law for the simple fact that law exists or is what it is.195 Despite the positivist label, this 
ideology, according to Nino, “reflects a form of conservative jusnaturalism and means that 
the positive law shall be obeyed and applied by judges irrespective of any axiological 
disagreement, which, in every case, shall be oriented to propose any modification through 
legal means.”196 
 In Brazil, for example, the Binding Statement No. 10, approved by the S.T.F. in 2008, 
may be considered an example of This ideology. This statement basically prescribes that a 
Court cannot choose not to apply, in whole or in part, a statute or regulation in a given case, 
without holding it unconstitutional.  
 A curious reasoning given by S.T.F. Justice Eros Grau, in his concurring opinion 
may reveal this attitude. In Brazil, pursuant to article 100 of the C.F., payments by the state 
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treasuries, in any level, shall be made exclusively in chronological order of submission of 
court orders.197 In 2006, an ill person requested immediate payment due to her severe health 
conditions and to the fact that persons in her situation had extraordinarily been awarded 
payments in the past. When this case was decided, in conformity with the C.F., there were 
few situations that made possible an early payment and suffering from severe illness was not 
one of them.  
 In his concurring opinion, Justice Grau reasoned that to maintain integrity with what 
he had decided in the past, he had to deny the ill person’s claim. The constitutional rule did 
not allow the Government to make early payments in that situation. But the facts of this case 
did not present what is considered a normal situation, but an exceptional one. Grau then 
wrote that “the exceptional situation is a spot of indifference between chaos and regular 
situations, a spot captured by the norm. But it is the norm that, suspending its force, gives 
place to the exceptional circumstance—only in this way the norm is turned in to a rule, 
keeping this status in relation with the exception.”198 Grau added that the S.T.F., when 
necessary, must take into account these exceptional circumstances. Doing so does not depart 
from the juridical order because it applies the norm by disapplying it, that is, removing it 
from the exception.”199 Therefore, he ruled that the ill person should have precedence over 
the general public to receive her indemnization. Shortly thereafter, in 2009, the Brazilian 
Congress approved a constitutional amendment and included this right of preference for ill 
people as one of the hypothesis that allow preferable payment.200  
 From this reasoning, it is possible to note that what the S.T.F. did, in the case, was to 
depart from the general application of a written rule to achieve justice in an individual case, 
under compelling circumstances, finding an exception to the rule. This departure is tolerable 
in most rule of law systems.201 The same line of reasoning is used to justify, for example, 
the exceptions for upholding legislation that treats people unequally, without considering it 
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, when compelling, important or legitimate state interests are proven by the 
government.202 However, in these cases, U.S. courts would hardly consider that the Equal 
Protection Clause is being applied by being disapplying, even though it does not treat people 
equally. On the contrary, Justices will probably reason that there is an exception for the 
application of the clause that is justified by some other interest or that equal treatment 
depends always on circumstances validating distinctions. 
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 This idea that the law applies, even in exception cases in which the rule does not 
apply and an exception is declared, is an example of the strength of the civil law judge 
adhesion to the legislation. 
 
II.4.2.3. The Rational Legislator 
 
 In addition, in the civil law world, attributing to the legislator certain rationality 
qualities is typical. These qualities, in Santiago Nino’s view, are far from being real, but they 
enable the practical reformulation of the enacted law. Therefore, this reformulation will 
sound as a mere description of latent solutions.203 
 Santiago Nino points out that civil law jurists refer to the legislator as being a unique 
individual who has established all norms that are part of a legal system.204 He adds that 
lawyers and judges “[a]lso mention an imperishable legislator, which through his will 
sustains the norms’ validity, including those established a long time ago by men that even 
may be dead.”205 “The rational legislator is also always conscious of the statutes that he 
enacts.”206 This is true even for statutes approved by Congress by their members simply 
raising their hands, without knowing what in fact is written in the bill.207 Omniscience is 
another quality of the rational legislator. According to the dogma, he is aware of all the 
factual circumstances that are comprised by the enacted statute.208 The legislator is also 
operant, meaning that he will not enact rules that do not have any function.209 This property 
is similar to the rule against surplusage, which is commonly used in U.S. statutory 
interpretation.210 
 Jurists, in addition, say that the rational legislator is, generally, fair. In this sense, 
they often give him credit for the axiological interpretative solutions that they adopt when 
deciding cases.211 Moreover, the legislator is always coherent, meaning that his will cannot 
be itself contradictory, and precise, in the sense that his will points in an unambiguous 
direction, even when the language he uses is open textured.212 
 Nino asserts that the adoption of this rational legislator fictional model occurs 
because it allows the dogmatic jurists to give the rational legislator the credit for the solutions 
they adopt when interpreting axiological standards. In this sense, dogmatic jurists fill gaps, 
eliminate contradictions, make clear vague terms, and waive superfluous norms, all without 
showing that a modification of the law has taken place. They simply pass off the impression 
that they are providing a description of the current law, as if Congress has genuinely thought 
of it.213  
 Nino adds that this technique is not used in a cynical or speculative manner, but in 
most cases by obeying traditional theoretical habits, which are soundly adequate to reconcile 
legal certainty with standards of rationality and justice.214 
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 The Polish jurist Slawomira Wronkowska, a current member of the Constitutional 
Court of her country, also has a work on the rational legislator. She explains that “a lawyer 
considering the problems of lawmaking builds a certain model of the rational legislator by 
selecting the assumptions constituting this legislator in a way so that the norms enacted by 
this legislator could be used as means for the attainment of objectives set by him.”215  
 She adds that “[i]t is a characteristic that a lawyer interpreting a particular text in 
order to reconstruct binding legal norms […] adopts assumptions about the legislator as to 
reconstruct from the given text not any norms, but the norms, which—assuming that they 
will be realized—would be an appropriate means for the attainment of the set objectives.”216 
 Further, she asserts that “[a] lawyer formulating recommendations how to apply legal 
norms derived from interpretation acts in a similar way. He assumes that the legislator wants, 
[using] particular norms, to establish an appropriate and desired system of social relations 
and on the basis of this assumption he recommends a particular application of legal 
norms.”217  
 Finally, Wronkowska concludes that “the assumptions constituting the rational 
legislator are selected in such a way as to make the rational legislator a certain model of 
socio-technical abilities; and to make the norms enacted by him sufficiently effective and 
economic for the attainment of the set objectives.”218  Nevertheless, she warns that the 
rational legislator is solely a formal model, which varies through different periods of time 
and cultures219.  
 Luis Jiménez de Asúa says that “today, in democracies, the law does not emerge from 
an autocrat, from a single person, whose ‘spirit’ and ‘will’ is, in any manner, very hard to 
find. The legislator is nowadays an abstraction, or even better, a function.”220 
 The excerpt below, which summarizes a case decided by the Court of Appeals of Sao 
Paulo, shows how these dogmas are generally applied in Brazil. The case involved the 
recognition and dissolution of a same sex partnership, a matter not expressly treated by 
Brazilian statute law and, for some, banned by the constitutional text. The C.F. has a chapter 
that regulates matters of family law. Article 226, paragraph 3, states that “[f]or purposes of 
protection by the State, the stable union between a man and a woman is recognized as a 
family entity, and the law shall facilitate the conversion of this entity into marriage.”221 Since 
the text wording refers to “a man and a woman”, conservative jurists assert that the C.F. 
banned the recognition of same-sex unions and gay marriage in the country. Even though 
the S.T.F. already decided the issue in 2011 and held that these unions are a right of gay 
couples,222 the São Paulo Court, in 2013, relied on dogmas such as legal order completeness 
                                                          
215  Slawomira Wronkowska, The Rational Legislator as a Model for the Real Lawmaker, in Polish 
Contributions to the Theory of Philosophy in Law, 137, 160. 
216 Id.  
217 Id. The fact that a lawyer invokes the rational legislator to develop an argument does not mean that he is 
advancing a previous settled scheme of social policies and that the judicial decisions will be coherent with past 
precedents. He may argue that his position is the most appropriate one and therefore should be employed by 
the court. There is wide margin for argumentation and great possibility of subjectivism.  
218 Id.  
219 Id. at 162.  
220 Cited by NINO, see note 109, at 392. 
221 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 226, paragraph 3 (Braz.). Official Translation from 
the Brazilian Senate.  
222 S.T.F., A.D.I. No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Carlos Britto, j. 05.05.2011, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO 
[D.J.e.],14.10.2011, 341 (Braz.). 
 
 44
and rational legislator to justify the conclusion that the law protects the same sex 
relationship and did not invoke the S.T.F. precedent on their case summary.223 
 Justice Carlos Ayres Britto, who wrote the 2011 Supreme Court opinion that upheld 
the constitutionality of same sex unions, also made reference to the rational legislator dogma 
on that occasion.224 
 Keith Rosenn, writing about this Brazilian Supreme Court ruling, noted that Justice 
Carlos Ayres Britto, “whose opinion was followed by a majority of the [Court], reinterpreted 
article 1.723 of the Civil Code in conformity with the Constitution, to make same sex couples 
eligible for treatment as a family unit. Three members of the Court reached a similar result 
by treating the absence of regulation of same-sex unions as a gap in the law, which they 
filled by resorting to analogy.”225 
 The interesting thing to point out is that Justice Britto considered the reference to the 
rational legislator pertinent even taking into account that constitutional history showed that 
the reference to the words man and woman on article 226, paragraph 3, was inserted with 
the purpose of discriminating gay couples. Justice Lewandowski, who followed Britto’s 
opinion, cited some constitutional conventional debates and proved this point.226 Therefore, 
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Homosexual relationships are part of social reality. It is so true that there are various secondary norms that 
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the rational legislator is not the ‘actual legislature’ and may be referred to by judges even to 
justify a different view from the one adopted by the legislature. 
 These references to the legislator in judicial opinions basically reflect a form of 
communication that the civil law jurist considers to take place between the enacted 
legislation—not Congress—and courts. According to Marcelo Neves, the “interpreter-
applicator attributes sense to the normative text. This does not mean that this attribution of 
sense turns the interpreter into the producer of the norm. The situation points to a limited 
desire of structuring a double contingency and determine the content of a communication 
(what did the alter mean?).  The message of the legislation or Constitution drafters (alter) 
carries an informative meaning which needs to be understood by ego (judge), who may make 
a mistake.”227 
 In accordance with Nino, “the juridical dogmatic accomplished […] an extraordinary 
relevant social function. Regardless of its written law systematization activity, it provides 
their main recipients (judges), much more coherent, complete, precise and adequate, in 
axiological terms, systems of juridical solutions in comparison to the materials created by 
legislators. In this way, the ideal of division of powers is sustained and courts, when facing 
possible gaps, contradictions and ambiguities in legislation are able to justify its sentences 
grounding them on allegedly authentic interpretations of this legislation, not on their own 
opinion. Courts, then, see their interpretative problems reduced.”228 
 All in all, it is possible to note the approach described by civil law scholars and courts 
regarding the interpretation of texts: the interpreter assumes he is applying the statute in the 
better updated way and not creating new law, even if his application attributes senses that 
have never been thought or attributed before to the written law, or even if it contradicts the 
textual meaning. So, his work is viewed as a form of giving attribution to a social fact source.  
 
II.5. Rules and Principles in Brazilian Law 
 
 Justice Luís Roberto Barroso states that “the modern dogmatic approves the 
comprehension that the norms in general, and the constitutional norms in particular, can be 
framed in two big and diverse categories: principles and rules.”229 This classification seems 
to be prevalent among judges and lawyers in Brazil.230 It also seems to be undisputable that 
“principles and rules can direct actions and decisions in certain determined circumstances, 
but the nature of the direction that comes from them varies.”231 This variation is in the core 
of the current debates in Brazil.   
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 The task of providing a precise definition for the current function of rules and 
principles in the Brazilian system may not be an easy one for this and other reasons.232 As 
previously noted, recent scholarship acknowledges that the enactment of the C.F. in 1988 
represented a substantial change in the role of legal rules and of principles in the country 
compared to early scholarly works from the 20th Century. This change is considered the 
main reason for the emergence of the post-positivistic theory.233 It is not the purpose of this 
work to go deeper than necessary to describe the current role of rules and principles.234 
Therefore, some important facts and some influential opinions will be omitted.  
 Indeed, the main purpose of this subchapter is to describe the role legal rules and 
principles serve in helping to decide cases in Brazil. I will basically describe how rules and 
principles orient the actions of judges when they reach a case solution. I will not yet examine 
the position of neoconstitutionalism to evaluate if this line of reasoning is right or wrong. I 
will do that in chapter IV. 
 
II.5.1. Rules and Principles 
 
 When talking about principles, in general, Brazilian scholars will mention Ronald 
Dworkin.235 Citations of Dworkin’s works are commonly made to distinguish rules from 
principles. This logical distinction is largely incorporated in Brazil’s legal works, and jurists 
commonly say that both standards are different species of norms236 and differ in the character 
of the direction they give.237 
 In this sense, rules are commonly understood as being more clearly defined, objective 
and applicable to a specific set of facts. If the situation they regulate occurs, rules generally 
govern. “They are cogent and one either respects them completely or clearly violates 
them.”238 They are mostly described as having an all-or-nothing fashion.239 They are applied 
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 47
by subsumption. If the facts they address occur, certain predeterminate consequences usually 
follow.240 If rules conflict, one shall prevail. The criteria for choosing the one to apply are 
their generality, temporality and hierarchy.241 
 The distinction among primary and secondary rules, which will be explained in the 
subsequent chapter, is present in the country’s legal texts. There are duty-imposing and 
power-conferring rules, as in any other organized legal system.242 There are also metarules 
that guide how other rules should be interpreted, such as the rules that specify the criteria 
used to resolve conflict of rules.243 
 Principles, on the other hand, are traditionally seen as norms with a higher degree of 
abstraction, which do not specify with certainty the action that shall be performed in a wide 
range of situations.244 They are described as an initial goal that demands to be realized by 
consequentially oriented activities.245 They are, therefore, “not definitive but only prima 
                                                          
[sometimes], and the difference between them is almost a matter of form alone.” The use of words like 
"reasonable," "negligent," "unjust," and "significant" often make rules perform the function of principles. “Each 
of these terms makes the application of the rule which contains it depend to some extent upon principles or 
policies lying beyond the rule, and in this way makes that rule itself more like a principle.” Dworkin supra note 
17, at 25. Neves even says that these rules should be understood as hybrids. Therefore, Dworkin would probably 
respond to Neves that they are not talking about the same thing and that Neves probably misunderstood what 
he really meant by principles.  
 The German scholar Robert Alexy has also criticized Dworkin’s all-or-nothing rule approach. He 
argued that rules can only be considered all-or-nothing if all the rule’s exceptions could be enumerated. Since 
even Dworkin agrees that the enumeration of all exceptional cases in which the rule would not apply is 
impossible, because a new exception which will avoid the application of the rule may always arise, Alexy 
contends that the rule will not be ever completely known. 
 Alexy would probably criticize Dworkin’s explanation for why a rule that is written even with broad 
standards cannot be turned into a principle (but merely keep serving the role of a principle). Dworkin argues 
that “even the least confining of these terms restricts the kind of other principles and policies on which the rule 
depends” and gives an example of how an unreasonable contract could not be enforced if there were a principle 
or policy that would impose the enforcement of this contract. In this sense, he concludes that if there was no 
rule, but merely a policy against enforcing unreasonable contracts or a principle that unfair contracts ought not 
to be enforced, the contracts might be enforced without alteration of the law. Alexy would probably say that 
this example only proves his point that it is impossible to settle all cases in which a rule would apply, because 
an underlying principle or policy could always add an exception to the rule. As Marcelo Neves observes, for 
Alexy, “all rules are only applicable in terms of the ‘all-or-nothing’ fashion at the end of the process of 
concretization, when all possible and relevant exceptions for the solution of the case have been excluded.” 
ROBERT ALEXY, DIREITO, RAZÃO, DISCURSO – ESTUDOS PARA A FILOSOFIA DO DIREITO 144-145 (Porto Alegre: 
Livraria do Advogado, 2nd, 2015). 
 All in all, despite these jurisprudential debates, which will be better examined ahead, Dworkin’s 
logical distinction between rules and principles is usually referred to by Brazilian judges. However, it does not 
nearly describe all types of most common uses of principles in the legal system and may mean that Dworkin’s 
classification was improperly understood by most Brazilian lawyers and that it is not appropriate to reflect the 
common use of these standards in Brazil. See NEVES, supra note 21, at 16-18, 61, 104. See also CÓDIGO PENAL 
[C.P.] [CRIMINAL CODE] art. 94, II (Braz.); See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 55, II 
(Braz.). 
240 See Zagrebelsky, supra note 26, at 629. 
241 In Brazil, the conflict of rules is solved by declaring one of them invalid. Normally, these conflicts are 
solved by applying the following criteria: (1) hierarchy: the superior rule prevails over the inferior (lex superior 
derogat legi inferiori); (2) temporality: the more recent rule prevails over the older one (lex porterior derogat 
legi priori); and (3) generality: the special rule prevails over the general rule (lex specialis derogat legi generali). 
See LEI DE INTRODUÇÃO ÀS NORMAS DO DIREITO BRASILEIRO [L.I.N.D.B.] [INTRODUCTORY ACT TO THE 
BRAZILIAN NORMS] art. 2, par. 1° and 2° (Braz.). See Subchapter II.5.5. 
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facie requirements.”246 They are subject to the logic of the possible and, within this ambit, 
they often meet other conflicting principles.247 They need to be harmonized, relativized and 
balanced.248 The fact that they are not applied in a case or are applied without full force does 
not mean that they are invalid. They have dimensions of weight and are considered 
optimization requirements.249 
 
 II.5.2. Dworkin’s Principle Source Argument (No Pedigree) 
 
 Since Dworkin is a commonly referred source for the definition of principles, it is 
important to analyze if his doctrine well explains the Brazilian use of principles.  
 Dworkin’s well-known attack on positivism focuses primarily on the impossibility 
of a social fact model of rules to capture the role that principles play in the law. Dworkin 
contends that the legality of principles depends on their content, not on their source. He 
claims that the power of principles come from their sense of appropriateness, but not from 
some test of pedigree:250 
 
“The origin of these as legal principles lies not in a particular 
decision of some legislature or court, but in a sense of 
appropriateness developed in the profession and the public 
over time. Their continued power depends upon this sense of 
appropriateness being sustained. If it no longer seemed unfair 
to allow people to profit by their wrongs, or fair to place 
special burdens upon oligopolies that manufacture potentially 
dangerous machines, these principles would no longer play 
much of a role in new cases, even if they had never been 
overruled or repealed. (Indeed, it hardly makes sense to speak 
of principles like these as being "overruled" or "repealed." 
When they decline they are eroded, not torpedoed).” 251 
 
 Of course, Dworkin does not deny that institutional support plays an important role 
in asserting the force of principles. He argues that if the judge resorts to prior cases to justify 
a principled decision in which that principle was cited or figured in the argument, or if the 
judge mentions any statute that seemed to exemplify that principle, or even if the principle 
was cited in the preamble of the statute, or in the committee reports or other legislative 
documents that accompanied it, all these facts of course could be considered and would give 
more weight to the principle.252 
 But these aspects are not essential for him. As Scott Shapiro points out, “Dworkin’s 
argument appears to be this: the legal impact of a principle’s institutional support on its 
legality and weight is itself determined by principles, namely, those relating to institutions 
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and their authority. […] These institutional principles […] are supported by very broad 
principles of political morality.”253  
 Therefore, as Shapiro observes, “Dworkin believes that no rule could be fashioned 
that accurately reflect the verdicts of all these principles, presumably because the 
possibilities that would have to be considered and codified are infinite in number. Moreover, 
these principles and their weights fluctuate overtime, based on their own degree of 
institutional support, and hence any resulting master rule would fail to be stable.”254 In 
Dworkin’s own words: 
 
“Yet we could not devise any formula for testing how much 
and what kind of institutional support is necessary to make a 
principle a legal principle, still less to fix its weight at a 
particular order of magnitude. We argue for a particular 
principle by grappling with a whole set of shifting, developing 
and interacting standards (themselves principles rather than 
rules) about institutional responsibility, statutory 
interpretation, the persuasive force of various sorts of 
precedent, the relation of all these to contemporary moral 
practices, and hosts of other such standards.”255 
 
 Dworkin’s refined view of principles seems to vary substantially from how civil law 
jurists traditionally see their legal principles and also differs from the prevalent view in the 
Brazilian constitutional law stage. This assertion will be examined in the following 
chapter,256 but the main reasons for this conclusion will be detailed in the subchapters below. 
  
II.5.3. The Civil Law Jurist’s view of Principles 
 
 This subchapter has the purpose of showing what is the most popular understanding 
of the role of principles in Brazilian law, both as to their origins and their functions. 
 The civil law jurist historically has dealt with principles in law reasoning. The fact 
that she has traditionally acknowledged written laws as the major source of law creation 
never precluded her from formulating arguments and from deciding cases grounded on this 
type of standards. And this is true nowadays in her practice. 
In summary, according to the former S.T.F Justice Eros Grau, the system of law is 
composed of:  
 
[i] general principles of law, […] as the principle of unjust 
enrichment; 
 
[ii] implied principles, which are inferred as a result of the 
analysis of one or more constitutional precepts or of one or 
multiple statutes; and  
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[iii] written principles, which are set forth in the text of the 
C.F. or of statutes.257 
   
II.5.3.1. General Principles of Law 
 
 Principles had generally a supplementary role in Brazilian law in most of the 20th 
Century.258 In fact, this supplementary trait may be perceived in the wording of article 4 of 
the Introductory Act to the Brazilian Norms, a statute enacted in 1940 with the purpose of 
guiding judges in the application of the law. Pursuant to article 4, “when the [written] law 
has a gap, the judge will decide the case by means of analogy, customs and the general 
principles of law.”259 A similar provision—article 7—existed in the former Brazilian Civil 
Code, which was enacted in 1916 and remained in force until 2003.260 However, there has 
been a matter of controversy on which are the general principles of law. 
 There is a division among scholars as to whether judges, resorting to the general 
principles of law, are authorized to apply natural law. This dispute is sustained on the fact 
that some civil law countries expressly restrict the content of these principles as being the 
one that the positive legal system grants. This is the case, for example, in Italy and Spain. 
Both countries adopt a positivistic view of this concept, as opposed to a naturalistic view.261 
 The article 12 of the Italian Civil Code states that “[i]f a dispute cannot be decided 
by a specific provision, consideration shall be given to the provisions governing such cases 
or similar matters; if the case remains unsolved, it shall be decided according to the general 
principles of the legal state.” 262  The fact that the text makes reference to the general 
principles of the legal state is seen as a prohibition of use of ius naturale.  
 A similar, but no so clear, precept is set forth in the Spanish Civil Code. Article 1, 
item 4, establishes that “[g]eneral legal principles shall apply in the absence of applicable 
statute or custom, without prejudice to the fact that they contribute to shape the legal 
system.”263 
 Some traditional Brazilian authors have argued this approach in classical law 
books.264 However, the author of the bill that resulted in the approval of the first Brazilian 
Civil Code by the Brazilian Congress in 1916, Clovis Bevilaqua, was a defender of the 
natural law position: 
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“The general principles of law, unlike what some contend, do 
not refer to the general principles of the national law, but to the 
current fundamental elements of the human legal culture; to 
the ideas and principles over which the dominant juridical 
conception rests; to the inductions and generalizations of the 
legal science and of the technique precepts.  
Such principles, some criticize, are vague, undetermined. But 
they are not that much. Certainly, we shall deeply enter in the 
legal philosophy, in the history of civilization, and with the 
spirit equipped by a careful legal education, in order to 
undertake the investigation of the general principles of law. 
[…] Notions of freedom, liberty, equity, morality, sociology 
and compared legislation concur to detach from the whole set 
of ideas, which are the basis of modern civilization, the general 
principles of law.”265   
  
 Finally, since the article 4 of the Introductory Act to the Brazilian Norms, cited above, 
does not prohibit the judge to resort to natural law when applying general principles of law, 
some judges have done exactly that in recent cases. For example, the quote below is a part 
of a case summary decided in 2017 by the Superior Tribunal de Justiça [S.T.J.], the Brazilian 
highest court for statutory interpretation: 
 
“[...] in cases such as this one, it is possible to clearly denote 
that the demand’s solution does not find grounds in the 
positivity of the Bid Invitation Document, being inevitable for 
the judge to resort to general principles of law, especially to 
values such as equality, reasonableness and proportionality, 
among other things, since positive reason does not help her in 
writing a fair opinion.”266 
 
 For the purposes of this thesis, it is worth emphasizing that the first major opening of 
the Brazilian legal system to principles in adjudication took place with the enactment of 
article 4 of the Introductory Act to the Brazilian Norms, Brazil’s closure rule,267 which allows 
the judge to turn to general principles of law to decide a case that has no solution on the 
posited norms and cannot be appropriately solved by resorting to analogy or customs. 
 
II.5.3.2. Implied Principles 
 
 Another manner that principles enter into the legal discourse of the Brazilian system 
is similar to what happens in Italy regarding the comprehension of the general principles of 
law.  
 Nino contends that “in addition to the legislation rationality, the dogmatic applies 
various argumentative tools to show as compatible their adherence to the written legislation, 
avoiding its formal imperfections and adapting the text of the law to the current evaluating 
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standards.”268 He explains that a relevant technique is the work jurists perform to systematize 
the written law, building a body of legal principles, which are more general and allegedly 
equal to the enacted law. In this sense, the jurist describes the system in a simple manner, as 
a set of few principles, whose logical consequences are easy to determine.269 
 Joseph Raz, in an article in which he criticizes Dworkin’s definition of principles, 
stated that “not everything that looks like a legal principle is a legal principle, at least not in 
the sense that Professor Dworkin has in mind.”270 The first example he gives is this dogmatic 
judge’s tool pointed out by Nino. Raz asserts that courts and scholars, by invoking principles, 
refer summarily to a body of legal rules without specifying their content in detail. But Raz 
says that “they are not statements of the contents of laws of a special type, namely legal 
principles. They are merely a brief allusion to a number of rules.”271 He calls this method of 
reasoning individuation of rules. He gives an example regarding freedom of speech in the 
U.S. law: 
 
“Someone may say that in this country the principle of 
freedom of speech is recognized by law. When asked what he 
means he may say that the only laws setting limits to the liberty 
to express opinions are concerned with libel and military 
security; that censorship of films, books and the theatre must 
be justified by the protection of the infants; that there are 
detailed regulations guaranteeing access to the mass media to 
people representing all shades of opinions on public matters; 
and so on. His statement that in his country freedom of speech 
is recognized by law can thus be seen to be a summary 
reference to a great number of laws, not a statement of the 
content of a single law.”272 
  
 This definition, which for Raz differs from the one Dworkin is talking about when 
referring to principles,273 is the definition alluded by Nino above.  
 In the context of civil law, Nino points out that the method of individuation of many 
rules in general principles does not imply, for the civil law judge, a modification in the legal 
system, if the statements that are made remain in the same reach as the enacted rules. 
However, he claims that “it is not rare for dogmatic jurists to overstep this limit, proposing 
general principles in substitution to various norms of the system, but which, at the same time, 
have a field of reference longer than the whole body of substituted rules and allowing new 
principles not included in the original system derive and fulfilling system gaps.”274 Nino 
asserts that the new norms are introduced in an almost unnoticed manner, because they seem 
as mere logical consequences of the rules that were encompassed in the principle.275  
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 At last, the Argentinian scholar compares this technique of identifying implied 
principles with another similar one, also adopted by the civil law jurist, which he claims to 
be a bit more sophisticated. The civil law lawyer also, by grouping statements of written 
laws, formulates “theories.”276  
 The most relevant theory in Brazil nowadays is the theory of fundamental rights 
articulated in most constitutional law school books, grounded on the reading of article 5 of 
the C.F., which is Brazil’s equivalent document to the Bill of Rights. 
  
II.5.3.3. Written Principles 
 
 The Brazilian Constitution and many of its statutes also establish a wide variety of 
principles. As an example: 
 
“Art. 34. The Union shall not intervene in the States or in the 
Federal District, except to: 
[…] 
VII. ensure compliance with the following constitutional 
principles:    
a. republican form, representative system and democratic 
regime;  
b. individual rights;   
c. county autonomy;    
d. rendering of accounts of direct and indirect public 
administration;   
e. application of the minimum required by the receipts 
resulting from the state taxes, including those stemming from 
transfers, for maintenance and development of education and 
for public health activities and services.”277 
 
[…] 
 
“Art 37. The direct or indirect public administration of any of 
the Branches of the Union, States, Federal District and 
Counties, shall obey the principles of legality, impersonality, 
morality, publicity and efficiency, as well as the following: 
[…] .”278 
 
 Following this C.F. tendency of writing down principles—but not only due to this 
circumstance—it became common to include principles in the text of statutes. A good 
example is article 2 of Lei No. 9.784/1999, which regulates administrative proceedings in 
Brazil: 
 
“Art. 2 The public administration shall obey, among others, the 
principles of legality, finality, motivation, reasonableness, 
proportionality, morality, full defense, contradictory, legal 
certainty, public interest and efficiency.”279 
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 The federal statute that sets forth practices of administrative improbity also has 
provisions which spell out principles that shall be obeyed by public authorities and 
employees: 
 
“Art. 4. Public agents of any level or hierarchy have an 
obligation to strictly follow the principles of legality, 
impersonality, morality and publicity in matters that they 
handle.”280 
 
 This type of norm is also present in legal texts of other civil law countries. In 
Colombia, for example, article 209 of the Constitution sets forth that the “administrative 
function is at service of general interest and is developed based on the principles of equality, 
morality, efficiency, economy, celerity, impartiality and publicity, through the 
decentralization, delegation and deconcentrating functions.”281 The German Constitution 
also has several principles in its text. For example, in article 33, item 5, which regulates equal 
citizenship in public service, there is a provision that states: “[t]he law governing the public 
service shall be regulated and developed with due regard to the traditional principles of the 
professional civil service.”282 
 Therefore, Brazil, as well as some other civil law countries, expressly took the 
position to include standards in rulebooks and attribute them the qualification of principles.  
 The fact that these norms are qualified as principles translates an attitude to judges 
and lawyers as to how they view the role of these standards in legal reasoning. Indeed, 
traditional logical properties of principles such as not falling into the “all-or-nothing” fashion 
and having dimensions of weight are commonly predicated by Brazilian jurists to these 
posited standards.283 As Joseph Raz precisely observes, “the word ‘principles’ usually carries 
an implication of greater generality and greater importance than the word ‘rules.’”284 
 The importance of this validity dependence on the case is mostly noted when one 
reads the traditional type of written norm that sets forth these principles. Usually, many 
principles are listed in the same legal precept and some give contradictory instructions to the 
determinations given by others. One that carefully reads article 2 of Lei No. 9.784/1999, cited 
above, may note that the application of principles of legality, morality, legal certainty and 
efficiency may be contradictory in a specific set of facts. If a public employee has to be 
efficient in his task, he may not be able to apply, in a strict sense, some posited norms that 
would ordinarily be applied to the case. This departure may be seen as a violation of legality, 
especially if the enforcing authorities understand that strict application of norms has more 
weight and is more important than achieving efficiency in the situation. 
 Therefore, defining the content of principles, but particularly the content of posited 
principles, may be a difficult task for the interpreter. The meaning of some written principles, 
like “county autonomy” or “republican form, representative system and democratic regime” 
is, in most of cases, settled in advance in other rules. Their content is most likely to be 
construed taking into account express rules concerning these issues in the C.F. text as well 
as in other statutes. But the content of other posited principles will have to be settled as the 
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situations arise. Take the principle of administrative morality, for example. In one of the first 
cases in which this principle was interpreted (or concretized) by the S.T.F., the Justices 
commented the difficulties that it brings for the interpreter. During oral debates, Justice Néri 
da Silveira stated that “the morality principle is currently a constitutional principle and it will 
be up to the Supreme Court to define it, in our system.”285 Nevertheless, article 4 of the 
administrative improbity statute, which was quoted above, states that public agents of any 
level or hierarchy have an obligation to strictly follow the principle of morality in the matters 
that they handle.286 
 Regarding the application of principles, Justice Barroso argues that “as they do not 
put in detail the conduct to be followed for its concretization, the activity of the interpreter 
will be more complex, because it will be up to her to define the direction to take.”287 He adds 
that, “in relation to principles, an additional hardship may be stated: the goal to be reached 
or the ideal state to be transformed in reality may not be objectively determined, which will 
demand a subjective integration by the interpreter. A principle has a minimal sense and range, 
an essential core, in which it is equated to rules. But, from a determined point, nevertheless, 
the interpreter walks into an undetermined space, in which the demarcation of its content will 
be subjected to the interpreter’s ideological or philosophical conception.”288 
 This idea of the existence of a core in principles was endorsed by the S.T.F. in the 
nepotism cases mentioned in subchapter II.2. It is possible to note from the following 
quotation of Justice Ricardo Lewandowski’s opinion that the S.T.F. concluded that the 
principle of morality listed in article 37 of the C.F. has a “fixed core,” a “certain zone” and 
nepotism lies inside these areas: 
 
“This morality is not an element of the administrative act, […] 
but is fulfilled with ethical values culturally shared by the 
community, which are part, due to this fact, of the legal order 
in force. 
The semantic indetermination of the principles of morality and 
impersonality cannot be an obstacle to the determination of the 
rule of prohibition of nepotism. As Garcia de Enterria well 
points out, in the structure of every undetermined concept, it 
shall be identified a ‘fixed core’ (Begriffkern) or a ‘certain 
zone’ that is composed of previous and safe data, from which 
an applicable rule to the case can be extracted. The prohibition 
of nepotism is a constitutional rule that is inside the zone of 
determination of the principles of morality and impersonality.” 
289 
 
  A final remark is that Lenio Streck has articulated that the introduction of written 
principles in the law has made the concept of general principles of law, analyzed in 
subchapter II.5.3.1., outdated. Although I disagree with his position and the recent precedent 
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I have cited in that subchapter shows that the concept is still applied,290 it is true that the 
concept has lost its importance due to the vast number of principles that have been written 
into legal norms, because it is more difficult for a judge to consider a gap in the system: 
 
“The general principles of law are constructions of the 
nineteenth century, which have the purpose to solve the 
problem represented by the closure of the legal system, 
“closed” by article 4 of the French Civil Code. That is, the 
general principles of law were introduced as a criterion for 
closing the system, aiming to preserve, therefore, the pureness 
and integrity of the world of rules. It is no longer possible to 
talk about general principles of law in the era of constitutional 
principles (if someone talks about it, bad luck – it is outdated; 
and even if the S.T.F. uses it, the observation has the same 
equal value). Who asks this question (or affirmation) does not 
know that there has been a discontinuity between general 
principles of law and constitutional principles.291 
 
 Although Streck takes this position, it is a fact that in 2010, Congress passed a statute 
attributing the name of Introductory Act to the Brazilian Norms, instead of Introductory Act 
to the Civil Code, to Decreto-Lei 4.567, of 1940. Article 4 of such decree-law, as shown in 
the beginning of this subchapter, is the one that states that judges may resort to general 
principles of law. Streck’s position, therefore, seems to be contradictory to Congress’ intent. 
Indeed, he strongly criticized the enactment of the statute that changed the name of this 
decree-law, claiming that this norm is incoherent with the contemporaneous 
constitutionalism model.292 However, his point is important because the relevance of general 
principles of law in legal reasoning has diminished. That is the reason I have stated in the 
introductory chapter that the supplementary character of principles has evolved into being at 
the center of the legal system. 
 
II.5.4. The Breadth of Principles 
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 Another relevant distinction is the civil law view of the breadth of principles, 
especially the Brazilian one, in comparison to Dworkin’s view. In Hard Cases, Dworkin 
asserts that “[a]rguments of principle are arguments intended to establish an individual goal; 
arguments of policy are arguments intended to establish a collective goal. Principles are 
propositions that describe rights; policies are propositions that describe goals.”293 Alexy, on 
the other hand, remarks that “[p]rinciples can be related both to individual rights and to 
collective interests.”294  
 Dworkin, therefore, claims that principles are linked to individual rights. But by the 
reading of posited principles and of the cases cited in subsection II.2, one may conclude that 
Dworkin’s view is narrow in comparison to the concept used in Brazil and probably in most 
civil law jurisdictions, where this distinction between arguments of policy and arguments of 
principle is not clearly drawn. The definition of principles such as democracy in the party 
loyalty cases and administrative morality in the nepotism cases were not made to protect 
individual rights. On the contrary, by affirming that political seats belong to the parties in 
proportional elections, the S.T.F. was mostly advancing a goal of strengthening party fidelity 
and, therefore, in the Court’s view, protecting the interests of the whole society, not of one 
specific person. The same took place in asserting that appointing public official relatives to 
public positions is a violation of the principle of morality. The goal was to avoid personal 
privileges in the Public Administration.  
 Alexy recognizes the importance of the distinction between individual rights and 
collective interests. But he adds that “it is neither necessary nor desirable to tie the concept 
of a principle to that of an individual right. The common logical characteristics of both types 
of principle, which Dworkin alludes to his ‘principles in the generic sense’, and which 
become patently obvious when principles compete, make a wider concept of principle appear 
more suitable.” 295 He claims that Dworkin’s distinction can be made within that wider 
concept if one wishes. 
 Dworkin, in an article in which he offered a response to overseas commentators of 
his work, addressed the difficulties that his distinction between policies and principles pose 
for some countries, due to the way these nations’ constitutions are written. When offering 
comments to an article authored by Arthur Chaskalson, former Chief Justice of the 
Constitutional Court of South Africa, he observed that: 
 
“The quality of Chaskalson’s Court and his own role in leading 
that Court is evident in his discussions of some of its most 
important decisions, and, in particular, its decisions enforcing 
what are often called socioeconomic constitutional rights. 
People’s moral rights against their government include not 
only what are called ‘negative’ freedoms—the right to 
important liberties, like freedom of speech, religion, and 
conscience, and rights to a fair trial—but also ‘positive’ rights 
to support for their basic needs of health, housing, and 
education that is consistent with the economic resources of 
their community. Traditional constitutions, including the 
American Constitution, provide guarantees of certain negative 
rights that are enforceable by courts. But they do not make 
explicit provisions for positive rights except for making hard 
policy decisions about resource application, strategy, timing, 
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and these decisions are better made by officials who are 
directly responsible to the electorate than by judges. 
Following World War II, however, many of the newer 
constitutions did include guarantees of positive rights, either 
as nonjusticiable, as aspirations or as judicially enforceable 
mandates. The framers of the South Africa’s new Constitution 
believed, understandably, that they could not deny positive 
constitutional assurance to the majority of citizens who had 
been deprived of the basic requisites of human dignity for so 
long, and so they chose to include carefully drafted and 
judicially enforceable positive rights in the form Chaskalson 
describes.”296 
 
 The Brazilian C.F. has made reference to several social goals and purposes that 
ultimately are considered socioeconomic fundamental rights. Some of those rights are 
treated as principles in legal reasoning. The content of these principles, in the Brazilian 
current legal practice conventions, is seen not as mere aspirations but as judicially 
enforceable mandates.297  
  
II.5.5. Interpretation of Rules and Concretization of Principles 
 
 In a world dominated by the written law, texts have to be interpreted and the judge’s 
task, therefore, has traditionally been to rationally express the content of the words of the 
enacted law when adjudicating a case.   
 The literal meaning of the text initially dominated legal interpretation. The 
importance of this method came from ancient times. 298  However, Friedrich Carl Von 
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Savigny, in a 1840 treatise on Roman Law, 299  argued for a new “regular method for 
interpretation of law.”300 He asserted that there are three techniques for legal interpretation 
that shall be considered: (1) textual, verbal or grammatic; (2) systematic, structural or 
contextual and (3) historical.301 Further, reacting to the problem of an environment in fast 
transformation, Savigny added a fourth technique: (4) purposive or teleological 
interpretation.302 
 Savigny’s work was of decisive importance in Brazil and there is no doubt that any 
Brazilian judge or lawyer that interprets a statute, until today, considers Savigny’s four 
techniques appropriate and applies them. The four methods were first used to interpret rules 
but are also relevant to construe the content of principles. 
 There is a general notion in the country that these four methods must be combined. 
None shall be deemed absolute. Therefore, the literal meaning is not considered the most 
important and relevant mode for achieving the right interpretative result. The others are 
treated as supplementary to it. On the contrary, some precedents mention that the maximum 
in claris cessat interpretatio [“when [law] is clear, it does not need interpretation]303 is no 
longer pertinent for the majority, if not all cases.304 Some authors, like the S.T.F. Justice 
Gilmar Mendes and Professor Paulo Branco, even contend that “it is correct the result that, 
through the successive utilization of all methods of interpretation, transmits the meaning of 
the law.” 305 Brugger also makes the same point:  
 
“One should avoid concentrating on any particular one method 
or on any school of jurisprudence that focuses solely on the 
textual, contextual, historical, or teleological perspective. This 
may be seen a trivial criterion, but it is not without 
consequences. It leads to the critique of simplistic premises 
such as: ‘law is (or should only be) politics’, ‘the law is (or 
should only be’ in the books, ‘law is (or should be) restricted 
to what historically was willed’, law only reflects (or should 
only reflect) economic rationality’, etc. Consequently, my 
advice may be stated thus: Let us adhere to some form of 
integration theory when applying methods of interpretation 
and assessing schools of jurisprudence.”306 
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 Therefore, in Brazil, due to Savigny’s influence and to the dominance of his mode of 
thinking, there is no debate whether it would be acceptable for judges to adopt a purposive 
interpretation when interpreting statutes and/or the Constitution. Purposive reasoning shall 
be used in the majority, if not all cases since there is no hierarchy among this technique and 
the other three. There is not a “fear of purposive interpretation of law and legal institution,” 
as observed by Lon Fuller, when he criticized H.L.A. Hart’s positivism. 307  
 Regarding the different views of common law jurists with respect to the civil law 
Savigny’s teleological method, Lord Denning, from the U.K., asserts the following: 
 
“They adopt a method which they call in English by strange 
words—at any rate they were strange to me—the "schematic 
and teleological" method of interpretation. It is not really so 
alarming as it sounds. All it means is that the judges do not go 
by the literal meaning of the words or by the grammatical 
structure of the sentence. They go by the design or purpose 
which lies behind it. When they come upon a situation which 
is to their minds within the spirit—but not the letter—of the 
legislation, they solve the problem by looking at the design and 
purpose of the legislature—at the effect which it was sought to 
achieve. They then interpret the legislation so as to produce the 
desired effect. This means that they fill in gaps, quite 
unashamedly, without hesitation. They ask simply: What is the 
sensible way of dealing with this situation so as to give effect 
to the presumed purpose of the legislation? They lay down the 
law accordingly. If you study the decisions of the European 
Court, you will see that they do it every day. To our eyes— 
shortsighted by tradition—it is legislation, pure and simple. 
But, to their eyes, it is fulfilling the true role of the Courts. 
They are giving effect to what the legislature intended, or may 
be presumed to have intended. I see nothing wrong in this.”308 
 
 The civil law judge does not behave in the same way as some U.S. judges do 
regarding the need to update statutory law or the understanding of the constitutional text, at 
least with respect to the textualist views. In the U.S., legal scholars specify two paths that 
judges follow when identifying mistakes in legal texts. “One strain, represented by Judge 
Foster [in Lon Fuller’s classic book ‘The Case of the Speluncean Explores’ 309 ] […], 
emphasizes statutory purposes and sees judges and agencies as helpful partners as well as 
normative updaters in the ongoing statutory enterprise.310 The other strain, represented by 
Judge Keen [also from Fuller’s book], emphasizes the rule-of-law virtues in following 
statutory plain meanings and the greater institutional competence of the legislature to make 
and update public policy.”311 
 Judge Keen’s approach, similar to the argument advocated by Justice Antonin 
Scalia’s textualism, which does not take a progressive role in solving statute problems and 
                                                          
307 Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630, 669 
(1958). 
308 Buchanan & Company Ltd. v Babco (U.K.) [1977] QB 208, [1976] EWCA Civ 9. 
309 Lon F. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers 62 (4) Harv. L. Rev. 616 (1949). 
310 ESKRIDGE JR. ET. ALL, supra note 136, at 507. 
311 Id. 
 
 61
advance public policy, would likely be understood to be wrong in Brazil and would probably 
be considered contrary to the judge’s duty set forth in article 5 of the Introductory Act to the 
Brazilian Norms, which states that “in the application of the law, the judge shall observe the 
social goals to which the law is oriented and the demands of the common good.”312 If the 
interpretation goes beyond the application of linguistic laws, through a “corrective 
interpretation”, the civil law jurist will probably attribute it to a logical interpretation.313 
Civil law jurists consider that the interpreter may be able to better understand a text than the 
text drafter understood it.314  
 Patricia Perrone confirms this view. She takes the position that by grounding an 
interpretation on its teleological element, the judge goes along with the evolutive 
comprehension of the C.F., “discovering the interpretation of its commands to situations not 
originally foreseen and, consequently, changing its content, without modifying its text, in 
order to fulfill the ends that justify its norms when facing new realities.”315 
 This necessity of updating the constitutional and the statutory law was also an issue 
identified when the legal dogmatic approach was described in subchapter II.4.2. As said, the 
juridical dogmatics has been considered essential to the administration of justice and to the 
development of the law. The applied techniques, like the teleological method and the rational 
legislator myth, among others, perform the relevant mission of adapting the law to certain 
rational and axiological standards.  
 According to Thomas Vesting, “the environmental pressure fatally burdened the act 
of interpretation, giving rise to fresh judgment; the factual reach was transformed in each 
new case as the result of selections through systemic stable rules and, in turn, totally 
controlled in the system.”316 As noted, “either the quaestio juris of a life circumstance is 
already anticipated by the law of the jurists or by the political legislative activity or, if this 
is not the case, at least, the adjudicator may solve it through literal, logic, gap-filling or, 
eventually, analogic interpretation, in the deductive sense employed. The system always has 
a readily response, at least ideally.”317 
 Some civil law jurists [at least some modern ones] use different words when they 
analyze the content of rules and principles. If rules are interpreted, the same cannot be said 
of principles. As Zagrebelsky remarks, “it is not interpretation – in the sense this term is used 
by jurists – because the wording that expresses legal principles contains very little to be 
interpreted.”318 
 As seen in subchapter II.5.3.3., especially due to the fact that the legislative branches 
have expressly included legal principles in the text of statutes and, more significantly, of the 
C.F., contemporary constitutional scholars began to take the position that it is not right to 
say that these norms must be interpreted but must be concretized. Concretization does not 
reveal a solution that is in the text but sets a dialectic process of creatively determining results 
in conformity with, but not determined by, the C.F..319 This term is commonly used by many 
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well-kwon jurists, like Winfried Brugger,320 Gustavo Zagrebelsky,321 Thomas Vesting,322 
Karl Larenz,323 Marcelo Neves,324 among others.  
 The main debate that takes place is whether the act of concretization of principles 
reflects creation of new law. Zagrebelsky denies it. He points out that “the case already falls 
under the law”325 and adds that “[i]n the presence of a pertinent principle, the judge cannot 
invoke the lack of a law to reject a question as lacking legal relevance. He must, on the 
contrary, reason constructively about the case, in light of the relevant principle and from this 
position give an answer.”326 
 On the other hand, Thomas Vesting: 
 
“the supporters of the concretization model agree unanimously 
that a legal argumentation that locates itself beyond the logical 
deductive methods is inescapable, especially, due to the 
undetermined character of the major premises. This 
supposition seems imperative, in that it would not be necessary 
any methodologic theory that reflects over the interpretive 
method, if law’s interpretation could take place in a totally 
deductive way,if it were not more than imperative 
subsumption according to the logic. Today, in any case, the 
methodologic theory majorly considers that interpretation 
(juridical) itself is creative, that it is, so as to speak, the very 
creation of the law; today, few stick to an idea of strict 
deduction of the application of the law.”327  
 
 In fact, Vesting points out that the very use of a new linguistic expression, such as 
concretization instead of interpretation, traces to this comprehension of law creation, instead 
of mere deduction of rules: “[f]or expressing the difference in comparison to the juridical-
positivistic model of application and subsumption even linguistically, the term 
‘interpretation’ has been since the sixties on ongoing replacement by other terms like 
‘obtaining the law,’ ‘legal work,’ ‘legal argumentation’ or even ‘law concretization.’ 
Sometimes, ‘interpretation’ and ‘law concretization’ may be considered opposites.”328 
 Another remark is that Alexy asserts that “principles can be reasons for decisions, 
that is, for concrete ought-judgements.”329 He argues that principles are not merely reasons 
for rules but may be reasons for actions.330 
 This assertion is to a great extent adopted by Brazilian judges. As shown in subsection 
II.2, although neither the C.F. nor any statute had ever expressly outlawed the practice of 
nepotism, the S.T.F. ruled that the prohibition derived from the republican principles of 
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morality, impersonality, equality and efficiency, which are set forth in Article 37 of the 
constitutional text.331 Hence, posited principles were the main source for the decisions.  
 Finally, I agree with Joseph Raz’s assertion regarding the five different purposes that 
he points out that principles are used in law.332 Principles serve as grounds (a) for interpreting 
laws; (b) for changing laws; (c) for finding particular exceptions to laws; (d) for making new 
rules; and (e) for justifying action in particular cases. This list, nevertheless, is not complete 
and other authors may point other common uses.333 
  
II.5.6. Conflict of Rules and of Principles 
 
 The conflict of rules is traditionally solved by declaring one of them invalid or 
inapplicable. 334 Normally, these conflicts are solved by applying the following criteria: (1) 
hierarchy: the superior rule prevails over the inferior (lex superior derogat legi inferiori); (2) 
temporal: the more recent rule prevails over the older one (lex porterior derogat legi priori); 
and (3) generality: the special rule prevails over the general rule (lex specialis derogat legi 
generali). This is what is established in article 2, §§ 1st and 2nd, of the Introductory Act to 
the Brazilian Norms.335 
 The idea of conflicting principles is a more recent debated issue in Brazilian 
jurisprudence. The doctrine most frequently advanced in Brazilian legal books and in court 
decisions is Robert Alexy’s balancing theory, exposed in Theory of Constitutional Rights.336 
 According to the German scholar, when two principles compete, the issue must be 
resolved by balancing the conflicting interests served by these principles. The judge must 
decide which principle (that have equal status in the abstract) has greater weight in the 
concrete situation. 337  The solution will establish a conditional relation of precedence 
between the principles in light of the concrete circumstances. Alexy points out that “the 
relation of precedence is conditional because in the context of the case conditions are laid 
down under which one of the principles takes precedence. Given other conditions, the issue 
of precedence might be reversed.”338 
 Alexy notes that the important point in the theory of condition of precedence is that 
“the court is no longer speaking about the precedence of a principle, requirement, interest, 
claim, right or any other subject; rather conditions are being identified under which there is 
breach of constitutional rights.”339 
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 An example of balancing was given in the vaquejada case. The S.T.F. weighed the 
cruelty of the vaquejada against the benefits of the cultural practice and established that 
cruelty against the animals had precedence, striking down the State of Ceara statute.  
 Balancing became such a dominant technique in adjudication that the new Civil 
Procedure Code [C.P.C], enacted in 2016, incorporated it in its text. The C.P.C. states that 
“in the case of collision of norms, the judge shall justify the object and the general criterion 
of the balancing adopted, stating the reasons that authorize the interference of the displaced 
norm and the factual premises that ground the conclusion.”340 
 Zabrebelsky points out that this relation of precedence is also made by legislatures 
when drafting rules.341 In the vaquejada case, the State of Ceara Assembly had supposedly 
done it. But, according to Brazilian conventions and to article 102 of the C.F., the S.T.F. has 
the power to review the constitutionality of this decision.  
 Another widely agreed approach to solving conflicts of principles is the application 
of the principle of proportionality. According to Alexy, the “nature of principles implies the 
principle of proportionality. […] If a constitutional right norm competes with another 
principle, then the legal possibilities for realizing that norm depend on competing principles. 
To reach a decision, one needs to engage in a balancing exercise as required by the Law of 
Competing Principles.”342 
 Proportionality in judicial practice instructs the judge to consider three subprinciples: 
necessity, suitability and proportionality in a narrow sense. Alexy notes that the first two 
follow from the nature of principles as optimization requirements relative to what is factually 
possible, whereas the last one derives from its relation as to what is legally possible.343 
 The most controversial case in which the principle of proportionality was applied was 
possibly the Habeas Corpus n° 82.424,344 the so-called Ellwanger case, decided in 2003, by 
the S.T.F.. This case discussed whether the publication of a Holocaust denial book 
configured racism, a non-bailable and imprescriptible crime in Brazil. By a 7 to 3 vote, the 
court denied the habeas corpus and allowed the criminal lawsuit to proceed. Two of the 
Justices, Gilmar Mendes and Marco Aurélio, applied the principle of proportionality, but 
reached contradictory results. Mendes, after reviewing the book, asserted that it had no 
historical revisionist purpose and represented a mere attack on the Jewish population. 
Therefore, he reasoned that in the collision of freedom of speech and nondiscrimination 
principles, both established in the C.F., the latter should prevail. Marco Aurélio, on the other 
hand, considered that the content of the book did not cause imminent violence and simply 
represented the defendant’s personal opinion. He stated that the case involved a book whose 
ideas were intolerant and anti-Semitic but did not incite racist violence. Therefore, in 
weighing the same principles, he concluded that the crime of racism had not been 
committed.345 Proportionality, then, allows subjectivity in judgment.  
 Justice Luís Roberto Barroso also points out that the principle of proportionality has 
mostly been applied as a criterion for examining the reasonableness of legislative and of 
administrative acts. He notes that it allows the judiciary to invalidate legislative or 
administrative acts in situations in which: 
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 “a) [t]here is no adequacy between the end sought and the 
means used to achieve that end [(suitability)]; 
b) [t]he measure is not required or necessary, there being an 
alternate means for arriving at the same result with a lesser 
burden upon a fundamental right (prohibition of excess) 
[(necessity)]; and 
c) [t]here is no proportionality in the strict sense of the word, 
meaning that what is lost by effecting a given measure is more 
important than what is gained [(proportionality in its narrow 
sense)].”346  
 
 A good example of how this application may take place is provided by electoral cases 
in Brazil. In proceedings in which an electoral wrongdoing occurs, electoral judges must 
resort to the principles of proportionality and of reasonableness to decide whether the 
unlawfulness is serious enough to justify the application of the sanctions of office removal 
and disqualification to run for eight years.347 If they find that applying these sanctions in the 
case is disproportional, they may choose not to punish the infringer, even though it is 
undisputable that the facts are subsumed by the law text occurred. In these cases, judges are 
basically deciding what the reach of the statute is, not interpreting, making an intelligible and 
rational decision and avoiding a mechanical one. 348 
 In fact, the principle of proportionality has become an essential tool for civil law 
judges and has acquired unprecedented relevance in legal reasoning. As David Beatty, a law 
professor at the University of Toronto, correctly observes, “the judiciary has constructed a 
working model of judicial review that relies, almost entirely, on the principle of 
proportionality to tell […] when the elected representatives of the people and their officials 
are acting properly and when they are not.”349 He adds that: 
 
“[i]n all areas of government regulation, no matter the nature 
of the right or freedom that is alleged to have been violated, 
and regardless of the personal characteristics of those bringing 
the case, on what might be called the jurist’s model, the test is 
always the same. Laws—indeed any act undertaken in the 
name or without the authorization (explicit or tacit) of the 
state—must respect a basic principle of proportionality in the 
way they deal with the different interests and values they 
affect. Whether judges are faced with a claim of religious 
freedom, sex discrimination, or for material support from the 
assessment as possible of what the disputed state action 
actually means to those it affects the most. When it is applied 
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properly, proportionality requires judges to assess the 
legitimacy of whatever law or regulation or ruling is before 
them from the perspective of those who reap is greatest and 
those who stand the most.”350 
  
 Regarding the popularity of the principle, Beatty affirms that “[i]n tracing its roots 
beneath the words of the page, judges have found that proportionality runs to all four corners 
of every constitutional text. Collectively, their judgements establish the neutrality of its 
definition as well. Although […] it often goes by different names, ‘reasonableness’ in India 
and Japan, ‘toleration’ in Israel, ‘strict scrutiny’ in the U.S., its meaning never changes.”351 
 Proportionality has acquired such an importance that many statutes have included 
provisions—Humberto Ávila calls them metanorms or normative postulates, which he 
considers a distinct species of norm, different from rules and principles352—compelling 
judges to take the principle into consideration. Some of those statutes were referred in 
subchapter II.5.3.3. above. Another legal precept that shall be mentioned is article 8 of the 
recent Civil Procedure Code, enacted in 2015, which sets forth that “in applying the legal 
order, the judge shall follow social goals and common good demands, sheltering and 
promoting human dignity and observing the proportionality, the reasonableness, the legality, 
the publicity and the efficiency.”353 
 
II.5.7. Constitutionalizing the Law 
 
 Since principles can serve as grounds (a) for interpreting laws; (b) for changing laws; 
(c) for figuring out particular exceptions to laws; (d) for making new rules; and (e) for acting 
in particular cases, they may conflict with rules. In these situations, principles may weigh in 
a case in which a rule unequivocally applies, changing the rule or finding an exception to it 
or generating other consequences.  
 This relationship among rules and principles is more apparent when one examines 
the phenomenon of constitutionalizing the law. This phenomenon is well described by Justice 
Barroso: 
 
“In countries where democracy arrived later, such as Portugal 
(1976), Spain (1978), and Brazil (1988), the 
constitutionalization of the law is a more recent—and perhaps 
more intense—phenomenon. In Brazil, particularly, due to its 
extensive and analytical Constitution, the constitutionalization 
of the law has taken on two important dimensions: a) the 
inclusion in the Constitution of principles related to multiple 
areas of the Law, including civil, administrative, criminal, 
procedural, and other areas, and b) the projection of 
fundamental constitutional principles, like human dignity, in 
the different domains of sub-constitutional law, giving new 
meaning and scope to their norms and institutions. 354 
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 Barroso adds that the constitutionalizing the law phenomenon resulted in an 
“extensive and profound process of judicialization of social relations and politically 
controversial issues that have sparked debate regarding the role of the judiciary and the 
legitimacy of its decisions.”355 “The values, public interests, and behavior contemplated in 
the principles and the rules of a constitution now tend to affect the validity and meaning of 
all sub-constitutional legal norms.”356 
 Indeed, the phenomenon of constitutionalizing the law has led Brazilian adjudication 
to adopt an opposite practice to the one exercised in the U.S., regarding statutory 
interpretation. In Brazil, due to this circumstance, there is no canon of constitutional 
avoidance357 or minimalism.358 On the contrary, judges are highly encouraged to take into 
account constitutional principles to decide the meaning of statutes, even in cases that 
statutory interpretation would be sufficient. Through their constitutional reasoning, they may 
sometimes “rewrite” or “improve” statutory provisions, what may be criticized in the U.S..359  
 An example of that phenomenon took place is a tax case. Although the Brazilian 
National Tax Code sets forth that rules granting tax exemptions shall be construed literally,360 
courts have constantly been declaring the right of disabled persons who cannot drive to 
purchase cars without paying sales tax. 361  This exception, however, according to local 
legislation, is only granted to disabled drivers who can drive an automobile. The reason for 
this discrimination is that the exemption supposedly shall compensate the costs of vehicle 
adaptation. Courts, however, consider this discrimination unreasonable because it does not 
furnish all disabled people with the same protection granted by the Federal Constitution. 
They say that people who cannot drive cars are probably the ones that mostly need the use 
of an automobile. Therefore, courts constantly grant claims for tax exemption, when disabled 
persons file lawsuits.362 
 
II.6. Stare Decisis (Doctrine of Precedent) 
  
The Brazilian doctrine of precedent also differs from the prevalent doctrine of 
common law countries. The binding force of precedents in Brazil has been more a matter of 
rules than of culture.  
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 Winfried Brugger, talking about Germany, states that “[r]espect for judicial precedent 
is not a formally binding guideline for judicial interpretation in [his country], because in a 
code law system, judicial decisions serve only as gloss on the law which is to be found in the 
rules and principles of the governing legal texts.”363 
 Karl Larenz, also German, affirms that to qualify as “jurisprudence”—the term 
continental lawyers use to designate caselaw—as source of law, one shall specify what she 
understands as source of law. “If all factors that cooperate with the creation and latter 
development of the law qualify, then the jurisprudence, so as the legal science, is a source of 
law. However, if one considers only the base for the origin of a legal norm to which one 
wishes normative validity, in a binding sense, in this case, [the sources of law] are only the 
legislation and the original use in a general conviction (as source of customary law).”364
 The Brazilian judge, grounded in the civil law tradition, has a different approach 
towards precedents from the common law judge because Brazilian law considers enacted law 
to be its major source of law. 
 Precedents do not have the same force as the enacted law because they commonly 
offer only persuasive reasons for judges to decide in the same manner in similar cases. Since 
judges are only bound to apply the legislation, they may choose to follow the previous 
decision if they consider it to be a right application of the enacted law. Precedents are not 
considered mandatory norms or peremptory reasons¸ at least in the majority of cases.365  
 As Larenz observes, “courts, according to our legal organization, are not bound to 
precedents as they are to the [enacted] law. It is not the precedent, for being a precedent, that 
binds, but the norm that it contains, if this norm is considered a correct interpretation or 
concretization [of the law].”366 For these reasons, the judge’s behavior is different when 
facing the necessity of applying a written norm or a precedent: 
 
“[…] every judge that decides again the same issue can and 
shall, in principle, decide independently and shall follow the 
precedent’s interpretation, the norm’s concretization or the 
judicial development of the law, if he is convinced that the 
precedent is right and is grounded on current law. Therefore, 
the judge does not have to blindly accept the precedent. He not 
only has the power, but is compelled to depart from the 
previous decision if he concludes that the precedent’s 
interpretation is wrong or if such interpretation represents an 
poor development of the law, or even if he concludes that the 
question the precedent addresses, although rightly decided in 
the past, shall be settled in a different manner today, due to the 
change in a normative situation or in the whole legal order.”367 
 
 The same view exposed by Brugger and Larenz is shared in the Brazilian law. Since 
precedents historically have had only a persuasive effect, they are not considered binding, 
unless in exceptional hypotheses, in which the C.F. or the C.P.C. grants this effect. These 
circumstances are the following: firstly, when the full bench of the S.T.F issues a final 
                                                          
363 Brugger, supra note 33, at 398. 
364 LARENZ, supra note 323, at 615. 
365 See RAZ, supra note 284. 
366 Id. at 612. 
367 Id.  
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decision, on the merits, in an abstract constitutional review action, 368  this decision has 
binding effect as regards to the other bodies of the judicial branch and the governmental 
                                                          
368 The Brazilian system of judicial review of the constitutionality of norms is considered to be a mixed one, 
having been developed under influence of both the U.S. diffuse model (any judge may bar the application of a 
law on the grounds that it is incompatible with the C.F.) and the Austrian concentrated model (only the 
Constitutional Court may issue a ruling on the constitutionality of legislation). In Brazil, pursuant to the C.F., 
the Judiciary branch can review the constitutionality of legal norms both in concrete and in abstract cases.  
The abstract actions can be initiated by public authorities or representative entities that, pursuant to the C.F., 
have specific standing to commence this type of proceeding. Before the S.T.F. adjudicates the case, several 
interested entities and political parties may file amicus curiae briefs defending or attacking the constitutionality 
of the statute under analysis, and the Chief Prosecutor of the Republic and the Federal Solicitor General are 
obligatorily heard. It is worth noting that the S.T.F. has mandatory review over these actions. In this sense, if 
the proponent party can, under the Constitution, initiate the abstract review proceeding, the Court will hear the 
case and issue an opinion. There is no discretionary power not to issue a ruling. 
Also, the S.T.F. Justices adjudicate cases in public, not privately as in the SCOTUS, for example. So, after 
hearing oral arguments, the Justices debate and vote the case in a public session. Sometimes, the appreciation 
of the case may be adjourned, if one of the Justices asks for more time to study the proceeding file. The judgment 
will then resume in a future session, previously announced in the Court’s calendar.  
Once all of the Justices issue a vote, the Chief Justice pronounces the result and publishes a short conclusion 
of the ruling in the Court’s official gazette. The result of the judgment is binding whenever this short conclusion 
is published. But the whole opinion is only disclosed after the debates are typed, reviewed and approved by the 
Justices, which also may turn in written votes. Therefore, it is common in Brazil that lawyers know the case 
result but have not yet read the Court’s opinion. 
Pursuant to the Constitution, in an abstract review case, if the S.T.F. rules that an article or an entire statute 
or regulation is unconstitutional, either on formal or on substantive grounds, this article or whole norm is 
declared to be void and is considered removed from the legal system. This opinion, in general, has retrospective 
effects, which means that Courts will treat the legal norms as always having been void, not only after the 
enactment of S.T.F. ruling. In exceptional cases, the S.T.F. may issue an opinion conferring prospective effects 
to the unconstitutionality decision, or even to the constitutionality ruling. This will take place only in 
extraordinary circumstances, in order to protect legal certainty or other compelling interest.  
The other form of judicial review is called concrete or incidental review. It may be practiced by all Brazilian 
judges in any case. If, in a lawsuit, a judge is confronted with the debate of the constitutionality of a statute or 
a regulation (the judge himself may initiate the debate), he has the power to declare it unconstitutional and then 
adjudicate the case. If the losing party appeals, this decision may be subject to review by a Court of Appeals, 
either State or Federal depending on the matter, and, after that, the case may be heard by the S.T.F. if the losing 
party files an extraordinary appeal.  
This extraordinary appeal is decided by the S.T.F. if it considers that the constitutional question in debate 
has general relevance. The vote of four justices is necessary to meet this requirement. If the Court considers the 
issue of general repercussion, it has also to review the case, not having discretion to merely dismiss the appeal 
without issuing an opinion. 
The Article 97 of the Constitution requires that all decisions that hold a statute or a regulation partly or fully 
unconstitutional must be decided by the majority of the members of the ruling Court (or at least of the majority 
of the highest bench of a Court of Appeals). In the case of the S.T.F., a total vote of 6 Justices is necessary to 
proclaim the unconstitutionality of a statute or a regulation since our Highest Court has 11 Justices. 
If a statute or a regulation is held unconstitutional in an extraordinary appeal case, technically, since the 
proceeding is merely subjective (that is, involves a litigation between two parties, it is not abstract review), the 
unconstitutional article is not removed from the legal system. In this case, the S.T.F. notifies the Brazilian 
Senate in order for it to suspend the execution of this norm in Brazil (Article 52, X, C.F.).   
Finally, state courts also exercise abstract judicial review of state statutes and regulations regarding state 
constitutions. These decisions can only be reviewed by the S.T.F. if the state constitution norm that provided 
the basis of the court decision is a mere reply of a C.F. norm. Since the S.T.F. is considered, under Article 102 
of the C.F., the ultimate guardian of the constitutional text, it hears the appeal in order to check if the state 
court’s ruling contradicts its interpretation of the federal constitutional text. See 
http://www2.stf.jus.br/portalStfInternacional/cms/verConteudo.php?sigla=portalStfSobreCorte_en_us&idCo
nteudo=120199. 
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entities in all levels, not being mandatory to the legislative branch. This rule is set forth in 
article 102, § 2 of the C.F.369  
 Secondly, the S.T.F may, ex-officio or upon request, by the vote of two thirds of its 
members, issue a súmula vinculante (binding statement) of a case result, which will express 
the conclusion of reiterated decisions of the Court on a constitutional matter. Such súmula 
vinculante (binding statement) shall have binding effect, in conformity with art. 103-A of the 
C.F..370 The S.T.F. also may issue sumulas não vinculantes (non-binding statements), which, 
although reflect a settled understanding of a legal issue grounded in previous cases 
adjudicated by the Court, are not legally considered to be binding and are merely persuasive.  
 Furthermore, the new Civil Procedure Code [C.P.C.] of March 2015371 adopted a new 
attitude towards precedents, which, for many Brazilian scholars, approximated the Brazilian 
system to the common law system.372 It was an attempt to introduce a culture of following 
precedents in the country. The article 927 of the C.P.C. says that judges must “unify their 
jurisprudence and keep its stability, integrity and coherence.”373 To achieve such purpose, § 
4 of article 928 determines that the modification of (a) sumulas (statement of settled law), 
(b) settled caselaw or (c) theses adopted in multiple appeals issue374  shall observe the 
necessity of adequate and specific justification, taking into account legal certainty, 
protection of trust and equality of treatment.375 If precedents or statements that the Code 
considers binding on judges are not followed, the parties may file a claim directly to the court 
that issued the decision to uphold its authority.376 
 The new C.P.C. has also established a rule377 that to depart from previous unbinding 
precedents, judges must distinguish the cases or show that the understanding adopted in them 
has been overruled. If they do not bear this burden, their decisions will be considered 
insufficiently justified and, therefore, will be void. For some authors, such rule changed the 
force of precedents in general. If they are not binding, at least there is a general expectation 
that they will be followed and, although the law recognizes the judge’s power to deviate from 
                                                          
369 Art. 102, § 2, of the C.F: “The Supreme Federal Tribunal’s definitive decisions on the merits in direct 
actions of unconstitutionality and in declaratory actions of constitutionality shall have erga omnes effect and 
shall be binding with respect to the rest of the Judiciary and the federal, state and county public administration, 
both direct and indirect.” See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 102 (Braz.). Translated by 
Keith Rosenn, Constituteproject.org https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2014.pdf 
370 Some courts consider that a third circumstance in which a decision is binding takes place when the full 
bench of a court issues an abstract ruling on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a legal precept or 
interpretation. This decision shall be considered binding on the court’s divisional panels. However, this opinion 
may not be technically true. The effect of a full bench decision on the remaining panels of the court is that these 
divisional panels will be authorized to pronounce the unconstitutionality of norms in similar cases, without 
having to send the case to be reviewed by the full bench again. Nevertheless, there is no legal provision that 
literally attributes the binding effect. Additionally, when a court decision has binding effect, it means that if the 
decision is not applied in a subsequent case, the losing party may file a claim to the grantor court demanding 
its application. In the situation herein specified, this claim is not legally admitted, since it is not a case 
established in the statute. 
371 The C.P.C. entered into force on March 2016, one year after its enactment. 
372  This attitude was expressly stated in the bill drafters’ justification for the proposed statute. See 
https://www.senado.gov.br/senado/novocpc/pdf/Anteprojeto.pdf. 
373 CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.] [CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 927 (Braz.). 
374 The multiple appeals legal issue may be recognized in judgments of the S.T.F. and of the S.T.J., when 
these courts declare that these appeals shall be taken as representative of general relevance cases. CÓDIGO DE 
PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.] [CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 928, I and II (Braz.). 
375 CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.] [CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 927, § 4 (Braz.). 
376 See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 102, I, ‘l’ and art. 105, I, ‘f’ (Braz.). 
377 See CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.] [CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE] Article 489, § 1, VI (Braz.). 
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them, it also imposes the burden of providing reasons why they are doing so. In this sense, 
such authors call them weak binding precedents.378 
 The need to install a culture of precedent-following has led Brazilian high judges to 
draw up different justifications from their American counterparts in unconstitutional 
decisions. Both countries adopt the rule that ‘the unconstitutional law is no law at all’ and, 
therefore, that ruling has retrospective effects. 379  But, since stare decisis is a rule of 
American Law,380 the fact that an unconstitutional law is not formally removed from the 
legal books is not considered a major problem, because judges will not apply it, especially 
after a SCOTUS ruling. 
 Indeed, American legal books have several unconstitutional laws that have not been 
technically removed from its texts but are considered void and, in practice, inapplicable. A 
significant example is the article VI, Section 8, of the North Carolina Constitution, which 
disqualifies for office “any person who shall deny the being of Almighty God.”381 The Texas 
Penal Code rule, which provides that “[a] person commits an offense if he engages in deviate 
sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex” and which was invalidated by 
the SCOTUS in Lawrence v. Texas,382  has never been formally repealed by the Texas 
Legislature and, hence, removed from the code.383 Nevertheless, it is very unlikely that a 
Texas district attorney, by still trying to enforce such statute, would prosecute someone for 
engaging in homosexual activity, even if he disagrees with the Supreme Court decision. 
Courts would probably think that he does not know the current law in force. Therefore, 
technically, in the U.S., judges “cannot reach into statute books and erase laws.”384 
 In Brazil, a measure adopted by the S.T.F. that certainly contributed to strengthening 
the force of its decisions in relation to future similar cases was to consider the 
                                                          
378 As Laura Baccaglini, Gabriella Di Paolo and Fulvio Cortese observe “[M]erely stating that in Italy 
judicial precedent has no binding force for the other judges does not fully clarify the effect that a decision might 
have on other judges. A judicial precedent may in fact have varying degrees of effectiveness: the fact that, in a 
legal system, decisions do not bind subsequent judges to rule in the same way on similar or identical cases does 
not necessarily mean that there is a general expectation that the precedent will be followed. Indeed, some 
systems, which deny the existence of an obligation on the part of the judge to follow the precedent, refer to a 
so called ‘weak’ binding force of the ruling, i.e., they recognise the judge’s power to deviate from prior 
decisions if there are serious and well-founded reasons for ruling otherwise. As we shall see, the position of the 
Italian legal system wavers clearly between those who believe that precedent can have a weak binding force 
and those who see a mere persuasive effect.” Laura Baccaglini, Gabriella Di Paolo and Fulvio Cortese, The 
value of judicial precedent in the Italian legal system, 
379 See Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
380 According to the SCOTUS, “[t]he obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity, and a contrary 
necessity marks its outer limit. With Cardozo, we recognize that no judicial system could do society's work if 
it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it. See B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 149 
(1921). Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity 
over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable. See Powell, Stare Decisis and Judicial 
Restraint, 1991 Journal of Supreme Court History 13, 16. At the other extreme, a different necessity would 
make itself felt if a prior judicial ruling should come to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for 
that very reason doomed.” Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992). 
381 N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 8.  
382 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
383 There is a note in Texas Code about the Supreme Court ruling, but the provision is still there. See Tex. 
Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (2003). 
384 Brian Palmer, How a Bill Becomes Not a Law What happens to unconstitutional state laws? Can they 
just stay on the books forever?, SLATE, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2013/04/north_ 
carolina_state_religion_bill_does_unconstitutional_legislation_disappear.html (last visited Dec. 11, 2017). 
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unconstitutional law formally removed from the legal world.385 This effect automatically 
takes place every time the S.T.F. reaches a decision in an abstract review case.386 Therefore, 
contrariwise to the U.S. view, members of the Judiciary branch have the power to reach into 
a statute book and erase the law—in fact, technically, since the law is void, it works as if it 
has never been enacted—. The S.T.F. understands that it has such power because its 
decisions, in abstract review cases, have binding effect, according to the C.F..387 Congress 
does not dispute it and has never reacted to such understanding. 
 However, for concrete review cases, which may be exercised by any judge in any 
type of subjective lawsuit, in order for an unconstitutional decision to have extra parties 
effect (not limited to the litigating parties), article 52, X, of the C.F. demands that the Senate 
suspends the execution of such unconstitutional law. Only then, by the terms of such precept, 
the law will be considered not to have any legal effect and judges will not be able to apply it 
anymore if they disagree with the S.T.F. decision. The Senate suspension act will only have 
prospective effect, not retroactive effect.388  
 Despite the clarity of its words, until recently, there was a debate over whether article 
52, X, of the C.F. should still be understood as to bring the Senate an action to suspend the 
unconstitutional law for it not to be considered in force anymore.389 In a very recent case, 
decided on November 29, 2017, whose opinion has not yet been published, the S.T.F. 
reviewed its former understanding that a declaration of unconstitutionality of a statute in a 
concrete review case did not automatically have binding effects. According to the case result 
summary,390 the Court granted binding effects to such ruling, which incidentally declared the 
unconstitutionality of article 2 of Lei No. 9.055/95, that authorized the use of white asbestos 
in Brazil. Therefore, the Court held that the Senate decree would no longer have the force of 
suspending the validity of the law, but only to help publicize the S.T.F. decision.391 
 Nevertheless, the relevant point to note, for the purposes of this work, is that stare 
decisis is historically far from being a cultural tradition in Brazilian law and though its 
importance has been gaining momentum, many judges still remain faithful to the view 
exposed by Karl Larenz, that “it is not the precedent per se that binds, but the norm that it 
contains when such norm is considered a correct interpretation or concretization.”392  
                                                          
385 This rule was adopted in the opinion written by Justice Moreira Alves in the Administrative Proceeding 
No. 4.477-72, DJ de 16/5/1977, p. 3.123-3.124. Alves used the teleological reduction technique, which limited 
the range of art. 42, X, of the 1967/69 Constitution, which set forth that the Senate had the power to suspend 
the execution, as a whole or in part, of a law or decree, declared unconstitutional by a S.T.F. final decision. 
Through this teleological reduction, the S.T.F concluded that art. 42, X, only applied to cases of concrete 
review. For a better overview of the different systems of constitutional review in Brazil, see supra note 368. 
386 Additionally, it is worth noting that abstract review was first introduced in Brazil in 1965, through an 
Amendment to the 1946 Constitution. It was further kept in the text of the 1967 Constitution and in the text of 
the 1988 Constitution. New forms of actions were letter introduced by subsequent Constitutional amendments. 
The 1988 not only introduced new types of abstract review actions, but also widened the range of parties that 
have standing to initiate this type of proceeding. See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 102, 
I and 103 (Braz.). 
387 See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 102, I and 103 (Braz.). 
388 This means that persons who have not filed an individual lawsuit and were not awarded a judicial ruling 
exempting them to follow the law will still be obligated to observe it.  
389 See S.T.F., Rcl. No. 4.335, Relator: Min. Gilmar Mendes, 20.03.2014, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA ELETRÔNICO 
[D.J.e], 22.10.2014 (Braz.).  
390 The case result is published shortly after the ruling session is over. It essentially contains a statement of 
what was ruled by the court, but not the Justices votes. This publication, therefore, is not the case opinion, 
which is then drafted by the Court and is also published. 
391 See S.T.F., A.D.I. No. 3.046, Relator: Min. Rosa Weber, 29.11.2017, Opinion Pending (Braz.). 
392 LARENZ, supra note 323, at 612.  
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 The absence of a stare decisis rule has consequences for the Brazilian legal society. 
Lower court judges and prosecutors do not feel compelled to follow non-binding precedents 
and upper judges feel freer to depart from their courts’ own prior decisions. This freedom is 
one of the causes of the high number of cases that reach upper courts in Brazil and also of 
the considerable number of reversals. A recent study from the Fundação Getúlio Vargas 
[F.G.V.], for example, showed that 44% of the habeas corpus filed in the S.T.J., the highest 
Brazilian court for legal matters, had been filed against opinions from the Court of Appeals 
of the State of São Paulo [T.J.S.P.]. Among these proceedings, the S.T.J. reversed the lower 
court ruling in 27% of the cases. According to an article published by Bruno Torrano, a law 
professor and clerk at the S.T.J., the T.J.S.P. tend to be harder on criminal defendants than 
the S.T.J..393  
 Even though Torrano may be angry about the São Paulo judges’ attitude, following 
upper courts’ precedents—technically speaking—is not required because S.T.J. opinions in 
habeas corpus cases do not bind them.394 The fact that their decisions may be reversed will 
not hinder their careers—they hold a life tenured position and need not to seek reelection like 
judges in many U.S. states—and they will not be fired for it, nor that will be held against any 
career promotion. They may simply choose to ignore the upper court precedent, because they 
see themselves free to apply the law in the way they consider correct.  
 An example of this assertion is the sentence that convicted former President Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva for corruption charges, the crime mentioned in subchapter II.4.1. above. 
The sentence, written by the Federal Judge Sergio Moro, asserted that there is an ongoing 
debate about whether the performance of an official act is a necessary requirement for the 
crime of passive corruption.395 Moro cited a S.T.J. precedent, holding that the practice of an 
official act is not necessary.396 He also said that the S.T.F.’s ruling in Ação Penal 470, a 
famous case called Mensalão, decided in 2012, in which former officials from the Partido 
dos Trabalhadores – PT were convicted for corruption, had not settled the issue.397  
                                                          
393 Bruno Torrano, Seria o Tribunal de Justiça de São Paulo um Reino Jurídico Autônomo? ACADEMIA, 
https://www.academia.edu/34488663/SERIA_O_TRIBUNAL_DE_JUSTIÇA_DE_SÃO_PAULO_UM_REI
NO_JURIDICO_AUTÔNOMO. (last visited Dec. 11, 2017). 
394 Thiago Bottino, a law professor at Fundação Getúlio Vargas at Rio de Janeiro, Visiting Scholar at 
Columbia University, while being interviewed by Consultor Jurídico, a legal website in Brazil, stated the 
following: “In the case of binding statements from the S.T.J. [which do not have binding effect according to 
the law], the district judge and the Court of Appeals judge have independency to decide in the manner they 
want it. The problem is doing so when they already know that an upper court has a different understanding of 
the issue. In this case, the judge is compelling a party to appeal the case. Or, if the party is poor and will not 
appeal, the judge is treating her in an unequal manner in comparison to the party that will appeal. When one 
says that whomever has a good lawyer gets a lot of things, it is true, because he will go to the higher court, and, 
hence, will be granted a ruling which applies the settled law, while others cannot do the same. This is valid for 
the criminal law, but also to civil and family law.” Marcelo Pinto, Habeas Corpus, STJ e STF não comunicam 
bem sua jurisprudência a tribunais, CONSULTOR JURÍDICO (May 18, 2014, 9:38 AM), 
https://www.conjur.com.br/2014-mai-18/entrevista-thiago-bottino-professor-direito-fgv-rio. Translation mine. 
395  See TRF-4, A.P. No. 5046512-94.2016.4.04.7000/PR, Juiz Sergio Moro, 
https://abrilveja.files.wordpress.com/2017/07/sentenc3a7a-lula.pdf.  
396 S.T.J., R.H.C. No. 48.400, Relator: Min. Gurgel de Faria, 17.3.2017, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA ELETRÔNICO 
[D.J.e] 30.3.2015 (Braz.) (taking the position that the crime of passive corruption exempts the effective practice 
of an official act. The decision asserts that the official act does not have to be individualized and does not have 
to undoubtedly be linked to the received advantage, since the public function trade takes place in a diffuse 
manner, through a plurality of acts that are of hard individuation). 
397 The Brazilian style of opinions is similar to the English style. The S.T.F. issues seriatim opinions by 
each judge, having the reader the hard task of identifying the reasons that justified the majority reasoning. See 
BURNHAM, supra note 132, at 64. Seriatim is a Latin word that means “in due order, successively; in order, in 
succession; individually, one by one; separately; severally.” Seriatim, Canadian Law Dictionary (Barron’s, 7th 
ed., 2006. Also, as said in note 368 supra, the Supreme Court Justices (as all Brazilian Court judges) adjudicate 
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 However, the reason why the former President Fernando Collor was acquitted by the 
S.T.F. for corruption charges, in 1994, was because the Court ruled that he had not performed 
any official act in exchange for undue advantage.398 The S.T.F. acknowledged Collor’s 
acceptance of undue advantage but acquitted him of the corruption accusation because he 
had not performed an official act in exchange for it.  
 Clearly, Judge Moro did not feel bound to follow the precedent settled in Collor’s 
criminal case, even though he was judging another former president for the same crime. Moro 
did not even cite Collor’s case in his reasoning.399 He cited an opinion from the S.T.J. and 
three opinions from U.S. Courts of Appeals [one of them reversed after McDonnell400] while 
asserting that “in the Brazilian jurisprudence, the issue is still subject to debates, but the most 
recent rulings take the position that to be convicted for corruption, one needs not to perform 
an official act, but if an act is performed, it is not necessary to precisely individualize it.”401 
As he observed, the S.T.F. in the Mensalão trials had not followed its previous ruling in 
Collor’s case requiring an official act.402 
 Consequently, although passive corruption has been a crime in Brazil since 1940, one 
of its requirements is still not settled in the case law, nor Congress has acted to clarify the 
law—a practice that is not common in the country. Prosecutors, for example, do not need to 
prosecute corruption only if they can prove that an official individual act was performed, 
such as the one required by the S.T.F. to convict Collor. If they disagree with the S.T.F. 
ruling, they may simply initiate an action without proving such fact and hope that the judge 
that will hear the case also disagrees with the S.T.F. precedent. If this suit results in an 
acquittal, the fact is not considered a down point since they have a professional career and a 
lifetime job. Judges, under the current stage of the law, do not need to convict only if they 
recognize such requirement in the evidence. They may adopt the S.T.J. precedent cited by 
Moro and rule differently from the S.T.F. in Collor’s case. If the case gets appealed, there is 
                                                          
cases in public, not privately as the U.S. Supreme Court, for example. So, after hearing oral arguments, the 
Justices debate and vote the case in a public session. Regarding the Mensalão, the case citation is the following: 
S.T.F., A.P. No. 470, Relator: Min. Joaquim Barbosa, 17.12.2012, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e.], 
19.4.2013 (Braz.). Moro’s conclusion regarding this point is asserted in paragraph 867 of the sentence. See 
TRF-4, A.P. No. 5046512-94.2016.4.04.7000/PR, Juiz Sergio Moro, 
https://abrilveja.files.wordpress.com/2017/07/sentenc3a7a-lula.pdf. 
398 S.T.F., A.P. No. 307, Relator: Min. Ilmar Galvão, 13.12.1994, Diário da Justiça [D.J.], 13.10.1995 
(Braz.). 
399 This circumstance, in any sense, implies that President Lula should not have been convicted by Judge 
Moro. The evidence is very complex and I am not taking this position, especially because Moro, at last, 
recognized the performance of an official act, although not a specific one linked to the bribes received.399 His 
sentence was upheld by the Tribunal Regional de Apelações da 4° Região (TRF-4), in a court session held on 
January 24, 2018. 
400 United States v. Jefferson, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165824 (asserting that “in light of the Supreme Court 
decision in McDonnell, it cannot be said that the erroneous Birdsall introduction that Jefferson received at trial 
was harmless with respect to his convictions for bribery and vacating some of the convictions”). 
401 Id. The three U.S. Court of Appeals cases cited by Sergio Moro were the following: US v. DiMasi, No. 
11-2163 (1st Cir. 2013); US v. Terry, No. 11–4130 (6th Cir. 2013); and US v. Jefferson, No. 09–5130 (4th Cir. 
2012). 
402 In an article published in the newsprint Folha de S. Paulo, Justice Luís Roberto Barroso admitted that 
even some of the S.T.F. members—although a minority—have a tendency not to follow some full bench 
decisions with which they disagree and consider a wrong constitutional interpretation. Barroso notes that “this 
is a negative fact that must be contextualized: many judges, educated in the civil law tradition, still are not 
adapted to the culture of precedent following, which is an innovation brought from the common law tradition. 
The problem, which is residual, will be solved soon.” Luís Roberto Barroso, 'Operação Abafa' tenta barrar 
avanços do STF, escreve Barroso (Fev. 23, 2018, 6:00 AM), 
https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ilustrissima/2018/02/em-artigo-ministro-do-supremo-rebate-criticas-feitas-ao-
tribunal.shtml). 
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no certainty as to whether the ruling will be reversed since even the S.T.F.’s position was 
modified or at least weakened in the Mensalão cases. The issue will only be definitely settled 
when the S.T.F. decides an abstract review case on the matter or enacts a binding statement 
with its final decision on the issue. 
 Another example was a decision rendered by the S.T.F. in an election matter. The 
Court examined if the T.S.E. had acted properly when disqualified a reelected mayor to run 
for a new office term in a neighboring city.403 The issue was whether the one reelection 
limitation rule for Executive Office set forth in the C.F. also applied for elections in other 
cities or states. The S.T.F. upheld the T.S.E.’s ruling but held that such Court could not have 
applied this new understanding for cases heard in the same election, because it had already 
ruled differently for other candidates in appeals that had been decided in that same election 
year. Article 16 of the C.F. demands that alterations in election law shall not occur in the 
year of the election. Indeed, the T.S.E. had changed its reading of § 5 of article 14 of the C.F. 
on the third similar case that it heard in that year.404 Therefore, the S.T.F. had to notify the 
T.S.E. not to change its prior rulings, at least in cases decided in the same elections, because 
that did not guarantee equal treatment of the candidates. 
 All and all, the absence of a consolidated stare decisis doctrine makes the evolution 
of the law more complicated in Brazil. Case law is also seen as the law of the land in common 
law countries [having the same force as the statute law], whereas in Brazil it is generally not 
seen as having the same force of the enacted law, except when the enacted law says so. This 
fact carries significant consequences for the guiding function of law and will be examined in 
chapter 5.  
  
II.7. Chapter Conclusions 
 
 The main purpose of this chapter was to describe the basic answers that are 
commonly given to three philosophical questions about Brazilian law: (a) what is considered 
to be law in Brazil? (b) What is the role of rules and principles in Brazilian law? And, (c) is 
there a predominant criterion that judges employ when adjudicating cases in Brazil? In 
summary, the main answers that I think are accurate to these questions are the following.  
 Brazilian law considers that a social fact is necessary to take place in order for law to 
exist. This social fact is traditionally seen as an act of the legislative branch: the enactment 
of legislation. The most important social fact that has taken place in Brazil for the legal 
community was the enactment of the C.F. in 1988. Such document established the basic rules 
as to what are the necessary steps for Brazilians to identify what is law and what is not law. 
It states, in its article 5, II, that “no one shall be obligated to do or refrain from doing 
something except by virtue of [enacted] law.”405 The basic comprehension of the term law 
in this constitutional provision is enacted law. Therefore, coercion is traditionally deemed 
legitimate only when the citizen performs an act that runs against a written legal provision, 
which is considered a product of the democratic will of the people. The necessary procedures 
for making law are regulated in the constitutional text (either federal, state or municipal level) 
and, as said, are basically understood as taking place through the enactment of legislation.  
 Brazilian judges share this basic view. In the three cases that were cited in subchapter 
II.1 and in the others cases referred throughout this chapter, the justifications of the decisions 
rendered, although many times founded in rules that clearly did not provide unequivocal 
                                                          
403  S.T.F, R.E. No. 637.485/RJ, Relator: Min. Gilmar Mendes, 1.8.2012, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO 
ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e.], 21.5.2013 (Braz.). 
404 See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 14, § 5 (Braz.). 
405 See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5, II, (Braz.). 
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instructions as to how to decide the case, were attributed to specific provisions of Brazilian 
enacted law.  
 Indeed, Brazilian legal practice adopts Savigny’s four interpretation methods: literal, 
historical, contextual and teleological, to identify the content of the law. Only if these 
techniques do not provide an answer, should the judge rule by applying analogy, customs or 
general principles of law. 406 Even when facing a gap, in accordance with article 140 of the 
C.P.C., the Brazilian judge has to decide the case. 407 The country adopts the prohibition of 
non liquet rule. 
 The in claris cessat interpretatio maximum, which is similar to the plain meaning 
rule of interpretation, is not usually followed, since Brazilian lawyers share the view that 
their legal texts shall not be read in parts, but as a whole. They adopt the legal dogmatic 
approach, which is very common in the civil law world, and understand their legal system as 
having properties such as unity, consistency, coherence, and completeness. Such properties 
have allowed Brazilian judges to update—without formally changing—their statutes, which 
are, in general, not so clear and detailed in comparison with the U.S. statutes. 
 Regarding the C.F., the current mainstream view among Brazilian courts and scholars 
is that, after its enactment in 1988, a great change took place in the way we understand the 
its function. Constitutional norms gained the status of enforceable norms. Their observance 
became imperative. If not obeyed, constitutional norms can prompt government coercion. 
They are seen as mandatory norms, even if their text demands complement by statute law.408 
They also have started influencing many areas of the law, such as civil, criminal and 
administrative law. The phenomenon is called ‘constitutionalizing the law’ and reflects an 
opposite view of the American constitutional avoidance doctrine409 or minimalism.410  
 The interpretation of constitutional norms also uses dogmatic techniques, such as 
Savigny’s four methods, but scholars argue for additional approaches. To assure practical 
concordance, Brazilian jurists understand that the constitutional provisions—commonly 
broader and open textured if compared to statutory provisions—must be optimized when in 
conflict to preserve the Constitution’s unity. Works of Konrad Hesse411 and Robert Alexy 
are very popular and are constantly cited in judicial opinions. They basically state that “[t]he 
                                                          
406 Decreto-Lei No. 4.657, de 4 de setembro de 1942, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U] de 4.9.1942 
(Braz.). 
407 CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.][CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 140 (Braz.).  
408 A very influential doctrine in a book written in the middle of the 20th century, authored by José Afonso 
da Silva, has been superseded by this new view of constitutional norms being self-enforceable. See JOSÉ 
AFONSO DA SILVA, APLICABILIDADE DAS NORMAS CONSTITUCIONAIS (Malheiros, 8th ed., 2015) (arguing for a 
classification of constitutional norms that focused on their efficacy. For Silva, there are three types of 
constitutional norms: (a) norms that have full efficacy; (b) norms that have limited efficacy and demand 
statutory regulation; (c) norms that have full efficacy but may be limited in part by statutory law). 
409 See supra text accompanying notes 30 and 357. 
410 See supra text accompanying note 358. 
411 See Brugger, supra notes 33 and 172, at 398. Regarding Hesse’s integrative effect, Rudolf Streinz 
stresses the following: “There is no doubt that the constitution also has an integrative function over and above 
its function as a set of rules. This applies less to the actual text itself than to the content, which is not necessarily 
in detail, but is sensed, and on which ‘constitutional patriotism’ focuses. Democracy, if it is not to simply 
remain a formal principle of responsibility, depends on the existence of certain pre-conditions. The ‘basic 
understanding of state and law which holds national citizens together and affords the unity of the state’, cannot 
be secured solely by a constitutional text, but finds its true roots in the constitutional preconditions. The state 
does not have a good constitution but is in good shape. In its constitution, it documents the political reality 
developed by its people and institutions, to the extent that it is to be formalized as a legal achievement and 
continuously updated. In this respect constitutional law enables integrative identity building. We must simply 
remain aware of its limits. Rudolf Streinz, European Integration through constitutional law in GOVERNING 
EUROPE UNDER A CONSTITUTION 16 (Springer, 2006).  
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principle of the constitution’s unity requires the optimization of [values in conflict]: [b]oth 
legal values need to be limited so that each can attain its optimal effect. In each concrete 
case, therefore, the limitations must satisfy the principle of proportionality; that is, they may 
not go any further than necessary to produce concordance of both legal values.”412 
 Stare decisis is not a general rule or principle in Brazilian law.  The recent enactment 
of some legal provisions shows an effort to disseminate and acculturate it in the country. 
However, some Brazilian judges still feel free to disregard upper court precedents when they 
disagree with their interpretation of the law. They generally only do not do it with decisions 
that the legislation attributes binding effects.  
 Furthermore, Brazilian judges also resort to legal principles when deciding cases. 
Principles, at first, were merely supplemental in legal reasoning and judges commonly used 
them to fill gaps in the system. Their content was mostly found in natural law. However, 
nowadays, principles are paramount in legal reasoning. They may be written in legal texts, 
whereas judges will essentially concretize what they mean once they apply them to a case. 
Or they may also be implicit, being extracted as an inference of the content of legal norms 
that are posited in the Constitution and in statutes. At last, constitutional principles interact 
with legal rules in adjudication, optimizing their content, allowing judges to reach a solution 
which they consider in line with the principle’s content. 
 
II.8. Jurisprudential Notes 
 
 Brazilian law has unquestionably changed in the last thirty years. The enactment of 
the 1988 C.F. was a significant moment in the country’s legal history. Judges today resort to 
legal sources that are very differently written in comparison to the legal texts that existed 
before 1988. Some of the norms are essentially moral and, for that reason, demand that 
officials employ moral reasoning when construing them. Judges adjudicate more complex 
cases, many related to the enforcement of social and collective diffuse rights, which involve 
arguments of policy. They consider their role to be different from the role of their 
predecessors: they must enforce a Constitution that is not only a political document, but a 
legal and enforceable rule-book. 
 In this sense, it was more than reasonable for Brazilian jurisprudential scholars and 
judges to engage in a project to evaluate (a) what indeed has changed in Brazilian law; (b) 
why it has changed; and (c) if these changes are so deep as to even have modified the 
philosophical spine of the system.  
 As I noted in chapter I, legal positivism was, for decades, the most prominent school 
of jurisprudence in Brazil.413 But, due to the recent changes, some scholars have simply 
claimed that positivism is no longer able to explain the Brazilian legal system. They argue 
that positivism is tied to surpassed ideas, like the separation of law and morals and 
legalism.414 They contend that the contemporary constitutionalism has opened the legal 
system to moral values and, therefore, to natural law. In this way, they try to systematize a 
new theory, which they call post-positivism, to better capture the phenomena that currently 
dominate the legal system. 415 
 Nonetheless, post-positivists cannot explain if morality is always present in the law, 
or if it is just contingent. They also do not have an answer to convincingly describe why 
Brazil’s former constitutional regimes, some of them evil and, therefore, immoral, are 
                                                          
412 HESSE, supra note 189, at 68. 
413 See supra note 14. 
414 Barroso, supra note 37, at 585-586. 
415 Id. 
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considered law. In addition, they cannot elucidate why, in some moments, Brazilian law is 
still tied to legalist approaches, and sometimes tolerates immoral decisions.  
 Brazilian post-positivism, chained to the civil law tradition, does not acknowledge 
judicial lawmaking. Even though judges concretize constitutional concepts through a 
dialectic process of “creatively determining results in conformity with, but not determinable 
by, the Constitution,”416 they still consider this to be mere posited law application and their 
creative decisions, as a rule, may be applied retroactively417 to the facts of the case.418  
 Moreover, a German post-positivistic theory, in trying to deny judicial discretion in 
hard cases, have adopted a different approach regarding what is considered to be the law. 
They argue for the separation of the text and the norm. Therefore, posited law would not be 
the law, because the law would only exist once the norm is applied to a concrete situation. 
 The main contender of this view is the German author Friedrich Muller, who 
advanced the structuring legal theory and argues that this “theory developed a new post-
positivistic concept of legal theory according to which the legal norms […] have not already 
been written into legislation.” 419 This view, nevertheless, has trouble in explaining criminal 
legality, for example.  
 Although the structuring legal theory is not purely adopted in Brazil—except in few 
S.T.F. opinions, generally written by former Justice Eros Grau420—this distinction among 
text and norm has acquired some support. A strong criticism of positivism in the country is 
that it does not “distinguish the text from the norm.”421 
 In this sense, post-positivism, although is the prevalent jurisprudential theory in 
Brazil, is often seen with suspicion and is sometimes associated with judicial activism and 
usurpation of legislative power. Professor Jorge Galvão, for example, claims that the notion 
of the rule of law has been severely compromised.422 
 Post-positivism also does not convince old school legalistic423 judges that the current 
judicial activity is sensibly different from the pre-1988 period. For these judges, 
“rationalistic aspiration to a mechanistic jurisprudence stands firmly in place, as the product 
of a need of certainty.” 424  The “idea of adjudication as a logical-deductive operation 
consisting in objective application of the law to a particular case at point, by way of 
                                                          
416 See Brugger, supra note 33, at 398.  
417 According to Cruz, Brazil’s classic theory of decision states that the “decisional act is of cognitive nature, 
with declaratory and temporal retro-operant effects. ALVARO RICARDO DE SOUZA CRUZ, JURISDIÇÃO 
CONSTITUCIONAL DEMOCRÁTICA 94 (Del Rey, 2004). 
418 The exception would be the application of article 27 of Lei No. 9.868/1999 declares that “when holding 
a statute or a normative act unconstitutional and taking into account legal certainty and exceptional social 
interests reasons, the Supreme Court, by a two-third count, may restrict the effects of that declaration or decide 
that it will only have efficacy after the decision may no longer be appealed or in any other moment that the 
Court determines.” Lei No. 9.868, de 10 de Novembro de 1999, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
11.11.1999 (Braz.). 
419 Muller, supra note 29, at 331. 
420 See S.T.F., ADPF No. 153, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, 29.4.2010, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA ELETRÔNICO [D.J.] 
6.8.2010 (Braz.). Translation mine. 
421 CRUZ, supra note 417, at 96.  
422 JORGE GALVÃO, O NEOCONSTITUCIONALISMO E O FIM DO ESTADO DE DIREITO 312 (Saraiva, 2014) 
(Galvão refers to neoconstitutionalism, but says that neoconstitutionalism is sometimes described as post-
positivism, Id. at 23). 
423 This old legalistic view, according to Susanna Pozzolo, “does not point out simply a formalist doctrine 
of interpretation and application of positive law, but also an ideology of legality that identifies it with law-
application, separation of powers and, recently, with the respect for a written Constitution, guaranteed for a 
legal judge.” SUSANNA POZZOLO, NEOCONSTITUCIONALISMO E POSITIVISMO JURÍDICO 104 (Landy, 2011). 
424 Zagrebelsky, supra 26, at 622. 
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normative and legalistic syllogism and without any need to look beyond the four corners of 
the law,”425 is still dominant for them. 
 Also, post-positivism is criticized by authors that claim that judicial decisions should 
not employ moral arguments and that law simply cannot be filtered by morality. 426 Ingeborg 
Maus, from Germany, states that the elevation of the Judiciary branch to a condition of 
superior instance of morality represents a regression to pre-democratic social models: 
 
“If the justice elevates, in this sense, to the condition of 
society’s superior moral instance, the social mechanism of 
control that—in an ideal field—every state apparatus should 
be bound to are removed. In the dominance of a Judiciary 
branch that exercises a “higher” morally enriched law in 
relation to the other branches that occupy themselves only with 
ordinary law—and in relation to the rest of the society—it is 
notorious the regression to the pre-democratic model of 
integration.”427 
 
 In the opening paragraph of this thesis, I stated that I intend to demonstrate why 
inclusive legal positivism best describes the Brazilian legal system. I will show that the 
theory not only explains the issues that Brazilian post-positivism fails to do, but also better 
elucidates the country’s current practices, in a clear and technical manner, which helps to 
avoid the unfair criticisms that post-positivism suffers today.  
 Inclusive legal positivism, in this sense, will help to clarify “the distinct nature and 
legitimacy of judicial decision making in the absence of clear textual guidance”428 in Brazil. 
In this sense, I borrow David Kennedy’s remarks: “[o]nly if it seem[s] possible to see judicial 
reasoning as different from and differently legitimate than legislation [can] an engaged 
liberal judiciary be defended.”429 
 After examining inclusive legal positivism and the other dominant Anglo-American 
theories that purport to explain what the law is, I will go over the most diffused ideas of post-
positivism in Brazil and will explain why I disagree with many of its claims but agree with 
others.   
                                                          
425 Id. 
426 See Lenio Streck, Judiciário quer nomear ministros: sugiro para a Saúde um não fumante!, CONJUR 
(Jan. 11, 2018 8:00 AM), https://www.conjur.com.br/2018-jan-11/senso-incomum-judiciario-nomear-
ministros-sugiro-saude-nao-fumante. 
427 INGEBORG MAUS, O JUDICIÁRIO COMO SUPEREGO DA SOCIEDADE 19 (Lumen Iuris, 2010). 
428 DAVID KENNEDY & WILLIAM W. FISHER, THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 553 (Princeton, 
2006).  
429 Id.  
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III. LAW AND MORALITY IN ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE AND 
THE BRAZILIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
 
III.1. Short Explanation of the Chapter Goals 
 
 The relationship between legality and morality is the central focus of the debate about 
the nature of law, which is the fundamental question of general jurisprudence.430 In the 
posthumously published Postscript to the second edition of his classic The Concept of Law 
(hereinafter referred to as “Postscript to The Concept of Law”), H.L.A. Hart 431 
acknowledged that the rule of recognition—his conventional master rule that determines 
which of the community’s norms are legal ones432—“may incorporate conformity with moral 
principles or substantive values as a criterion of validity.”433 For this reason, he classified 
the legal theory he described at the center of The Concept of Law as soft-positivism,434 which, 
in his words, “permits the identification of the law to depend on controversial matters of 
conformity with moral or other value judgments.”435  
 Although Hart acknowledged soft-positivism, which is more commonly referred as 
inclusive legal positivism, as an accommodation to Ronald Dworkin’s criticism of legal 
positivism,436 his endorsement was not sufficient to convince Dworkin437 or to promote 
consensus among the last century’s most prominent jurisprudence scholars on the legality-
morality relationship.438 In fact, by the end of the 20th Century, at least four different theories 
dominated the American academy in respect to the issue of the relationship between legality 
and morality. Such theories are inclusive legal positivism, exclusive legal positivism, natural 
law theory, and interpretivism.439 
 In this chapter, I will briefly analyze these four different theoretical perspectives. For 
explaining them, I will essentially adopt the views exposed by H.L.A. Hart and Wil 
Waluchow for inclusive legal positivism, Joseph Raz for exclusive legal positivism, John 
Finnis for the modern natural law theory, and Ronald Dworkin for interpretivism. 
                                                          
430 AILEEN KAVANAGH & JOHN OBERDIEK, ARGUING ABOUT LAW 93 (Routledge, 1st ed., 2009). 
431 H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71, Harv. L. Rev., 593 (1958). 
432 See Coleman, supra note 43, at 139.  
433 HART, supra note 43, at 250 (Oxford, 2d ed., 1994). 
434 Id.  
435 Id. at 251. Hart asserts that: “Dworkin in attributing to me a doctrine of ‘plain-fact positivism’ has 
mistakenly treated my theory as not only requiring (as it does) that the existence and authority of the rule of 
recognition should depend on the fact of its acceptance by Courts, but also as requiring (as it does not), that the 
certain criteria of legal validity which the rule provides should consist exclusively of specific kind of plain fact 
which he calls ‘pedigree’ matters and which concern the manner and form of law-creation or adoption. This is 
doubly mistaken. First, it ignores my explicit acknowledgement that the rule of recognition may incorporate as 
criteria of legal validity conformity with moral principles or substantial values; so my doctrine is what has been 
called ‘soft positivism’ and not as in Dworkin’s version of it ‘plain-fact’ positivism.” HART, supra note 43, at 
250. 
436  See, generally, DWORKIN, supra note 293; and RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1986). 
437 In 2004, Dworkin published the article Hart's Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy. See 
Ronald Dworkin, Hart's Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy, 24 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 1 (2004). 
438 HART, supra note 43, at 251.  Hart acknowledged in his Postscript that Dworkin had also criticized other 
soft positivism proponents. Dworkin’s most fundamental criticism, in Hart’s words, was that “the identification 
of the law [can] depend on controversial matters of conformity with moral or other value judgments” is 
inconsistent with the “general positivist ‘picture’ of law as essentially concerned with providing reliable public 
standards of conduct which can be identified with certainty as matters of plain fact without dependence on 
controversial moral arguments.” Id. I go over this criticism in subchapter III.5.1. 
439 See KAVANAGH & OBERDIEK, supra note 430, at 93. 
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 While describing each of these theoretical perspectives, I will also offer arguments 
to make clear why the basic characteristics of the Brazilian legal system shown in the 
previous chapter demonstrate that inclusive legal positivism is appropriate to answer what 
the law is and why its basic traits do not permit it to be framed within any of the other three 
views in the country. 
 I believe this analysis will be relevant to describe, theoretically, the jurisprudential 
characteristics of the Brazilian legal system. This examination will also allow beginning 
pointing out of the practical basic features that I consider to be problematic about the 
country’s legal system, which I will go over in detail in chapter 5. 
  
III.2. Inclusive Legal Positivism 
 
 To explore the basic properties that best characterize the inclusive legal positivistic 
theory, I will essentially resort to H.L.A. Hart’s theory, exposed in the well-known essay 
Positivism and The Separation of Law and Morals,440 as well as in the seminal book The 
Concept of Law441 and in the article Problems of the Philosophy of Law.442 As Dworkin 
famously declared in his The Model of Rules I, Hart’s positivist approach is not only clear 
and elegant, but also constructive thought in legal philosophy “must start with a consideration 
of his views.”443 
  
III.2.1. H.L.A. Hart’s Legal Positivism   
 
 In his seminal book The Concept of Law, Hart basically described the law as a 
particular social practice through which a society defines its rules.444 According to him, the 
key to the science of jurisprudence lies in the investigation of what it is for a social group 
and its officials to accept rules.445 Through such analysis, Hart argued for an institutional 
view of law.446 Law, in his opinion, is a system of social rules in two senses:447 
 
(a) the social rules generally regulate how human beings shall behave (“the 
character of the legal directive imposing the duty is injunctive and normative”);448 and 
 
(b)  the social rules only exist due to human social practices (“the criteria for 
what counts as a legal norm are artificial and conventionalist, and not moral”).449 
 
 Legal rules differ from moral or game rules because they commonly impose duties 
or obligations in imperative form and are, in general, considered obligatory to citizens.450 
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Rules, therefore, are usually formulated to guide actions.451 Citizens and officials behave in 
a certain manner not because they morally agree with what has been commanded by the 
lawgiver—they may or may not—or because they have a habit to do so, but due to the 
existence of a social practice that tells them to do so. If someone does not act in the manner 
established by the social rule, there should be a critical reflexive attitude that the binding 
standard is not being observed. This attitude is the internal aspect of rules, an aspect that 
habits, for example, lack.452 Most of the times, a sanction may be imposed for not observing 
a rule. “Hart’s approach, with emphasis on the internal aspect of rules and of the law, is 
hermeneutic in the sense that it tries to understand a practice in a manner that takes into 
account the way the practice is perceived by its participants:”453 
 
“The clear cases are those in which there is general agreement 
that they fall within the scope of a rule, and it is tempting to 
ascribe such agreements simply to the fact that there are 
necessarily such agreements in the use of the shared 
conventions of language. But this would be an 
oversimplification because it does not allow for the special 
conventions of the legal use of words, which may diverge from 
their common use, or for the way in which the meanings of 
words may be clearly controlled by reference to the purpose of 
a statutory enactment which itself may be either explicitly 
stated or generally agreed.”454  
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say their objective, their value, their significance or importance, as 
conceived by the people who performed them, engaged in them, etc.’ 
 
A theory of law that could predict or explain people’s behavior within a legal system would nonetheless 
seem a failure if its account for why people behaved as they did varied considerably form the people’s own 
understanding of their actions.” Id. Hart was influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein, for whom “[w]ords do not 
always and necessarily ‘stand for’ things, so before we dash into inquiries about the supposed things for which 
they stand, we must carefully work out the ways in which and the conditions under which words are used 
meaningfully in the languages we speak. A chief task philosophy is therefore that of working an interpretive 
understanding of normal human discourse in its normal social settings.” MACCORMICK, supra note 447, at 26. 
454 HART, supra note 442, at 106. 
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 For a system of law to exist and to differ itself from a pre-legal regime, a special kind 
of rules, that impose no duties or obligations, shall also exist and be accepted by officials.455 
These rules are Hart’s secondary rules and are introduced with the purpose of solving 
problems of uncertainty, staticity and inefficiency.456 The combination of primary rules—
rules that impose obligations and duties—and secondary rules is, in his view, the real “key 
to the science of jurisprudence.” 457 
 According to Hart, there are three types of secondary rules and each of them has the 
goal of remedying each one of the mischiefs above:  
 
(a) to correct the uncertainty as to define which primary rules of obligation are 
legal and which are not, the system must introduce a rule of recognition.458 This rule—which 
Zipursky says that it is not really a rule but consists of propositions459— may take a variety 
of forms, simple or complex. The rule of recognition has also the purpose 460of implementing 
the idea of a legal system, by furnishing a unified set of rules, as opposed to an unconnected 
set. 461  Without the existence of a rule of recognition, the “judicial role as such is 
inconceivable.”462 Hart contends that “law’s primary role is to guide individuals’ conduct in 
day-to-day life, to define what we may expect from fellow citizens, governments, 
                                                          
455 HART, supra note 43, at 94. 
456 Id. at 92-94. 
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458 According to Benjamin Zipursky, “in The Concept of Law Hart uses the phrase ‘rule of recognition’ in 
three interrelated ways. First, he sometimes suggests that rules of recognition are linguistic entities that 
designate what the primary rules of the system are (famously, through designating the criteria for legal validity). 
Thus, Hart’s first example of a rule of recognition is ‘an authoritative list of text of the [primary] rules to be 
found in a written document or carved on some public monument. In the Postscript, and in ‘Positivism and The 
Separation of Law and Morals’, Hart suggests that the United States Constitution may be a part of the rule of 
recognition in the American legal system, and this is certainly an example of a text. The tendency to see the 
rule of recognition in this way is further supported by the fact that primary rules of a legal system are very 
plausibly identified with linguistic entities—with texts—and Hart appears to regard primary and secondary 
rules as different species of the same type of thing—rules. 
Second, Hart often suggests that the rule of recognition is what certain linguistic entities (such as certain 
provisions within the United States Constitution) express. The rule of recognition, on this view, is the 
designation of standards or criteria that determine what the primary rules of the system are. But no particular 
formulation is the rule of recognition. These formulations merely express it. On this view, the rule of recognition 
is a proposition that sets forth the standards which determine what the primary rules of a legal system are. It is 
plain that the first, purely linguist aspect is inadequate for interpreting The Concept of Law: ‘In the day-to-day 
life of a legal system its rule of recognition is very seldom expressly formulated as a rule.’ The use of unstated 
rules of recognition, by courts and others, in identifying particular rules of the system is a characteristic of the 
internal point of view. Moreover, Hart frequently speaks of acceptance of a rule, by which he means accepting 
that certain criteria determine which putative norms are legally valid, and accepting the latter is accepting 
something of a propositional order. 
Third, and most famously, Hart frequently claims that a rule of recognition is a particular kind of social 
practice, which he calls a ‘social rule’. This claim, and the analysis of social rules to which it is conjoined, lie 
at the core of his account of law, as recent scholarship suggests.” Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Model of Social 
Facts, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT – ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW 219, 226-227 (Oxford, 
2001). 
459 As Benjamin Zipursky notes, “The Concept of Law asserts that in a modern legal system (such as the 
American and the U.K. systems) the extant laws are rules that satisfy certain conditions. What those conditions 
must be will depend on what a set of legal officials in the legal system—typically the judges—accept as the 
master rule of the system. This ‘rule of recognition’ is two things alone: (i) a propositional entity (which is 
concededly difficult to formulate) that sets out various conditions for what counts as law, and (ii) a social 
practice. See Zipursky, supra note 46, at 1199. 
460 HART, supra note 442, at 106. 
461 HART, supra note 43, at 94-95.  
462 MACCORMICK, supra note 447, at 166. 
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corporations, among others” and the rule of recognition is the way he imagines the citizen 
may be able to grasp these rules.463 As such, they have propositional content and they are 
normative in nature;464 
 
(b) in dealing with the staticity problem of rules—which consists in the fact that 
in primitive societies rules can only be altered through a slow process of growth, whereby 
courses of conduct once thought optional become first habitual or usual, and then 
obligatory—, the system introduces rules of change. Such rules empower "an individual or 
a body of persons to introduce new primary rules for the conduct of the life of the group, or 
of some class within it, and to eliminate old rules;”465 
 
(c) to solve the inefficiency problem, which refers to social conflicts that may 
take place as to whether the primary rules of obligation have or have not been violated, the 
legal system introduces the rules of adjudication. Such rules identify the individuals who are 
to adjudicate disputes and the procedure that shall be followed by them. Rules of 
adjudication, therefore, introduce concepts of judges, courts, judgments and jurisdiction, and 
may be reinforced by further rules imposing duties on judges on how to adjudicate.466 
 
 He also states that “if courts are empowered to make authoritative determinations of 
the fact that a rule has been broken, these cannot avoid being taken as authoritative 
determinations of what the rules are. So, the rule which confers jurisdiction will also be a 
rule of recognition, identifying the primary rules through the judgments of courts and these 
judgments will be a ‘source’ of law.” 467  At last, he adds that legal systems have also 
centralized pressure and commit officials with the task of implementing sanctions.468 
 As Neil MacCormick notes, Hart has a view that a particular aspect of a government 
ruled by laws is that there are institutions and proceedings to elaborate, in a clear and 
authoritative manner, which standards of conduct are legal and which are not. The legal order 
converts vaguer standards of conduct into rules, which ideally are more precise. 469 
MacCormick also asserts that “Hart clearly does not agree that all law is in the relevant sense 
‘posited’ by some deliberate legislative decision […]. What he does hold is that legal rules 
as social rules have social sources, being entirely rooted in the actual practices (doings, 
sayings, and thinkings) of persons in society. Legal rules are neither derive nor include, nor 
derive from objectively preexisting and valid natural standards of human conduct.” 470 
Furthermore, in the Postscript to the Concept of Law, Hart stated that the practice theory is 
not pertinent to enacted legal rules, for these norms “may exist as legal rules from the moment 
of their enactment before any occasion for their practice has arisen.”471 
 Hart’s theory, then, is focused on the actual behavior, on the words and on the 
thoughts employed in the depiction of rules among society, whether in legal texts, decisions, 
or other statements that may be considered authoritative by officials, as well as in the official 
practices that describe the comprehension of these social facts.472 Law uses “normative 
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vocabulary of ought to, entitled to, authorized to. Legal statements are generally practical 
[and in] contrast with descriptive statements, their function is to guide and appraise our 
conduct.”473 As Benjamin Zipursky contends, for primary rules, “[w]hat matters [for Hart]—
as in language and meaning generally—is that the rule exists within a certain context in which 
members of a community regard the expression as properly interpreted and responded to in 
a certain manner. The injunctive quality of legal directives is what Hart has in mind when he 
calls them ‘duty-imposing rules.’ Their content is such that they purport to direct individuals 
to act or not to act in a certain manner.”474 
  
III.2.1.1 Hart’s Battles 
 
 Hart’s jurisprudential works targeted many important points: (a) John Austin’s 
command theory;475 (b) William Blackstone’s mechanistic view of law; (c) the American 
realist movement, led by Oliver Wendell Holmes and by Karl Llewellyn; and (d) the natural 
law theories and their view that morality and law are inherently interconnected. 
 Hart’s attack on Austin’s command theory was made both through the introduction 
of the internal aspect of rules and of the notion that all legal rules are not necessarily posited 
by a sovereign’s deliberate decision, but exist due to social origins, rooted in social practices 
of persons in a society, through acts, statements and thoughts.476 By means of these ideas, 
Hart demonstrated that legal rules could not be considered merely commands because rules 
differ from acts done under coercion and they did not originate from a sovereign, but from a 
practice. Also, commands are more precise to describe duty-imposing rules and cannot 
explain Hart’s secondary power-conferring rules. 
 Additionally, he pointed out that an important distinction of a legal rule from a 
command is the fact that the rule, in the administration of justice, may be applied to cover a 
situation that was not present or believed to be present in the minds of legislators.477 That 
would be true, according to him, for any legal system. Hart argues that Bentham’s utilitarian 
description calls this application—which was not thought or believed to be thought by 
legislators—judicial legislation, whereas Hart thinks that this qualification may fail to make 
justice to this phenomenon, at least in some cases.478 The scholar notes that it is important to 
distinguish: [(a)] when applying rules to instances different that legislators considered or 
could have considered represents a deliberate choice or fiat of the interpreters from [(b)] 
when the inclusion of the new case under the rule is a natural elaboration of the rule, as 
something implementing a purpose which seems natural to attribute (in some sense) to the 
rule, rather to an intention of the law drafter.479  
 Hart’s criticism on mechanistic decisions is detailed in his article Positivism and the 
Separation of Law and Morals and in The Concept of Law. Hart takes the position that 
opinions rendered in a mechanistic fashion “would scarcely deserve the name of 
decisions.” 480  He considers mechanical reasoning an ‘error’, calls mechanistic judges 
‘automatic’ or a ‘slot machine’ and says that it would be better to ‘toss a penny in applying 
a rule of law.’481 The formalist vice is centered in the excessive use of logic by courts, in 
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taking “a thing to ‘a dryly logical extreme’, or in making an excessive use of analytical 
methods.”482 Hart considers the lack of examination of social values and consequences when 
interpreting some general term the main mechanistic error:483  
 
“[…] [L]ogic does not prescribe interpretation of terms; it 
dictates neither the stupid nor intelligent interpretation of any 
expression. Logic only tells you hypothetically that if you give 
a certain term a certain interpretation then a certain conclusion 
follows. Logic is silent on how to classify particulars–and this 
is the heart of a judicial decision.”484 
 
 Hart recognizes that the adoption of rigid modes of interpretation leads to more 
situations in which the meaning of rules will be predetermined in a legal system. 485 
Nevertheless, he criticizes such method, arguing that “rigid classification and divisions 
ignore differences and similarities of social and moral importance.”486 The British scholar 
says this adoption “prejudges what is to be done in ranges of different cases whose 
composition cannot be exhaustively known beforehand.”487 
 Next, Hart gives his famous “crossing stolen vehicle across State lines” example, 
regarding the problem a judge confronts when someone steals an airplane and take it to 
another state. He mentions that the case is not controlled by linguistic conventions and 
criticizes the mechanistic judge for deciding based on logic, and for not confessing that he is 
not dealing with the standard but is in an area of penumbra. In this penumbral zone, the 
general terms of the rule are susceptible to different interpretations and the decision is most 
likely to be determined by the judge’s discretionary choice. The result is uncontrolled by 
linguistic conventions. 488  As Hart asserts at the end of the essay, “we live among 
uncertainties between which we have to choose, and […] the existing law imposes only limits 
on our choice and not the choice itself.”489 
 The lack of identification of a core area of rules is Hart’s main criticism to the realist 
movement, whose proponents had a skeptical view of rules. He acknowledges that the realists 
“opened men’s eyes to what actually goes on when courts decide cases, and the contrast drew 
between the actual facts of judicial decision and the traditional terminology for describing it 
as if it were a wholly logical operation.”490 He called senseless the notion articulated by some 
extreme realists that rules never control courts’ decisions and insisted in the possibility of 
hard core settled meaning in some norms. 491  Also, he criticized the fact that Holmes’ 
prediction theory492 could not explain the existence of courts and judges, and why their 
decisions are authoritative. 493  As Zipursky observes, Hart attacked mischiefs in legal 
interpretation and advocated for judges to be more transparent, frank and truthful, exposing 
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the law’s flaws instead of imposing their own views by saying that the law covers what it 
does not.494 
 Nevertheless, Hart did state that in case of “rules with an open texture and at the 
points where the texture is open, individuals can only predict how courts will decide and 
adjust their behavior accordingly.” 495  In fact, Hart understood the importance of rule-
skepticism as a theory of the function of rules in judicial decisions.496 But he claimed that 
this approach resulted from a misconception of rules being able to anticipate all possible 
situations to which they should apply. When the sceptic discovers the flaws of the rules, he 
then moves to deny that there can be any rules: 
 
“Thus the fact that the rules, which judges claim bind them in 
deciding a case, have an open texture, or have exceptions not 
exhaustively specifiable in advance, and the fact that deviation 
from the rules will not draw down on the judge a physical 
sanction are often used to establish the sceptic’s case.”497  
 
 At last, Hart’s most famous struggle was to sustain, under his concept of law as a 
system of rules, the separation of law and morals, a thesis that had been priorly articulated 
by Austin and Bentham. While emphasizing that in the penumbral area the system of law 
does not have a response to the case, leaving to the judge the responsibility to make a rational 
non-formalistic decision, Hart argued that the fact that a choice has to be made does not mean 
law and morals are merged. He points out that there can be intelligible decisions in the 
penumbral area which do not appeal to moral arguments, but to social aims, policies, among 
other types of reasoning. Moral arguments only show one type of criticism and of argument 
that may be employed by the judge, under his discretion, when reaching the decision, but are 
far from exclusively representing in totality what the word “ought” may mean. Economic, 
political, even evil arguments could be referred to by the judge; his decision would not be 
considered formalistic, but not necessarily moral: 
 
“The point here is that intelligent decisions which we oppose 
to mechanical or formal decisions are not necessarily identical 
with decisions defensible on moral grounds. We may say a 
decision: ‘Yes, that is right; that is as it ought to be,’ and we 
may mean only that some accepted purpose or policy has been 
thereby advanced; we may not mean to endorse the moral 
propriety of the policy or the decision. So the contrast between 
the mechanical decision and the intelligent one can be 
reproduced inside a system dedicated to the pursuit of evil 
aims.”498  
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 Nevertheless, Hart concludes that the pursuit of evil aims would not be possible in 
systems like the British and the American, which “widely recognize principles of justice and 
moral claims of individuals.”499 Such phrase, taken from the essay entitled Positivism and 
the Separation of Law and Morals, written in 1958, discloses a position that would be later 
better detailed by Hart: his acknowledgement of soft-positivism or inclusive legal positivism. 
 In his 1965 essay Lon L. Fuller: The Morality of Law, in response to Fuller’s assertion 
that his rule of recognition could not be subject to any explicit or implicit provision for 
revocation of abuses, Hart argued that: 
 
“There is, for me, no logical restriction on the content of the 
rule of recognition: so far as ‘logic’ goes it could provide 
explicitly or implicitly that the criteria determining the validity 
of subordinate laws should cease to be regarded as such if the 
laws identified in accordance with them proved to be morally 
objectionable. So a constitution could include in its restrictions 
on the legislative power even of its supreme legislature not 
only conformity with due process but a completely general 
provision that its legal power should lapse if its enactments 
ever conflicted with principles of morality and justice.”500 
 
 Hart, in that occasion, however, slipped a critical opinion on the adoption of 
substantive vague standards of morals and justice in the rule of recognition:  
 
“The objection to this extraordinary arrangement would not be 
‘logic’ but the gross indetermination of such criteria of legal 
validity. Constitutions do not invite trouble by taking this 
form.”501 
 
III.2.1.2. Hart’s Inclusive Legal Positivism Acknowledgement 
 
 In the Postscript to The Concept of Law, Hart clearly took the position that “in some 
systems of law, as in the United States, the ultimate criteria of legal validity might explicitly 
incorporate besides pedigree, principles of justice or substantive moral values, and these may 
form the content of legal constitutional restraints.”502 Therefore, Hart called this doctrine 
soft-positivism, which is also known as inclusive legal positivism.503 The first proponents of 
the ideas associated to this doctrine were E. Phillip Soper, in Legal Theory and The 
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Obligation of the Judge: The Hard/Dworkin Dispute504 and Jules Coleman, in the essay 
Negative and Positive Positivism, published in 1982.505 
 A problem of a system that includes substantive restraints in its rule of recognition, 
nevertheless, is that there may be situations in which citizens are not able to ascertain, in 
advance and with certainty, what the legal rules are. Nevertheless, Hart thinks this is an 
overrated problem, at least for most legal systems, and contends that the exclusion of all 
uncertainty is impossible: 
 
“It is of course true that an important function of the rule of 
recognition is to promote certainty with which the law may be 
ascertained. This would fail to do if the tests which it 
introduced for law not only raise controversial issues in some 
cases but raise them in all or most cases. But the exclusion of 
all uncertainty at whatever costs in other values is not a goal 
which I have ever envisaged for the rule of recognition. This 
is made plain or so I had hoped, both by my explicit statement 
[…] that the rule of recognition itself as well as particular rules 
of law identified by reference to it may have a debatable 
‘penumbra’ of uncertainty. There is also my general argument 
that, even if laws could be framed that could settle in advance 
all possible questions that could arise about their meaning, to 
adopt such laws would often war with other aims which law 
should cherish.”506 
 
 Therefore, regarding the relationship of law and morals, Hart articulated that it is 
possible to have a legal system in which laws do not have to observe any substantive 
standards to be valid. This legal system, even though could have valid immoral laws, would 
still deserve to be called a legal system. However, the mere fact that the rule of recognition 
of a system accepts morality as a criterion for some (or all) of its laws does not shake Hart’s 
conviction that it is theoretically possible to distinguish legal standards from moral standards 
and, therefore, does not strike the separation thesis. 
 It is important to stress that Hart’s support for the separation thesis does not turn him 
into an apologist of immoral, dishonest or unethical acts. On the contrary, he centered great 
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part of his scholarship arguing for a critical morality in many legal areas, such as criminal 
law. His main goal with the separation thesis was to avoid the premature conclusion 
prevalent in classic natural law theory that “an unjust law is no law at all.”507 For Hart, such 
conclusion discourages society from developing a critical position as to whether its laws are 
unfair and, for this reason, deserve to be changed. 508 
 A final remark is that Hart drew a line between two types of morality: positive 
morality and critical morality. The term “positive morality” was used by Hart in the book 
Law, Liberty and Morality. This is a concept that was first used by John Austin. For Hart, 
positive morality is not the individual morality; it is the social morality, the morality of a 
social group that is socially integrated. It is the morality that in fact is accepted and shared 
by a certain group, which is capable to apprehend it as a matter of fact.509 Positive morality 
is opposed to critical morality, which refers to the criterion adopted by lawyers to criticize 
the posited norms, seeking their modification.510  
 
III.2.1.3. The Model of Social Facts 
 
 Hart’s legal doctrine treats law as a product of social facts. As Zipursky notes, for 
Hart, “what makes a statement of law true is that the legal norm that it asserts satisfies the 
conditions set out by some rule of recognition.” 511  Zipursky adds that Hart takes the 
Austinian idea that a command is law and turns this idea to attribute the quality of law to the 
command (and to the secondary rules) that are positioned. “How it is positioned is a matter 
of social and historical fact about the position and conduct of the issuer and audience of the 
command.”512  
 The strong criticism against Hart’s social fact view is that “knowing the law in a 
useful sense will always mean being able to apply it, and so long as there are open questions 
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about how the law is to be interpreted at various junctures, there will be huge gaps in what 
is the truth about law.”513 Therefore, simply stating that all laws can be captured by a social 
fact alone may reveal to be an impossible task, because to understand how the law is 
comprehended by the officials that shall apply it, one may have to understand the rules of 
interpretation these officials put to use. This idea is clearly argued by Zipursky: 
 
 “The apparatus to articulate this problem was in front of Hart 
in The Concept of Law, but he made little use of it, at least 
explicitly. So long as there are secondary legal rules that have 
the status of social rules and are conventionally accepted by 
legal officials, it is plausible that norms of interpretation are 
social rules too.”514 
 
 Zipursky adds that it is a possibility that Hart would have understood that norms of 
interpretation are implicit in the rule of recognition, or are a form of rule of adjudication, or 
even a special form of secondary rule. But he concludes that such comprehension does not 
matter, because even if understood as such type of rules, uncertainty would not be eliminated 
and Hart was aware of that:515  
 
“Hart of course believed there was uncertainty and would have 
no reason to wish a theoretical device that would suppress that 
truth. It would, rather, help us to articulate the possibility of 
law existing with respect to a matter that was prima facie 
ambiguous (on language alone), but that competent legal 
officials would all regard as having the same meaning. To the 
extent that there are accepted rules of interpretation, those 
rules also determine what the underlying legal rules mean in 
the legal system. Hence, there could also be truth about the 
correct interpretation of a legal rule.”516 
 
 Zipursky, therefore, argues for an extension of Hart’s social facts thesis, one that 
would accommodate much of the problem of the “open texture of the law.” Under this 
expanded version, which he labels the model of social facts or the penumbra-extending 
version, “we would still have answers to legal questions that were true by virtue of social 
facts determining secondary legal rules as extant, and by virtue of the application of those 
secondary rules.”517 
 Hart did mention a few words about law adjudication—what in one occasion he 
called “justice in the administration of the law”518 —and criticized the utilitarians for calling 
every decision in the penumbral area judicial legislation, a qualification that fails to 
distinguish when rule application is a deliberate choice of judges for situations which are 
beyond any possibility of the legislator’s consideration to when the application is a natural 
elaboration of the rule—which merely implements the a purpose natural to the law in some 
sense.519 Nonetheless, he conceded, in the Postscript to The Concept of Law, that he “said 
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far too little […] about adjudication and legal reasoning and, in particular, about arguments 
that his critics call principles.”520 
 To correct his omission, Hart criticized Dworkin for making a sharp contrast between 
rules and principles, as described in subchapter II.5.1. above. He called the latter non-
conclusive norms and made the following observations: 
 
“I see no reason to accept either this sharp contrast between 
legal principles and legal rules, or the view that if a valid rule 
is applicable to a given case it must, unlike a principle, always 
determine the outcome of the case. There is no reason why a 
legal system should not recognize that a valid rule determines 
a result in cases to which it is applicable, except where another 
rule, judged to be more important, is also applicable to the 
same case. So a rule which is defeated in competition with a 
more important rule in a given case may, like a principle, 
survive to determine the outcome in other cases where it is 
judged to be more important than another competing rule.”521 
 
 Therefore, in conformity with Hart’s words on adjudication, one may notice that he 
does make a clear distinction between what the law is and its institutional forces. As 
Waluchow precisely points out, Hart evidently takes the position that “a judge must 
sometimes decline to apply valid law”:522 
 
“It is a common mistake to think that Hart’s theory of law does 
imply that valid laws must be applied in all cases in which their 
core of settled meaning would seem to make them clearly 
applicable. But this is far from true. Nowhere does Hart 
suggest this theory of adjudication, nor is there anything in his 
theory of law which commits him to that position. This is clear 
if one examines Hart’s writings carefully with an eye towards 
the distinction between law and its institutional forces. 
Whether a valid rule must be followed in a core case will 
crucially depend, in part, on the institutional rules of 
adjudication accepted within the legal system. These, together 
with rules of recognition, help define the varying institutional 
forces valid laws have for judges.”523 
 
 Indeed, Waluchow is right about pointing out that Hart’s theory does not determine 
an unsophisticated binding application of laws by judges whenever they are valid. Hart spent 
a lot of energy in trying to demonstrate the impossibility of law to predict all situations. 
Moreover, his struggle against mechanical application of laws reveals his opposition to 
unintelligible decisions. Attributing to Hart a literalist conception does not seem to be fair 
with one of his most important scholarship goals. Hart’s theory, as MacCormick observes, is 
considered to be hermeneutical due to his purpose of comprehending the law as how their 
participants understand and apply it (or not):524 
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524 See Bix, supra note 453. 
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“When Hart ascribes to sociologists the job of external 
description of legal orders, he is presumably referring to 
Weber’s view that the sociologist is not directly concerned 
with a normative interpretation of law, but with the probability 
that people in society will respond in certain ways to their own 
normative interpretation of law.”525 
 
 In fact, in the Postscript to The Concept of Law, Hart criticized Dworkin’s all-or-
nothing rule’s conception and admitted that even areas that demand near-conclusive rules 
prohibiting or requiring the same specific actions admit exceptions in the application of the 
rule in “rare cases.”526 
 An example of application of this assertion is the British law’s golden rule, which is 
basically “designed to ensure that in interpreting words literally, no absurdity or 
inconsistency results.”527 When such rule is applied, of course the literal meaning of the text 
is not observed and one may argue that the rule has not been followed. However, such 
criterion for deciding cases is largely adopted by British judges and there is no doubt that the 
golden rule is a rule in the United Kingdom.528 The golden rule, which leads to the departure 
of the literal application of a rule, is Hart’s “rare case” in which the judge may not apply a 
rule.   
 A similar approach exists in the civil law world. According to Nino, civil law judges 
may identify axiological gaps in the legal system. This situation takes place when judges 
consider that the legislator would not have established the solution that he adopted in the 
statute if he had noticed a particularity that he did not pay attention to. Therefore, judges 
conclude that the stipulated solution shall not be applied to the case, because they consider 
it illogical or unfair and that there is a gap in the system that may be integrated in 
adjudication.529 The rationale is similar to the golden rule approach.  
 For John Finnis, the application of the golden rule clearly takes part in a process of 
identifying “a moral standard as one which anyone adjudicating a given case has the duty to 
apply even though it has not (yet) been posited by the social facts of custom, enactment, or 
prior adjudication.”530  
 An example from American Law comes from the issue cited in the subchapter 
II.4.2.2. concerning the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. This clause prohibits states from denying any person 
within its territory the equal protection of the laws. However, U.S. Courts have some 
                                                          
525 MACCORMICK, supra note 447, at 43.  
526 HART, supra note 43, at 263. 
527 PHIL HARRIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW 212 (Cambridge, 7th, 2007). 
528 See Becke, Assignee of Wm. Ashton, an Insolvent Debtor v. Smith (1836) 150 Eng. Rep 724 (KB). See 
also Grey v. Pearson, 6 ER 60 (1857) (asserting that “[i]n construing statutes, the grammatical and ordinary 
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77 (Nelson Education, 2006). 
529 NINO, supra note 109, at 340. KELSEN, supra note 174, at 275.  
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principle such as fairness, of rejecting favourable or unfavorable treatment which is arbitrary when measured 
by the principle (the Golden Rule) that like cases are to be treated alike, unlike cases differently, and one should 
do for others what one would have them do for oneself or for those one already favours…” John Finnis, Natural 
Law: The Classical Tradition in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 10 
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precedents in which they stated that statutes that treat people unequally can be held 
constitutional and, for this reason, this constitutional clause will not be offended, if states are 
able to prove compelling, important or legitimate interests for treating people unequally.531 
 Nevertheless, it seems true that, for Hart, in the vast majority of cases, it is likely that 
judges will follow the law, even if they morally disagree with it. The use of the word “rare” 
denotes his position that law departure in adjudication shall be exceptional. Hart, 
nonetheless, rejects ideological positivism.532 
 The important point to bear in mind is that it is wrong to say that Hart’s positivistic 
view asserts that judges are always bound to apply the law and that Hart was aware that some 
uncertainty would always exist in the system, and that, in these cases, judges are likely to 
adopt a form of accommodation of the problem of “relative indeterminacy” of the law. 
Zipursky “penumbra covering rules” may vary in a legal system and may take different 
forms, as we will see in the following subchapters. The system may adopt several criteria 
that judges should follow to make the decisions, such as golden rule, axiological gaps, 
balancing, attributing certain dogmatic properties to the system or even act as a legislator—
as set forth in the Swiss Civil Code.533 
  
III.2.1.4. Coherentism 
 
 One last remark on Hart’s theory is concerned with what he called truth in law 
adjudication. As Zipursky described in the essay Practical Positivism versus Practical 
Perfectionism: The Hart-Fuller Debate at Fifty, when advocating the separation thesis, 
Hart’s goal was not primarily to point out a conceptual distinction among law and morality, 
but to draw a line between what the law is from what the law ought to be.534 
 Even though Hart did not think that judges should always decide cases following the 
text of rules, he did believe that judges should be clear about this fact, when they decided not 
to follow it.535 Therefore, for an opinion to be rightly written, the judge should inform the 
applicable law and should describe the reasons why it should or should not be applied in the 
particular case. If the case was in a penumbral zone, the judge should expose this fact. When 
talking about the Grudge Informer case in Positivism and The Separation of Law and Morals, 
Hart asserted that merely sustaining that Nazi Law was not law at all—as Gustav Radbruch 
and Lon Fuller contended—did not correctly address the question as to whether a woman 
that committed an outrageously immoral act, not forbidden under the Nazi regime, should be 
punished. Hart observed that one should not conceal that, in some occasions, life forces us 
to choose between the lesser of two evils and the person that has the authority to make the 
decision must be conscious that “they are what they are.”536 In the Grudge Informer case, 
                                                          
531 See note 202. 
532 For ideological positivism, see subchapter II.4.2.2. 
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534 See Zipursky, supra note 46. 
535 According to Hart, “what is mostly needed in order to make man clear sighted in confronting the official 
abuse of power, is that they should preserve the sense that the certification of something as legally valid is not 
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the two evils were (a) punishing someone based on an ex post facto law or (b) letting a person 
who committed an atrocious act go free.537 
  Hart believed that there ought to be clarity, candor, an excellence in accurate legal 
interpretation. Zipursky individuates these values advocated by Hart as veracity, a term not 
used by the British author, but which accurately captures Hart’s thought. This quality is 
practical, not conceptual, because veracity allows one to accept the truth in law in practical 
cases. This is good for instrumental reasons, because “[w]e cannot know whether to obey, 
disobey, revise, reject, celebrate, or overturn the law unless we know what it actually 
says.”538  
 Based on these excerpts, one might conclude that Hart believed in a conception of 
truth in law adjudication. The qualification of something as true in law, however, according 
to Benjamin Zipursky, cannot come from the fact that (a) there is a correspondence of the 
legal proposition to the world—a theory called the correspondence theory of truth; (b) 
statements of law are empirically verifiable—the reductionist verificationism in the theory 
of meaning; or (c) statements of law can be justified by some other self-justified beliefs—the 
foundationalism theory.539 All these qualities argued by these theories, if demanded, would 
probably not authorize to affirm that there is truth in law adjudication. 
 Instead, Zipursky argues for a coherentist approach, which adopts a thinner account 
of legal truth, one that would be possible by attributing the quality of truthfulness or falseness 
to “a domain of assertions that purport to be about a range of practices, goods, actions, and 
entities connected with our everyday world, and spoken about and argued coherently,”540 
and not by being in accordance with empirical evidence, justification for believing in it or 
correspondence of the proposition to the world. Moral arguments, in this sense, are mostly 
construed, not found.541  
 Therefore, with regards to legal positivism, Zipursky strives that, even though law in 
the penumbral area could not be captured by a social fact, it is possible to talk about truth in 
relation to decisions made to solve these penumbral cases, if we admit that these decisions 
follow accepted practices of interpretation that correspond to secondary rules: 
 
“Another way to describe this practice is […] [through] a 
practice of truth-seeking. The practice seems to be 
accompanied by a presumption that there is some answer to 
which adjudicators ought to converge, a presumption that 
justificatory forms of argument that can be analyzed as truth-
preserving will lead us to the argument, an idea that the right 
answer is independent of the will of the answer-seeker, and 
conviction that the answer will be a sound basis for action. The 
suggestion is that a critical question in jurisprudence is the 
legitimacy and appropriateness of what might be called truth-
seeking […] practices and attitudes in adjudication.”542 
 
                                                          
all the values we cherish ultimately will fit into a single system, that no one them has to be sacrificed or 
compromised to accommodate another.” Id. 
537 See HART, supra note 43, at 210. 
538 See Zipursky, supra note 46, at 1180. 
539 Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Coherentism, 50 S.M.U L. Rev. 1679, 1682-1687 (1997). 
540 Zipursky, supra note 46, at 1206. 
541 See STEPHEN GUEST, RONALD DWORKIN 15 (Stanford, 3rd ed, 2013). 
542 MACCORMICK, supra note 447, at 43. 
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 Zipursky adds that this truth-seeking practice, in the positivist case, should not be 
focused as a “locus of legitimacy,” but as a form of assessment of the laws and the methods 
of argumentation: 
 
“This approach does not focus on the truth-seeking practice as 
a locus of legitimacy. Instead, it says that we should pour our 
energy into the assessment of laws and the methods of 
argumentation. We must also question the proper scope and 
occasions of the exercise of adjudicative power, on the other, 
given that the adjudicative practices work as they do, and given 
that the law and its methods are what they are. Both these 
approaches are consistent with saying that legal statements are 
about the law; there is nothing problematic with saying that 
legal statements are true; that no extra-legal discourse is 
needed to describe the subject matter of law; and that 
coherence among our legal statements is the measure of 
whether to accept legal statements.”543 
 
 Hart’s positivistic conception of truth in law adjudication, of course, differs from 
Dworkin’s, as we will see in the following subchapters. Zipursky observes that “Dworkin is 
ultimately a legal coherentist with a twist. The twist is to give a sufficiently rich and attractive 
account of the detailed nature of the truth-seeking practices in adjudication that the 
institutions of the law, and communities governed through those institutions, turn out to 
possess a certain sort of social virtue; in Dworkin’s case, it is the virtue of integrity.”544 
 As a conclusion, it is important to point out that, under the coherentist approach, it is 
possible to speak about the veracity of statements of law if one considers that the truth of 
these statements is not claimed because it is compatible with empirical evidence, justification 
for believing in it or correspondence of the sentence to the world, but because it follows 
forms of argumentation conventionally adopted in the legal community and are argued 
coherently in the everyday world.  
 This approach is largely adopted by Brazilian judges, whenever they talk about truth 
in law, because truth will be considered to be found if forms of argumentation conventionally 
adopted through rules of adjudication are argued, like balancing or proportionality, among 
others. 
 
III.2.2. Brazil: A Hartian Legal System 
 
 This subchapter intends to show that Hart’s theory of law, which purports to 
demonstrate how law is generally understood, in his soft-positivistic view, captures how 
Brazilians understand their legal system. At first, the subchapter outlines some propositions 
that give an account of part of the country’s current rule of recognition and show how 
substantial constraints compose it. Following, it will elucidate how Hart’s concept of norms 
and his approach regarding the separation of law and morals takes part in the country’s legal 
practice. At last, it will show why Zipursky’s model of social facts and coherentism theories 
are appropriate for depicting Brazilian law because they also explain that a legal theory can 
adopt a criterion orienting judges on how to decide cases.  
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III.2.2.1. Brazil’s Rule of Recognition 
  
 In this and in the next subchapter, I will formulate propositions to show what is the 
current rule of recognition in Brazil in respect to law identification and adjudication. I do 
not intend to exhaust Brazil’s rule of recognition propositions. This task would deserve an 
entire article focused on it. My goal is to demonstrate how substantive criteria are 
incorporated within the rule.545 
 Brazilians, as Hart, do see their legal system as very institutionalized, being the result 
of a specific set of social facts, which are created by human institutions to regulate how they 
shall behave. 
 Pursuant to the description provided in subchapter II.3, the enactment of a written 
law is the major source of rights and duties in Brazil, therefore, is the social fact that 
generally needs to take place for a norm of conduct to become legal in the country. The 
quotes from José Afonso da Silva, Manuel Gonçalves Ferreira Filho, and the S.T.F. Justice 
Alexandre de Moraes, in subchapter II.3.1, expose a comprehension that legality is fulfilled 
with the enactment of written legal norm by the Legislative Branches. Institutional support 
through law enactment, therefore, is generally required for norms to enter into the legal word. 
The cited rulings both from the S.T.F. and from the State of São Paulo Court of Appeals 
confirm this view. These scholars and officials, when technically justifying this claim, 
usually refer to the text of article 5, II, of the C.F., said to reflect the content of the legality 
principle. This constitutional provision sets forth that “no one shall be obligated to do or 
refrain from doing something except by virtue of [enacted] law.”546 
 A depiction of the Brazilian rule of recognition, for this reason, shall contain a 
proposition like the following:  
 
- The judicial duty is to apply as valid law every statute passed 
and not further repealed by the majority of the Legislative 
Branch, either in the Federal, State, Federal District or 
Municipality level, if the statutes observe the formal and 
substantial limits set out in the Federal Constitution, and, if 
applicable, in State Constitutions and in the Federal District 
and Municipalities organizational laws.547 
 
 The role of the constitutional text, as depicted in subchapter II.3.1, cannot be left 
behind in a description of the Brazilian rule of recognition. After the enactment of the 1988 
C.F., officials no longer see the C.F. merely as an essential political and organizational 
document, but as a text with normative force that allows judges to recognize causes of actions 
without the need of statutes concretizing its provisions. The prevalent official practice 
considers constitutional norms to be self-enforceable, being able, in most of cases, to prompt 
government coercion even if no statute is enacted to regulate the obligations established in 
the text.  
 Therefore, if one were to imagine a rule of recognition proposition applied by 
Brazilian officials with respect to the C.F., one could say that this rule would run as follows: 
 
                                                          
545 For a comment an attempt to describe the Rule of Recognition in the United States, see Stephen V. Carey, 
What is the Rule of Recognition in the United States? 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1161 (2009). 
546 See note 2.  
547 I took as an example of rule of recognition statements, the propositions presented by Neil MacCormick. 
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- The judicial duty is to apply as valid law the provisions 
inserted in the Constitutional text ratified in 1988, recognizing 
causes of actions for protecting the rights established in the 
text, save for the provisions that have been validly repealed by 
procedures set forth in article 60 of the Constitution, but 
including every provision validly added by way of 
constitutional amendment under article 60.548 
 
 Subchapter II.4.1. demonstrated that Brazilian statutes are generally not as detailed 
as their U.S. counterparts. Also, the C.F., although much longer and analytic than the U.S. 
Constitution, does not generally go into specificities in the wide range of issues that it deals 
with. On the contrary, the 1988 Framers expressly introduced a large number of rules and 
principles in the C.F., some of them reflecting social goals, others fundamental rights. These 
value-laden text includes, for example, as foundations of the Republic, human dignity and 
the social value of labor,549 and as fundamental goals of the nation the eradication of poverty 
and marginalization, the reduction of social and regional inequality and the promotion of 
the good of all.550 Other examples of open-textured words established in the C.F. that were 
mentioned in cases cited throughout this work were animal cruelty, administrative morality, 
democracy and administrative probity. A quotation from Professor Patrícia Perrone, cited in 
subchapter II.4.1, helps to paint the current picture.551  
 These principles, social goals, fundamental rights and foundations written in the C.F., 
according to Hart’s theory, are all part of Brazilian law, because they are so identified as 
valid legal rules in accordance to the criteria provided by the rule of recognition.552 The fact 
that they establish the obligation of statutes and official action to conform with the moral 
criteria they impose is not a problem for asserting their legal status, at least for an inclusive 
legal positivist adept. As Hart observed, there is “no logical restriction on the content of the 
rule of recognition: so far as ‘logic’ goes it could provide explicitly or implicitly that the 
criteria determining the validity of subordinate laws should cease to be regarded as such if 
the laws identified in accordance with them proved to be morally objectionable.”553 Indeed, 
one of Hart’s example of moral standards in the rule of recognition is the Nineteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which establishes substantive constraints on the 
content of legislation regarding abridgments of the right to vote.554 Waluchow, talking about 
Canada’s rule of recognition, takes a similar position in respect to section 1 of the Canadian 
Charter. This provision declares that the Charter “guarantees the rights and freedoms set out 
in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified 
in a free and democratic society:”555 
 
“So what is required by section 1 of the Canadian Charter is 
not the kind of reasoning which strives to be neutral with 
respect to, or totally detached from, concerns of political 
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549 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.][CONSTITUTION] art. 1, III (Braz.). 
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shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
555 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitutional Act, 1982, being Schedule B to 
the Canada Act, 1982, c 1 (U.K.). 
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morality. The issues are not purely factual in nature, nor are 
they purely technical legal matters. What is required by section 
1 is some measure of normative, moral judgment which tackles 
the tricky issues involved whenever one is called upon to strike 
a reasonable balance between competing moral and political 
interests. Section 1, then, requires a significant measure of 
moral reasoning. In determining the constitutional status of 
laws in Canada, courts must often consider their ‘moral 
merits’. For good or ill, in Canada the existence of law is not 
one thing, its merit or demerit another thing entirely. The two 
have been joined by Canada’s rule of recognition and the 
charter validates it.”556 
 
 Brazilian jurists, as stated in subchapters II.5.4 and II.5.5, very commonly decide 
cases based on the interpretation/concretization of moral standards embedded in these 
principles. They accept these standards; consider that they may provide direct causes of 
action and use them as guide for their decisions. An external observer, in reading judicial 
opinions, would easily conclude that in Brazilian legal practices these standards are part of 
law. A statement about this issue could, then, be written in the following way: 
 
- The judicial duty is to enforce as valid law the principles, 
social goals, fundamental rights and foundations inserted in the 
Constitutional text ratified in 1988, save for the provisions that 
have been validly repealed by procedures set forth in article 60 
of the Constitution, and including every provision validly 
added by way of constitutional amendment under article 60.557 
  
 Furthermore, the existence of the Judiciary branch and its role in solving disputes is 
laid out in the C.F., satisfying the criteria of legal validity.558 Therefore, the criterion of 
legality assures, through secondary rules, the power of courts and makes their decisions 
binding on the parties. As Raymond Wacks observes, “judges are empowered by […] rule[s] 
of adjudication.”559 
  
III.2.2.2. Brazil’s Rules of Adjudication 
 
 The mere fact that someone depicts that Brazilians see their constitution as a binding 
document does not tells us how judges interpret it. In the U.S., originalists and living 
constitutionalist jurists560 also see the U.S. Constitution as a binding document and yet 
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disagree on how the document should be interpreted. It is, however, possible to try to capture, 
as a social fact, what is the prevalent practice adopted by officials in interpreting texts that 
meet the legal criterion.561 This social fact will have to take into consideration the way most 
Brazilian judges behave in construing the interpretation of the country’s enacted rules and 
other primary rules they consider binding. This, pursuant to Hart’s classification of rules, 
will be a form of rule of adjudication.  
Since the C.F. expressly states that the S.T.F. is responsible “for safeguarding the 
Constitution,”562 it is important to pay attention to the methods of interpretation that this 
Court employs to define the meaning of the provisions of the C.F. The identification of the 
behavior of judges towards the text is relevant because, as previously described, it has 
changed throughout the years in comparison to practices adopted by the S.T.F. with respect 
to Brazil’s previous constitutions. But even in this new constitutional regime, the practices 
of the S.T.F. Justices towards constitutional interpretation have varied. Patrícia Perrone 
points out this behavioral modification: 
 
“There are two important marks in relation to the S.T.F. 
judicial behavior after the enactment of the 1988 Constitution. 
The first is the recognition of the efficacy of the constitutional 
norms. Up to the enactment of the 1988 C.F., the Brazilian 
Constitutions were not seen as authentic legal norms and were 
systematically disrespected. After the 1988 C.F., jurists started 
to hold the position that the Constitution is a legal norm, which 
must be applied directly to regulate reality, without the need of 
statutes to give efficacy to it. The power to apply the text was 
given to judges, in resemblance to what already took place 
with statutory law. […] 
The second mark of the S.T.F. judicial behavior, in a 
hermeneutical point of view, is the assimilation of the theory 
of principles, which took place in the mid-1990s. This new 
phase was distinguished for the recognition of the status of 
norms of constitutional principles, for the appeal to the 
principles of reasonableness and proportionality, for the 
affirmation of balancing of values technique as the leading 
interpretative approach in this new context, of a wider 
openness and fluid legal hermeneutic.”563 
 
This reference substantiates Hart’s approach that some of the rules of adjudication—
which are called by Humberto Ávila metanorms or normative postulates (subchapter 
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II.5.6.)—may be considered legal rules due to judicial practice. The rules of adjudication in 
Brazil are generally not set forth in any legal text,564 but are usually described by scholars 
through observation of the judicial practice. Judges may simply accept the practice and 
conform to it, especially in Brazil, in which, pursuant to subchapter II.4.4., in a general 
manner, there is no stare decisis. 
As stated in subchapter 4.3, principles have been written in Brazilian legal texts. 
These principles are considered prima facie norms; they, along with implied principles, are 
commonly employed by judges to decide cases in which there is no clear solutions in the 
posited norms. According to Robert Alexy’s theory, the most prominent in the country, when 
two principles compete, the issue must be resolved by balancing the conflicting interests 
served by these principles. The judge must decide which principle (that have equal status in 
abstract) has greater weight in the concrete situation.565  
Patricia Perrone noted a modification of the attitude of judges after the enactment of 
the 1988 Constitution. Judges no longer saw the document as a mere political but began 
treating it as an enforceable legal norm. So, the general comprehension of constitutional law 
changed due to judge’s practices. There was no reaction from Congress to challenge this 
change of behavior and to stop the growth of judicial power. No rules or constitutional 
amendments were passed to bind a certain behavior as to how interpret the C.F. or statutes. 
On the contrary, many statutes that were drafted in the period have incorporated these 
conventional practices within, particularly the ideas of constitutionalizing the law,566 which 
were described in subchapter II.5.7.567 Also, many political parties have initiated abstract 
actions before the S.T.F. to enforce fundamental rights.568  
Based on these reasons and on the current judicial practice adopted by the majority 
of judges in Brazil in relation to written and implied principles, one may argue that one of 
the propositions of the rule of recognition, related to a secondary rule of adjudication, may 
run like this: 
 
- The judicial duty is to enforce the goals, foundations, 
principles and fundamental rights established in the provisions 
of the Constitutional text currently in force. If these goals, 
foundations and principles conflict, the judge shall solve this 
conflict through the application of a balancing test and/or 
through the application of the principles of proportionality and 
reasonableness.  
  
 In addition, even before the 1988 C.F., Brazilian officials shared a discourse that 
valid laws were only the ones enacted by the Legislative branch, but, at the same time, 
employed several techniques that allowed updating legal texts, such as the four traditional 
                                                          
564 Except for some articles of the Introductory Act to the Brazilian Norms. See LEI DE INTRODUÇÃO ÀS 
NORMAS DO DIREITO BRASILEIRO [L.I.N.D.B.] [INTRODUCTORY ACT TO BRAZILIAN NORMS] art. 2, par. 1° and 
2°, 4-5 (Braz.). See e.g. supra notes 312, 335 and infra notes 567 and 571. Another example that may be cited 
is the provisions of articles 107-112 of the Brazilian Federal Tax Code. See CÓDIGO TRIBUTÁRIO NACIONAL 
[C.T.N.] [FEDERAL TAX CODE] art. 107-112 (Braz.) (regulating the interpretation and integration of federal tax 
law).  
565 ALEXY, supra note 246, at 51. 
566 See Subchapter II.5.7. 
567 An example is article 8 of the new Code of Civil Procedure, enacted in 2015, which states: “In applying 
the legal order, the judge will care for the social ends and to the common good demands, safeguarding and 
promoting human dignity and observing proportionality, reasonableness, legality, publicity and efficiency.” 
This article states a typical rule of adjudication. 
568 See text accompanying note 846. 
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methods of interpretation—literal, systematic, teleological and historical—and also the 
fictions of the juridical dogmatic—unity, coherence, consistency and completeness and the 
rational legislator myth. Despite the fact that the range of these techniques was substantially 
shorter if compared to the current judicial practices, they served and still serve the relevant 
function of reformulating the law, proposing certainty to its vague terms, filling its gaps, 
solving its incoherencies and adjusting its norms to determined axiological ideals.569 These 
techniques are all part of Brazilian law and may be perceived as a social fact. They are rules 
of adjudication and it is possible to make the subsequent propositions to describe their role 
in the official practice: 
 
- The judicial duty is to interpret legal texts through the 
application of the literal, systematic, teleological and historical 
methods of interpretation.  
 
- The judicial duty is to generally apply the legal system as a 
whole, with unity, coherence and consistency, and not by the 
reading of insulated texts.570 
 
 The balancing technique, the methods of interpretation and the juridical dogmatic, 
along with Brazil’s closure rule,571 all serve as Zipursky’s penumbra covering arguments.572 
They have the purpose of accommodating the problem of the open texture of the law. This 
problem is intentional when a system chooses to use principles, which are prima facie non-
conclusive norms and need to be concretized in adjudication. 
 
III.2.2.3. The Separation of Law and Morals in the Brazilian Legal System 
 
 Hart’s most famous endeavor was to sustain the possibility of the separation of law 
and morals. He considered that the incorporation of moral standards is contingent, not 
inherent to a legal system. That is why he acknowledged inclusive legal positivism. He 
notoriously believed that there could be evil regimes and those would still count as law. The 
goal of this subchapter is to analyze how this issue is treated by Brazilian officials; whether 
Brazilians would consider that law exists in a system that pursues evil aims. 
 
III.2.2.3.1. Evil Regimes 
 
 In fact, Brazil is a good example for confirming Hart’s point that a legal system 
would still exist even though it could pursue evil aims. The country’s journey as an 
independent nation has experienced many tyrannical moments. The task is to evaluate, as a 
                                                          
569 NINO, see note 109, at 384. 
570 There are several opinions of the S.T.F., generally written by the former Justice Eros Grau, in which it 
is stated that “the Constitution shall not be interpreted in strips, in pieces. […] the interpretation of law is the 
interpretation of the law, not of insulated texts, depicted from the law as a whole. We do not interpret texts of 
law, insulated, but the law—the Constitution—as a whole.” S.T.F., A.D.I. No. 3.685, Relator: Min. Ellen 
Gracie, 22.6.2006, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA [D.J.] 10.8.2006 (Braz.) (concurring opinion written by Justice Eros 
Grau). See also S.T.F., ADPF No. 144, Relator: Min. Celso de Mello, 6.8.2008, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA 
ELETRÔNICO [D.J.] 25.2.2010 (Braz.) (concurring opinion written by Justice Eros Grau). 
571 Article 4 of the Introductory Act to the Brazilian Norms sets forth that “when there is a gap in the law, 
the judge shall decide the case resorting to analogy, customs and general principles of law.” LEI DE 
INTRODUÇÃO ÀS NORMAS DO DIREITO BRASILEIRO [L.I.N.D.B.] [INTRODUCTORY ACT TO THE BRAZILIAN 
NORMS] art. 4. Translation mine. 
572 Zipursky, supra note 46, at 1206. 
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social fact, how Brazilians perceive the status of the norms that were in force in these 
totalitarian times. 
 Brazil became an independent country in 1822. However, the country did not 
immediately adopt a democratic regime. D. Pedro I, son of King John VI of Portugal, was 
proclaimed Emperor and ruled until 1831. His son, D. Pedro II, after a transitory period, was 
crowned and stayed in power until 1889, when the Republic was proclaimed.  
 During this monarchist regime, the country was ruled by a Constitution, enacted in 
1824, which established four branches of government: the Executive, the Legislative, the 
Judiciary and the Moderator (the Emperor). The Moderator Power, which looked over the 
well-functioning of the other three, 573  was, in reality, the manner the Emperor had to 
interfere in the functioning of the other three branches. The Supremo Tribunal de Justiça, 
the highest court on the land, acted as a mere “office of the Imperial Government.”574 
 Throughout Brazil’s Imperialist regime, elections were carried, but under selective 
suffrages. Voting rights were awarded on the basis of employment and minimum property 
and were denied to women.575 Slavery was permitted during most of the regime—Brazil is 
the country that received the greatest number of African slaves on Earth576—and was only 
abolished in 1888.577  
 Nevertheless, some parts of the Imperialist Commercial Code,578 enacted in 1850, 
are still enforced by judges in Brazil today and are considered to have been taken in by the 
1988 C.F., a document that started a new era of comprehension of law, with the purpose of 
assuring democracy, equal treatment and guaranteeing a just and fair order.579 These goals 
are the opposite of those of the imperialist regime—whose legal order was insensible to 
popular suffering580—but there is no debate as to whether laws from that period that do not 
confront with the substantial limits of the C.F., and have not been formally revoked, are still 
binding. 
 The same is said of the laws that were approved in other totalitarian moments. The 
country’s current Criminal Code was enacted in 1940,581 during Getúlio Vargas government 
(1930-1945). Vargas promulgated a Constitution in 1937, revoking the former document 
that had been approved three years before. He justified that this new Constitution was 
necessary because there was “a state of apprehension raised in Brazil due to the communist 
                                                          
573 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL DE 1824 [C.F. 1824] [1824 CONSTITUTION] art. 10 (Braz.). 
574 See supra note 417, at 270. Cruz points some important moments of judicial review during the empire, 
especially after the creation of the habeas corpus in 1832, with the enactment of a Criminal Procedure Code. 
Nevertheless, he claims that law was not able to limit the excesses and arbitrariness of the Executive Branch 
during the Imperial Regime. Id, at 272. 
575 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL DE 1824 [C.F. 1824] [1824 CONSTITUTION] art. 92 (Braz.). 
576 According to the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, a project at Emory University, Brazil received 
about 4.9 million slaves through the Atlantic trade, while mainland North America imported about 389,000 
during the same period. See Simon Romero, Rio’s Race to Future Intersects Slave Past (Mar. 8, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/09/world/americas/rios-race-to-future-intersects-slave-past.html. The last 
country on Earth to abolish slavery was Mauritania, in 1981. See John D. Sutter, Slavery’s last stronghold, 
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2012/03/world/mauritania.slaverys.last.stronghold/index.html.  
577 Brazil was the last country in the Americas to abolish slavery. The Lei Aurea (Golden law) was approved 
by Congress and signed in by Princess Isabel on May 13, 1888. See 
https://library.brown.edu/create/fivecenturiesofchange/chapters/chapter-4/abolition/ 
578 The articles which are still in force are 457 to 913. They regulate maritime commerce. The first part of 
the code was repelled by the Brazilian Civil Code enacted in 2002. See CÓDIGO COMERCIAL (Pt. I, recodified 
in Civil Code, 2002) [C. Com.] [COMMERCIAL CODE] (Braz.). 
579 Souza, supra note 24, at 156. 
580 CRUZ, supra note 417, at 92. 
581 See CÓDIGO PENAL [C.P.] [Criminal Code] (Braz.). 
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infiltration, which, because of its extension and deepness, demanded radical and permanent 
remedies.”582  
 Under the 1937 Constitution, the efficacy of judicial review was seriously 
compromised, because any unconstitutionality ruling could lose its effects by a decision of 
Congress. But Congress was closed during the regime, therefore, this provision meant that 
the President could reverse any S.T.F. decision.583 Article 180 of the 1937 Constitution 
declared that “while Parliament does not meet, the Republic President will have the power 
to issue decree-laws on all the legislative matters that are under the Federal Government 
powers.”584 
 Vargas also issued a state of emergency decree that allowed deportations, 
censorships and the suspension of individual liberties. Pursuant to the terms of the decree, 
those acts could not be reviewed by the Judiciary.585 The case of Olga Benario Prestes, a 
German Jew, married to Luis Carlos Prestes, the then leader of the communist party, one of 
Vargas’ main opposers, is emblematic. In 1936, she was arrested and, while pregnant, was 
deported to Germany. She died in a concentration camp in Bernburg. The Olga Benario case 
is an evidence of the close ties that Vargas had to the Nazi regime—Brazil only joined the 
war on the allies’ side due to significant American pressure and in exchange for economic 
compensations; Brazil’s exports to Germany during the Vargas regime were as financially 
relevant as the exports to the U.S..586 
 During Vargas’ dictatorial government, Brazil’s Criminal Code, still in force, was 
enacted through an exclusive act of the President. The fact that the Criminal Code was never 
approved by a democratic Congress and was enacted during a dictatorship period is no 
barrier for being enforced today. Indeed, the S.T.F. has ruled that pre-constitutional norms 
that substantially conform with the 1988 C.F. are considered taken in by it even if their 
approval process did not follow the C.F.’s procedural requirements for similar legislation.587 
The Criminal Code is considered received because judges regard its provisions substantially 
compatible with the 1988 C.F.. Judges, hence, consider that this legal norm, passed as a 
decree-law,588 has the current status of an ordinary statute and can only be amended by laws 
of identical or higher hierarchy. The same is the status of the Criminal Procedure Code.589 
 A third evil period of Brazilian history was the military dictatorship regime that 
lasted from 1964 until 1985. During that time, Congress was closed for a couple of years; 
elections were manipulated by the sitting government; around 333 federal parliamentary 
seats were revoked in 1969;590 five seats were added to the Supreme Court;591 three Supreme 
                                                          
582 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL DE 1937 [C.F. 1937] [1937 CONSTITUTION] preambule (Braz.). Translation 
mine. 
583 CRUZ, supra note 417, at 284. 
584 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL DE 1937 [C.F. 1937] [1937 CONSTITUTION] art. 180 (Braz.). Translation mine. 
585 CRUZ, supra note 417, at 285. 
586 Fernando Serpone, Alemanha de Hitler foi principal parceira do Brasil de Getúlio, ULTIMO SEGUNDO 
(Sep. 13, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://ultimosegundo.ig.com.br/revolucao1930/alemanha-de-hitler-foi-principal-
parceira-do-brasil-de-getulio/n1237772842065.html 
587  See e.g., S.T.F, AO No. 63/RS, Relator: Min. Celso de Mello, 14.2.2014, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA 
ELETRÔNICO [DJe] 14.2.2014. There is no doubt, however, that if the current President tried to issue a Decree-
law, enacting a Criminal Code, such statute would be as a whole unconstitutional, because it does not observe 
the C.F. formal legislative requirements, even if its provisions were materially compatible with it.  
588 The official number of Brazil’s Criminal Code is Decree-Law No. 2.848, of December 7, 1940. 
589 The official number of Brazil’s Criminal Procedure Code is Decree-Law No. 3.689, of October 3, 1941. 
590 See Anos de Chumbo: é ordenada a reabertura do Congresso Nacional, https://seuhistory.com/hoje-na-
historia/anos-de-chumbo-e-ordenada-reabertura-do-congresso-nacional.  
591  Ivan Furmann, O Supremo Tribunal Federal e o regime militar de 1964 (Dec. 2011), 
https://jus.com.br/artigos/20557/o-supremo-tribunal-federal-e-o-regime-militar-de-1964/4. 
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Court Justices were forced to retire;592 the right to habeas corpus was denied for crimes of 
opinion; there was press and speech censorship; and around 434 persons were killed or 
disappeared because they were against the regime and many more were tortured.593 Keith 
Rosenn, a Professor at the University of Miami, described the regime in the following way: 
 
“The period preceding the promulgation of the 1969 
Constitution was one of constant crisis resulting from 
widespread opposition to the military government. The 
government responded by issuing a series of 12 Institutional 
Acts that continuously modified the 1967 Constitution in 
accordance with the military command’s assessment of the 
needs of the moment. A constitution that can be modified by 
the government’s unilateral declaration that it has decided to 
utilize a self-proclaimed ambulatory constituent power is, like 
the Emperor’s new clothes, only a transparent disguise for 
naked power. In 1972, Professor Riordan Roett concluded, 
with considerable justification, that the military’s commitment 
to constitutionalism was basic cosmetic.”594 
 
 The fact that Brazilians suffered under such a brutal regime has not been sufficient 
to state that the country did not live under a rule of law system. In fact, it is common to draw 
a line between what Brazilians called a state of law (estado de direito) and a democratic 
state of law (estado democrático de direito).595 The first concept is commonly associated to 
the 1964-1985 dictatorship period, while the second concept is used to describe the current 
constitutional regime, installed after the enactment of the 1988 C.F.. This expression is 
mentioned in the text of article 1 the C.F. The state of law, although a legal system, is not 
considered to be the current legal system, because of the substantial choices made with the 
enactment of the 1988 C.F. text. But this does not mean that Brazilians do not consider it to 
have been a system of law, neither indicates that every legal norm that was passed in this 
period is void. 
 Indeed, many legal norms and acts that were enacted and performed during the 
military dictatorship were received by the current constitutional regime and are applied by 
judges. For example, S.T.F. appointments made during those years were honored by the 
1988 C.F. and the Justices served until retirement. Only with the retirement of Justice Sydney 
Sanches, in 2003, the Court no longer had members appointed by military presidents.596 
                                                          
592 S.T.F. Justices Hermes Lima, Victor Nunes Leal e Evandro Lins e Silva, considered to be leftists by the 
military regime, were forced to retire. That led to the resignation of the then S.T.F. Chief Justice Gonçalves de 
Oliveira and of Justice Antônio Carlos Lafayette de Andrada, who was to be sworn in as Chief Justice after 
Justice Oliveira’s two-year term. See The Military Dictatorship and the hard Supreme Court hard years, 
http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=124565. 
593 Wilson Lima, Comissão da Verdade confirma 434 mortes e desaparecimentos na ditadura (Dec. 10, 
2014, 10:32 AM), http://ultimosegundo.ig.com.br/politica/2014-12-10/comissao-da-verdade-confirma-434-
mortes-e-desaparecimentos-na-ditadura.html. 
594  Keith S. Rosenn, Brazil’s New Constitution: An Exercise in Transient Constitutionalism for a 
Transitional Society, 38 Am. J. Comp. L. 773, 774-775 (1990). 
595 See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.][CONSTITUTION] art. 1 (Braz.). 
596 Until 1991, the majority of Justices came from that period and by 2000, twelve years after the C.F. 
enactment, four justices appointed by military presidents still remained in the S.T.F.. See Furmann, supra note 
591 
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These justices served honorably their positions and many of them are still regarded among 
the country’s best judges in history.597  
 Many laws passed in that period are still valid, even if they could not be approved 
today. A curious case is the amnesty law,598 enacted in 1979, which pardoned all crimes 
committed by the armed forces and by civilians during the tyrannical regime. That law 
undoubtedly conflicts with the country’s current substantial values that are engraved in the 
1988 C.F.. However, in 2010, the S.T.F. ruled that the amnesty law is compatible with the 
current Constitution and remains valid.599 The Court took into account the historical context 
in which the law was approved and the conciliatory spirit that prevailed in the debates that 
allowed the peace talks to start the process of returning to a democratic regime. The Justice 
who wrote the majority opinion, Eros Grau, a left-wing lawyer appointed to the S.T.F. by 
former President Lula, was arrested during the dictatorship years. He stated that deciding not 
to hold the amnesty law incompatible with the 1988 C.F. did not mean denying the need to 
repudiate all the torture that had been carried. But he voted that the amnesty law should be 
declared received by the new constitutional order. 
 Those examples show that Brazil’s account to law is very Hartian in the sense of the 
possibility of separation of law and morals. Even during immoral regimes in its history, 
Brazil regards that a rule of law regime existed in the country, although part of the laws that 
those regimes enacted were, even then, considered immoral. Nonetheless, they were valid 
law.600 The other part of the laws, which were not immoral then and that are not immoral 
nowadays, are considered to be valid and are still applied if in accordance with other 
requirements of the criteria of validity. 
 A distinction among Nazi law and Nazi-era law adopts a similar approach.601 It is 
true that Lon Fuller, in his famous essay Positivism and Fidelity to Law, acknowledged that 
under the Nazi regime there was no comparable deterioration in the ordinary branches of 
private law, if contrasted to laws of race or criminal law, for example.602 Therefore, the 
examples provided in this subchapter regarding Brazilian law would probably not be 
sufficient to convince Fuller that law and morality may not overlap and that those systems 
still were legal ones. Fuller focused on the capacity of the system to subsist as an enterprise 
of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules. These Brazilian authoritarian 
regimes did not endure.  
 But since the main goal of this subchapter was to analyze how Brazilians perceive 
the evil regimes—whether they are able to produce valid laws or if they are not legal systems 
                                                          
597 A classic example is Justice Moreira Alves, appointed by President Geisel, in 1975. For information on 
his importance for the country’s law, see http://english.tse.jus.br/videos/justice-moreira-alves-leaving-medical-
school-for-law-school. 
598 Lei No. 6.683, de 28 de Agosto de 1979, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 28.8.1979 (Braz.). 
599 See S.T.F., ADPF No. 153, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, 29.4.2010, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA ELETRÔNICO [D.J.] 
6.8.2010 (Braz.). 
600 The worst act that was enacted in Brazil, at least during the 20th Century, was the Ato Institucional No. 
5, of 1969, which closed the Congress, suspended habeas corpus for political crimes, among other measures. 
For more information, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AI-5. 
601 “There is a difference between what one might call ‘Nazi law’ and ‘Nazi-era law’, so there were a few 
pieces of legislation from the Nazi period that were considered sufficiently uncontroversial and free of the 
ideological taint of Nazism to be left on the statute books—for example, the Credit Law of 1934 and the Energy 
Law of 1935. Though subject to later revisions, amendments and modernisations, both are still in force today 
See Q&A: Are any laws made by the Nazi regime still in use?, http://www.historyextra.com/period/qa-are-
any-laws-made-by-the-nazi-regime-still-in-use/. 
602 Fuller, supra note 307, at 661. 
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at all—the examples prove that Hart’s institutional view is correct to describe the country’s 
practices: law may exist even in evil times.603  
 Of course, nowadays, after the enactment of the 1988 C.F., it is certain that Hart’s 
conclusion that the pursuit of evil aims would not generally be possible in countries like 
Britain and the U.S.—because they “widely recognize principles of justice and moral claims 
of individuals,”604—is applicable to Brazil.  
 
III.2.2.3.2. Reasoning in Cases that Deal with Unsettled Legal Issues 
 
 In Positivism and Separation of Law and Morals, while emphasizing that in the 
penumbral area the system of law does not have a response to a case, leaving to the judge 
the responsibility to make a rational non-mechanical choice, Hart argued that the fact that a 
choice has to be made does not mean law and morals are merged. This is at the center of 
Hart’s discretion argument, probably the most controversial and contested of his views.605  
 Hart pointed out that judges, when deciding a case attributing sense to open-textured 
standards, which do not have settled meaning, can make intelligible decisions that do not 
necessarily appeal to moral arguments, but to social aims, policies, among other types of 
reasoning. Moral reasoning is solely one type of argument that may be employed by the 
judge but is far from exclusively representing in totality what the word “ought” may mean—
Hart believes that judges are likely to create a rule in the case, since there is no solution in 
the law, but natural applications of the settled law to similar situations may also occur. 
Economic and political arguments could be referred to by the judge; if so, his decision would 
not be considered mechanical, but not necessarily moral.606  
 Later in his life, in Problems of the Philosophy of Law, Hart contended that when 
rules do not control the outcome of the case, judges have discretion to make this decision. 
                                                          
603 Hart, nevertheless, acknowledged that systems that advance an evil agenda suffer from instability: 
“[h]ence a society with law contains those who look upon its rules from the internal point of view as accepted 
standards of behaviour, and not merely as reliable predictions of what will befall them, at the hands of officials, 
if they disobey. But it also comprises those upon whom, either because they are malefactors or mere helpless 
victims of the system, these legal standards have to be imposed by the force or threat of force; they are 
concerned with the rules merely as a source of possible punishment. The balance between these two 
components will be determined by many different factors. If the system is fair and caters genuinely for the vital 
interests of all those from whom it demands obedience, it may gain and retain the allegiance of most for most 
of the time, and will accordingly be stable. On the other hand, it may be a narrow and exclusive system run in 
the interests of the dominant group, and it may be made continually more repressive and unstable with the 
latent threat of upheaval. Between these two extremes various combinations of these attitudes to law are to be 
found, often in the same individual.” HART, see note 43, at 201-202. 
604 Id.  
605 See, generally, Dworkin, supra note 17. 
606 According to Hart, “[t]he point here is that intelligent decisions which we oppose to mechanical or formal 
decisions are not necessarily identical with decisions defensible on moral grounds. We may say a decision: 
‘Yes, that is right; that is as it ought to be,’ and we may mean only that some accepted purpose or policy has 
been thereby advanced; we may not mean to endorse the moral propriety of the policy or the decision. So the 
contrast between the mechanical decision and the intelligent one can be reproduced inside a system dedicated 
to the pursuit of evil aims.” Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, supra note 431, at 613. In 
The Concept of Law, Hart adds that “the open texture of law leaves a vast field for a creative activity which 
some call legislative. Neither in interpreting statutes nor precedents are judges confined to the alternatives of 
blind, arbitrary choice, or ‘mechanical’ deduction from rules with predetermined meaning. Very often their 
choice is guided by an assumption that the purpose of the rules which they are interpreting is a reasonable one, 
so that the rules are not intended to work injustice or offend settled moral principles. Judicial decision, 
especially on matters of high constitution import, often involves a choice between moral values, and not merely 
the application of some single outstanding moral principle; for it is folly to believe that where the meaning of 
the law is in doubt, morality always has a clear answer to offer.” HART, supra note 43 at 204. 
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Hart, in this occasion, revealed that he never intended to endorse discretion because he 
romantically thought of it as the best option. He was not taking the position of what is best 
for the legal system but looking for a term that allows capturing what in fact happens and 
confessed that ‘discretion’ may not accurately describe what takes place: “[i]t may well be 
that terms like ‘choice’, ‘discretion’, and ‘judicial legislation’ fail to do justice to the 
phenomenology.”607 
 Hart’s discretionary argument, in a sense, reveals a lot of his unromantic view of law 
and his unwillingness to accept illusory descriptions of what effectively takes place. He 
considers Roscoe Pound, Ronald Dworkin and Karl Llewelyn [and probably Hans Kelsen] 
noble dreamers.608 
 Discretion, nevertheless, for him, does not mean arbitrary or non-justified 
decisions:609 
 
“Judges do not generally, when legal rules fail to determine a 
unique result, intrude their personal preferences or blindly 
choose among alternatives; and when words like ‘choice’ and 
‘discretion’ or phrases such as ‘creative activity’ and 
‘interstitial legislation’ are used to describe decisions, these do 
not mean that courts do decide arbitrarily without elaborating 
reasons for their decisions—and still less that any legal system 
authorizes decisions of this kind.”610 
  
 The argument he made was that “a wide variety of individual and social interests, 
social and political aims, and standards of morality and justice [come into play]; and they 
may be formulated in general terms as principles, policies and standards.”611 
 I have cited that Brazilian judges, such as Justice Luís Roberto Barroso, correctly 
assert that some of the cases covered by principles cannot be objectively determined; these 
standards are commonly understood to have a certain minimum range, but there are areas of 
indeterminacy, in which subjective judgments are necessary and in which choices shall be 
made.612 As an illustration, Barroso cites an argument based on the principle of human 
dignity: 
                                                          
607 HART, Supra note 442, at 106. 
608 See HART, American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, in 
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, supra note 442, at 123-145. Hart, of course, knew Llewelyn was 
a realist exponent. But Hart considers Llewelyn’s grand style example of the judicial decision, in which he 
draws a metaphor of the judge having to ‘carve’ his decision with the ‘grain’ of the system as a whole, the 
example of a Noble Dream. Id. at 137. 
609 Hart’s view looks similar to the following view, written by Kent Greenawalt: “[w]hen authoritative 
standards yield no clear answers, when a judge must rely on debatable personal assessments to decide a case, 
and when more than one result will widely be regarded as satisfactory fulfillment of his judicial responsibilities 
then it does not make good sense to say that a judge is under a duty to reach one result rather than another; as 
far as the law is concerned, he has discretion to decide between them.” Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and 
Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75, Columbia Law Review, 359, 378 
(1975). 
610 Id. at 106-107. 
611 Id.  
612 “In relation to principles, an additional hardship may take place: the goal to be achieved or the ideal state 
to be transformed in reality cannot be objectively determined. There is a need for subjective integration of the 
interpreter. A principle has a sense, a minimal meaning and range, an essential core, to which it is similar to 
rules. From a certain point, nonetheless, the interpreter enters into a realm of indeterminacy, in which its content 
definition will be subject to the interpreter’s ideological or philosophical conceptions.” See BARROSO, supra 
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“An example is the principle of human dignity. Other than not 
stating the necessary behaviors to comply with human 
dignity—this is the first difficulty: discover the behaviors—
there may be controversy as to what dignity means from a 
determined essential content, according to the point of view of 
the interpreter.”613 
 
 Barroso’s acknowledgement is clearly an evolution from the old civil law tradition of 
considering the system of law complete and, therefore, able to provide a solution for all 
cases.614 
 The purpose of this subchapter is to examine if Brazilian judges think like Hart or if 
they consider that their decisions in interpreting and construing principles on unsettled legal 
issues should be grounded solely on moral reasoning—we will see that Dworkin contends 
that these decisions shall be made according to the political morality, at least in individual 
rights cases. 
 The answer to this question was somewhat given in subchapter II.5.4, in which I 
described the breadth of principles in Brazil. Due to the fact that principles in Brazil do not 
cover solely individual rights cases, but also several social goals and purposes that are 
considered to be socioeconomic fundamental rights, courts generally do not only resort to 
moral arguments to solve these type of cases, but to economics, politics, even legalists, 
among others. 
 In reality, it is very hard to know when judges will resort to moral principles as the 
main institutional force to solve a penumbral case, or if they will resort to social and political 
aims, even in individual rights cases. In this sense, the point of view of the interpreter, as 
Barroso notes, can be decisive.  
 In fact, in Brazil, cases involving conflict of principles commonly happen when an 
individual fundamental right conflicts with socials goal. Courts generally decide these cases 
balancing rights and interests, as well as applying the principle of proportionality. Individual 
moral rights, under the proportionality scheme, cannot be totally suppressed, but can be 
limited. Brazil’s approach is similar to the one adopted by article 1 of the Canadian Chart of 
Rights and Freedoms: 
 
“1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees 
the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.” 615 
  
 Due to the adoption of this line of reasoning, the S.T.F has an understanding that 
“there are no absolute rights, even the fundamental rights set forth in art. 5, of the C.F., or in 
treaties or in human rights international conventions. The criteria and methods of 
reasonableness and proportionality are fundamental in this context because they disallow the 
                                                          
note 27, at 151. Translation mine. Barroso admits the existence of discretion. See text referred to by note 288. 
Id. at 154. 
613 Id. at 151. 
614 See BOBBIO, supra note 174, at 119 (Editora Unb, 8th ed., 2006). Translation mine. See also KELSEN, 
supra note 174, at 273-274. 
615 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, c 1 (Can.). 
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prevalence of one determined right or interest over the other of same or higher juridical-
evaluative stature.”616 
 The Civil Procedure Code of 2016 [C.P.C.], which, as seen, posited balancing as a 
technique for reasoning under art. 489, § 2, does not specify the kind of arguments that may 
be used by the judge in the balancing process.617 
 There are many cases decided by the S.T.F. in which one could argue that moral 
principles did not win the argument. One may cite, for example, a case concerning the social 
right of housing, decided in 2006.618 The Court, by a 7 to 3 count, upheld a statutory provision 
that establishes that the realty in which a guarantor of a lease agreement resides can be 
judicially sold to pay debts of the tenant, if this real state was purposely included as collateral 
for rental payments in the lease agreement, even if the guarantor does not have any other 
realty to reside.619  
 The question was controversial because, in Brazil, there is a statute that sets forth that 
the family residence real estate cannot be sold to pay personal debts. The lease agreement 
collateral situation is a statutory exception to the general rule and the appellant party argued 
that this exception provision was unconstitutional, because article 6 of the C.F establishes 
housing as a social right.620 The majority reasoned that the social right of housing does not 
mean that every person has a right to own a house. The Court noted that the fiduciary 
guarantee is the cheapest form of collateral and asserted that declaring the unconstitutionality 
of the statutory provision would raise the costs of access to lease agreements for low-income 
persons, since lessors would be unwilling to take it due to its lack of strength.  
 In the reasoning, Justice Cezar Peluso argued that a balance between the right of 
housing of an ample class— formed by persons interested in renting a realty—has to prevail 
even if it harms a smaller group—formed by the guarantors who own only one real estate, its 
family dwelling—as they are not compelled to offer it as a collateral in a lease agreement. 
He stated that the economics of the market should not be modified by the Court. Therefore, 
economic arguments were weighed to justify the majority opinion. The three dissent votes 
focused on moral arguments to hold the statutory provision unconstitutional.  
 Another case in which moral reasons were not decisive was the ruling adopted in six 
abstract actions that attacked a Resolution, issued by the T.S.E., that redistributed the 
Chamber of Deputies seats among the Brazilian states, to match the populational growth 
modification. The S.T.F. concluded that this seat assignment should have been made by 
Congress and not by the T.S.E.. 621  But Congress has not taken any measure since the 
                                                          
616  S.T.F., HC No. 93.250, Relator: Min. Ellen Gracie, 10.6.2008, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA ELETRÔNICO, 
27.6.2008.  
617 Art. 489, § 2, of the C.P.C., sets forth that “in the case of collision of norms, the judge shall justify the 
object and the general criteria of the balancing adopted, stating the reasons that authorize the interference of 
the displaced norm and the factual premises that ground the conclusion.” CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.] 
[CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 489, § 2 (Braz.). 
618 S.T.F., R.E. No. 407.688, Relator: Min. Cezar Peluso, 8.2.2006, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA, 6.10.2006. 
619 Lei No. 8.009, de 26 de Março de 1990, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 30.3.1990, art. 3, VII 
(Braz.). 
620  “Art. 6. Education, health, nutrition, labor, housing, leisure, security, social security, protection of 
motherhood and childhood and assistance to the destitute, are social rights, in accordance with this 
Constitution.” Translated by Keith Rosenn, Constituteproject.org 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2014.pdf 
621 “Article 45. The Chamber of Deputies is composed of representatives of the people, elected in each State, 
Territory and the Federal District by a proportional system.  
§ 1° The total number of Deputies, as well as the representation of each State and the Federal District, shall 
be established by complementary law in proportion to the population. The necessary adjustments shall be made 
in the year prior to the elections, so that none of the units of the Federation has fewer than eight nor more than 
seventy Deputies.” CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.][CONSTITUTION] art. 45, § 1° (Braz.). The complementary 
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enactment of the 1988 C.F., because the majority of states would lose seats and just few 
would gain.622 The necessary criterion to calculate the proportion of seats among the states 
has never been set in a statute. 
 It is easy to see that the Court chose a legalist approach, maintaining a situation of 
unequal treatment among the states, since the seat representation at the Chamber of Deputies 
has not been updated and does not reflect the current population distribution in Brazil. This 
lawsuit involved the right of a minority of states, which has been violated by the majority 
inertia. It is a typical case in which courts traditionally should employ moral reasoning, like 
equal treatment and equal protection, but that was not the S.T.F.’s path. 
 In the U.S., in contrast, to assure the efficacy of the “one man one vote” principle, 
the SCOTUS has ruled unconstitutional several district maps that abusively drew voting 
districts. 623  Non-legalistic decisions seem common when constitutional courts interpret 
moral constitutional provisions to assure equal treatment.624 
 A third case that can be cited involved the possibility of division of a retirement 
pension among the wife and the husband’s concubine, after his death.625 According to the 
facts, the man had concomitantly formed two families and had several children with both of 
them.626 He financially supported both his wife and his concubine, who pacifically accepted 
that bigamous situation. Nevertheless, when he died, the married wife refused to share the 
pension with the concubine. The latter filed a lawsuit and the Court of Appeals of the State 
of Bahia awarded her half of the pension. The state appealed. The S.T.F. reversed the holding 
on the grounds that her relationship was unlawful since legal unions [similar to common law 
marriages] can only be recognized if both the companions are not married. The case approach 
was legalist, because the factual situation, in which all three involved parties had for many 
years consented, was not taken into account.  The Court stated that Brazilian posited law only 
gives effect to legal unions if none of the parties is legally married. This legalist approach 
ended up treating the concubine unfairly, depriving her of her means of subsistence.627 
 There are even easier cases that are worth mentioning. For example, if a judge denies 
a claim on an unequivocal legal issue covered by a statute, and the lawyer files the losing 
party appeal after the statutory deadline, no appellate judge will hear the case. The fact that 
the sentence adopted an unconstitutional, illegal, unfair or immoral reasoning, will not 
matter. They will apply the literal rule of the C.P.C. that states that appeals should be filed 
                                                          
law enacted to regulate this article is the Lei Complementar No. 78, of December 30, 1993. This law established 
the maximum number of 513 members at the Federal Chamber of Deputies and, in sole paragraph of article 1, 
awarded the T.S.E. the power to allocate the seats. The S.T.F., in this case, ruled this sole paragraph 
unconstitutional, because it violated art. 45, § 1°, of the C.F., which requires a complementary law to regulate 
the matter. S.T.F., A.D.I. No. 4.947, Relator: Min. Gilmar Mendes, 1.7.2014, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO 
ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e.], 30.10.2014 (Braz.). 
622 Based on the Resolution issued by the T.S.E., the following states were awarded seats: Para (4 seats), 
Ceará and Minas Gerais (2 seats), Amazonas and Santa Catarina (1 seat). The following states would lose seats: 
Paraíba and Piauí (2 seats), Pernambuco, Parana, Rio de Janeiro, Espírito Santo, Alagoas and Rio Grande do 
Sul (1 seat).  
623 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (asserting that delineation of voting districts is a justiciable 
issue).  
624 See also WALUCHOW, supra note 3, at 144. 
625 S.T.F., R.E. No. 397.762, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, 3.6.2008, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA [D.J.], 12.9.2008. 
626 The deceased had 11 offspring with his wife and 9 with his concubine. Id.  
627 According to the case record, the lower court opinion registered that: “In reality, this situation described 
in this case records, although uncomfortable, is very common in the Brazilian culture. As the inferior judge 
described, the deceased accomplished to administer his wedding’s subsistence with a serious and longstanding 
affective relationship with the concubine, what brings to the indeclinable conclusion that the deceased had two 
families, administer and provided for both of them, financially supporting them.” Id. Translation mine. 
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within 15 days of the sentence’s publication in the official court report. The S.T.F. would 
rule in the exact same way if an extraordinary appeal filed after the 15-day term.628 
 Adopting a similar outcome, the S.T.F. also rejected the possibility that courts, in 
judging rescissory actions, rescind final judicial decisions that applied the holding of 
precedents that were later overruled by the S.T.F..629 The Court sustained that the rescissory 
actions are only admissible, under the C.P.C., in restricted cases and that this action does not 
have the function of uniformizing case law. Therefore, persons that were denied rights under 
old precedents may not have the possibility of having this right acknowledged now, in 
conformity with the more recent understanding of the law, because their cases were 
adjudicated and the decisions are final. Therefore, even if you have moral laws, there is no 
guarantee that you will have a moral outcome, because many variables may play a role to 
avoid the moral result, such as procedural issues. 
 Nevertheless, the citations and examples above should not pass the impression that 
moral reasoning never comes into play. On the contrary, especially in the activity of 
concretization of principles, the most common feature is to adopt moral approaches and the 
cases cited in subchapter II.2 are good examples. Precedents that declared the right of same-
sex couples to legal unions630 and the right to perform an abortion in the first trimester of the 
pregnancy631 are other good examples. The phenomenon of constitutionalizing the law is 
evidently dominated by moral reasoning, because the language and comprehension of 
constitutional principles is essentially moral (e.g. administrative morality). 632  Human 
dignity, as stated, is posited as one of the Republic founding principles and has enormous 
relevance in adjudicating cases.633 Nonetheless, it is not treated as an absolute principle that 
trumps all other conflicting considerations.634 
 Even the rules that incorporate the balancing and proportionality techniques of 
solving conflict of norms, such as art. 489, § 2, of the C.P.C., do not impose moral reasoning 
as the mean for defining content of indeterminate legal concepts. They do demand that judges 
justify the positions they adopt, but do not establish the type of argument that judges shall 
employ. 
 In summary, when deciding a case attributing sense to unsettled legal issues, 
Brazilian judges may make intelligible decisions that do not necessarily appeal to moral 
arguments, but to social aims, policies, economic and political, among other types of 
reasoning.  
  
III.2.2.4. Commands and Sanctions 
 
                                                          
628 S.T.F., AgR-R.E. No. 831.172, Relator: Min. Luís Roberto Barroso, 14.10.2014, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO 
ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e], 30.10.2014. 
629 S.T.F., R.E. No. 590.809, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, 22.10.2014, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO 
[D.J.e], 24.11.2014. 
630 See S.T.F., A.D.I. No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Carlos Britto, 5.5.2011, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO 
[D.J.e], 13.10.2011. 
631 See S.T.F., HC No. 124.306, Relator: Min. Luís Roberto Barroso, 9.8.2016, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO 
ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e], 16.3.2017 (Braz.) (asserting that the criminalization of abortion in the first trimester 
offends fundamental rights of the woman, like her right of autonomy, of physical and psychical integrity, of 
controlling sexual and reproductive choices, of equal treatment and of social discrimination, because the 
criminalization substantially impacts poor women).  
632 See Subchapter II.5.7. 
633 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 1, III (Braz.). See BARROSO, supra note 27, at 285-
330. 
634  See, e.g., S.T.F., HC No. 93.250, Relator: Min. Ellen Gracie, 10.6.2008, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO 
ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e], 27.6.2008. 
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 By attacking Austin’s command theory, Hart demonstrated that legal rules could not 
be considered only commands because they differ from acts done under coercion. He also 
drew a line between duty-imposing rules and power-conferring rules, a distinction that Brazil 
widely accepts—as stated in subchapter II.5.1—and showed that the latter have the nature 
of rules, even though they do not prescribe sanctions. Hart also attacked Kelsen’s conception 
that all rules are backed by sanctions and are drafted for instructing officials as how to behave 
when certain conditions are satisfied.635 He showed that legal norms are normative in the 
sense that try to orient general behavior, not only official. The purpose of this subchapter is 
to briefly show that Brazil does not accept the idea that all rules are followed by a sanction 
and that even duty-imposing rules may not be backed by a threat and are still considered 
rules.  
 There are several duty-imposing rules that are not backed by threats in Brazilian 
codes and still are considered rules. For example, in Civil Procedure, there are many 
provisions that establish deadlines for judicial acts, what Brazilian scholars call improper 
time limits. Article 226, III, of the C.P.C. states that judges shall issue sentences within 30 
days after the fact-finding phase of the proceeding ends.636 But the judge will not be punished 
if the does not perform the act within that term. In fact, there is no stipulated sanction for the 
breach of that rule in the statute. 
 More recently, the S.T.F. held that even a crime not backed by a sanction [in a 
criminal sense] can be, nonetheless, considered a crime. This understanding took place when 
the Court decided whether possessing drugs for personal use was still a crime. Due to a 
modification of the criminal statute, that crime is not punished by time in prison or restriction 
of rights. If a drug user is caught, he shall be notified of the consequences of this habit and 
can be ordered to provide services to the community. This comprehension led the S.T.F. to 
conclude that drug possession is no longer penalized but is still a crime.637 
 These examples show that a judge who does not follow a statute deadline or the drug 
possessor, as a matter of the internal point of view, may know that they are disobeying the 
law, but their disobedience will not cause them any punishments [or at least incarceration in 
the drug user’s case]. It will not be the fear of punishment that will move them, but the 
psychological notion of legal duty.  
 In addition, returning to Hart’s attack, he understood that there is a difference 
between “making a law” and “making a face-to-face order”. Commands are authoritative 
and, even general ones, give the idea that a specific order has been demanded and that the 
ordered person understood it. Making a law may not fit this frame: 
 
“In this respect making laws differs from ordering people to 
do things, and we must allow for this difference in using this 
simple idea as a model for law. It may indeed be desirable that 
                                                          
635 “Power-conferring rules as fragments of laws. In its extreme form this argument would deny that even 
the rules of the criminal law, in the words in which they are often stated, are genuine laws. It is in this form that 
the argument is adopted by Kelsen: ‘Law is the primary norm which stipulates the sanction’. There is no law 
prohibiting murder: there is only a law directing officials to apply certain sanctions in certain circumstances to 
those who murder. On this view, what is ordinarily thought of as the content of law, designed to guide the 
conduct of ordinary citizens, is merely the antecedent or ‘if-clause’ in a rule which is directed not to them but 
to officials, and orders them to apply certain sanctions if certain conditions are satisfied. All genuine laws, on 
this view, are conditional order to officials to apply sanctions. They are all of the form, ‘If anything of a kind 
X is done or omitted or happens, then apply sanction of a kind Y’. HART, supra note 43, at 35-36. 
636 CÓDIGO DE PROCESSO CIVIL [C.P.C.] [CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 226, III (Braz.). 
637 S.T.F., R.E. No. 430.105, Relator: Min. Sepúlveda Pertence, 13.2.2007, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA [D.J.], 
27.4.2007. See also S.T.F., HC No. 132.203, Relator Min. Alexandre de Moraes, 30.5.2017, DIÁRIO DO 
JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e], 4.9.4.2017 (acquitting a small drug user of military crime charges).  
 
 114
laws should as soon as may be after they are made, be brought 
to attention of those to whom they apply. The legislator’s 
purpose in making laws would be defeated unless this were 
generally done, and legal systems often provide, by special 
rules concerning promulgation, that this shall be done. But 
laws may be complete as laws before this is done, and even if 
it is not done at all. In the absence of special rules to the 
contrary, laws are validly made even if those affected are left 
to find out for themselves what laws have been made and who 
are affected thereby.”638 
 
 As an example, a case decided by the S.T.F.: there is a constitutional provision that 
states that governments may enforce tax raises in the subsequent year of the one in which 
the statute that raised the tax is published.639 This rule, known to establish the principle of 
tax anteriority, exists to give fair notice to taxpayers of tax raises, so that they may reorganize 
their budget to pay the new or incremented tax. Removal of tax benefits also shall obey this 
principle.640 Nevertheless, in a case in which the law that affected the taxpayer was published 
on December 31, 1994, a Saturday, in an extraordinary edition of the official gazette, the 
S.T.F. concluded that the principle of tax anteriority was not offended.641 
 It is hard to consider that taxpayers had notice of this statutory modification before 
the beginning of the new year. Yet, the mere fictitious notice was considered enough by the 
S.T.F. 
 Therefore, if Hart’s example for striking down the command theory was that, under 
this doctrine, laws make face-to-face orders to citizens so that they clearly know what has 
been demanded, the example above helps to illustrate his point, because actual publicity of 
laws is hardly an issue in Brazil—the official requirement is publication in the official 
gazette, which lawgivers are unlikely to read, especially on extra editions, published on 
weekends, as depicted in the facts of the cited case.  
 Also, Hart’s arguments to defeat the command theory demonstrate his assertion that 
positivism is not strictly committed with unequivocal clarity, what drives him away from 
exclusive legal positivism, as will be shown below. 
 These brief considerations, of course, do not exhaust Hart’s criticism on Austin,642 
but seem to be the most controversial ones and show why the Brazilian system would side 
with Hart on these matters.  
   
III.3. Exclusive Legal Positivism 
 
 It is now time to explain why exclusive legal positivism does not capture what 
Brazilians consider to be law. In examining this issue, I will keep justifying why inclusive 
legal positivism is a more powerful doctrine at least for Brazil’s reality.  
                                                          
638 HART, supra note 43, at 22. 
639 Article 150. Without prejudice to other guarantees assured the taxpayer, the Union, States, Federal 
District and Counties are prohibited from: […] III. collecting taxes: […] b. in the same fiscal year in which the 
law that instituted or increased them was published. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 150, 
III, b (Braz.). 
640  See S.T.F., R.E. No. 564.225, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, 2.9.2014, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO 
ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e], 17.11.2014. 
641 See S.T.F., R.E. No. 344.944, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, Redator p/acórdão Min: Eros Grau, DIÁRIO 
DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e], 28.8.2008. 
642 For more of Hart’s criticism on the command theory, see HART, supra note 43, at 16-25. 
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 Exclusive legal positivism is a respectable doctrine, whose most prominent 
supporters are Joseph Raz and Scott Shapiro. This work will focus on Raz's view of it because 
he was the first proponent of the theory and his is the most debated version in the Anglo-
American academy.  
 Raz essentially argues for a source thesis of law. The word source is used by him in 
a technical sense and means that “[a] law has a source if its contents and existence can be 
determined without using moral arguments.”643 For Raz, “the law on a question is settled 
when legally binding sources provide its solution. In these cases, judges are typically said to 
apply the law, and since it is source-based, its application involves technical, legal skills in 
reasoning from those sources and does not call for moral [discernment].”644 He thinks that 
there are two reasons for accepting the sources thesis. The first one is because this thesis 
“reflects and explicates” our conception of the law. The second one is because it provides 
reasons for adhering to that conception.645 For saying that the source thesis provides the 
correct description of the legal practice, Raz draws a line between law application and law 
development. He asserts that judges perform two functions: either they apply the law or they 
develop the law. In some cases, it is hard to disentangle these two operations. But, the point 
he intends to make is that while applying the law judges use legal skills and while developing 
the law judges use moral arguments.646  
 Raz also makes a distinction between settled law and unsettled law. On the one hand, 
he claims that “[i]t is primarily deciding cases regarding which the law is unsettled (as well 
as distinguishing and reversing settled law) that judges are thought to develop the law using 
moral, social, and other non-legal arguments.”647 On the other hand, “[i]t is when deciding 
cases where the law is settled that judges are thought of as using their legal skills in applying 
the law.”648 For Raz, the phenomenon of law only takes place when there is settled law, 
because only then “the private view of member of the society, or of influential sections or 
powerful groups in it, ceases to be their private view and becomes (i.e. lays a claim to be) a 
view binding on all members notwithstanding their disagreement about it.”649  
 The reason for stating that the law is only settled law is mainly that, by claiming 
authority over citizens, law has to be able to make a practical difference in orienting their 
conduct. Law should preempt all other conflicting considerations. If law is unsettled, it does 
not serve this orienting function and, therefore, should not be considered law, because people 
                                                          
643 JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF THE LAW 47-48 (Oxford, 2nd, 2009). 
644 Id. at 49-50. 
645 Id. at 48. 
646 In order to prove the difference of both activities, Raz gives an example of judicial appointments to the 
bench: “When discussing appointments to the Bench, we distinguish different kinds of desirable characteristics 
judges should possess. We value their knowledge of the law and their skills in interpreting and arguing in ways 
showing their legal experience and expertise. We also value their wisdom and understanding of human nature, 
their moral sensibility, their enlighted approach, etc. There are many other characteristics which are valuable 
in judges. For present purposes these two kinds are the important ones. The point is that while it is generally 
admitted that both are very important for judges as judges, only the first group of characteristics mentioned is 
thought of as establishing the legal skills of the judge. The second group, though relevant to his role as a judge, 
is thought of as reflection of his moral character, not his legal ability. Similarly, when evaluating judgments as 
good or bad, lawyers and informed layman are used to distinguishing between assessing arguments as legally 
acceptable or unacceptable and assessing them as morally good or bad. Of many legal decisions we hear that 
they are legally defective, being based on misinterpretation of a statute or a case, etc. Of others it is said that 
though legally the decisions are acceptable, they betray gross insensitivity to current social conditions, show 
how conservative judges are, that they are against trade unions, or that in their zeal to protect individuals they 
go too far in sacrificing administrative efficiency, etc.” Id. 
647 Id. at 49. 
648 Id. 
649 Id. at 51-52. 
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will not be sure on how to behave in order to follow it, neither judges will be reasoning 
according to the law. As Raz asserts, “it is of the very essence of the alleged authority that it 
issues rulings which are binding regardless of any other justification, it follows that it must 
be possible to identify those rulings without engaging in a justificatory argument.”650  
 In summary, Raz points out that the underlying function of law is “to provide publicly 
ascertainable standards by which members of the society are held to be bound so that they 
cannot excuse non-conformity by challenging the justification of the standard.”651 Raz’s 
sources doctrine is called exclusive positivism because no legal rule may condition legality 
on morality.652 
 Based on the considerations noted in the previous subchapters, it is clear that 
exclusive legal positivism explains law differently than Brazilians do. For the proponents of 
this theory, many open textured provisions of legal texts that Brazilians consider part of the 
law—because they were enacted by Congress—would not be law because the instructions 
they provide are not unequivocally certain. 
 It is true that the Brazilian legal system has, as a goal, the intention of furnishing the 
country’s citizens with ascertainable standards of conduct. This is a statutory requirement set 
forth in a statute that regulates how statutes shall be written in Brazil.653 Brazilians are also 
very concerned with legal certainty. As stated in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the 
concept is seen as inherent to the idea of rule of law. 654  Nonetheless, as described in 
subchapter II.4.1., in the civil law tradition, the generality of the rule is considered a positive 
property of the legal norm because of the premise that the judge or the legislator will never 
be able to foresee all possible cases in which the rule must govern. On the contrary, for 
assuring the continuum adaptation of the legal rules to the new cases, civil law countries draft 
broader statutes if compared to common law countries and adopt Friedrich Carl Von 
Savigny’s four techniques of legal interpretation—textual, systematic, historical and 
teleological.655 The adoption of the juridical dogmatic also allows judges to develop and 
update the law, presupposing to only be applying what was already law.656 
 Moreover, after the enactment of the 1988 C.F., the tendency of Brazilian law has 
been to employ moral standards in legal texts, such as morality, efficiency, loyalty, among 
others. These concepts are sometimes qualified as indeterminate legal concepts. The fact that 
jurists currently employ the verb concretizing, instead of interpreting legal principles, show 
that their meaning in particular cases is construed “in a process of creatively determining 
results in conformity with, but not determinable by, the [C.F.].”657  
 In addition, Brazil does not have well-developed theories of fair notice, vagueness or 
overbreadth, for example. For a legal rule to satisfy the requisite of legality, it will not really 
matter if its terms are vague, broad or may not offer good guidance to the citizens. There is 
a sort of general understanding—or practice—that the terms will be made clear through a 
process of interpretation or concretization. The fact that some court applications of the rule 
will not find support in the legislative history or even in the original intent of the drafters is 
not generally a problem. The social fact has taken place, there is written law on the general 
issue and what the Judiciary extracts from the text, in a process that may also take into 
                                                          
650 Id. 
651 Id. at 92. 
652 Id. at 8.  
653 See art. 11 of Lei Complementar No. 95, de 26 de fevereiro de 1998, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] 
de 27.2.1998.  
654 See generally S.T.F., MS No. 22.357, Relator: Min. Gilmar Mendes, 27.05.2004, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA 
[D.J.], 05.11.2004 (Braz.).  
655 VESTING, supra note 131, at 217-219. 
656 NINO, supra note 109, at 384. 
657 Brugger, supra note 33, at 398.  
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account constitutional principles, as we will see, is considered within the legitimate authority 
of courts. 
 In light of these considerations, it is clear that Brazilians do not consider, as a social 
fact, that the legal phenomenon only takes place when the law is settled. Defining the content 
of vague laws is deemed to be a task of courts, although judges do not acknowledge law 
creation, only law application, even when they are developing the law. These decisions 
generally apply retrospectively to past facts because they are seen as an expression of what 
the law has always been. 
 Take the nepotism case for example (subchapter II.2.2.). The S.T.F. Justices reasoned 
that the prohibition of the practice already existed in the law. The existant law is the 
administrative morality and impersonality principles. Nonetheless, even the then lawyer Luís 
Roberto Barroso, who filed the actions before the S.T.F., stated that “the case was morally 
good, but faced juridical hardships.” 658  The issue was controversial and provoked 
disagreement. In ruling the case, the Court did not acknowledge that it was creating law but 
concluded that the prohibition lied in the core of the referred principles. If one examines the 
case in light of Raz’s thesis, it will be hard to affirm that the principle of administrative 
morality offers such an ascertainable guidance that he claims law needs to provide. It is more 
likely that Raz would contend that the law was developed in these cases and that the 
prohibition was created in that occasion, since even judges disagreed as to whether the 
prohibition could be extracted from these principles. 659 
  Another example is Brazil’s approach towards disciplinary punishments. Maria 
Sylvia Zanella Di Pietro states that “in administrative law, vagueness prevails. There are few 
infractions clearly described by the law, as it happens with ‘public employment 
abandonment’. Most of the infractions are left to administrative discretion when dealing with 
a concrete case; it is the sentencing authority that will frame the act as a serious fault, 
irregular proceeding, service inefficiency, public disobedience, or other infractions set forth 
in an undetermined manner by the statutory legislation.” 660 In order for punishments to be 
applied, will the law need to be settled in each case? Only in a second equal case will the law 
be applied? That is not the Brazilian current practice. This example resembles Waluchow’s 
point that “[w]ithin [some] societies, some degree of ‘unsettledness’ is wisely accepted as a 
reasonable price to pay for the sake of other values considered to be of at least comparable 
importance.”661 
 Finally, going back to the analysis of the crime of corruption in Brazil (subchapter 
II.4.1), even though it is still controversial the question as to whether the commitment of an 
official act is a necessary requirement for configuring corruption—as Judge Moro noted in 
the former President Lula case—judges do not dispute if the requirements of article 5, 
XXXIV, of the C.F., have been observed. This legal provision states that “there are no crimes 
unless defined in prior law, nor are there any penalties unless previously imposed by law.”662 
Lula was convicted despite the fact that the law could be uncertain— I am not saying that it 
is uncertain, I am just calling attention to the fact that the sentencing judge pointed out that 
there was uncertainty as to what the settled law was and Moro claimed that Lula performed 
an official act, although not a specific one.663 
                                                          
658 BARROSO, supra note 27, at 370. 
659 See text accompanying notes 67 and 69. 
660 DI PIETRO, supra note 18, at 515. Translation mine. 
661 WALUCHOW, supra note 3, at 134. 
662 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5, XXXIV (Braz.). Translated by Keith Rosenn, 
Constituteproject.org https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2014.pdf 
663 See supra text accompanying note 399. 
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 Hart, by endorsing inclusive legal positivism and an institutionalist view of law, 
unequivocally disagrees with Raz. Hart acknowledges some flexibility in law application, 
especially because he recognizes ‘the relative indeterminacy of rules and precedents.’ His 
view is unequivocally more precise to describe Brazilian law than Raz’s view, as a matter of 
social fact: 
 
“This indeterminacy springs from the fact that it is impossible 
in framing general rules to anticipate and provide for every 
possible combination of circumstances which the future may 
bring. For any rule, however precisely formulated, there will 
always be some factual situations in which the question 
whether the situations fall within the scope of the general 
classificatory terms of the rule cannot be settled by appeal to 
linguistic rules or conventions or to canons of statutory 
interpretation, or even by reference to the manifest or assumed 
purposes of the legislature. In such cases the rules may be 
found either vague or ambiguous. A similar indeterminacy 
may arise when two rules are expressly framed in such specific 
terms as ‘reasonable’ or ‘material’. Such cases can be resolved 
only by methods whose rationality cannot lie in logical 
relations of conclusions to premises. Similarly, because 
precedents can logically be subsumed under an indefinite 
number of general rules, the identification of the rule for which 
a precedent is an authority cannot be settled by an appeal to 
logic.” 664 
 
 If Hart considers judicial decisions to be authoritative, although acknowledging the 
relative indeterminacy of the law, it is likely that he does not see authority as only being 
legitimate if citizens are able to priorly identify law without relying on other substantive 
reasons. The understanding for the Brazilian legal system by its judges and officials is much 
closer to this picture.  
 Nevertheless, Raz’s view of positivism is a more sophisticated theory if compared to 
the mechanistic view of law, in which all laws are supposedly announced in advance and 
applied without the need of law-creating activity. Raz does not think that enacted rules 
always furnish the reasons to act. On the contrary, he claims that only when the interpretation 
of the rule is settled and reasons are furnished, there will be law. He asserts that moral 
reasoning comes into play in the process of construing those clear reasons, that make 
authority legitimate. The task of judges, for that reason, is not only to apply, but also to 
develop the law. His only wrong point, at least in accordance with the Brazilian prevalent 
point of view, is to consider that when the judge concretizes moral standards incorporated 
into law by the legal criteria—including the C.F.—he is acting outside the legal system and, 
hence, no law exists until the issue is settled. 
 The argument that laws, to offer guidance, should be settled in advance is a powerful 
one and cannot be neglected. As we saw, Brazil has a statute conveying this obligation to 
legislators. Indeed, as Kristen Rundle argues, Raz’s position may reveal “a commitment to 
understand law as a phenomenon that is fundamentally linked to respect to the legal subject 
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as an agent.”665 Raz asserts that by entailing treating humans as persons capable of planning 
and plotting their future, the rule of law respects human dignity.666 However, due to Brazil’s 
institutional view of law, Brazilians do not consider that a legal norm only exists when 
unequivocal guidance is provided. This would mean to confuse the concept of law with the 
concept of rule of law. Yet, most of the country’s scholars would concur on the need of legal 
certainty because this concept has been adopted as a C.F. principle and is embedded in the 
idea of democratic state of law.667 I intend to examine how to deal with this issue in chapter 
V.  
  
III.4. Modern Natural Law Theory 
 
 “Natural law theory has been remarkably influential since it made its first appearance 
2,500 years ago in ancient Greece. Its origins lie in the idea that there is a rational order 
which exists in nature and which is discoverable by human reason.”668 There is a wide variety 
of writings on the topic,669 from Aristotle670 to Thomas Aquinas.671 Nevertheless, natural law 
has long been “surrounded in mystery and generality.”672 John Finnis’ neo-Thomism theory, 
developed in the book Natural Law and Natural Rights, 673  is seen as a restatement of 
classical natural law theory. His influence in the Anglo-American jurisprudence is 
unquestionable. That is the reason why I will focus on his work. 
 The first point to stress is that, according to Finnis, “[a] theory of natural law need 
not be undertaken primarily for the purpose of thus providing a justified conceptual 
framework for descriptive social science.”674 Therefore, as Hart observes, Finnis “flexible 
interpretation of natural law is in many respects complementary to rather than a rival of 
positivist legal theory.”675 Finnis does not deny the separation of law as it is and law as it 
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ought to be.676 In this sense, he disagrees with the conclusion prevalent in classic natural 
theory that “an unjust law is no law at all,”677 at least when referring to posited law. His 
theory seeks to “assist the practical reflections of those concerned to act, whether as judges, 
or as statemen, or as citizens.”678 Finnis wants them to understand “what morality has to say 
about law.”679 
 Although Finnis, therefore, does not deny neither the need, nor the independence of 
posited law, it is important to emphasize the differences between soft positivism and natural 
law at the level of theory: “inclusive legal positivists advocate a morally neutral conception 
or conceptual analysis of law, while natural law theorists argue that law is best understood 
teleologically, within the context of a larger moral analysis.”680 
 In light of these considerations, what Finnis argued is that a “theory of natural law 
claims to be able to identify conditions and principles of practical right-mindedness, of good 
and proper among persons, and in individual conduct,”681 and not really explain what it takes 
to be the law of a system. In this sense, it is clear that his theory does not fit the purpose of 
this thesis because it will not help describing the Brazilian legal system in a descriptive- 
explanatory fashion.  
 Nonetheless, Finnis’ theory can offer important insights to law development in 
Brazil, as to how the moral principles that have been incorporated to the country’s posited 
law—through written principles—shall be concretized. This point has been constantly 
addressed throughout this thesis. The S.T.F. has asserted the importance of natural law in 
construing broad constitutional principles, such as administrative morality, for example: 
 
“[…] morality, as a principle of Public Administration (art. 37) 
and as a requirement of validity of administrative acts (art. 5, 
LXXIII), has the system of law par excellence as its source, 
especially the constitutional legal order. It is certain that 
human values inspire and underlie the order are, in many cases, 
the normative concretization of values removed from the 
guideline of natural rights, or from the ethical and moral 
heritage established by society’s common sense.” 682 
  
 Another example is the natural right to pursue happiness. The S.T.F. has also 
acknowledged that this right, mentioned in the U.S. Declaration of Independence,683 is an 
important hermeneutical guide to develop the fundamental rights set forth in the Brazilian 
Constitution. This right was referred by Justice Celso de Mello as grounds for recognizing 
the right of same sex unions and the right for transgenders to change their names to match 
their gender preference.684 
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 Also, in the course of this work I have pointed out some cases in which the Brazilian 
system of law allows reasoning based on moral (natural law) arguments. I have mentioned 
that, for John Finnis, the application of the golden rule clearly takes part in a process of 
identifying “a moral standard as one which anyone adjudicating a given case has the duty to 
apply even though it has not (yet) been posited by the social facts of custom, enactment, or 
prior adjudication.”685 
 Let us turn now to Finnis’ theory. He asserts that there is a differentiation among 
focal conception of the law and actual law. The former is the ideal law and the latter is merely 
an approximation.686 The law is used in its focal (core) meaning when it secures the common 
good of society.687 This common good, “in the case of a political community, […] [is] the 
securing of a whole ensemble of material and other conditions that tend to favour the 
realization, by each individual in the community, of his or her personal development.”688 
However, the personal development shall be trumped if it does not meet the common good 
of the political community in a wide sense.  
 There is an idea in Finnis that the individual considerations that should be respected 
are those in which there is individual collaboration with others. Finnis asserts that “there is a 
common good of the political community, and it is definite enough to exclude a considerable 
number of types of political arrangements, laws, etc.”689 He cites seven basic forms of human 
goods that fit this common collaboration with each other: life (self-preservation), knowledge, 
play, aesthetic experience, friendship (sociability, acting in the interests of others), religion 
and freedom in practical reasonableness (employing one’s intelligence to solve general 
problems of life).690 The author states, nevertheless, that “[t]he principles that express the 
general ends of human life do not acquire what would nowadays be called a ‘moral’ force 
until they are brought to bear upon definite ranges of project, disposition, or action, or upon 
particular projects, dispositions or actions. How they are thus to be brought to bear is the 
problem for practical reasonableness.”691  
 There are nine intermediate practical reasonableness principles “to guide the 
transition from judgments about human goods to judgments about the right thing to do here 
and now.” 692  These principles are the acts of (a) recognizing the good of practical 
reasonableness, which allows one to choose commitments, projects and actions; (b) 
establishing a coherent plan of life; (c) setting no arbitrary preference amongst values; (d) 
setting no arbitrary preference amongst persons; (e) having certain detachment from all the 
specific and limited projects which one undertakes, but also committed to them; (f) 
performing efficiency with reason: one must not waste one’s opportunity by using inefficient 
methods; (g) respecting every basic value in every act, refraining from doing acts that does 
nothing but damage or impede realization of the basic forms of human goods; (h) favoring 
and fostering the common good of one’s communities; and (i) acting in accordance with 
one’s conscience.693 
                                                          
685 Finnis adds that “[t]his specific moral standard will usually be a specification of some very general 
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 Wacks points out that these, in Finnis view, constitute the universal and immutable 
principles of natural law. He adds that: 
 
“Finnis argues that this approach accords with the general 
conception of natural law espoused by Thomas Aquinas. It 
does not, he claims, fall foul of the non-cognitivist strictures 
of Hume […] for these objective goods are self-evident; they 
are not deduced from a description of human nature. So, for 
example, ‘knowledge’ is self-evidently preferable to 
ignorance.”694 
 
 Since Finnis’ theory does not intend to provide a justified conceptual framework for 
descriptive social science, as mentioned above, I will not make further comments on it.  
 Nevertheless, a final point to be made regarding natural law is that there has been an 
attempt to drawing a hierarchy among Brazilian C.F. norms, ranking them up in accordance 
to their compatibility to natural law. 
 This attempt was made through the filing of ADI 815. In the case, the Governor of 
the State of Rio Grande do Sul demanded the S.T.F. to hold unconstitutional parts of two 
provisions of the original text of the C.F. that set forth the minimum number of the Chamber 
of Deputies’ members per state. In Brazil, the C.F.695 guarantees at least eight representatives 
per state and four per territory. Therefore, there is overinclusion of representatives for some 
states and underinclusion for others. According to numbers of the 2010 census, a Deputy 
from São Paulo represents 432,000 citizens, whereas a Deputy from Roraima represents 
33,000.696 
 However, the S.T.F. dismissed the case because it understood that the proponent, the 
Governor of the State of Rio Grande do Sul, had failed to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted. The Court held that this unequal treatment amongst states was established by the 
Framers of the 1988 C.F. and the Court could not judge this choice. This judgment would 
have to be made attributing a higher status to some constitutional norms—because they 
supposedly conformed with suprapositive norms—in comparison to others, which did not 
conform with this criterion. The Court held that, even if it admitted that suprapositive law 
exists, it lacked authority to exercise this control.697 
  
III.5. Interpretivism 
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 Interpretivism is attributed to Ronald Dworkin. It is basically known for the idea that 
in hard cases698 propositions of law do not control the outcome of the cases, since there is 
theoretical disagreement among judges on what is the correct content of these propositions 
under the law. 
 For Dworkin, positivism, which has the main purpose of guiding conduct, fails in 
trying to be a mere descriptive theory of law, because in hard cases it offers no guidance. 
Any attempt to merely describe the law through social facts, as positivism aims, would not 
be successful in explaining what law really is, because law is essentially interpretive. The 
author argues that “propositions of law are not simply descriptive of legal history in a 
straightforward way, nor they are simply evaluative in some way divorced from legal history. 
They are interpretive of legal history, which combines elements of both description and 
evaluation but is different from both.” 699  He, therefore, stresses for a constructive 
interpretation of the law, which positivism, by linking laws to social facts, cannot offer. 
 Dworkin compares judicial interpretation to writing a novel, and states that when 
judges interpret the law, they are writing a new chapter of the story, which must be consistent 
to the material that has been construed so far—fit requirement—, but also creative to develop 
the story.700 Their creativity, however, has to respect a coherent conception of justice and 
fairness that provide the best constructive interpretation of the community’s legal practice.701 
Therefore, judges are not really stepping outside the law for arguments, but just discovering 
solutions that are latent in the law. 
 Dworkin also disagrees with the ideas that propositions of law are either (a) “intended 
to be expressions of what the speaker wants the law to be;”702 or (b) “attempt to describe 
some pure objective natural law, which exists in virtue of objective moral truth rather than 
historical decision.”703 In this sense, he criticizes natural law, for assuming that moral claims 
can be true because they are in accordance with universal reason or God’s rules. Dworkin 
thinks that moral claims can be true independently of belief and desire; but correspond to 
more abstract substantive moral claims that are not linked to any sort of higher order.704 
Morality plays a role in Dworkin’s theory because he points out that judges, when 
solving an unsettled controversial issue—as writing the new chapter of the novel—, may 
decide in a way which is consistent with the community’s moral principles that best justify 
the previous cases. “What is law depends on moral judgments as to which principles best 
justify past political decisions, and legal standards are whatever body of standards provides 
the best moral justification for a society’s established legal rules and institutions.”705 
Although Dworkin denies the possibility of engaging in a descriptive-evaluation of a 
legal system, such as the one Hart proposed to do in The Concept of Law, some commentators 
see that Dworkin’s attempt to prove Hart wrong did not work, because what Dworkin 
developed is not a theory of what the law is, but a theory of the judicial decision. Therefore, 
they claim Hart won the debate.706 I do not intend to examine the Hart-Dworkin debate, 
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because it is not the purpose of this work. What I do intend to do is to show that Dworkin’s 
interpretative view of describing the law is not accurate to explain the Brazilian current 
practices.  
In subchapters II.5.1, II.5.2 and II.5.4., I went over some differences between the 
current views adopted in Brazil and Dworkin’s conceptions regarding the breadth of 
principles and the distinction among principles and rules. Therefore, I will not go deep in 
these issues again. Also, when explaining why I think inclusive legal positivism offers the 
most accurate explanations for Brazilian legal practices, I have, at least indirectly, refuted 
some of Dworkin’s theses. I think we can talk about a “Brazilian rule of recognition” to 
formulate statements of what is legal and what is not legal. Brazilians do not have a problem 
in writing moral principles into law and they still consider that these pedigreed principles 
serve the role of principles, not merely standards. They also do not think the role of their 
judges is confined into settling issues of principle and not of policy. 
My goal for this chapter is to focus on four of Dworkin’s main points and to examine 
if they are pertinent to capture the Brazilian legal practice: (a) if his assertions as to why 
inclusive legal positivism fails compromise the framing of the theory in Brazil; (b) if the 
chain novel metaphor captures Brazil’s application of laws; (c) if his “rights as trumps” 
doctrine describes the practices that dominate Brazilian adjudication in similar cases; and (d) 
if his views as to how principles enter into judicial reasoning are appropriate to frame 
Brazilian practices. 
It is important going over these points because Dworkin is certainly among the most 
cited—and probably misread—American jurisprudential authors in Brazil, and many of the 
jurists that cite his work refer to these points to explain Brazilian law.707 
Finally, it is relevant to state that this thesis does not have the purpose of criticizing 
interpretivism as an accurate manner for capturing the American legal system and its 
practices. The fact that interpretivism may be a pertinent theory for explaining American law 
does not automatically make it a precise theory for depicting Brazilian law and the focus of 
this work is restricted to Brazil. 
 
III.5.1. Dworkin’s Attack on Inclusive Legal Positivism 
 
 Inclusive legal positivism is traditionally seen as an accommodation of Ronald 
Dworkin’s criticism of Hart’s version of legal positivism because Hart had failed to address 
the role of principles in law.708 But, as noted, this compromise did not settle the debate. 
Dworkin also criticized inclusive legal positivism and denied the possibility of including 
value-laden principles in the rule of recognition, because social facts would not be able to 
grasp as a whole what these values mean. Therefore, positivism would not serve its major 
role, that is, guiding conduct and solving the uncertainty of law, which, for Dworkin, was 
the main problem targeted by Hart.709 
 In reading many provisions of Brazilian legal texts that were cited throughout this 
work, one may note that Brazilian legislators do not seem to worry about writing these broad 
and general provisions. The principles of morality, impersonality, equality and efficiency are 
set forth in article 37 of the C.F.. Do they provide clear reasons for deciding whether 
nepotism is unconstitutional, as the S.T.F. did in the cases mentioned in subchapter II.2.2? 
                                                          
707 See André Karam Trindade, O dia em que o romance em cadeia virou cadeia sem romance, CONSULTOR 
JURÍDICO (May 17, 2014, 8:00 AM), https://www.conjur.com.br/2014-mai-17/diario-classe-dia-romance-
cadeia-virou-cadeia-romance; see also CONRANDO HÜBNER MENDES, CONTROLE DE CONSTITUCIONALIDADE E 
DEMOCRACIA (Campus Jurídico, 2008). 
708 See, generally, DWORKIN, supra note 293; and DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 436 . 
709 DWORKIN, supra note 293, at 128. GUEST, supra note 541, at 46. 
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 Indeed, Dworkin may be right. This article may offer poor guidance in some cases 
both for judges and for citizens. This will depend as to whether the factual situations to which 
judges apply it are considered hermeneutically controversial. If a public agent issues an 
administrative order in exchange for a bribe, that act will certainly be considered illegal and 
immoral. However, if he prints his daughter’s ten-page school assignment in the government 
department’s printer, the issue as to whether this act is immoral, illegal or if the principle of 
impersonality has been violated can be controversial. In the nepotism case, the S.T.F. said 
that banning the practice was in the core of the principles of morality and impersonality. 
Chapter V will examine whether this should be considered proper guidance.    
 If Brazilian legislators chose to insert broad words that do not provide clear 
instructions on how public agents and citizens shall behave, they are certainly not intending 
to furnish all the guidance that Dworkin argues positivism intends to supply.710 Indeed, as 
shown in subchapter II.4.1, the style of the civil legislation in general is less detailed than the 
U.S. style. Brazilian codes and laws do not attempt to “provide rules that are immediately 
applicable to every conceivable concrete case.”711  
 Zagrebelsky notes that the choice of principles over rules improves flexibility and 
adaptation: 
 
“In relation to rules, the legally relevant elements in a case are 
established in a more or less determined way. In contrast, 
principles, as already suggested, yield no such determined 
path, with the result that the relevant elements of the law are 
determined on a case-by-case basis. This characteristic renders 
principle-based jurisprudence particularly plastic and 
adaptable, whereas jurisprudence by rules aims at a greater 
rigidity and fixity.”712 
 
 In this sense, Brazilian legislators seem simply to share Hart’s view that “even when 
verbally formulated general rules are used, uncertainties as to the form of behaviour required 
by them may break out in particular concrete cases.”713  
 Indeed, Jules Coleman may have a point when he states that “legal rules can be 
understood in terms of the role they play in justifying decisions, not in causing or guiding 
action.”714 This assertion is certainly more accurate to express the type of guidance legal 
principles offer. 
 In addition, as Waluchow points out, Dworkin’s argument from the function of law 
“fails to adequately distinguish between what might thought to be desirable in a legal system 
and what might be thought essential to its very existence.”715 A system of general rules and 
principles, which obey the criterion of its rule of recognition, may be a bad system in offering 
guidance, but may still be law in accordance with the institutional tradition. As I stated 
before, Brazil, following this tradition of civil law drafting, does not have well-developed 
theories of fair notice, vagueness or overbreadth, for example. For a legal rule to satisfy the 
requisite of legality, it will not really matter if its terms are vague, broad or may not offer 
                                                          
710 For more extended comments on this matter, see WALUCHOW, supra note 3, at 184-186. 
711 DAVID & DE VRIES, supra note 125, at 88. 
712 Zagrebelsky, supra note 26, at 647. 
713 HART, supra note 43, at 126. 
714 COLEMAN, supra note 1, at 147. 
715 WALUCHOW, supra note 3, at 188. 
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good guidance to the citizens. There is a sort of general understanding that the terms will be 
made clear through a process of interpretation or concretization.716 
 Therefore, although Dworkin may be precise in pointing out that a system that 
includes value-laden principles in its rule of recognition and in rules in general may not offer 
good guidance, this fact does not undermine the Brazilian institutional view of law, since the 
criterion of validity has been met. On the contrary, this circumstance is considered essential 
for providing the necessary flexibility established by the 1988 C.F. to guarantee “a just and 
fair judicial order”717 that the document sets as a general goal. 
 
III.5.2. Are Brazilian Judges Writing a Chain Novel? 
 
 The question to be answered in this subchapter is whether Dworkin’s famous chain 
novel metaphor is compatible with the practices of a country, like Brazil, that (in general) 
does not have stare decisis as a rule.  
 In subchapter II.6, I cited an excerpt from Karl Larenz in which he stated that “courts, 
according to our legal organization, are not bound to precedents as they are to the [enacted] 
law. It is not the precedent, for being a precedent, that binds, but the norm that it contains, if 
this norm is considered a correct interpretation or concretization [of the law].”718 The same 
practice exists in Italy719 and in Brazil, save for the binding precedent exception in the case 
of the latter. Larenz’s observation makes clear that precedents do not hold the same status of 
enacted law and that is the typical view of a system that does not acknowledge judicial 
rulemaking.  
 Indeed, this approach seems to be the typical of countries that adopt a top-down 
model of norms creation and interpretation.720 This model, as Hart noted, employs a maximal 
use of general classifying words to offer guidance. In theory, as I have pointed out in 
subchapter II.3 and II.4., this model assumes that the enacted law fulfills general 
requirements of generality, equality of application and certainty, and respects the separation 
of powers.721 The fact that jurists do not deny that enacted law need to be interpreted does 
not shake this conviction, because they generally think that the legal methods will make 
                                                          
716 Waluchow offers the following example as the basis of a powerful critique of Dworkin: 
 “Imagine that a system of social regulation possesses all the hallmarks of a municipal legal system. It has 
judges, lawyers, courts, litigants, secondary rules of recognition, chance and adjudication, and so on. Imagine 
further that its fundamental secondary rules allow for less determinacy and stability than is possible, say because 
they allow Herculean criteria for legal principles, or because they stipulate rights of political morality like due 
process, liberty, and equality as criteria of validity applicable to all subordinate laws.” 
Supporting inclusive legal positivism against Dworkin, he continues:  
“Is it obvious that positivists would refuse to view such a system as a failed attempt at law, a perversion of 
law? If not, they would clearly be in danger of promoting a fused identity between what law is and what it ought 
to be, and foregoing the many advantages which, in the view of positivists, one reaps from a wide concept of 
law which separates the existence of a legal system from its moral and political evaluation—a concept which 
allows for the possibility of immoral, wicked, or otherwise highly unsatisfactory legal systems. Whether one 
agrees with positivists that a wider concept is indeed theoretically preferable, it is indisputable that this is their 
view, and that Dworkin’s Argument From Function would be rejected on the familiar ground that the existence 
of law is one thing and its merit or demerit quite another. The positivist’s descriptive-explanatory theory of law 
should not be transformed, against his will, into a normative theory about what it is desirable to have in legal 
systems.” WALUCHOW, supra note 3, at 190.  
717 Souza, supra note 24, at 156. 
718 Id. at 612. 
719 Laura Baccaglini, Gabriella Di Paolo and Fulvio Cortese, supra note 378 
720 See Reaume, supra note 11, at 115-123; HART, supra note 43, at 124-125; WALUCHOW, supra note 13, 
at 204-208. 
721 See TAMANAHA, supra note 113, at 119. 
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possible for them, through logical operations of technical characters, finding out what the 
law means.722 
  In this sense, Brazilian judges traditionally do not picture themselves writing a novel, 
as Dworkin argues in his famous metaphor. 723  In fact, for the conventional notion, the 
romance is already written and judges are merely readers that interpret the story, and whose 
views will be authoritative in the cases they are adjudicating. They shall not modify the 
original novel, because it is copyrighted to the legislature. 
 Brazilian judges will try to understand the novel as a whole; they will assume that it 
has unity, consistency, coherence and it is a complete source of the story. If they admit some 
gaps, they will fill them because the author oriented them to do so.724 But even if their 
interpretation does not adequaly fit the original story when confronted with the plain meaning 
of the words, they consider it to be a mere reading of the story, not an addition of a new 
chapter. It can be a literal, historical, contextual or even teleological reading. This reading 
may change during times. But it is the same story that is being read over and over and 
interpreted each time by each judge. 
 Traditional judges are also not bound to other judges’ readings. In fact, they claim 
that, under the law, they owe respect solely to the original novel. Of course, their peers’ 
views may be persuasive, they may consider them appropriate and follow them, especially 
because starting a new interpretation all over again may be demanding and time consuming. 
Nonetheless, they may also consider the previous interpretations wrong and choose to 
disregard them, except in cases in which the author of the novel tells them to be bound by a 
prior interpretation. 
 Dworkin may be correct that the chain novel metaphor captures the American legal 
system. But the example Dworkin has in mind is the system interprets the U.S. Constitution, 
an Eighteenth Century legal text, whose words are sometimes broad, but whose principles 
are strong and must be continually updated to fit the current stage of the American Society—
this is undisputable whether one is an originalist or a living constitutionalist or adopts any 
other constitutional interpretive view,725 because contenders of all schools of thought must 
interpret the text to present facts, although in a different manner and range. Stare decisis is 
also a rule of American law widely accepted by judges.  
 The literary novel example, nonetheless, may not be the best one to explain Brazilian 
practices, because the novel is, in general, written broadly—as stated in subchapter II.4.1., 
in which the civil legislation style was covered.  
 A post-impressionist painting,726 with is focus on abstract qualities and avoidance of 
specific details, may provide a better idea of the civil law generality and certainty. Consider, 
for example, Van Gogh’s Starry Night,727 which is part of The Museum of Modern Art - 
MOMA’s permanent collection in New York City. If one examines this work of art, the 
person will note that Van Gogh painted a starry night. She may observe that there is a city, 
                                                          
722 See BONAVIDES, supra note 114, at 437.  
723 See Dworkin, supra note 699. 
724 Article 4 of the Introductory Act to the Brazilian Norms sets forth that “when there is a gap in the law, 
the judge shall decide the case resorting to analogy, customs and general principles of law.” LEI DE INTRODUÇÃO 
ÀS NORMAS DO DIREITO BRASILEIRO [L.I.N.D.B.] [INTRODUCTORY ACT TO THE BRAZILIAN NORMS] art. 4. 
Translation mine. 
725 See BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 560. 
726 Post-Impressionism, in Western painting, is a movement in France that represented both an extension of 
Impressionism and a rejection of that style’s inherent limitations. The term Post-Impressionism was coined by 
the English art critic Roger Fry for the work of the late 19th-century painters as Paul Cézanne, Georges Seurat, 
Paul Gauguin, Vincent van Gogh, Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec, and others. See The Editors of Encyclopedia 
Britannica https://www.britannica.com/art/Post-Impressionism. 
727 For viewing this painting, please visit https://www.moma.org/collection/works/79802. 
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an arbor, a church and some mountains. But, she may not be sure as to whether there is a 
comet in the sky; if the sun has already risen; or if the moon is very bright in the night; if it 
is a windy night; or if she can see the northern lights: the aurora borealis.728 She will have to 
interpret it to determine what the painting displays. 
  Nevertheless, this work has shown changes on the Brazilian social facts regarding 
legal practices, especially after the enactment of the 1988 C.F.. Since the Constitution is not 
seen as mere political document anymore and judges confer normative force to the text and 
consider that it tells them to take part on the process of guaranteeing a fair and just society 
for Brazilians, judges may well now be writing some new chapters. Insofar as they play an 
active role in improving Brazilian society, assuring that fundamental and social rights are 
respected by the three levels of Government, a new vision of the metaphor may be pertinent 
today, at least for some areas of law. 
 The Judiciary acts in this new role by applying the law, after being provoked through 
the filing of actions. In these lawsuits, the causes of action invoked by the parties are 
commonly the broad constitutional principles, which they think need to be concretized in the 
situation at hand. The use of the word concretization, instead of interpretation, shows that 
judges are doing a different kind of work nowadays. As an excerpt from Barroso 
demonstrates that constitutional principles “do not put in detail the conduct to be followed 
for its concretization.” 729 In this sense, as he notes, “the activity of the interpreter will be 
more complex, because [most of the times] it will be up to him to define the direction to 
take.”730 
 Taking this new scenario into account, Dworkin’s chain novel metaphor starts to 
make sense to describe the reality of what Brazilian judges are doing, at least regarding 
constitutional law. And since, as noted in subchapter II.5.2, there is ongoing practice of 
constitutionalizing the law, this metaphor may even be pertinent to also describe other areas 
of Brazilian legal practice.  
 Indeed, due to changes in social practices, some of Brazil’s current norms—both 
constitutional and statutory—do not fit the top-down model anymore—at least those that 
need to be concretized by the Judiciary in a case by case fashion. By writing these broad 
principles into the law and affirming that they are self-enforceable and do not depend on the 
enactment of a statute to have force, Brazil also adopted a bottom-up model of lawmaking to 
deal with constitutional issues. As Gustavo Zagrebelsky observes, “[t]he concretization of 
the principles take place in the course of the work either of the legislator, through a rule that 
looks to future events, or of the judge, through a decision that looks back to past events.”731 
 According to Professor Denise Reaume: 
 
“[t]his model holds that although we may agree on and be 
deeply committed to certain abstract values or principles, we 
cannot anticipate all the fact situations in which they may be 
implicated, nor can we fully map out a comprehensive view of 
the concrete consequences implicated by those values. We 
want our legal system to be informed by principles of justice, 
liberty and equality, but these are multifaceted concepts whose 
                                                          
728 Aurora borealis is the name of “[t]he bright dancing lights of the aurora are actually collisions between 
electrically charged particles from the sun that enter the earth's atmosphere. The lights are seen above the 
magnetic poles of the northern and southern hemispheres. They are known as 'Aurora borealis' in the north and 
'Aurora Australis' in the south.” See https://www.northernlightscentre.ca/northernlights.html. 
729 BARROSO, supra note 27, at 151. Translation mine. 
730 Id. 
731 Gustavo Zagrebelsky, supra note 26, at 631.  
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meaning is contested. In such situations, it is wise not to 
attempt a comprehensive theory issuing a precise network of 
rules at the outset, but rather to let the implications of the 
abstract principles be revealed incrementally through 
confronting fact situations on a case-by-case basis.”732 
  
 The bottom-up method is based on the common law approach, although it has 
differences because in Brazil it is based on pedigreed sources, which originated from a clear 
social fact, the inclusion of principles in written norms, specially the 1988 C.F.. The method 
is addressed by Hart in The Concept of Law, when he gives the “hat in the church 
example.” 733  Waluchow, following Reaume’s teachings, also argues that the Canadian 
Charter of rights should be concretized in a bottom-up method of lawmaking.734 I will return 
to this subject in the following chapters.735 
 
III.5.3. Are Brazilian Rights Trumps?  
  
 Dworkin famously argues that “rights are best understood as trumps over some 
background justification for political decisions that states a goal for the community as a 
whole.”736 He claims that, for example, “if someone has a right to publish pornography, this 
                                                          
732 Reaume, supra note 11, at 117. 
733 Hart’s “hat in the church” example is the following: there are two ways of communicating standards of 
conduct in advance of successive occasions on which they are applied. For notifying his son that he needs to 
take off his hat on entering a church, a father may opt to expressly tell him that ‘Every man and boy must take 
off his hat on entering a church’ or may not say anything and except that his son would observe his attitude. 
For the second model to work, the son must regard his father as an authority on proper behavior, and would 
watch him to learn how to behave. Also, according to Hart, “much of the jurisprudence of this century has 
consisted of the progressive realization (and sometimes exaggeration) of the important fact that the distinction 
between the uncertainties of communication by authoritative example (precedent), and the certainties of 
communication by authoritative general language (legislation) is far less than this naïve contrast suggests. Even 
when verbally formulated general rules are used, uncertainties as to the form of behaviour required by them 
may break out in particular concrete cases. Particular fact-situations do not await us already marked off from 
each other, and labelled as instances of the general rule, the application of which is in question; nor can the rule 
itself step forward to claim its own instances. In all fields of experience, not only that of rules, there is a limit, 
inherent in the nature of language, to the guidance which general language can provide. There will indeed be 
plain cases constantly recurring in similar contexts to which general expressions are clearly applicable ('If 
anything is a vehicle a motor-car is one') but there will also be cases where it is not clear whether they apply or 
not. (‘Does ‘vehicle’ used here include bicycles, airplanes, roller skates?’) The latter are fact-situations, 
continually thrown up by nature or human invention, which possess only some of the features of the plain cases 
but others which they lack. Canons of ‘interpretation’ cannot eliminate, though they can diminish, these 
uncertainties; for these canons are themselves general rules for the use of language, and make use of general 
terms which themselves require interpretation. They cannot, any more than other rules, provide for their own 
interpretation. The plain case, where the general terms seem to need no interpretation and where the recognition 
of instances seems unproblematic or 'automatic', are only the familiar ones, constantly recurring in similar 
contexts, where there is general agreement in judgments as to the applicability of the classifying terms.” HART, 
supra note 43, at 125-126. 
734 WALUCHOW, supra note 13, at 204-208. 
735 Although judges may be writing a new chapter, not having stare decisis as a general rule in the system 
creates constant problems of coherence in adding new chapters to the novel. Each judge may add a new chapter 
in the development of the constitutional or any other area of law, but whether the next judge will continue the 
story or take a step back and rewrite the same chapter, is always an issue. The fact that there is a debate as to 
whether, for example, the practice of a specific an official act is a requirement for configuring corruption in 
Brazil, a practice criminalized in 1940, shows that adding solid chapters to the chain novel may not be an easy 
task. See subchapter V.5.4. 
736 Ronald Dworkin, Rights as Trumps, in KAVANAGH & OBERDIEK, supra note 430, at 308. 
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means that it is for some reason wrong for officials to act in violation of that right, even if 
they (correctly) believe that the community as a whole would be better off if they did.”737 
Dworkin’s struggle is against utilitarianism; his view is that rights protect individuals “in 
spite […] of the wider good.”738 The question to be answered in this subchapter is whether 
this is the Brazilian view of rights, as exposed in law adjudication. 
 In subchapter III.2.2.3.2., it was mentioned that the S.T.F has an understanding that 
“there are no absolute rights, even the fundamental rights set forth in art. 5 of the C.F., or in 
treaties or in human rights international conventions. The criteria and methods of 
reasonableness and proportionality are essential in this context because they reject the 
prevalence of one determined right or interest over the other of same or higher juridical-
evaluative stature.”739 Is this view incompatible with Dworkin’s?  
 This question is relevant for this work because Dworkin’s trump thesis displays his 
view that political morality arguments should prevail over other considerations. On the other 
hand, inclusive legal positivism asserts that those arguments will prevail if this criterion is 
set forth in the rule of recognition. 
 To answer the question proposed for this subchapter, it is necessary to take a step 
back and analyze some issues regarding the context of Dworkin’s work. Although the Hart-
Dworkin debate is possibly Dworkin’s most famous struggle and Dworkin argued that he, 
as Hart, was providing a theory of law not tied to any particular system or legal culture, 
foreign critics seem to think that Dworkin’s theory is limited to the American reality, at least 
with respect to his rights thesis and his distinction among arguments of policy and of 
principle. 740 
 David Kennedy explains that, in the years after 1968, the liberal thought in the U.S. 
was under enormous pressure and that had several impacts in the legal field, especially after 
the Warren Court years.741 The methods of reasoning and the centrality of adjudication that 
prevailed during this period were attacked and became more evident. The rise of textualism 
gave strength to critics that called the liberal decisions judicial activism and that they usurped 
legislative powers. “Defending the liberal tradition seemed to require a defense of 
adjudication as an intellectual activity distinct from legislation—and utilitarian 
policymaking—while remaining open to the broad readings of legal texts and tradition 
favored by liberal judges.”742  
 Kennedy affirms that “Dworkin […] took up the challenge of offering a theory of 
adjudication between textual fealty and legislative policymaking.”743 
 Dworkin’s endeavor, nevertheless, was to offer a theory of adjudication in a country 
where there has not been any political rupture since its independence and where the core of 
the constitutional background for rights remained almost untouched after the Civil War 
                                                          
737 Id. 
738 Id. 
739  S.T.F., HC No. 93.250, Relator: Min. Ellen Gracie, 10.6.2008, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA ELETRÔNICO, 
27.6.2008.  
740 See ALEXY, supra note 246, at 66. According to the Indian judge Upendra Baxi, “the Indian Supreme 
Court has a vast appellate jurisdiction, transcending the portfolio originally offered by the Bill of Rights. 
Necessarily, these background conditions situate the Indian Hercules very differently. Cultural contexts within 
which they perform often cast them in the image of an ambivalent “constitutional” Brahmin! All this aggravates 
the tasks of normative cross-cultural comparison.” Upendra Baxi, “A known but indifferent judge”: Situating 
Ronald Dworkin in contemporary Indian jurisprudence, 1 Int’l J. Const. L., 557, 565-566 (2003); See also 
Arthur Chaskalson, From Wickedness to Equality: The Moral Transformation of South Africa Law, 1 Int’l J. 
Const. L. 590, 609 (2003). 
741 KENNEDY & FISHER, supra note 428, at 551. 
742 Id. 
743 Id. 
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Amendments. This initiative was especially difficult because the U.S. was already a 
developed nation and could not be called a society in transition,744 in which the judicial 
branch was required to be a player in improving society, especially in discovering new rights. 
Arguing that rights were not always visible in pre-existing legal norms but could be 
discovered through principled-based reasoning and without resorting to policy 
considerations was certainly a very powerful move by Dworkin.  
 But in Dworkin’s late works, he seems to have felt that this American institutional 
reality left his theory too narrow in comparison to what was happening in the world. The 
new constitutions, equally in Europe, Africa and Latin America, included not only individual 
rights, but also many positive rights. In the continental legal theory, scholars call these 
“social rights”—which demand positive actions from the state to warrant substantive 
equality—second-generation rights. They differ from the first-generation rights, which are 
considered to be the traditional liberal rights that citizens have against the state, such as life, 
liberty and property. There are even a third and a fourth categories: the third-generation 
rights—that encompasses the rights to humanity self-preservation, such as environmental 
protection; and the fourth-generation, linked to the idea of biological research rights, like 
the ability to manipulate human genetics.745  
 In subchapter II.5.4., I went over this issue and cited a quote from Dworkin in which 
he comments upon the South African former Supreme Court member Arthur Chaskalson. 
Dworkin’s remarks show that the tasks of adjudication and of recognition of rights in these 
countries are more complex and due to that fact it is very hard to sustain that positive (social) 
rights trump all other collective interests. 
 One of Chaskalson’s examples of the dominance of collective over individual rights 
was the Soobramoney case,746 in which the South African Supreme Court rejected the claim 
from a patient suffering from chronic renal failure to be provided with renal dialysis without 
charge. Chaskalson noted that the plaintiff did not fall into the preferable cases established 
by the state guidelines, which were the patients that could be cured—he was a diabetic in the 
final stage of chronic renal failure, suffering from ischemic heart disease and cerebrovascular 
disease. Since resources were limited and the Government should establish some criterion, 
the Court ruled that awarding preference to patients that had more chances of surviving was 
more important than simply spending funds to prolong Mr. Soobramoney’s life. 
 Dworkin, in commenting upon this ruling, asserted that the Court acted properly and 
that “Mr. Soobramoney was treated with equal concern [because] if the government cannot 
provide, out of its health care budget, dialysis for everyone in renal failure, then it does not 
deny equal concern to give priority to those who can benefit most from that technology.”747 
                                                          
744 Several provisions of developing nations have established goals in their constitutions. In subchapter 
II.2.2.1. I mentioned that, in Brazil, the 1988 Framers expressly introduced a large number of rules and 
principles in the C.F., some of them reflecting social goals, others fundamental rights. This value-laden text 
includes, for example, as foundations of the Republic human dignity and the social value of labor, and as 
fundamental goals of the nation the eradication of poverty and marginalization, the reduction of social and 
regional inequality and the promotion of the good of all. The South Africa Constitution also declares that “[t]he 
state must take reasonable legislative measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive 
realization.” S. AFR. CONST. (1996) § 27 (2). 
745 See NORBERTO BOBBIO, THE AGE OF RIGHTS I-XV (Oxford, 2005). These qualifications emerge from the 
1789 French Revolution motto “Liberty, Equality and Fraternity.” See PEDRO LENZA, DIREITO 
CONSTITUCIONAL ESQUEMATIZADO 958 (Saraiva, 16ed, 2012). 
746 Chaskalson, supra note 740, at 602. See also Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal, 1998 
(1) SALR 765 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
747 Dworkin, supra note 296, at 653.  
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Dworkin claims that this approach is egalitarian—the court’s reading is “consistent with 
equal concern for all”748—, as opposed to substantive: 
 
 “Judges must choose between two strategies [when judging 
positive rights cases]. The first strategy is substantive. It 
requires judges to review at least the major decisions that 
government made in allocating resources to satisfy the basic 
needs specified in the Constitution, and to reject any such 
decisions they find unreasonable. This substantive strategy 
might require judges to declare that government policy is 
unreasonable because it spends too much on health care and, 
therefore, not enough on housing. The second strategy is 
egalitarian: it insists not that government must make any 
particular allocation of resources but that it must show equal 
concern for all in the allocations it does make. It cannot, for 
example, distribute what it does assign for health care in a way 
that ignores greater or more basic health needs in order to serve 
lesser or less basic ones, when there is no need for that 
allocation.”749 
 
 This ruling shows how hard is to say that Mr. Soobramoney’s right to health 
protection trumps rival collective considerations. Dworkin argues that the rival 
considerations in Mr. Soobramoney’s case are egalitarian, not utilitarian; the wishes of a 
member of the community are not being discriminated because of the wishes of another 
member. But there is no doubt that, at the end of the day, his constitutional right to full health 
care assistance was compromised, because this egalitarian treatment neglected him the 
possibility of living the remaining period of life in the best possible way. This was probably 
an argument that would make a private health insurance company to lose a lawsuit if it had 
denied Mr. Soobramoney’s claim. 
 If one examines precedents regarding health claims against the state in Brazil, he will 
note that the Judiciary approach is more concerned with safeguarding human dignity, even 
of terminal patients. Indeed, there are several judicial decisions that grant injunctions to 
obligate the government to financially support individual treatments.750 These decisions are 
                                                          
748 Id. According to Stephen Guest, in Taking Rights Seriously, Dworkin has already accepted a “version of 
utilitarianism which incorporates a reasonably robust egalitarian premise. It requires, though, thinking of an 
agglomeration of choices consistent with the right of each to be treated with equal concern and respect.” Guest, 
supra note 541, at 93. The passage he cited from Dworkin’s book is: “Utilitarian arguments of policy […] seem 
not to oppose but on the contrary to embody the fundamental right of equal concern and respect, because they 
treat the wishes of each member of the community on a par with the wishes of any other.” Id. See DWORKIN, 
supra note 293, at 275. 
749 Id. 
750 The grounds for these decisions are the general provisions of the C.F. that grant the right of health 
protection (art. 196) and article 2, paragraph 1º, of Lei No. 8.080/1990: “Art. 2º The health is a human being 
fundamental right and the State is obligated to fulfill the indispensable conditions to its full exercise. § 1º The 
duty of the State is to guarantee health protection consists in the formulation and execution of economic and 
social policies that aim the reduction of illness risks and of other grievances and in the institution of conditions 
that secure universal and egalitarian to the actions and services for the promotion, protection and recovery. § 2º 
The duty of the State does not exclude the duty of the people, of the family, of companies and of society.” Lei 
No. 8.080, de 19 de setembro de 1990, COL. LEIS REP. FED. BRASIL, September 1990.  
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generally upheld by the S.T.F..751 No doubt the subject is very controversial. In fact, there is 
an ongoing case in which the S.T.F. is trying to fix objective criteria for cases in which the 
public administration is compelled to supply medication to individuals.752 But it is likely that 
the South Africa Supreme Court approach, endorsed by Dworkin, would be regarded 
contrary the prevailing political morality in Brazilian law. The general understanding of the 
C.F. right to health protection—at least in accordance with the prevailing judicial 
decisions—seems to be more linked to the idea of no one left behind, at least concerning 
health and educational issues. It may sound romantic, but courts have been trying to enforce 
full health assistance coverage to those who file suits requiring it.753 If Mr. Soobramoney’s 
was Brazilian, the government would probably have been forced to provide him with the 
treatment, either directly in a public hospital or by paying his bills in a private hospital.  
 The following syllabus of a S.T.F. opinion regarding the right to day care for up to 
5-year-old children is an evidence of the prevailing principle: 
 
“- Youth education represents an inalienable constitutional 
prerogative granted to children, which, for allowing their 
development, as a first step of the process of basic education, 
warrants them attending day care and pre-school (C.F., art. 
208, IV).  
This high social significant legal prerogative requires the state 
to create objective conditions that allow, in a concrete manner, 
up to 5-year-old children (C.F., art. 208, IV), the effective 
access to day care and pre-school. An unacceptable 
governmental omission may unfairly frustrate the positive 
right that the text of the Federal Constitution granted to them.  
Youth education, being a fundamental right of every child, is 
not submitted, during the process of concretization, to mere 
discretionary evaluations of Public Administration, neither it 
is subordinated to pure pragmatical governmental reasons.”754 
 
 This, in any sense, means that Brazilian law adopts a view that individual social rights 
always trumps community goals. In fact, these proceedings are analyzed by judges, in a case-
by-case manner, in which they balance the individual interest and the state’s considerations 
for not fulfilling the social right obligation. Principles of reasonableness and proportionality 
are generally applied—as noted in subchapters II.5.5. and III.2.2.2. 
                                                          
751  See e.g. S.T.F., STA No. 860, Relatora: Min. Carmen Lucia, 24.11.2017, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO 
ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e], 27.9.2017 (Braz.) (reaffirming a decision that determined that the Fundação Municipal 
de Saúde of the City of Niteroi provides the medication Canakinumab (Ilaris) to a patient that suffers from 
Mevalonate Kinase Deficiency - MKD); See S.T.F., R.E. No. 956.475, Relator: Min. Celso de Mello, 12.5.2016, 
DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e], 13.5.2016 (Braz.) (reversing a Court of Appeals judgement and 
determining the immediate enrolment of a four-year old child in a public day care; asserted that the justification 
of the restriction of the possible clause is not an excuse for not complying with basic social rights, like the right 
to fundamental education). 
752 The S.T.F. case numbers are R.E. No. 566.471 and R.E. No. 657.718. Until this moment, Justices Marco 
Aurélio, Luís Roberto Barroso and Edson Fachin have casted their votes. The court has not yet informed when 
this judgment will be adjourned.  
753 For an article criticizing the current role of judges in making policy decisions in health protection cases, 
see Eduardo Appio, Não cabe aos juízes determinar a política pública de Saúde, CONJUR (Nov. 23, 2005 12:02 
PM), https://www.conjur.com.br/2005-nov-23/nao_cabe_juiz_determinar_politica_publica_saude. 
754  S.T.F., A.R.E. 639.337 AgR., Relator: Min. Celso de Mello, 23.8.2011, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO 
ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e], 14.9.2011. Translation mine.  
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 Dworkin, in Hard Cases, drew a distinction between absolute and less then absolute 
rights, as well as between abstract and concrete rights. These distinctions show that his 
trumps theory may not be so strong as it sounds and he admits balancing, although he would 
probably only admit as rival considerations compelling circumstances that do not depart 
from his egalitarian framework.755 Nevertheless, there is a difference when one says that 
there are no absolute rights, and when one uses the vocabulary that rights are either absolute 
or less absolute. The latter, although not so strong, cannot be simply understood as relative 
and will not be outweighed for any type of social goal.756 
 Waluchow makes a similar statement about the issue in Canada: 
 
“[…] section 1 specifies that the [Canadian] Charter 
‘guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in the subject to 
such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.’ The 
subsequent history of the Canadian courts in developing 
section 1 attests to their belief not only that Charter rights can 
be qualified by greater good. This is anything but the 
suggestion that rights are trumps. It is a message that rights are 
not absolute, but they are not blunt instruments with which to 
demand selfish advancement of one’s own individual interests. 
It is also a message of which Canadians are well aware.”757 
 
 Finally, in The Judge’s New Role: Should Personal Convictions Count?, of 2003, 
Dworkin once again stated the foreign constitutionalism phenomenon and the enlargement 
of the judicial role in many countries: 
 
“In the decades after World War II, more and more of these 
democracies gave judges new and – except in the United States 
– unprecedented powers to review the acts of administrative 
agencies and officials under broad doctrines of reasonableness, 
natural justice and proportionality, and then even more 
surprising powers to review the enactments of legislatures to 
determine whether the legislatures had violated the rights of 
individual citizens laid down in international treaties and 
domestic constitutions. The impact of moral pronouncement 
on judicial argument thus became much more evident and 
pronounced. In recent years international courts, like the 
European Court of Human Rights, have become progressively 
more important, and the role and powers of judges have 
therefore acquired yet a further dimension.”758 
 
 Dworkin noted that the new role was different from the traditional one in three ways. 
He asserted that judges had to confront moral issues in a more pervasive fashion in general 
administrative regulation and in a much more pervasive in constitutional and international 
subjects. He then acknowledged the need judges have to make choices and balance interests: 
                                                          
755 See Dworkin, supra note 296, at 653. 
756 Dworkin, supra note 428, at 571. 
757 WALUCHOW, supra note 13, at 177. 
758 Ronald Dworkin, The Judge’s New Role: Should Personal Convictions Count?, 1 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 4, 
5 (2003). 
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“The role of moral judgments is pervasive and undeniable in 
administrative regulation […] because the standards of that 
task are themselves set out in moral language—the language 
of convenience and necessity, or reasonableness, or 
proportionality, for example—and because it requires judges 
to choose among contested conceptions of economic and 
administrative efficiency, and to fix an interaction and balance 
between efficiency and other moral values.”759 
  
 Taking into account these new institutional choices and the moral language employed 
to translate them into the new constitutions, Dworkin then starts talking about choices—
instead of one right answer—and balancing—instead of trumping. Also, Dworkin mentions 
the need that these choices be made taking into account typical arguments of policy—
economic and administrative efficiency. 
 Dworkin calls this new role of the Judiciary in foreign countries government by 
adjudication. He says that this enterprise shall to be carried based on principled decisions, 
but he seems to understand how hard it is to create a theory that could describe this more 
complex interpretative task—such as his law as integrity for first generation rights—and 
acknowledges that the judge’s personal convictions will matter much more in these policy 
cases: 
 
“Government by adjudication is newly appealing for a 
different reason as well: it seems better suited than the 
alternatives to the cultural and ethical pluralism that is so 
marked in modern political communities and associations. 
Adjudication is constructivist rather than oracular: though 
judges rely, as I have been insisting, on their own personal 
moral convictions, they accept an institutional responsibility 
for integrity with what other judges have done and will do, 
which means that the body of principle they together construct, 
by way of constitutional interpretation, is more likely to be 
abstract and less tied to any particular cultural tradition. The 
political rather than ethical character of these principles 
contributes markedly to that result.”760 
 
 Dworkin’s approach regarding government by adjudication, which differs from his 
arguments used to describe the appropriate role of judges in American Law, is centered on 
specific social facts—the use of moral language in the constitutions and the prevalent official 
behavior that award powers to judges to apply these standards. There is no doubt that 
institutional history has always been very important to his rights theory,761 but his view that 
judges should play an active role in reviewing the acts of administrative agencies and 
                                                          
759 Id. at 5-6. 
760 Dworkin, supra note 758, at 11. 
761 In A Reply to Critics in Taking Rights Seriously, Dworkin wrote that legal rights, in his view, “are 
institutional rights, and these are genuine rights that provide important and normally very powerful reasons for 
political decisions. Background moral rights enter, in ways I have tried to describe, into the calculation of what 
legal rights people have when the standard materials provide uncertain guidance, and some positivists’ thesis, 
that legal rights and moral rights are conceptually distinct, is therefore wrong.” DWORKIN, supra note 293, at 
326. 
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officials under broad doctrines of reasonableness, natural justice and proportionality—
matters more linked to arguments of policy—and through them build the body of principles 
in this government by adjudication enterprise, sounds different from what he argued in prior 
works. Since the matters are more complex, Dworkin even asserts that “judges shall rely 
[…] on their own personal moral convictions.”762  
 In making these remarks, it is unquestionable that Dworkin comes closer to describe 
the current active role of judges in these societies in transition in a very similar way as 
chapter II describes the role of Brazilian judges in interpreting the 1988 C.F.. And Dworkin’s 
remarks start to sound like Hart’s remarks on interpretation. This quotation of The Concept 
of Law demonstrates my point. Hart, as Dworkin, also mentions choice, balancing and 
principled reasoning: 
 
 “Neither in interpreting statutes nor precedents are judges 
confined to the alternatives of blind, arbitrary choice, or 
‘mechanical’ deduction from rules with predetermined 
meaning. Very often their choice is guided by an assumption 
that the purpose of the rules which they are interpreting is a 
reasonable one, so that the rules which are not intended to 
work injustice or offend settled moral principles. Judicial 
decision, especially on matters of high constitutional import, 
often involves a choice between moral values, and not merely 
the application of some single outstanding moral principle; for 
it is folly to believe that where the meaning of the law is in 
doubt, morality always has a clear answer to offer. At this point 
judges may again make a choice which is neither arbitrary nor 
mechanical; and here often display characteristic judicial 
virtues, the special appropriateness of which to legal decision 
explains why some feel reluctant to call such judicial activity 
‘legislative’. These virtues are: impartiality and neutrality in 
surveying the alternatives: consideration for the interest of all 
who will be affected; and a concern to deploy some acceptable 
general principle as a reasoned basis for decision. No doubt 
because a plurality of such principles is always possible it 
cannot be demonstrated that a decision is uniquely correct: but 
it may be made acceptable as a reasoned product of informed 
partial choice. In all this we have the ‘weighing’ and 
‘balancing’ characteristic of the effort to do justice between 
competing interests.”763 
  
III.5.4. Dworkin’s Principles and the Brazilian View 
 
  This final session will examine if Dworkin’s view of principles matches the views of 
Brazilian judges and scholars regarding the same issue. 
 In subchapters II.5.1, II.5.2. and II.5.3, I stated that Brazilian judges usually adopt 
Dworkin’s logical distinction among rules and principles, that Brazilian legal texts have 
posited standards and called them principles and that, beside these written principles, judges 
also refer to implied principles and to general principles of law. 
                                                          
762 Dworkin, supra note 758, at 11. 
763 HART, supra note 43 at 204-205. 
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 According to article 1 of the Introductory Act to the Brazilian Norms, the law enters 
into force after 45 days of its publication in the official gazette. This mark is important to 
establish the compliance of the requirements of article 5, II, C.F., which sets forth that “no 
one shall be obliged to do or refrain from doing except by virtue of [enacted] law”764, and 
also article 5, XXXIX, of the C.F., which sets forth that  “there are no crimes unless defined 
in prior law, nor are there any penalties unless previously imposed by law.”765 Therefore, 
regarding the requirements of legality and especially of criminal legality, the publication of 
an abstract norm satisfies the constitutional moral requirement of nullum crimen sine lege 
(“no crime without law”). 
 Since principles are also included in the body of the C.F. and of statutes, once these 
texts are published, the principles already exist in the legal system, are presumptively valid 
and, after the 45-day vacatio legis, may produce effects.  
 When in The Model of Rules I, Dworkin mentions that principles cannot have 
pedigree, it is because he considers that “we could not devise any formula for testing how 
much and what kind of institutional support is necessary to make a principle a legal principle, 
still less to fix its weight at a particular order of magnitude.”766 So, the legal norms that are 
called principles in Brazil would not be called principles for Dworkin.  
 Dworkin admits that “a rule and a principle can play much the same role [sometimes], 
and the difference between them is almost a matter of form alone.”767 He mentions that the 
use of words like “reasonable,” “negligent,” “unjust,” and “significant” often make rules 
perform the function of principles and says that “[e]ach of these terms makes the application 
of the rule which contains it depend to some extent upon principles or policies lying beyond 
the rule, and in this way makes that rule itself more like a principle.”768 Nevertheless, these 
standards will not be principles in his opinion, but the norms that contain them would be 
rules. 
 So, are these views irreconcilable? 
 To answer this question is necessary to stress that, in Hard Cases, Dworkin says that 
an adequate theory will make use of “a distinction between abstract and concrete rights and, 
therefore, abstract and concrete principles.”769 He states that an “abstract right is a general 
political aim the statement of which does not indicate how that general aim is to be weighed 
or compromised in particular circumstances against other political aims,”770 and claims that 
the grand rights of political rhetoric are in this way abstract.”771 As examples, Dworkin cites 
the right of free speech, dignity and equality.772 
 Concrete rights, and, therefore, principles, “are political aims that are more precisely 
defined so as to express more definitely the weight they have against other political aims on 
particular occasions.”773 He gives the following example: 
 
“Suppose I say, not simply that citizens have a right to free 
speech, but that a newspaper has a right to publish defense 
                                                          
764 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5, II (Braz.) (trans. Brazilian Federal Senate). 
765 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5, XXXIX (Braz.) Translated by Keith Rosenn, 
Constituteproject.org https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2014.pdf. 
766 Dworkin, supra note 17, at 41. 
767 Id. at 25. 
768 Id. 
769 Dworkin, supra note 741, at 572. 
770 Id. 
771 Id. 
772 Id. 
773 Id. at 572. 
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plans classified as secret provided this publication will not 
create an immediate physical danger to troops. My principle 
declares for a particular resolution of the conflict it 
acknowledges between the abstract right of free speech, on the 
one hand, and competing rights of soldiers to security or the 
urgent needs of defense on the other. Abstract rights in this 
way provide arguments for concrete rights, but the claim of a 
concrete right is more definitive than any claim of abstract 
right that support it.”774 
 
 These abstract principles and rules would probably be the “rules and standards” of 
the “preinterpretative” stage of Dworkin’s process of constructive interpretation, mentioned 
in Law’s Empire.775 
 Dworkin’s distinction among abstract and concrete rights and principles in Hard 
Cases helps us to understand what he means in The Model of Rules I when he says that 
principles cannot have pedigree. He has in mind concrete principles and concrete rules. To 
be concrete, it means that these principles have survived the adjudication process and are 
taken to be the best solution to comply with the community’s political morality.776 The all or 
nothing fashion of the rule follows the same line of thinking. After all political morality is 
evaluated in the interpretative stage, the concrete solution proposed by the abstract rule 
provides the best outcome for the case. 
 His Riggs v. Palmer777 example shows this very well. The New York court famous 
case, decided in 1889, concerned whether an heir named in his grandfather’s will could 
inherit his part after killing his ascendant. Although the NY law did not have any provision 
that denied grandson to inherit in this situation, the court ruled against him by applying the 
principle that no one can benefit from his own wrong.778  
 Dworkin says that the rule that “one who murders is not eligible to take under the will 
of his victim […] [did not] exist before this case was decided.”779 Nevertheless, the court 
cited the principle above to create this rule. This principle was a part of the law for him, so 
judges did not have to reach outside the legal system to find a solution. Dworkin says that 
“[i]n Riggs, the court cited the principle that no man may profit from his own wrong as a 
background standard against which to read the statute of will and in this way justified a new 
interpretation of the statute.”780 
 But the pedigreed principles that are included in Brazilian legal texts are obviously 
abstract rules, not concrete ones. In fact, the concrete rule of the case, as the current 
vocabulary of principles in Brazil suggests, will only exist once the principle is 
concretized.781  Concretization, as the word signalizes, makes specifically what Dworkin 
says: turns a pedigreed abstract principle into a pedigreed concrete principle. 
 Therefore, if Dworkin admits that abstract principles may exist and they turn into 
concrete principles during adjudication, when they are interpreted, his denial of the 
possibility that principles enacted in the legislation be considered principles does not make 
sense. Abstract rights and principles also do not hold in their faces when they will be applied 
                                                          
774 Id. at 572-573. 
775 DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 436, at 65. 
776 See NEVES, supra 21, at 61. 
777 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889). 
778 Dworkin, supra note 17, at 23. 
779 Id, at 30. 
780 Id.  
781 See subchapter II.4.2.1. 
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or how. The principles inserted in legal texts operate exactly in the same way. They will be 
applied based on the criteria judges apply—in the Brazilian case, the most pervasive method 
is balancing.  
 This is an additional evidence that it is possible to make a distinction among law 
identification and adjudication. Abstract principles may be identified, but their concretization 
will be left to adjudication.  
 Alexy’s qualification of principles as optimization requirements, in this sense, makes 
more sense to describe the practice of principle application in Brazil. Generally, in Brazilian 
cases, judges will resort to written principles as initial grounds for adjudication, as prima 
facie norms, as Alexy states, or as non-conclusive norms, as Hart asserts. After balancing 
them with other principles and norms, they will solve the case. Brazilian judges and lawyers 
do not consider that only with the case solution in hand they may identify whether they have 
a principle or a rule. When they talk about principles and rules, they will mostly be talking 
about abstract principles or abstract rules in Dworkin’s vocabulary.  
 The following quote, from Justice Luís Roberto Barroso, makes clear that when 
Brazilian judges and scholars refer to the normative structure of principles and rules, they are 
referring to abstract rules and principles, which will involve judicial interpretation or 
concretization for the application in specific cases. Barroso notes that they give instructions, 
point out directions, provides details of the covered conduct: 
 
“In relation to their normative structure, a rule specifies the 
acts to be performed for its adequate compliance. Although the 
interpreter activity cannot be qualified as mechanical—
because he shall give the human touch that links the text to real 
life—the application of a rule does not normally demand a 
more sophisticated rational process. If the abstract fact occurs, 
the established effect shall be produced. Principles, on the 
other hand, point to aims, ideal states to be reached. As the 
norm does not get into detail the conduct to be followed for its 
compliance, the activity of the interpreter will be more 
complex, because he will have to decide which action to take.” 
782 
  
 Dworkin’s conception of the moment when one identifies if he is reasoning with a 
concrete principle—at the end of the argumentative chain—in fact, seems to be similar to 
when Brazilian official applies the closure rule, which states that “when the [written] law has 
a gap, the judge will decide the case by means of analogy, customs and the general principles 
of law.”783 The general principle of the law is also employed to close the argumentative 
chain.  
 A divorce lawsuit decided by the State of Rio Grande do Sul Court of Appeals in 
2003 illustrates this assertion. The fact pattern is very similar to Riggs v. Palmer: a man killed 
his father-in-law and the debate was whether he should lose his share of the couple’s assets—
a consequence not set forth under the law in force—because the father-in-law estate had been 
inherited by the daughter-wife and, under their marital regime—which universally 
communicated all assets—those assets should be divided. 
 In a majority opinion, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the wife and denied the 
husband’s part of the share. In the reasoning, the court invoked the rational legislator and 
                                                          
782 BARROSO, supra note 27, at 151. Translation mine. 
783 LEI DE INTRODUÇÃO ÀS NORMAS DO DIREITO BRASILEIRO [L.I.N.D.B.] [INTRODUCTORY ACT TO THE 
BRAZILIAN NORMS] art. 4 (Braz.). 
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extracted from the posited rules a coherent principle, identifying the purpose of the norm 
[which is to provide a deterrence effect for assassinations in order to get inheritance rights].  
 Since this specific situation was not directly covered by the Civil Code then in force, 
the Court asserted the existence of an axiological gap and, by applying the closure rule, 
decided the case grounded on the principle that ‘no one can benefit from his own wrong’, 
acknowledging both that it is a general principle of the law and an implied principle. The 
implied principles, as Nino and Raz asserted in the quotes cited in subchapter II.5.3.2., are 
sometimes proposed to summarily describe the content of norms of the system. Their field 
of reference, nevertheless, can reach “longer than the whole body of substituted rules and 
allowing new principles not included in the original system derive and fulfilling system 
gaps.” 784 
 The concurring opinion of Judge Maria Berenice Dias ratified these conclusions. She 
first acknowledged the lack of statutory provision: 
 
“I agree with the judge rapporteur that the 1916 Civil Code did 
not state, among the hypothesis set forth in art. 1.595, the 
situation now handled, because it only excluded heirs from 
inheriting [in case they murder the testator or the intestate 
decedent, and the son-in-law murderer is not an heir of the 
decedent under the law].” 785 
 
 She then affirmed the need to apply the principle that orients art. 1.595 of the Civil 
Code. She also invoked the rational legislator dogma: 
 
“However, I cannot see how someone may not apply the 
principle that oriented the issuance of this high moral legal rule 
[art. 1.595 of the 1916 Civil Code] to this case. When the 
legislator demonstrated his repulse in contemplating any 
inheritance right to someone that attempts against the life of 
the decedent, unequivocally, he rejected the possibility that, 
who behaves in this way, be benefited with his wrongful act. 
There was a clear omission of the legislator in not 
contemplating this act, performed by another, but that directly 
or indirectly may benefit from the decedent’s patrimonial 
assets, should bore the same legal penalty. […] The legislator 
intended to punish the performer of the criminal act removing 
the assets that he would have been entitled to.”786 
 
 After, she made reference to the closure rule to justify deciding the case using 
analogy: 
 
“We cannot forget that the legal order is not complete and an 
evidence of this is that art. 4 of the Introductory Act to the 
Brazilian Norms and art. 126 of the Civil Procedure Code [of 
1973] determine that the Judiciary shall decide all lawsuits. In 
case of omission, evidently, the solution is not to deny the 
                                                          
784 NINO, note 109, at 392. Translation mine. 
785  T.J.R.S., Ap. Civ. No. 70005798004, Relator: Des. Luiz Felipe Brasil Santos, 9.4.2003, RJTJRS 
221/344. Concurring opinion issued by Des. Maria Berenice Dias. Translation mine. 
786 Id. 
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plaintiff’s request because the law gives the path: analogy, 
customary law or general principles of law.  
The law does not allow that the person who killed the decedent 
inherit, excluding him from the succession. So, the fact that the 
appellant is not an heir, but the heir’s husband, and the fact that 
this is a divorce lawsuit, not an inheritance lawsuit, does not 
authorize the departure from the legislator’s orientation and 
does not permit the killer to receive the decedent’s assets that 
became part of the matrimonial assets after his death. 
This legislator gap does not exist in the new Civil Code, which, 
in article 1.814, expands the hypothesis of inheritance 
exclusion, when it says that heirs convicted by murder or 
attempted murder against the decedent, the decedent’s spouse 
or the decedent’s parents or siblings, cannot inherit. 
Although we cannot apply the new Code to the present case, 
the fact that it contains such provision shows the acceptance of 
this orientation that was argued by scholars. […]”787 
 
 So, in this case, using Benjamin Zipursky’s terminology, the penumbra-extending 
rule,788 which is a secondary rule, permits the Brazilian judge to employ moral argumentation 
and to still reason inside the legal system, although, in fact, this rule did not provide the 
outcome, but merely oriented the judge to decide—since the system obligates him to make a 
decision—and the type of arguments he shall resort to—analogy, customary law, general 
principles of law.  
 Brazil could have opted for a Kelsenian rule of closure, which says that the system 
always has an answer—in this case the forfeiting of the assets would not have been permitted. 
But Brazilian law chose a different closure rule, one that still closes the system but allows 
for moral judgments. Judges that resort to it consider that they are still applying the law or at 
least they are applying moral reasons because authorized by the law. This is the heart of 
inclusive legal positivism.  
 Although Kelsen disagrees with legal systems that set a rule of closure such as the 
Brazilian—because he says that the law exists but the judges do not like the desired result—
he correctly mentions that the rule of the case in civil law systems, in general, will only be 
valid for that specific case: 
 
“This rule [the Swiss closure rule 789 ] presupposes the 
possibility that Swiss law is inapplicable and is actually not 
possible, since a legal order is always applicable and actually 
applied even when the court must dismiss the action on the 
grounds that the legal order does not contain a general rule 
imposing upon the defendant the obligation asserted by the 
plaintiff, so therefore the supposition, on which the cited rule 
is based, is a fiction. The fiction consist is this: a lack, based 
                                                          
787 Id. 
788 Zipursky, supra note 46, at 1201. 
789 “Art. 1. 1)  The law applies according to its wording or interpretation to all legal questions for which it 
contains a provision. 2) In the absence of a provision, the court shall decide in accordance with customary law 
and, in the absence of customary law, in accordance with the rule it would make as legislator.” 
SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB], CODE CIVIL [CC], CODICE CIVILE [CC][CIVIL CODE] Dec. 10, 
1907, SR 210, RS 210, art. 1 (Switz.). See also subchapter II.4.2.1. 
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on a subjective, moral-political value judgment, of a certain 
legal norm within a legal order is presented as the impossibility 
of its application. 
The legislator may be induced to use this fiction through the 
consideration that the application of a statute created by him 
may lead to an unsatisfactory result under certain unforeseen 
and unforeseeable circumstances; and that is desirable 
therefore to authorize the court, not to apply in such cases the 
statute that predetermines the content of its judgment, but to 
create an individual norm, whose content is not determined by 
a statute but adapted to the circumstances not foreseen by the 
legislator. If he were to formulate this authorization in a 
theoretically correct fashion, that is, without fiction, he would 
save to say: ‘If the application of the valid legal order is 
unsatisfactory according to the moral-political opinion of the 
court in the present case then the court may decide the case 
according to its own discretion.’”790 
 
 Finally, it is relevant pointing out that in Britain, a case with a similar fact pattern 
present in Riggs was decided very similarly, by extracting the principle behind the rule and 
applying it to an uncovered case. Britain had a rule that prevents a sane murderer from 
benefiting under the will of his victim. The debate was whether this forfeiture rule also 
applies to a case in which the victim died intestate and the murderer, under the law, would 
inherit. The principle “[a] person cannot bring an action based on his own wrong” was 
applied.791 
 
III.5.5. Chapter Conclusions 
 
 The purpose of this chapter was to show why the inclusive legal positivism is the best 
Anglo-American jurisprudential theory to capture the current Brazilian legal practices. 
 Brazilian judges consider that the laws of the country are a product of institutions. 
Laws usually have pedigrees, are generally a product of social facts. The 1988 C.F. is the 
most important one, because it defines the criteria of what is law and what is not law. Evil 
laws, although incompatible with the current legal order inaugurated in 1988, were seen as 
legal in the past and are still seen, today, as valid laws in that time, although they would not 
be valid in the current legal order.  
 Since the legislator enacted a constitution with many provision that resort to moral 
principles, Brazilian judges feel authorized to employ moral reasoning when adjudicating 
                                                          
790 KELSEN, supra note 184, at 247-248. 
791 “[…] The question, however, which I have to decide is whether the principle grounded on public policy 
which prevents a sane murderer from benefiting under the will of his victim applies with equal force to the case 
of the victim dying intestate so as to preclude the murderer (or his personal representative) from claiming, under 
the provisions of s 46 of the Act, the property in respect of which his victim died intestate. In my judgment the 
principle of public policy which precludes a murderer from claiming a benefit conferred on him by his victim's 
will precludes him from claiming a benefit conferred on him, in a case of his victim's intestacy, by statute. The 
principle (to quote the language of Fry LJ) must be so far regarded in the construction of Acts of Parliament 
that general words which might include cases obnoxious to the principle must be read and construed as subject 
to it. This view of the law is adopted by Fry LJ in Cleaver's case [1892] 1 QB 147, 156 and by Farwell J in In 
re Pitts [1931] 1 Ch 546, 550, and must in my judgment prevail over the view taken by Joyce J in In re Houghton 
[1915] 2 Ch 173, 177; and whether or not the opinions so expressed are binding on me, I agree with them and 
adopt them as my own. ‘A person cannot bring an action based on his own wrong. As to the doctrine of judicial 
precedent ‘we fill in the gaps.’” Re Sigsworth: Bedford -v- Bedford [1935] Ch 89. 
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cases. But there is not an official practice that moral reasoning should always be employed. 
On the contrary, social policy goals, economic, even political arguments may be used in 
adjudication because the C.F. also have provisions that determine these interests to be taking 
into account.  
 In this sense, Brazilian judges are not bound to a legalist view as some of the 
country’s judges could have been before the current C.F.. They consider that their 
interpretation can be more creative. They currently decide more controversial questions than 
their forerunners. Even before the 1988 C.F., the law already authorized, although more 
narrowly, moral reasoning in adjudication. This was essentially done through the closure 
rule, but also through social practices such as the rational legislator. 
 Nevertheless, in solving these moral cases, judges still do not think they are writing 
a new chapter of a novel. They consider to be merely applying the posited law. The fact that 
their decisions are authoritative, although sometimes the abstract rules and principles which 
they invoke are not so clear does not mean that they consider that law does not exist. On the 
contrary, the law exists from the moment that it enters into force, and this moment is fixed 
by statute. Judges, to define the content of existing law in individual cases, employ 
interpretative methods, cannons and balancing techniques, to harmonize conflicting values 
and provisions. They do so not because they think this is the best possible answer, but 
because official practice tells them that this is the legal way to reason.  
 Taking that into account, neither exclusive legal positivism, modern natural law 
theory or interpretivism correctly explain the Brazilian legal system. Inclusive legal 
positivism is more precise, because Brazilians view their legal system as a product of social 
facts and they claim to identify the legal materials through this institutional moments, even 
though they are aware that these social facts will often only provide the path to solving 
controversial cases, not the solution of these cases. 
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IV. BRAZILIAN POST-POSITIVISM  
 
IV.1. Short Explanation of Chapter Goals 
 
 As noted in chapter I, legal positivism was, for decades, the most prominent school 
of jurisprudence in Brazil.792 In the last 20 years, however, some jurisprudential scholars 
have argued that positivism has been defeated and now post-positivism is the prevalent 
school in the country.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to explain post-positivism as it is understood by 
Brazilian scholars and to illustrate why I consider it to be inadequate to the task of explaining 
and describing Brazilian law.  
 
IV.2. Post-Positivism Roots 
 
 First of all, there is an irony in the use of post-positivism as a way of capturing what 
is special about Brazilian law, since it did not arise first in law and it is not a product of 
Brazilian legal scholars.793 Post-positivism is essentially a method of social scientific inquiry 
that rejects empiricism. The post-positivistic message is to deny that all the knowledge 
comes from empirical facts. 
 The first author to use the expression in law was the German Scholar Friedrich Muller 
in 1971. Muller developed the structuring legal theory and argued that this “theory 
developed a new post-positivistic concept of legal theory according to which the legal norms 
[…] have not already been written into legislation.” 794 He claimed that: 
 
“Enactments are but norm-texts […], that is, formulations that 
precede legal norms; and they differ significantly from the 
eventual, “actual” legal norms generated, constructed, or 
completed for each successive concrete case in order to arrive 
at judgment. 
Furthermore, the normative domain […] belongs to the legal 
norm in a constitutive sense. The legal norm is, in other words, 
a complex phenomenon of a norm-programme […] as well as 
                                                          
792 See supra text accompanying note 14. 
793 “Postpositivism is […] neither antipositivism nor a continuation of positivism by other means. Its essence 
is an attempt to transcend and upgrade positivism, not the rejection of all positivist ideas and postulates of the 
scientific method. It has incorporated ideas of falsificationism (Popper), fallibilism and Feyerabend’s 
methodological pluralism (Hetherington 2000). Postpositivism also does not reject quantitative methodology, 
but it does attempt to harness it within a more complex research design. 
It also needs to be said that one only rarely encounters explicit (post)positivistic principles, but we can 
ascertain the existence of a hidden frame of reference and an implicit epistemological position (Hetherington 
2000). Most sociologists and economists are not concerned with the philosophy of science and with 
epistemological issues, but all of them must work with data and use certain methods for measurement and 
knowledge production. As it is understood by the author of this book, Postpositivism distinguishes itself from 
the different variants of positivism mainly through the view that the quantification and use of sophisticated 
statistical methods and mathematical models in itself and a priori do not enable the attainable of scientifically 
relevant insights. These methods and models are useful as research tools, yet they cannot be taken as a sufficient 
and necessary basis for the production of valid empirical evidence and a theoretically relevant interpretation of 
this evidence. They cannot be applied in a routine and simple way and cannot be a substitute for theoretical 
elaboration. The social sciences need a more integrated and deliberative methodological approach.” FRANE 
ADAM, MEASURING NATIONAL INNOVATION PERFORMANCE – THE INNOVATION UNION SCOREBOARD 
REVISITED 5-6 (Springer, 2014). 
794 Muller, supra note 29, at 331. 
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a normative domain […]. ‘Concretization’ no longer means 
that a general legal norm, found in a statute book, is made 
‘more concrete’. Realistically seen and reflected on, 
concretization is a step-by-step construction of legal norms, 
for each individual case, through which working elements 
within the text become even ‘more concrete.’”795 
 
 Muller argued that he overcame positivism because he distinguished text and norm. 
According to Georges Abboud and Rafael Tomaz de Oliveira, a theory must make this 
differentiation to develop under the post-positivistic paradigm. 796  Although Muller’s 
doctrine opens the path to the post-positivism debate, it does not describe the sense in which 
post-positivism is employed in Brazil and it does not reflect the current understanding of 
Brazilian legality.  
 Thomas Vesting also gives insights about Muller’s theory: 
 
“[The structuring theory of law] attacks the idea of lex ante 
casum, the supposition that the norm exists before it is 
confronted with the case. [Muller] criticizes legal positivism 
because it is little involved with objective structures and 
because it excludes ‘objective implications of legal norms and 
its own regulatory fields’ of the interpretation process. Both 
are unacceptable for the structuring theory of law. For this 
theory, the ground for legal meanings is in the practical use of 
rules, not in being a rule (ought to be) dissociated of reality 
(is). The practical work of jurists—some reference to the work 
of courts is made—‘creates in a non-soluble manner in 
regulatory determination’. The structuring theory of law aims 
to clarify this element of determination of law interpretation 
through a model of “normativity determined by the factual 
ambit’, in which the norms are drawn as ‘an orderer model 
oriented by the factual ambit.”797 
 
 Muller’s theory, by separating norm and text, essentially rejects syllogism, which he 
associates with positivism. He also criticizes Alexy’s theory—explained in subchapter II.5.5. 
when referring to the prevailing approach regarding principles and rules in Brazil—because 
the latter does not draw a clear distinction between text and norm and considers abstracts 
principles and rules to be norms.798 Therefore, now I turn to examine what are the main 
claims that Brazilian scholars appeal to justify post-positivism.799 
                                                          
795 Id. 
796 Georges Abboud & Rafael Tomaz de Oliveira, Neoconstitucionalismo: vale a pena acreditar? Revista 
da Academia Brasileira de Direito Constitucional, Vol. 7, No. 12, 196, 206 (2015) 
797 VESTING, supra note 131, at 240-241. 
798 Alexy qualifies principles as optimization requirements and rules as definitive requirements. See II.5.5. 
See also Abboud & Oliveira, supra note 796, p. 206. 
799 In Anglo-American jurisprudence, Neil MacCormick addressed the concept of post-positivism. He 
claimed that if the legal positivism excludes “the possibility that there is any moral minimum that is necessary 
to the existence of law as such,” then his version of institutional theory should be considered “non-positivist” 
or “post-positivist.” Although MacCormick was a very well-known legal thinker [he died in 2009], his theory 
did not achieve great popularity in the Anglo-American academy. Therefore, I will prefer not to make further 
comments on his views, especially because I think my justifications for contending inclusive legal positivism 
would serve to justify why I agree with his main arguments.  
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IV.3. The Brazilian Post-Positivistic Claims 
  
 The expression legal positivism “is used in many senses referring to clearly 
distinguishable and sometimes mutually incompatible theses.”800 One of them is that “the 
law consists only of standards explicitly enacted by centralized organs (i.e. statutes).”801 
Nino adds that two other conflicting senses may also be used to explain legal positivism: (a) 
“legal systems are self-sufficient in providing solutions for any possible case; the law has no 
gaps, contradictions, linguistic vagueness or ambiguities, etc.”;802 and (b) “the legal system 
may not contain a determinate solution for some cases.”803 These versions are linked to 
Kelsen’s pure law theory, which is also considered a positivistic theory. 
In addition, Nino says that positivism may be associated with the idea that “a legal 
system in force in a certain society can be identified only by taking into account empirical 
facts, just as the judicial recognition of its standards, disregarding any consideration about 
moral value or justice.”804 I consider this final view may be related to Hart’s definition.  
 Brazilian post-positivists that attack positivism commonly use arguments to knock 
down these senses of positivism.  
 Indeed, these are the main characteristics that Justice Luís Roberto Barroso, Brazil’s 
most important post-positivist exponent, points out when referring to positivism: “(a) an 
almost fully approximation between the law and the norm; (b) an affirmation of the 
institutional character of the law: the law is undivided and emanates from the state; (c) the 
legal order completeness, which has sufficient concepts and adequate instruments for solving 
any case, without gaps; and (d) formalism: the validity of a norm depends on following the 
necessary procedure for its creation, despite its content;”805 and (e) the adjudication is made 
by subsumption.806 
 Barroso notes that these statements about the law disclose the positivist idea of law’s 
scientificity. “The legal system was considered to be a perfect system and, as any dogma, it 
did not need any further justification despite its own existence.”807 The author’s view of why 
positivism was defeated is centered on the fact that the positivistic ideal of objectivity and 
neutrality was impossible to be accomplished. Law could not describe the reality. Law must 
have the aim to act over the reality, shaping it and transforming it. Therefore, law is not 
given, it must be created.808 
                                                          
MacCormick argued that he subscribed to positivism in 1973, but he changed it to one of post-positivism. 
He contended that “[l]aw as institutional normative order is, of course, dependent on human customs and on 
authoritative decisions, and is in this sense a ‘posited’ or ‘positive’ phenomenon. As such it is conceptually 
distinct from morality, according to any moral theory in which the autonomous moral agent plays a central role 
in determining moral obligations This distinctiveness however does not entail that there are no moral limits to 
what it is conceptually reasonable to acknowledge as ‘law’ in the sense of ‘institutional normative order’. There 
are such limits. Extremes of injustice are incompatible with law.” NEIL MACCORMICK, INSTITUTIONS OF LAW 
– AN ESSAY IN LEGAL THEORY 278 (Oxford, 2007). 
800 NINO, supra note 109, at 520. 
801 Id. As I have stated in subchapter II.3.2., this is a version of legal positivism called legislative positivism.  
802 Id.  
803 Id. 
804 Id. 
805 BARROSO, supra note 27, at 119. Translation mine. 
806 Id. Translation mine. 
807 Id. Translation mine. 
808 Id. 
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 Moreover, Barroso argues that positivism gave the philosophical background for 
strengthening totalitarian movements such as Nazism and Fascism in Europe.809 Therefore, 
after World War II, the idea of a legal order indifferent to ethical values was no longer 
tolerated. Post-positivism emerged after the downfall of these regimes and pathed the way 
for important legal debates regarding the social functions and the interpretation of the law.  
 Barroso observes that “post-positivism is a diffuse ideal, in which the relationship 
among values, principles and rules is included and defined. These are new facets of the new 
hermeneutics and of the new theory of fundamental rights.”810 Post-positivism, in this sense, 
does not want to totally strike down positivism, but to improve it. This improvement is made 
through the approximation of ethics and law—something that was argued by the classical 
natural law. This new proximity is handled through the insertion of principles, especially 
human dignity, reasonableness, solidarity and judicial review, in the law.811  
 In an article published in the U.S., Barroso summarized this view: 
 
“The philosophical milieu in which the new constitutional law 
blossomed can be referred to as post-positivism. The debate 
surrounding its characterization lies in the convergence of two 
major currents of thought offering opposite views of law: 
natural law and positivism—opposite, but sometimes uniquely 
complementary. Society's competing demands for legal 
certainty and objectivity (on the one hand), and for legitimacy 
and justice (on the other) have expanded beyond the confines 
of the ‘pure’ and ‘encompassing models.’ Instead, these 
demands now give rise to a broad and diffused set of ideas that 
are still in their systematization phase. 
In a way, post-positivism is a third path between positivism 
and the natural law tradition. Post-positivist thinking does not 
ignore the importance of the law's demands for clarity, 
certainty, and objectivity, but neither does it conceive of the 
law as being unconnected to a moral and political philosophy. 
Post-positivism grapples with the positivist postulate of 
separation between law, morality, and politics. It does not deny 
the unique nature of each of these fields, but it does 
acknowledge the practical impossibility of treating them as 
distinct 'spaces' that do not affect one another. If the 
complementary articulation between them is undeniable, the 
theory of separation—which is at the core of positivism and 
has dominated legal thought for many decades—pays tribute 
to hypocrisy.812 
 
                                                          
809 Id. This affirmation is controversial. Thomas Vesting claims that “the very spread understanding that 
legal-scientific positivism cultivated a bling dogmatic, immune from all non-legal elements, or, in a more 
general mode, excluded social and historical dimensions is a Post-War myth. A false reduced view only may 
emerge if we take as truth some legal positivism auto-comments, like, for example, the Laband’s preface to 
Das Staatsrecht des Deutschen Reiches [The Public Law of the German Empire], but, on the other hand, one 
may not profit from any of the contributions of this author.” VESTING, supra note 131, at 221-222. Translation 
mine. 
810 Id.  
811 Id. 
812 Barroso, supra note 37, at 585-586. 
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IV.4. Brazilian Post-Positivism Virtues 
 
 Brazilian Post-Positivists have certainly raised important criticism against features 
that were prevalent in Brazilian positivism and that seemed incompatible with the judicial 
practice after the enactment of the 1988 C.F.: (a) the dominance of legalistic decisions; (b) 
the fact that subsumption could not explain all types of reasoning in adjudication, and (c) 
their criticism on the legal system dogmatics’ attributes, such as unity, completeness, 
coherency and consistency; and (d) the fact that morality and law may overlap. 
 In this sense, by arguing that Brazilian positivism was defeated because of these 
attributes, post-positivists did an important job. 
 Nevertheless, in subchapter III.2, I drew attention to the fact that these characteristics 
cannot be associated with Hart’s view of positivism, which I here subscribe. I indicated that 
Hart’s positivism targeted Blackstone’s formalistic view of law. He considers mechanical 
reasoning an ‘error’, calls mechanistic judges ‘automatic’ or a ‘slot machine’ and says that 
it would be better to ‘toss a penny in applying a rule of law.’813 Therefore, in relation to this 
specific point, there is no controversy among Hart’s version of positivism, which I take to 
be accurate for the Brazilian system, and the post-positivism view.  
 The same conclusion goes to post-positivism’s criticism of subsumption. Hart, in 
criticizing formalism, accused it of failing to recognize penumbral cases, in which linguistic 
conventions do not control the outcome. He also censored the formalist judge for deciding 
based on logic, and for not confessing that he is not dealing with the standard case and is in 
an area of penumbra. 814 In this penumbral zone, the general terms of the rule are susceptible 
of different interpretation and the decision is most likely to be determined by the judge’s 
discretionary choice. The result is uncontrolled by linguistic conventions.815 
 Hart’s criticism on excessive logic reveals a lot of his unromantic view of law and 
his unwillingness to accept illusory descriptions of what effectively takes place. He considers 
Roscoe Pound, Ronald Dworkin and Karl Llewelyn [and probably Hans Kelsen] noble 
dreamers. 816  Therefore, framing dogmatics’ attributes, such as unity, completeness, 
coherency and consistency, in my reading of Hart, is not compatible with his “veracity” view 
of law,817 a term referred by Zipursky that precisely captures his ideas. 
 Finally, the view that morality and law must necessarily be kept apart is also 
contradictory to Hart’s soft-positivism. Hart clearly took the position that “in some systems 
of law, as in the United States, the ultimate criteria of legal validity might explicitly 
incorporate besides pedigree, principles of justice or substantive moral values, and these may 
form the content of legal constitutional restraints.”818 Therefore, absolute separation of law 
and morals was not among one of Hart’s soft-positivistic claims.  
 
IV.5. Brazilian Post-Positivism Defects 
  
 Hart’s goal in the book The Concept of Law was to provide an accurate depiction of 
what law is. His theory was intended to be both general, in the sense that it was not tied to 
                                                          
813 Id. at 610-611. 
814 HART, supra note 442, 104-105. 
815 Id. 
816 See HART, American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, supra 
note 442, at 123-145. Hart, of course, knew Llewelyn was a realist exponent. But he considers his grand style 
example of the judicial decision, in which he draws a metaphor of the judge having to ‘carve’ his decision with 
the ‘grain’ of the system as a whole the example of the Noble Dream. Id, at 137. 
817 HART, supra note 442, at 309-342 (Hart criticized Kelsen’s analysis of the unity of law). 
818 HART, supra note 43, at 247. 
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any particular legal system, and descriptive, which sought to give an explanatory account of 
what being governed by law means.819 Hart stressed that he had the intention of providing a 
descriptive account that was morally neutral and had no justificatory aims: “it does not seek 
to justify or commend on moral or other grounds the forms and structures which appear in 
[his] general account of law.”820 
 In comparing his enterprise with Dworkin’s, Hart stated that legal theory conceived 
in this manner was very different from Dworkin’s conception of legal theory. He said that 
Dworkin’s interpretive theory was partly “evaluative, since it consists in the identification of 
the principles which both best ‘fit’ and cohere with the settled law and legal practices of a 
legal system and also provide the best moral justification for them, thus showing the law ‘in 
its best light.’”821 
 In this thesis, I have tried so far to provide Brazilian law through the descriptive eyes. 
I intended to address what is law in Brazil, what is the role of rules and principles in Brazilian 
law and whether there is a predominant criterion judges employ when adjudicating cases in 
Brazil.  
 Although the enactment of the 1988 C.F. changed the relevance of the legal materials 
that judges enforce and the general understating of what the text means has put the 
Constitution at the center of the system, establishing that the moral concepts it brings serve 
as causes of actions—therefore, approximating ethics to law, as the post-positivists argue—
not much has really changed in terms of the descriptive account in Brazilian law. 
 Despite advocating for an approximation of law and morals, post-positivism still does 
not deny the institutional view of the Brazilian legal system. For the proponents of this legal 
thought, law is essentially a product of the legislatures. They will not diverge that criminal 
legality is achieved, for example, once Congress enacts a statute establishing that a conduct 
constitutes a crime.  The moral principles they employ in judicial review and in enforcing 
individual and social rights are the principles set forth in the C.F., a legal text. Some of them 
are implied principles, but the recognition of these principles is commonly justified in 
provisions of the C.F., as being a result of the concretization of the text. The reason they 
justify these principles is a social fact: the existence of written laws. 
 Also, in spite of the fact that post-positivism argues for a connection of law and moral 
philosophy, it is not certain whether this connection is always necessary to have law or if it 
is contingent to the areas they consider it most sensible, such as fundamental rights, areas in 
which they unequivocally think morality plays a role.  
 Post-positivists will not deny that Brazilian had legal systems during the Imperial 
Period, in which the 1824 Constitution was in force, or even during the last military 
dictatorship, in which the 1967 Constitution was in force. They will not say that there was 
not law under these regimes. They will only argue that some of the laws in force in those 
periods were bad law and that some of them are incompatible to the current legal [some of 
which are moral] standards posited in the 1988 C.F. and that the country’s modern views of 
human dignity, democracy and liberty would not conceive returning to these moments. 
 As I stated in subchapter II.2.2.3.1., it is common to draw a line between what 
Brazilians called a state of law (estado de direito) and a democratic state of law (estado 
democrático de direito). The first concept is commonly associated to the 1964-1985 
dictatorship period, while the second concept is used to describe the current constitutional 
regime, installed after the enactment of the 1988 C.F.. Both, nevertheless, are legal systems. 
Some of the laws of the former, such as the amnesty law, are still valid under the conditions 
of legal validity determined by the latter.   
                                                          
819 HART, supra note 43, at 239. 
820 Id. at 240.  
821 Id. at 241. 
 150
 The fact that post-positivism is linked to democratic values in Brazil will not also 
mean that their proponents will negate the status of system of law to the Chinese system, 
even if China is not currently authoritarian. The same will be said of Cuba, Venezuela or 
Russia, for example.  
 Not all judicial decisions that post-positivists would take as valid will provide moral 
outcomes. In fact, there are many decisions that can be called formalists or mechanical—
exactly one of the movement’s main target—, but they still would consider acceptable by 
them. Post-positivism does not deny that rules are generally applicable by subsumption. In 
subchapter III.2.2.3.2., I mentioned, for example, that if a negligent judge denies a claim 
related to a legal issue that is unequivocally covered by a statute, and the losing party lawyer 
files her appeal after the statutory deadline, no appellate judge will hear the case. The fact 
that the sentence adopted an unconstitutional, illegal, unfair or immoral reasoning, will not 
matter. They will apply the literal rule of the Civil Procedure Code that states that appeals 
should be filed within 15 days of the sentence’s publication in the official court report. 
 Indeed, since post-positivism acknowledges society’s demands for legal certainty and 
objectivity, as well as legitimacy and justice, as Barroso asserts, at some point, to meet with 
the needs of legal certainty, the post-positivism may have to compromise the value of justice, 
at least in some individual cases. This is exactly the case of the late filed appeal of the 
example above. 
 Post-positivists would also agree with utilitarian decisions that seek to give higher 
weight to collective interests in comparison to individual ones, if they consider that the 
individual interests were not disproportionally compromised. If this decision emerged from 
reasoning that balanced conflicting rules, principles and social goals, in which all of them 
were weighed, it would still be a correct one.  
 Barroso precisely points out that post-positivism in Brazil is still in their 
systematization phase. To be provide an accurate description of what they think law is, post-
positivism will still have to provide answers to many questions. 
 
IV.5.1. The Merger of Law Identification and Adjudication 
 
 Brazilian post-positivists criticized positivism because it argued for “an almost fully 
approximation between the law and the norm [the text].” 822  Muller also reproved this 
closeness and drew the distinction among norm-texts and the actual norm. This point is 
described in the following excerpt from a S.T.F. opinion, written by former Justice Eros 
Grau: 
  
“The current legal thought distinguishes normative text and 
legal norm, textual dimension and juridical phenomenon 
normative dimension. The interpreter creates the norm as of 
the texts and of the reality.”823 
 
 Grau closes his argument affirming that:  
 
“If this is right—and it is—, all texts are obscure until its 
interpretation, that is, until its transformation into norm. That 
is why I stated, in other context, that it is necessary ‘that we 
                                                          
822 BARROSO, supra note 27, at 119. 
823 See S.T.F., ADPF No. 153, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, 29.4.2010, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA ELETRÔNICO [D.J.] 
6.8.2010 (Braz.). Translation mine. 
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observe that the clarity of a law is not a premise, but the result 
of an interpretation […]’.”824 
 
 The S.T.F. Justice Gilmar Mendes, in the same line, asserts: 
 
“The fact is that, sometimes, due to the evolution of a factual 
situation to which the norm applies, and also due to a new legal 
view that starts to be dominant in society, the Constitution 
changes without the modification of its words. The text is the 
same, but the sense that is attributed to it is different. Since the 
norm and the text are not the same, one may note the 
modification of the norm, but the text did not change.”825 
 
 These writings expose the post-positivistic problems emphasized all along. Without 
acknowledging judicial lawmaking and trying to avoid literal/legalistic decisions, post-
positivists started to justify their creative judgments in properties of language, asserting that 
the results they reach are inevitable because of interpretative necessity. Therefore, the results 
are justified, even though they diverge from the enacted texts, because legal texts and legal 
norms are not the same thing.   
 Hart, on the other hand, states that enacted norms “may exist as legal rules from the 
moment of their enactment before any occasion for their practice has arisen.”826 Also, he 
argues that “where the texture is open, individuals can only predict how courts will decide 
and adjust their behavior accordingly.”827 In this sense, it is clear that Hart differentiates the 
content of rules and the content of decisions. The fact that he makes this separation, however, 
does not undermine his hermeneutical approach regarding the content of the rules, as opposed 
to a semantical one—see subchapter III.2.1.3.. 
 This is a sensitive part of this work because it draws the line among positivistic and 
post-positivistic thought. In fact, this matter is also important to understand why many 
Brazilian authors frame Dworkin as a post-positivistic author, since, as noted in subchapter 
III.5.4., he takes the position that principles and rules can only be defined at the end of the 
argumentative chain—therefore rejects the possibility of pedigreed principles. 
 Indeed, I consider that this controversy exists due to the post-positivistic merger of 
law identification and law adjudication. As Wil Waluchow notes, “the question ‘What is the 
present law on this matter?’ is logically distinct from questions concerning how citizens and 
judges should both morally and, in the case of judges, legally, respond with respect to the 
law.”828 Waluchow draws a distinction among the law and the institutional forces of the 
law.829 He adds that “Hart, Raz, Kelsen, Austin, and Aquinas all offer theories of law and 
have only a secondary interest in a theory of adjudication, that is, a theory about how judges 
do or should decide legal cases. Dworkin has it the other way round, i.e., he is primarily 
interested in a theory of adjudication from which he attempts to derive a theory of law.”830 
 The first clear problem that post-positivists face in trying to distinguish the text from 
the law is regarding criminal legality. The prevalent understanding both in Brazil and 
elsewhere is that the requirement of legality is met at the moment the statute is enacted. Once 
                                                          
824 Id. 
825 MENDES & BRANCO, supra note 305, at 134. Translation mine. 
826 HART, supra note 43, at 256. 
827 Id. at 138. 
828 WALUCHOW, supra note 3, at 31. 
829 Id.  
830 Id. 
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the statute is published and the vacatio legis period, the norm setting forth a crime is already 
in force. Taking Justice Eros Grau’s writings and Muller’s theory into consideration, the 
norm only exists once the text is applied. When then citizens have notice of the forbidden 
conducts? Marcelo Neves points out the problems of this theory for not being able to answer 
this question: 
 
“A way would be to simply affirm that the constitutional 
principles are not legal norms, because they only emerge at the 
end of the concretization process. In this perspective, the legal 
norms would only be complete rules in the moment that they 
are reasons to decide in a particular case. This thesis, […] 
although attractive, does not take into consideration an 
important question: if the legal norm only emerges at the end 
of the concretization process, judges and interpreters in general 
will not be subordinated to any legal norm in its activity of law 
concretization.”831 
 
 The reason post-positivists want to distinguish text and norm is because they need to 
explain why sometimes it seems that posited law is not applied by judges in some cases. 
These are cases in which moral reasons may conflict with plain meaning. Therefore, by 
separating the norm from the text, they are able to justify their creative decisions, while 
claiming they are simply applying the law, and distinguishing their practice from the practice 
of legislating. As I pointed out in chapter II, Brazilian judges in general are unwilling to 
recognize that they make law. 
 Take the party loyalty case cited in subchapter II.2.3. as an example. The Court, 
without any alteration of the constitutional text, overruled an old precedent and asserted that 
members of the Chamber of Deputies may not leave the party by whom they were elected, 
save for specific cases. Post-positivists would, then, claim that from the text of the 
constitution—principle of democracy—in conjunction with reality, they found the norm and, 
hence, the law. 
 However, in the same case, the Court ruled that most Chamber of Deputies’ members 
that had changed party affiliation before this decision did not lose their seats because the 
S.T.F. decided that the new interpretation would apply only to those who had switched 
affiliation after the date the T.S.E. asserted for the first time the need for party loyalty in 
disagreement with the previous S.T.F. precedent.832 
 How would post-positivistic judges explain this situation? They would say that, 
despite the old S.T.F. ruling, switching parties was never constitutional—they would not 
                                                          
831 NEVES, supra note 21, at 126. Muller’s theory, in this sense, comes close to Kelsen’s positivism, although 
he would certainly deny that proximity. Both of them share this idea that the norm will only exist at the end of 
the concretization process, although Kelsen would call the enacted text ‘general norm’ and Muller would simply 
call it a norm-text.  Zagrebelsky precisely describes Kelsen’s thoughts: “For Kelsen, every time the law is 
enforced it represents, on the one hand, the application of laws bound by existing norms and, on the other, a 
discretionary creation of new laws. In the development “by degrees” of the legal system, the constitution’s 
initially generic limitation becomes progressively more stringent, culminating in a fully determined rule 
articulated in the decision of the judge and in the law’s administration. Legal rules become increasingly and 
ever more precisely codified, while the discretionary role of the interpreter is correspondingly reduced to the 
point where it disappears. Gradually, the links between the set of rules and its application to each concrete case 
becomes tighter. According to this way of thinking, the creative nature of jurisprudence depends on the 
language used in the different “degrees of development” of the set of rules, or, in other words, on the structure 
of law itself. The structure of the law and the discretionary power of judges fit together.” Zagrebelsky, supra 
note 26, at 624. 
832 Id.  
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acknowledge judicial lawmaking in this decision—but by applying the democratic principle 
to the facts of this case and considering that there was a S.T.F. precedent, the judges would 
have to take every aspect into account and, therefore, rule that party switching did not lead 
those specific Chamber of Deputies’ members to losing their seats. 
 This portrayal of the law, nevertheless, is unrealistic. Any jurist that frankly describes 
the social fact related to these rulings would assert that the S.T.F. upheld the T.S.E. decision 
that party switching is now unconstitutional but chose not to apply this new ruling to 
members of the Congress that had changed party affiliation before the T.S.E. decision 
because they relied on an S.T.F. precedent. In this sense, they would say that the S.T.F. has 
set a new rule of conduct but decided not to impose this new rule to previous facts, because 
Deputies could not have known this rule in advance.  
 This is a typical case in which a Court inserts a rule in the system—the rule that party 
unloyalty is unconstitutional—but, in adjudication, chooses not to apply it to a specific case 
due to other relevant considerations. 
 Another unrealistic justification was the example I mentioned in subchapter II.4.2.2.. 
Justice Eros Grau, to allow an ill person precedence over the general public to receive her 
indemnization, despite the existence of any legal support, asserted that the Court should apply 
the rules that did not grant this right “by disapplying, that is, removing it from the exception.” 
833  So, starting from the text, analysing the context, it was possible to reach the legal norm.  
 Grau’s approach is evidently a post-positivistic one. It is not legalistic in the sense it 
did not deny the ill person’s claim because of lack of institutional support. Nevertheless, it is 
still tied to logical and mechanical explanations of law adjudication, exactly what Hart fought 
against. It is clear that the law did not control this case—Grau asserted that it did not—, but 
that sometimes judges simply try to accommodate justice in individual cases, under 
compelling circumstances, while adjudicating the dispute.834  
 Easier cases may also be cited. In subchapter III.2.2.3.2., I mentioned, for example, 
that if a judge denies a claim that is unequivocally granted by a statute, and the losing party 
lawyer files her appeal after the statutory deadline, no appellate judge will hear the case in 
Brazil. Nevertheless, the fact that the Court, in this particular set of facts, has to rule against 
the appellant does not mean that, in abstract, she does not have the legal right under law.  
 Benjamin Cardozo criticized this post-positivistic view of separating text and law: 
 
“Today there is rather danger of another tough an opposite 
error. From holding that the law is never made by judges, the 
votaries of the Austinian analysis have been led at times to the 
conclusion that it is never made by anyone else. Customs, no 
matter how firmly established, are not law, they say, until 
adopted by courts. Even statutes are not law because the courts 
must fix their meaning. That is the view of Gray in his ‘Nature 
and Sources of the Law.’ ‘The true view, as I submit’, he says, 
it that the Law is what the Judges declare; that statutes, 
precedents, the opinions of learned experts, customs and 
morality are the sources of Law.’ So, Jethro Brown in a paper 
on ‘Law and Evolution’, tell us that a statute, till construed, is 
not real law. It is only ‘ostensible’ law. Real law, he says, is 
                                                          
833 S.T.F., Rcl.-AgR. No. 3.034/PB, Relator: Min. Sepúlveda Pertence, 21.9.2006, 191, Diário da Justiça 
[D.J.], 27.10.2006, (Braz.) (Grau, E., concurring). Translation mine. The same rationale was also adopted by 
the S.T.F. in the following case, whose opinion was also written by Justice Eros Grau: S.T.F., A.D.I. No. 
3.489/SC, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, 09.05.2007, Diário da Justiça [D.J.], 03.08.2007, (Braz.). 
834 TAMANAHA, supra note 113, at 120. 
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not found anywhere except in the judgment of a court. The 
court may overrule them. For the same reason present 
decisions are not law, except for the parties litigant. Men go 
about their business from day to day, and govern their conduct 
by an ignis fatuus. The rules to which they yield obedience are 
in truth not law at all. Law never is, but is always about to be. 
It is realized only when embodied in a judgment, and in being 
realized, expires. There are no such things as rules or 
principles: they are only isolated dooms.”835 
 
 Next, Cardozo asserts that “[a] definition of law which in effect denies the possibility 
of law since it denies the possibility of rules of general operation, must contain within itself 
the seeds of fallacy and errors. Analysis is useless if it destroys what it is intended to explain. 
[…] Statutes do not cease to be law because the power to fix their meaning in case of doubt 
or ambiguity has been confided to courts.”836 
 The fact is that, as Waluchow notes, by mixing what is law with what is decided in 
cases, “we run the risk of entirely missing these features of legal norms.”837 That is why he 
emphasizes the need to distinguish between a theory of law and a theory of adjudication, 
what post-positivist undoubtedly wrongly blend altogether: 
 
“The law is instrumental, on their account, in determining what 
our adjudicative rights against judges are, if only because the 
judicial decision to which we have an adjudicative right is 
often the one which accords with existing law. But this is 
clearly not always true and so the law cannot be identified with 
adjudicative rights. Nor are legal rights necessarily co-
extensive with adjudicative rights, as we saw earlier in our 
discussion of primary and secondary rights. To suppose that 
the law is to be identified with our rights to particular judicial 
decisions would, once again, be to confuse a theory of law with 
a theory of adjudication. 
Although it has not been expressed explicitly in these terms, 
our positivistic theory can easily be made sensitive to the 
varying institutional forces law can have in different courts. 
The suggestion that the law be identified with a subset of the 
norms which all courts within a legal system are bound to 
apply or change does not mean that the institutional force of 
law is one and the same for all judges, nor, obviously, that it is 
always strictly binding. To be bound by a norm is not 
necessarily to be absolutely bound. It makes perfectly good 
sense to say that one might be bound by a norm from which 
one sometimes is free to depart, or which one has the power to 
                                                          
835 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 121-122 (Dover, 2016). Cited by 
WALUCHOW, supra note 3, at 66, footnote 39. 
836 Id. at 122-123. 
837 WALUCHOW, supra note 3, at 77. 
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change under certain defined conditions and for certain special 
reasons.838 
 
 The necessity of justifying the separation of text and norm also escorts post-
positivists to unrealistic justifications. In the article Constitutional Concretization, Muller 
mentions an example regarding the former wording of article 82 of the Brazilian 
Constitution.839 The provision stated that “[t]he period of office of the [Republic] President 
is four years, beginning on the first of January of the calendar year following the election. 
Any re-election for the office of the [Republic] President for a subsequent period is 
precluded.” 840  Muller, although stating that the provision is a clearly formulated text, 
enticing one to conclude that the synoptic wording suffices, claims that “only the full set of 
elements of ‘concretization’, weighed against one another in accordance with their 
methodological status, can lend convincing effect to the limits of the norm-programme.”841 
He adds that “this applies even to, relatively speaking, the most simple of numerically 
determined norm-texts.”842 This explanation, nevertheless, seems unrealistic and artificial to 
clarify a provision whose wording and general understanding is not controversial. 
 
IV.6. Post-Positivism or Different Laws and Practices? 
 
 The quotation below, written by Justice Luís Roberto Barroso, shows that the main 
concern that Brazilians had before the installation of the 1988 constitutional assembly was 
the lack of effectiveness of their old constitutions in transforming reality: 
 
“Two days before the summons of the 1988 constitutional 
convention, it was possible to identify one of the chronic 
factors of the failure in the realization of the State of Law 
(estado de direito) in Brazil: the lack of seriousness concerning 
the Constitution, the indifference to the distance between the 
text and the reality, between what reality was and what it 
should had been. Two emblematic examples: the Constitution 
of 1824 established that “the law will be equal for everybody,” 
provision that coexisted, without perplexity or embarrassment, 
with the nobility privileges, the vote based on property and the 
slave regime. Other: the Constitution of 1969, imposed by the 
Army Force Minister, ensured a broad list of public liberties 
that did not exist and promised to the workers an odd list of 
social rights not enjoyable, that included ‘summer camps and 
retirement homes’. It was sought, in the Constitution, not the 
                                                          
838 Id. at 77-78. Waluchow also mentions that Raz points out that being legally bound by a norm is consistent 
with the power to change or expunge it. Id. Raz writes that: “A rule which the courts have complete liberty to 
disregard or change is not binding on them and is not part of the legal system. But the courts in common law 
jurisdictions do not have this power with respect to the binding common law rules. They cannot change them 
whenever they consider that on the balance of reasons it would be better to do so. They may change them only 
for certain kinds of reasons. They may change them, for example, for being unjust, for iniquitous discrimination, 
for being out of step with the court’s conception of the purpose of the body of laws to which they belong, etc. 
But if the court finds that they are not best rules because of some other reason, not included in the permissible 
list, it is nevertheless bound to follow the rules.” RAZ, supra note 284, at 114-115.  
839 The provision was modified by a C.F. amendment of 1997. See Muller, supra note 29, at 341. 
840 Translated by Friedrich Muller. Id. 
841 Id. at 342. 
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way, but the detour; not the true, but the disguise. The most 
serious disfunction of the Brazilian constitutionalism, in that 
final moment of the military regime, was the lack of 
effectiveness of constitutional norms. Indifferent to what the 
Constitution prescribed, dominant classes built their own 
reality of power, insubordinate to a real democratization of the 
society and the State.”843 
 
 There is no doubt that post-positivists aimed to draw a line between the background 
philosophy of the old constitutional regimes and of the new one. They felt that law lacked 
efficacy, that the former constitutions were not truly enforced and did not promote the desired 
social changes. Post-positivists thought that it was necessary to empower judges and 
prosecutors, because they would make the checks and balances system more effective. Post-
positivists acknowledged Brazil was a society in transformation and considered that law to 
be an important and active tool for achieving the necessary social and political changes. 
 This empowerment was made through the insertion of principles, basic foundations 
and goals in the Constitution and other legal norms and also through granting more powers 
to the Judiciary to enforce these pre-commitments. Contemporary scholars qualify the 1988 
C.F. as a directive-constitution, as opposed to a warranty-constitution, such as the U.S. 
Constitution, which merely organizes the division of powers and stipulates individual 
rights.844 
 But, in terms of descriptive-explanatory jurisprudence, an external observer would 
simply affirm that Brazil has simply changed its primary and secondary rules—especially 
the rules of adjudication which specify the powers of judges. With the modification of the 
rules of adjudication, judges gained the power to be more effective in securing the 
achievements of the new social goals the C.F. chose to pursue and of the moral rights it chose 
to protect. 
 Indeed, instead of having a mere political-organizational constitution, Brazil opted to 
write a document that grants wide protections of individual and social rights, including 
environment, family and health rights and that sets goals for the government. Since the 
country also chose to use open-texture language to regulate these areas, to keep the text alive 
and updated, and adopted, as an official practice result, a secondary rule that judges have the 
power to enforce it, it is not surprising that the role of the Judiciary branch in Brazilian 
democracy has grown so much in the past 20 years.  
 Since the official practices regarding the interpretation of the law changed, judges 
have a more active role. These new practices, nonetheless, are a mere new type of secondary 
rules of adjudication.  
 In subchapter III.2.2.2., there is a quote in which Patricia Perrone noted that, although 
the C.F. text was very different from the text of former constitutions, it took time for the 
S.T.F. to assimilate the new role of principles. This only occurred in the mid-1990s. 
According to Perrone, this new phase was distinguished for (a) the recognition that 
constitutional principles had the status of enforceable norms; (b) the use of reasonableness 
and proportionality principles; (c) the consolidation of the balancing technique as the leading 
interpretative approach. 845  All of these characteristics are essentially new rules of 
adjudication that were adopted in Brazilian law through official practice, as a product of a 
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844 See JACINTO NELSON MIRANDA COUTINHO, CANOTILHO E A CONSTITUIÇÃO DIRIGENTE 99-100 (Renovar: 
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new understanding. Even political parties with Congress representation file abstract actions 
before the S.T.F. to have those rights enforced on behalf of the rights’ holders, requiring the 
Court to use these adjudicatory techniques. Congress rarely reacts to these decisions by 
passing amendments and laws to overrule them. This demonstrates that it is likely that 
Congress agrees with this new model of governmental functioning.846  
 In this sense, post-positivist philosophers may be right for wanting to depart from the 
old positivistic outlook that prevailed in Brazil and in the continental civil law countries 
during the first part of the 20th Century. Indeed, mechanical decisions were common, the 
legal dogmas were dominant and the efficacy of the legal system was questioned, at least in 
terms of social goals achievement.  
 By implementing this departure, however, post-positivism did not realize that they 
target some specific concepts associated with positivism by continental scholars and judges, 
not its philosophy, at least in the manner argued and explained by H.L.A. Hart. 
 Positivism, at least in the sense understood by Hart, contends that law is a product of 
human events, social facts, and official behavior. Hart does not argue that to be a positivistic 
system, the legal system should be self-sufficient in providing all solutions for any possible 
cases. On the contrary, Hart is a strong proponent that law will mostly not cover all situations 
and judges will probably have to make discretionary decisions, because there will be no 
answer under the posited laws, maybe only a direction. In addition, Hart says that the social 
fact criterion to identify what is legal and what is not legal may incorporate moral standards. 
In this sense, Hart’s positivism does not claim “the practical impossibility of treating [law 
and morality] as distinct spaces that do not affect one another.”847 
 In fact, morality and law may overlap in a legal system, but that is a product of a 
choice, of human achievement, not of some natural or inherent characteristic that a system 
must have to be considered a legal one. If there is one thing that Brazil’s constitutional history 
failures reveal is that fictions and dogmas in relation to inherent substantial properties of law 
only contribute to mechanicism, to formalism and to judges not taking seriously relevant 
questions of law. 
 The separation of law and morality thesis supported by Hart has an important 
message: that systems of law should avoid considering that only because something is legal, 
it is automatically moral. This automatic association of two distinct concepts removes clarity 
and candor in law identification and in legal interpretation and blunts the need that 
politicians, jurists and judges constantly evaluate the moral quality of the law, to either 
conclude whether it should be respected, renewed, revised or rejected. 848  Although not 
precise, Jeremy Bentham’s famous remark captures the idea of the separation thesis: “[u]nder 
a government of Laws, what is the motto of a good citizen? To obey punctually; to censure 
freely.”849 
                                                          
846 Several actions decided by the S.T.F. regarding controversial political issues were initiated by political 
parties with Congress representation. As examples, (a) A.D.P.F. 186, filed by the Democratas – D.E.M, 
discussing whether racial quotas are unconstitutional. See S.T.F., A.D.P.F. No. 186, Relator: Min. Ricardo 
Lewandowski, 26.4.2014, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e], 20.10.2014 (Braz.) (the court 
unanimously ruled that the quotas are constitutional); (b) A.D.I. No. 5543, filed by the Partido Socialista 
Brasileiro – P.S.B., arguing that unequal treatment of homosexual regarding the condition of blood donors is 
unconstitutional. The judgment has not been concluded yet; and (c) A.D.P.F. No. 347, filed by the Partido 
Socialismo e Liberdade – P.S.O.L., arguing for the recognition of a state of unconstitutionality compliance in 
the current conditions of the Brazilian jail system. The judgment has not been concluded yet. 
847 See Barroso, supra note 37, at 585. 
848 Zipursky, supra note 46, at 1171. 
849 JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT xvi (Royal Exchange, 2nd ed. 1823). Hart, regarding 
this excerpt, comments that: “But Bentham was especially aware, as an anxious spectator of the French 
revolution, that this was not enough: the time might come in any society when the law's commands were so evil 
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IV.7. If Post-Positivism fails, can Neoconstitutionalism Survive? (The Bottom-Up 
Model) 
 
 Neoconstitutionalism is global a political-juridical phenomenon that emerged after 
the World War II and that oriented the drafting of the new constitutions.850 Barroso notes 
that, “[a]s part of the movement toward new constitutionalism, three major transformations 
have subverted conventional knowledge about the application of constitutional law in the 
Roman-Germanic World.” These transformations were: 
 
“a) recognition of the constitution's legal force and 
justiciability;  
b) expansion of constitutional jurisdiction, especially of 
judicial review; and  
c) development of new ideas and new concepts in 
constitutional interpretation.”851 
  
 Neoconstitutionalism, as noted, is the most popular way of understanding the role of 
the Judiciary in interpreting the C.F. in Brazil. The question I want to answer in this 
subchapter is: is it possible to frame these transformations under Hart’s positivistic theory 
and, if so, how? In other words, can neoconstitutionalism, as depicted in Brazil, survive under 
inclusive legal positivism? My opinion is that it only cannot survive but also it can be better 
explained by inclusive legal positivism, since the latter solves many of the problems that 
scholars attribute to neoconstitutionalism today, such as judicial activism and usurpation of 
legislative power. 
 I believe I have partially answered the questions above in subchapter III.2.2. and 
III.5.2., but I will go into the issue in more detail now. 
 The recognition of the constitutional legal force and its justiciability is achieved 
through the definition of primary and secondary rules in a legal system. A legal system may 
opt to write a constitution creating not only individual liberties, but also imposing duties on 
                                                          
that the question of resistance had to be faced, and it was then essential that the issues at stake at this point 
should neither be oversimplified nor obscured. Yet, this was precisely what the confusion between law and 
morals had done and Bentham found that the confusion had spread symmetrically in two different directions. 
On the one hand Bentham had in mind the anarchist who argues thus: ‘This ought not to be the law, therefore 
it is not and I am free not merely to censure but to disregard it.’ On the other hand, he thought of the reactionary 
who argues: ‘This is the law, therefore it is what it ought to be,’ and thus stifles criticism at its birth. Both errors, 
Bentham thought, were to be found in Blackstone: there was his incautious statement that human laws were 
invalid if contrary to the law of God, and ‘that spirit of obsequious quietism that seems constitutional in our 
Author’ which ‘will scarce ever let him recognise a difference’ between what is and what ought to be. This 
indeed was for Bentham the occupational disease of lawyers: ‘[I]n the eyes of lawyers - not to speak of their 
dupes—that is to say, as yet, the generality of non-lawyers—the is and ought to be . . . were one and indivisible.’ 
There are therefore two dangers between which insistence on this distinction will help us to steer: the danger 
that law and its authority may be dissolved in man's conceptions of what law ought to be and the danger that 
the existing law may supplant morality as a final test of conduct and so escape criticism.” Hart, supra note 431, 
at 597-598. 
850 There are many versions of neoconstitutionalism. The one I will examine in this subchapter is the most 
articulated version in Brazil, which is developed by Justice Luís Roberto Barroso, grounded in Robert Alexy’s 
works. This is the version that I have summarized in subchapter II.5, in which I dealt with the role of rules and 
principles in Brazilian law. See also Lenio Luiz Streck, Eis porque abandonei o “neoconstitucionalismo” (Mar. 
13, 2014 8:00 AM), https://www.conjur.com.br/2014-mar-13/senso-incomum-eis-porque-abandonei-
neoconstitucionalismo. 
851 Barroso, supra note 37, at 587. 
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the state through a catalog of fundamental social rights, such as the obligations of treating 
people equally, with dignity and providing minimal conditions for subsistence. Legal 
provisions and/or the official practices may also establish that these duties are programmatic 
norms that shall be implemented by the legislative through the enactment of statutes and by 
the executive through the regulation of these statutes. Therefore, under this scheme, these 
constitutional rights cannot be enforced directly through the judiciary branch, but only 
through statutory review.852 
 But this is not the only possibility. A country may also choose to write this catalog of 
fundamental rights into a constitution, consider that the enactment of statutes is not necessary 
to make them enforceable, and confer courts the power to enforce these rights and also to 
overview their compliance by the other branches. This granting of judicial power may not be 
explicit but may be a matter of official behavior; officials understand that those powers were 
granted by the constitution.853 Courts, in this sense, by reading the constitutional abstract 
rights can recognize causes of action in a case-by-case fashion, in abstract or concrete review. 
This, of course, will be done concomitantly with legislative and executive action. A dialogue 
among branches is established.854 The question of who has the final decision on the issue 
may depend on whether the constitution entrenches some constitutional norms as 
immutable.855 But it is likely that these entrenched clauses will be limited to exceptional 
situations—individual rights, democracy conditions and separation of powers—and will be 
construed strictly. In cases of amendable clauses, the legislative branch may have the final 
word due to democratic legitimacy. As Waluchow notes, “[i]t is possible to have judicial 
review without granting judges the final say.”856 Rosalind Dixon would generally call this 
weak-form judicial review.857 Nevertheless, the legislative will also have the political burden 
of explaining why it is overruling a judicial decision.  
 Mark Tushnet, in the book Weak Courts, Strong Rights, writes about this topic: 
 
“The political developments I have sketched made judicial 
review more attractive. By the mid-1960s or so, most designers 
of modern constitutional systems concluded that some form of 
judicial review is the best means of ensuring that policies 
                                                          
852 As I noted above, a very influential doctrine in a book written in the sixties, entitled Aplicabilidade das 
Normas Constitucionais by José Afonso da Silva, argued for this view. Silva classified constitutional norms 
focusing on their efficacy. For Silva, there are three types of constitutional norms: (a) norms that have full 
efficacy; (b) norms that have limited efficacy and demand statutory regulation; (c) norms that have full efficacy 
but may be limited in part by statutory law. See SILVA, supra note 95. 
853 In the Brazilian case, one may argue that this recognition is explicit, due to the powers granted by the 
C.F. to the Judiciary branch in many articles, such as article 102, I, q, which establishes jurisdiction to try and 
to decide mandates of injunction, an action that might be filed when the absence of a regulating statute makes 
the exercise of a right or liberty related to nationality, sovereignty or citizenship impracticable (art. 102, I, q, 
C.F.), for example. On the other hand, one also can contend that the recognition of judicial power it is implicit, 
due to the praxis of politicians and political parties to file suits before the Supreme Court in matters relating to 
the regulation of social rights, in order to make them enforceable, and of the praxis of Congress in complying 
with the Court’s decisions and not opting to reverse them in many cases. See also note 846. 
854 The S.T.F sustained this comprehension when adjudicated the A.D.I. 5105. See S.T.F., A.D.I. No. 5105, 
Relator: Min. Luiz Fux, 1.10.2015, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e], 16.3.2016. 
855 The Brazilian C.F., for example, has an entrenchment clause: In accordance with article 60, § 4°, of the 
C.F.: No proposed constitutional amendment shall be considered that is aimed at abolishing the following: I. 
the federalist form of the National Government; II. direct, secret, universal and periodic suffrage; III. separation 
of powers; IV. individual rights and guarantees. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 60, § 4º, 
I-IV (Braz.). Translated by Keith Rosenn, Constituteproject.org 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2014.pdf. 
856 WALUCHOW, supra note 13, at 12. 
857 See Rosalind Dixon, The Core Case For Weak-Form Judicial Review, 38 Cardozo L. Rev., 2193 (2017). 
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inconsistent with the constitution will not be implemented. 
Yet, giving judges the power to enforce constitutional 
limitations can threaten democratic self-governance. The 
reason is that constitutional provisions are often written in 
rather general terms. The courts give those terms meaning in 
the course of deciding whether individual statutes are 
consistent or inconsistent with particular constitutional 
provisions. But, as a rule, particular provisions can reasonably 
be given alternative interpretations. And sometimes a statute 
will be inconsistent with the provision when the provision is 
interpreted in one way, yet would be consistent with an 
alterative interpretation of the same provision. […]  
Courts exercise strong-form judicial review when their 
interpretative judgments are final and unrevisable. […]  
Weak-form systems of judicial review hold out the promise of 
reducing the tension between judicial review and democratic 
self-governance, while acknowledging that constitutionalism 
requires that there be some limits on self-governance. The 
basic idea behind weak-form review is simple: weak-form 
judicial review provides mechanisms for the people to respond 
to decisions that they reasonably believe mistaken that can be 
deployed more rapidly than the constitutional amendment or 
judicial appointment process.”858 
 
 Although Tushnet mentions that weak-form of judicial review refers to more rapidly 
responses than a constitutional amendment, in Brazil, the C.F. amending process is much 
simpler than the U.S. Constitution’s process, because it does not require the approval of the 
States and is carried out by Congress alone, although in a more burdensome manner than the 
required for statutes.859 Therefore, the enactment of constitutional amendments can serve the 
task of implementing weak-form review because “judicial interpretations can be revised in 
the relatively short term by a legislature using a decision rule not much different from the 
one used in the everyday legislative process.”860  
 Countries that adopt this second constitutional model commonly consider themselves 
societies in transition, such as some European nations after World War II, Portugal, Spain 
and some countries in Latin America after the end of dictatorships in the last quarter of the 
20th Century.  
 Nevertheless, as Tushnet noted, countries who chose this form of enforcing rights 
will not write down rights in detail in their constitutions. They will usually write them very 
broadly, through the use of moral language, by means of principles, goals and basic 
foundations, as Brazil did. In this sense, if the official practice adopts a view that these rights 
are causes of action and that judges may enforce them even in the absence of statutory 
                                                          
858 MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS 20-22 (Princeton, 2008).  
859 According to the C.F., “Constitutional amendments may be proposed by: I. at least one-third of the members 
of the Chamber of Deputies or the Federal Senate; II. the President of the Republic; III. more than one-half of 
the Legislative Assemblies of units of the Federation, each manifesting its decision by a simple majority of its 
members. A proposed amendment shall be debated and voted on in each Chamber of the National Congress, in 
two rounds, and shall be considered approved if it obtains three-fifths of the votes of the respective members 
in both rounds. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 60, I-III, § 2º (Braz.). 
860 TUSHNET, supra note 858, at 24. Tushnet adds that “as the amendment process becomes easier, judicial 
review becomes weaker—and, conversely, as the legislative process becomes more difficult (with respect to 
specific issues, perhaps), judicial review becomes stronger. Id, footnote 18. 
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regulation, no doubt judges may have discretion as to how to enforce them. Since these are 
societies in transition, those countries may entrust their judiciary with great responsibility 
and will have confidence that this branch will guarantee that the constitution does not remain 
a symbolic document. Nonetheless, this responsibility will be shared with the legislative and 
the executive.  
 Under a soft-positivist scheme, both of these models of separation of powers are 
permissible, because they result of choices made by authorities that, according to secondary 
norms (rule of recognition), may draft the rights and duties (primary norms) and shall 
implement and enforce them (secondary norms, rules of adjudication).  
 Dworkin, as noted in subchapter III.5.3., calls this second approach government by 
adjudication861 and acknowledges that some countries have adopted this model, which he 
believes is more suitable for these nations. 862  
 Georges Abboud and Rafael Tomaz note that, by choosing this model, a country will 
depart from Montesquieu’s classical tripartite idea of government to better seek the ideal of 
effective limitation of political power. 863  These authors also point out that through a 
prescriptive viewpoint of the separation of powers the country will ask if the adopted model 
effectively carries out its desideratum:  
 
“In this sense, the concept of division of powers may be 
presented in different forms and it is possible the coexistence 
of organisms and functions that do not perfectly frame the 
classical tripartite, but, even so, pursue the ideal of a limited 
government concretization.”864 
  
 It is interesting to note that this model of division of powers is also dynamic.865 As 
noted in subchapter III.5.2, by observing this dynamic relationship of the branches of the 
government, focusing on the role of judges in constitutional and statutory interpretation, 
based on the neoconstitutionalist approach, Brazil does not fit the pure top-down frame 
anymore, even though some judges may think it still does.  
 By writing these broad principles into the C.F. and by affirming that they are self-
enforceable and do not depend on the enactment of a statute to have force, Brazil also adopted 
a bottom-up model of lawmaking to deal with the concretization of principles—which works 
concomitantly with the classical top-down model. 
 Since Brazil chose its legal system to be informed by the constitutional principles of 
justice, liberty and equality and decided that these principles are enforceable by courts and 
do not need to wait for government regulation to make them effective, courts gained an 
important role in implementing rights that are grounded in these principles and also in 
reviewing them when the implementation is made by the legislature and the executive. These 
rights are recognized by courts in a case-by-case fashion and also in abstract proceedings that 
are decided directly by the S.T.F..866 
                                                          
861 Dworkin, supra note 758, at 5. 
862 Id. See subchapter III.5.3. 
863 Abboud and Tomaz, nevertheless, note that “[a]t the moment that the structural modifications—which 
modify jurisdictions, organisms and functionalities—announce themselves not as techniques of government 
power limitation, but, as artifacts for autocratic exercise of government, we would have, in this case, a violation 
of the separation of powers and, as a consequence, of the constitutional state.” Abboud & Tomaz, supra note 
796, at 205. 
864 Id. at 204. Translation mine.  
865 Id. at 203. 
866 Reaume, supra note 11, at 117. 
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 The bottom-up method is based on the common law approach, although in Brazil it 
is grounded on pedigreed sources, originated by a distinct social fact, the enactment of the 
1988 C.F.. As I have previously observed, the method is addressed by Hart it in The Concept 
of Law:867 
 
“In fact all systems, in different ways, compromise between 
two social needs: the need for certain rules which can, over 
great areas of conduct, safely be applied by private individuals 
to themselves without fresh official guidance or weighing up 
of social issues, and the need to leave open, for later settlement 
by an informed, official choice, issues which can only be 
properly appreciated and settled when they arise in a concrete 
case.”868 
 
 In the U.S., for example, at least regarding administrative law, it has been possible to 
note the flexibility in the selection of methods for policy determination in the administrative 
process: 
 
“One of the most distinctive aspects of administrative process 
is the flexibility it affords in the selection of methods for policy 
formulation. While a legislature must normally confine itself 
to the declaration of generally applicable standards of conduct, 
and a court must deal with a problem as defined by the 
particular controversy before it, an administrative agency may 
often choose between these approaches or may even reject 
them in favor of more informal means of regulation.”869 
 
 Waluchow also argues that the Canadian Charter of rights should be concretized in a 
bottom-up method of lawmaking.870 He attributes a moral sense in defining what is the 
philosophy behind the implementation of charters of rights871 and argues that these rights 
should be considered pre-commitments for that community:  
                                                          
867 Hart’s remarks continue as follows: “In some legal systems at some periods it may be that too much is 
sacrificed to certainty, and that judicial interpretation of statutes or of precedent is too formal and so fails to 
respond to the similarities and differences between cases which are visible only when they are considered in 
the light of social aims. In other systems or at other periods it may seem that too much is treated by courts as 
perennially open or revisable in precedents, and too little respect paid to such limits as legislative language, 
despite its open texture, does after all provide. Legal theory has in this matter a curious history; for it is apt 
either to ignore or to exaggerate the indeterminacies of legal rules. To escape between extremes we need to 
remind ourselves that human inability to anticipate the future, which is at the root of this indeterminacy, varies 
in degree in different fields of conduct and that legal systems carter for this inability by corresponding variety 
techniques.” HART, supra note 43, at 130-131. 
868 Id. at 130.  
869 David Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy, 
78 Harv. L. Rev. 921 (1965). See also Joseph Landau, Bureaucratic Administration: Experimentation and 
Immigration Law, Duke Law Journal 1173-1240 (2016) (analysing the importance bottom-up policies 
implemented in immigration law). 
870 WALUCHOW, supra note 13, at 204-208. 
871 Waluchow points out the reasons why countries opt for charter protections: “We recognize that we are 
limited beings who are influenced, in both our everyday lives and in our political decisions, by a range of factors 
that often lead to less than desirable conduct. Furthermore, we recognize that our majoritarian procedures, 
though well designed to advance our collective interests in most cases, sometimes produce results to which we 
could not all agree in advance. They can lead to decisions that flout democratic conditions presupposed in either 
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“I am going to suggest that we instead view Charters as 
representing a mixture of only very modest pre-commitment 
combined with a considerable measure of humility about the 
limits of our moral knowledge. The latter stems from 
recognition that we do not in fact have all the answers when it 
comes to moral rights, and that we should do all we can to 
ensure that our moral short-sightedness do not, in the 
circumstances of politics, lead to morally questionable 
government action. Far from being based on the (unwarranted) 
assumption that we have the right answers to the controversial 
issues of political morality arising under Charter challenges, 
the alternative stems from the exact opposite: from a 
recognition that we do not have all answers, and that we are 
best off designing our political and legal institutions in ways 
that are sensitive to this feature of predicament.”872 
 
 The fact that these constitutional rights are pre-commitments and that they will be 
concretized as the situations occur—either in concrete or abstract review lawsuits—reveals 
the importance of courts, as well as the legislative and the executive, in the enterprise. Since 
countries that adopt this constitution model using moral principles to define rights do not 
anticipate all the situations they covered—they may anticipate some situations; some cases 
that judges decide only grounded on principles may be easy cases, as I observed in subchapter 
III.3.1873—, all branches may play a concomitant role. “Judicial decisions of this kind—
normally referred to as ‘decisions of principle’—do not eliminate the legislative problem, 
but rather recast it, setting limits on acceptable solutions.”874 
 In Canada, as Waluchow notes, “the idea of a shared partnership, involving a dialogue 
between Parliament and the courts, has begun to take hold in both public debate and judicial 
decisions.” 875  This shared partnership, nonetheless, to succeed, shall be based on an 
important set of virtues pointed by David Strauss: “[i]ntellectual humility, a sense of 
complexity of the problems faced by our society, a respect for accumulated wisdom of the 
past, and a willingness to rethink when necessary and when consistent with those virtues.”876 
 Waluchow gives an interesting example of a Canadian Supreme Court precedent in 
which this shared partnership may be noticed. In Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. 
N.A.P.E.,877 the Court sustained a provincial parliamentary decision and held constitutional 
a statute that postponed the start of equal rights payments to women in the health care sector 
to due to fiscal constraints. The pay equity obligation was established in an agreement entered 
into three years before the legislation was enacted. The Provincial Government argued that 
                                                          
the procedural conceptions of democracy with its emphasis on self-determination or the much stronger 
constitutional concepts and its more substantive ideals, such as the ideal of equal concern and respect. This, we 
recognize, can occur even when our majoritarian procedures are functioning as designed—that is, when no one 
is denied his right to participate on an equal protection footing with everyone else and decisions are not 
motivated by discreditable forces like fear and prejudice. In recognition of these limitations in ourselves and 
our procedures, we structure our constitution so as to overcome them. We opt for constitutional arrangement 
involving judicial review.” WALUCHOW, supra note 13, at 152. 
872 Id. at 127. 
873 Bix, supra note 453, at 176. 
874 Zagrebelsky, supra note 26, at 645. 
875 WALUCHOW, supra note 13, at 146. 
876 DAVID STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 139 (Oxford, 2010). 
877 Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E., 2004 SCC 66. 
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the deferral was necessary because it was facing a severe fiscal deficit. The Court had to 
analyze whether “this kind of consideration [the deferral of payment] was enough to justify 
an infringement of equality rights under the Section 1 “reasonable limits” clause of the 
Charter.”878 Zagrebelsky also gives an example of the dialog in the Italian Constitutional 
Court decisions: 
 
“In some cases, when it is a question of safeguarding ‘rights 
that have a price,’ ‘the minimum content’ of the relevant 
principles must be taken into consideration, thus limiting the 
discretionary power of the legislator concerning expenses and 
budget. For example, in a 1988 decision, the Italian 
Constitutional Court compared the involuntary unemployed 
person’s right to social assistance to the legislator’s autonomy 
over the budget and declared that a law that provided for an 
unemployment benefit of a few thousand lire per month was 
unconstitutional. The Court deemed that such an amount was 
below a minimum acceptable under law but left further future 
decisions to the legislature.”879 
 
 In the U.S., Abner Greene points out that much of the SCOTUS “work indicates […] 
a willingness to engage in dialogue with government officials and at times to defer to them, 
                                                          
878 WALUCHOW, supra note 13, at 268. The opinion stated that: “Section 9 of the Public Sector Restraint 
Act is justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter.  The need to address the fiscal crisis was a pressing and substantial 
legislative objective in the spring of 1991.  The crisis was severe.  The cost of putting pay equity into effect 
according to the original timetable was a major expenditure.  A lower credit rating, and its impact on the 
government’s ability to borrow, and the added cost of borrowing to finance the provincial debt, were matters 
of great importance.  Moreover, the government was debating not just rights versus dollars, but rights versus 
hospital beds, layoffs, jobs, education and social welfare. 
Courts will continue to look with strong scepticism at attempts to justify infringements of Charter rights on 
the basis of budgetary constraints.  To do otherwise would devalue the Charter because there are always 
budgetary constraints and there are always other pressing government priorities.  Nevertheless, the courts 
cannot close their eyes to the periodic occurrence of financial emergencies when measures must be taken to 
juggle priorities to see a government through the crisis.  
The government’s response to its fiscal crisis was also proportional to its objective.  First, as the pay equity 
payout represented a significant portion of the budget, its postponement was rationally connected to averting a 
serious financial crisis.  Second, the government’s response was tailored to minimally impair rights in the 
context of the problem it confronted.  Despite the scale of the fiscal crisis, the government proceeded to 
implement the pay equity plan, albeit at a slower pace.  In addition, the government initiated a consultation 
process with the union to find alternative measures.  There were broad cuts to jobs and services.  The exceptional 
financial crisis called for an exceptional response.  In such cases, a legislature must be given reasonable room 
to manoeuvre.  Third, on a balance of probabilities the detrimental impact of a delay in achieving pay equity 
did not outweigh the importance of preserving the fiscal health of a provincial government through a temporary 
but serious financial crisis.  The seriousness of the crisis, combined with the relative size of the $24 million 
required to bring pay equity in line with the original schedule, are the compelling factors in that respect.  The 
fiscal measures adopted by the government did more good than harm, despite the adverse effects on the women 
hospital workers.” In Brazil, recently, a very similar case has been decided in the opposite direction. In a 
decision rendered in A.D.I. 5.809, on December 18, 2017, Justice Ricardo Lewandowski suspended a statute 
that increased taxes and postponed the raise of payments for public employees which was granted by a previous 
statute. He claimed that failed to justify the postponement since, although under a fiscal crisis, had granted tax 
exemptions to several economic sectors. See S.T.F., A.D.I. No. 5.809, Relator: Min. Ricardo Lewandowski, 
DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e], 1.2.2018. 
879 Zagrebelsky, supra note 26, at 645. 
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either completely or partially.” 880  This intellectual humility attitude is a quality that, 
according to Strauss, common law judges, familiarized with the bottom-up model, have:  
 
“The first attitude at the foundation of the common law is 
humility about the power of individual reason. It is a bad idea 
to try to resolve a problem on your own, without referring to 
the collective wisdom of other people who have tried and 
solved the problem.”881 
 
 The mix between natural and posited law and the alleged likelihood of law assuring 
clarity, certainty and objectivity882 argued by post-positivists do not provide the necessary 
candor to acknowledge that not all situations were anticipated by the C.F., neither the catalog 
of rights is universal.  
 Therefore, explaining neoconstitutionalism through the inclusive legal positivist 
eyes, as a legal system’s chosen—not inherent—method, elucidates the different role of 
courts in implementing individual social rights and reviewing the legislative’s choices on the 
matter, being also much more honest and accurate to what actually takes place in comparison 
with how post-positivism explains it. 
 Inclusive legal positivism allows, then, an empirical or descriptive model of 
neoconstitutionalism.883 The phenomenon exists because of the way positive law is figured 
out in a system.884 Neoconstitutionalism is simply an “evidence of the existence of a social 
practice among judges of resolving [constitutional] disputes in a particular way” 885  in Brazil.  
 The Italian scholar Tecla Mazzarese shares the same opinion regarding the compatibility of 
positivism and neoconstitutionalism: 
 
“Now, simple and plain as it may sound, to conceive of neo-
constitutionalism as a form of natural law is nevertheless 
unsatisfactory and misleading. 
It is unsatisfactory since it actually misses the very point which 
grounds the demand for a neo-constitutionalist understanding 
of law, namely: the radical change positive law has been going 
through since the implementation and protection of 
fundamental rights have been taken to be purported as the main 
distinguishing feature of a legal system. 
Further, to conceive of neo-constitutionalism as a form of 
natural law is misleading since, to use Hans Kelsen's words, it 
actually ignores that similarly to King Midas transforming in 
gold whatever he was touching, law provides with an ultimate 
legal character whatever may happen to be its specific concern. 
That is to say, it ignores both that what is taken to be a matter 
of legal implementation and protection depends upon the 
catalogue of fundamental rights which may happen to be 
                                                          
880 ABNER GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION 247 (Harvard, 2012) (Greene makes this observation although 
acknowledging that in some cases such as Marbury, Cooper and Boerne the SCOTUS spoke as if the 
interpretive challenge were a mistake; he cites engagement in interpretative exchange in cases like Thompson 
v. Oklahoma, Gregory v. Ashcroft and Boumediene v. Bush). Id.  
881 Strauss, note 876 at 41. 
882 BARROSO, supra note 37, at 585-586. 
883 See Mazzarese, supra note 25. 
884 Id. 
885 Coleman, supra note 43, at 160. 
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selected in a given legal system, and that the greater or lesser 
extent to which such a catalogue of fundamental rights is 
secured legal implementation and protection depends, once 
again, upon what any given legal system may happen to adopt 
as their guarantees. In other words, it is misleading since, far 
from making it clear, actually conceals that both the values to 
be legally protected and the extent to which secure them 
depend, either of them, upon the contingent choices adopted 
by different legal systems.”886 
 
 Waluchow also mentioned the compatibility of inclusive legal positivism with more 
liberal and active approaches of constitutional interpretation. He says that there are various 
approaches, but he summarizes three categories: “(a) those who think that judges should be 
faithful to the text of the constitution; (b) those who believe that the proper object of 
deference is the intent of the original framers; and (c) those who claim that judges should 
view the constitution as a ‘living tree’ and interpret it in ways which express an ever-
changing and developing political morality.”887 He claims that “the judge will be more likely 
to follow adjudicative approach (c), which is similar to neoconstitucionalism, if he accepts 
inclusive legal positivism:  
 
“If, by way of contrast, a judge is thought to be discovering the 
existence or content of pre-existing valid law in a charter case 
involving appeal to considerations of political morality 
(because there is nothing in the nature of law which precludes 
this possibility, as inclusive positivism suggests), then such a 
retreat seems far less likely. The judge and others will view his 
decision, not as one which encroaches upon forbidden territory 
reserved for legislators, but as which is required by his normal 
legal-adjudicative obligation to discover and apply the law that 
exists and has institutional force over his decisions. There will 
be little danger that the archetypal image of the judge will be 
confused with the very different image of judge as legislator, 
politician, or moral reformer. So the judge will be more likely 
to follow adjudicative approach (c), as opposed to the more 
‘conservative’ approaches represented by (a) and (b), if he 
accepts inclusive positivism.”888 
 
IV.8. Nepotism, Cruelty Against Animals and Party Loyalty Again 
 
 Returning to the three cases we first examined in subchapter II.2., the role of the 
S.T.F. is much better explained once we understand the Brazilian system of concretization 
of constitutional principles as a bottom-up system. 
 Regarding the nepotism cases, the fact that S.T.F. banned nepotism in all three 
branches of government shows that the Court, in a bottom-up fashion, acknowledged a fact—
not anticipated by the 1988 Framers as so serious or maybe anticipated but not confronted in 
the C.F. due to corporativism—as causing damaging consequences to the country. The Court 
also noticed that the unfairness of allowing appointment of relatives privileged politicians, 
                                                          
886 Id. 
887 WALUCHOW, supra note 3, at 67. 
888 Id. at 71-72. 
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judges and other public officials in detriment to the whole population, who can only have 
access to public positions by public competitive examinations. Problems of unequal 
treatment, public inefficiency and excess of privileges were addressed. Therefore, the Court, 
grounding the prohibition in the principles of morality and impersonality (neutrality), ruled 
it unconstitutional.  
 As Justice Barroso—who was then the lead attorney of the case—commented, the 
“conventional knowledge” of respected scholars was that the only constitutional permissible 
manner to ban nepotism was through the enactment of a statute. However, to circumvent this 
conventional knowledge argument to say that no statute was necessary, the Court framed 
nepotism within the core of the concept of administrative morality and impersonality, in a 
top-down fashion. Therefore, the argument about the need of a statute prohibiting nepotism 
did not prevail, since the court claimed that nepotism offended the nucleus of principles of 
morality and impersonality.  
 By using the “core argument” the Court wanted to avoid any allegation of activism, 
lawmaking or undue interference with the separation of powers. The use of the “core 
argument” is certainly an attempt to justify the outcome as a process of logical deduction 
from a pre-established unequivocal conception of morality, which, based on the huge 
disagreement that existed even among judges, reveals not to be true.  
 It would have been more honest and sincere if the S.T.F. had asserted that, under the 
choices made by the 1988 C.F. Framers, the Court has an active role in construing the 
Constitution and in helping develop their principles such as equal treatment and assert that 
nepotism was a recurrent problem, not resolved by Congress, which had incentives not to 
deal with it.889 In this analysis, concrete experience plays a role and the concretization of the 
content of principles that inform S.T.F’s conclusion is less abstract and more down-to-earth.  
 In addition, a clear message is also sent: that legislative inertia in handling important 
issues is not an excuse for the absence of immediate C.F. enforcement.890 I will talk more 
about this case in the next chapter. 
 The dialogue approach was even clearer when the S.T.F. reviewed the 
constitutionality of the State of Ceara statute that allowed the vaquejada. The C.F. had a 
provision that declared that practices that submitted the animals to cruelty were not 
allowed.891 But the constitutional text also assures that popular cultural manifestations shall 
be protected. Therefore, under the neoconstitutionalism approach, the Court acted correctly 
to decide the controversy initiated by Brazil’s Chief Federal Prosecutor. In doing so, the 
Court reviewed the concretization of the principles that had been done by the State of Ceara 
Assembly and, after gathering evidence in the case file, granting the opportunity for amicus 
curiae to join in the case, disagreed with the State’s choice, because, in its opinion, it did not 
give proper weight to the animal cruelty prohibition. 
 Nonetheless, I pointed out in subchapter II.2.2. that an Amendment to the C.F. has 
been passed by the Federal Congress and, in the new text of article 225, § 7º, provided a new 
definition for cruelty, excluding from the concept the cultural sports practices that use 
animals, such as the vaquejada. Brazil’s Chief Federal Prosecutor challenged this new 
provision through abstract review, but the S.T.F. has not yet decided the case.  
                                                          
889 Because Congress members could appoint their relatives and the burden of these appointments was 
diffused.  
890 See Dixon, supra note 857, at 2214-2216. 
891 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 225, § 1º, VII, (Braz.). 
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 The debate is certainly of a different kind now because the constitutional challenge 
is framed on the violation of constitutional immutable clauses, 892  what is certainly highly 
questionable in the case, considering that the issue is about animal rights, not individual 
rights.  
 But even if the Court defers to Congress’ divergent choice, there is no doubt that the 
dialog among the branches is likely to have been relevant. Congress is likely to have carefully 
scrutinized the S.T.F. reasons and to have stated clearly why it disagreed with them. If 
Congress has not done this attentive examination, the political pressure on the issue will 
probably not settle. 
 Finally, regarding the party loyalty case, it is clear that a bottom-up model of judicial 
lawmaking also took place. The T.S.E., taking into account the dreadful consequences that 
party-switching caused for democracy, ruled the practice unconstitutional. Party unloyalty 
basically corroded the opposition parties’ strength, since the parties in the governmental 
coalition, using the government structure, had a lot of power, both political and financial, to 
attract Congressmembers to them. The problem was worsened because party public funds 
and campaign television time is proportionally divided according to the number of members 
in the Federal Chamber of Deputies. The facts revealed by the Mensalão trials proved these 
concerns were right.893 
 Both the S.T.F. and the T.S.E. did not wait for Congress to solve the problem, 
especially because the governing parties had no incentive to fix it and the functioning of 
Congress, as the result of popular vote balance, was under threat due to the arbitrary 
disequilibrium of forces and the fraud to the popular will.894 
 Other bottom-up decisions that are worth mentioning are the recognition of same sex 
unions,895 the right of abortion in cases of anencephaly,896 the coexistence of biological and 
socio-affective paternity897 and the rights of transgenders to change their names.898  
  
IV.9. Chapter Conclusions 
 
 Post-positivism is inadequate to the task of explaining and describing Brazilian law. 
Although post-positivists succeeded in attacking specific characteristics of that were 
prevalent in Brazilian positivism, which seemed incompatible with the judicial practice after 
the enactment of the 1988 C.F, they went too far in acknowledging an inherent relation 
among legality and morality and by trying to frame in law identification specific questions 
of adjudication.  
 Inclusive legal positivism, by asserting that morality can be a condition of validity if 
the rule of recognition says so, is much more accurate with Brazilian legal practices. And by 
                                                          
892 Article 60, §4°, of the C.F. says that “[n]o proposed constitutional amendment shall be considered that 
is aimed at abolishing the following: I. the federalist form of the National Government; II. direct, secret, 
universal and periodic suffrage; III. separation of powers; IV. individual rights and guarantees. CONSTITUIÇÃO 
FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 60, § 4º, I-IV (Braz.). Translated by Keith Rosenn, Constituteproject.org 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2014.pdf. 
893 S.T.F., A.P. No. 470, Relator: Min. Joaquim Barbosa, 17.12.2012, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO 
[D.J.e.], 19.4.2013 (Braz.). 
894 See supra note 86. 
895 See S.T.F., A.D.I. No. 4.277, Relator: Min. Carlos Britto, 5.5.2011, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO 
[D.J.e.],14.10.2011, 691 (Braz.).  
896 S.T.F., ADPF No. 54, Relator: Min. Marco Aurélio, 20.4.2012, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO 
[D.J.e.], 30.4.2013 (Braz.). 
897  S.T.F., R.E. No. 898.060, Relator: Min. Luiz Fux, 21.9.2016, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO 
[D.J.e], 28.4.2017. 
898 S.T.F. A.D.I. No. 4275, Rel. Min. Marco Aurélio, 1.3.2018, (unpublished). 
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explaining that law identification and adjudication are separated tasks, inclusive legal 
positivism offers clarity on why judges sometimes do not apply the laws in particular cases, 
without trying to affirm that a norm is being applied by being disapplied.899 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
899 S.T.F., Rcl.-AgR. No. 3.034/PB, Relator: Min. Sepúlveda Pertence, 21.09.2006, 191, Diário da Justiça 
[D.J.], 27.10.2006, (Braz.) (Grau, E., concurring). Translation mine. The same rationale was also adopted by 
the S.T.F. in the following case, whose opinion was also written by Justice Eros Grau: S.T.F., A.D.I. No. 
3.489/SC, Relator: Min. Eros Grau, 09.05.2007, 425, Diário da Justiça [D.J.], 03.08.2007, (Braz.). 
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V. PROBLEMS AND REMEDIES FOR INCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM  
 
V.1. Short Explanation of Chapter Goals 
 
 In the introductory chapter, I mentioned that showing that inclusive legal positivism 
well captures the Brazilian legal norms and practices would throw light on the country’s 
legal system upsides but would also clarify most relevant downsides. I also stated that 
highlighting these positive and negative features will be important because they are not 
evident and, therefore, are not usually noticed. 
 There is a famous quote, attributed to the former Ministry of Finance Pedro Malan, 
that “in Brazil, even the past is uncertain.”900 This phrase is used in at least two contexts: (a) 
sometimes it is related to the lack of clarity in the government financial records and (b) 
sometimes it is related to the unforeseeability of legal decisions and to legal uncertainty.  
 This chapter intends to (a) analyze problems of guidance that may occur with the 
inclusion of moral principles as condition of validity of laws and acts and to (b) suggest some 
remedies that can minimize this effect in Brazil.  
  
V.2. Uncertainty, Unintended Deterrence and Efficacy 
 
 According to Fernando Guimarães, Brazilian public administrators have been, bit by 
bit, “giving up deciding.”901 He remarks that due to excessive control of administrative 
actions and to general legal uncertainty, administrators simply do not want to “run risks:”902 
 
“Since the enactment of the 1988 Constitution, which inspired 
a model of control that strongly inhibited the liberty and the 
autonomy of the public administrator, we have been watching 
an amplification and a sophistication of the control over the 
administrator’s actions. Making every day administrative 
decisions started to attract legal risks of every order, that can 
even lead to the criminalization of the conduct. Under the paws 
of all this control, the administrator gave up deciding. He saw 
his risks being amplified and, under a self-protecting instinct, 
has circumscribed his actions to a ‘comfort zone’. In this sense, 
an inefficiency crisis due to control has been put in place: 
cornered, the administrators do not only perform acts trying to 
achieve the best administrative solution, but also to protect 
themselves. The adoption of heterodox or controversial 
administrative actions means exposing oneself to 
unimaginable risks. And this administrator inhibition towards 
this scenario of amplification of his legal risks is 
comprehensible. At the end of the day, sensitive decisions may 
purport the risk of being criminally prosecuted. As an 
inevitable consequence there is administrative inefficiency, 
                                                          
900  Mirian Leitão, O passado é incerto, O Globo (Abr. 19, 2015, 9:00 AM), 
https://blogs.oglobo.globo.com/miriam-leitao/post/o-passado-incerto-565154.html. Translation mine 
901 Fernando Vernalha Guimarães, O Direito Administrativo do Medo: a crise da ineficiência pelo controle, 
DIREITO DO ESTADO (Jan. 31, 2016 1:00 AM), http://www.direitodoestado.com.br/colunistas/fernando-
vernalha-guimaraes/o-direito-administrativo-do-medo-a-crise-da-ineficiencia-pelo-controle. Translation mine. 
902 Id. Translation mine 
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which clearly harms the functioning of public 
administration.”903 
  
 Guimarães is not alone in this criticism. Professors Joel and Pedro Niebuhr, in an 
article entitled “Public Administration of Fear,”904 make similar comments. They mention 
that public servants should only be punished if they acted with gross negligence or malice. 
But that is not what in fact happens:  
 
“Administrative agents should only be penalized when they 
had acted with malice or grave negligence, what would only 
take place in glaring and exceptional cases. They should not 
be penalized when law enforcement offices merely disagree on 
the merits with their decisions or with their legal interpretation 
on technical or juridical controversial issues. The 
interpretation of law enforcement offices should not be taken 
as absolute truth, what would lead to application of sanctions 
to administrative agents due to mere interpretive disagreement.  
This all seems obvious, very obvious. But it is not what 
happens in practice. Administrative agents are penalized, with 
harsh sanctions, even when they act in good faith, even in cases 
in which no one questions their honesty. They are penalized by 
pretense mistakes, which, in truth, reverts to interpretive 
disagreement or because of neglect of formalities prescribed 
by law. Some call this a hermeneutical crime. 
The law enforcement offices’ excesses gain relevance because 
administrators work with a fuzzy legislation, which gets lost in 
bureaucratic formalist regulations, whose most representative 
example is the unfortunate Lei No. 8.666/1993, that regulates 
the making public biddings and the execution of administrative 
contracts.905 
 
 Regarding this specific law, Joel and Pedro Niebuhr add that the prevalence of open 
textured principles has the effect of providing justifications for subjective and lose decisions: 
 
“This defective legislation is filled of various principles, 
which, by nature, are more open and, due to this reason, end 
up serving as pretense justification for any type of decisions, 
that goes to all sides, all subjective and loose. Furthermore, in 
a general manner, law enforcement offices do not worry about 
articulating arguments to justify that a given principle leads to 
one or another conclusion. They simply decide and use 
principles for allegedly furnish grounds to a decision, without 
                                                          
903 Id. Translation mine 
904 Translation mine.  
905 Joel Niebuhr & Pedro Niebuhr, Administração Pública do Medo - Ninguém quer criar, pensar noutras 
soluções. O novo pode dar errado e o erro é punido severamente, JOTA (Nov. 23, 2017 8:07 AM), 
https://www.jota.info/opiniao-e-analise/artigos/administracao-publica-do-medo-23112017. 
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explaining the reasons and circumstances the stated principle 
applies to that situation.906 
  
 In this sense, they conclude that “public administrators do not want to create, do 
something different, or think about other solutions. The new can go wrong and the mistake 
is severally punished.”907 
 Carlos Ari Sundfeld also observes: 
 
“It is true that, in abstract, nobody in the legal world discusses 
that the administrative action has to be efficient and effective. 
Even the Constitution demands ‘efficiency’ from the public 
administration (art. 37). But let’s speak the truth: the good 
public management is not a priority of the Brazilian 
legislation, nor of its interpreters. The priority has been 
another: limiting and controlling—even threatening—as much 
as possible the administrators, which are, in principle, 
suspected of having done something. 
[…] 
Our problems in the public government do not come from 
simple technical imperfections of laws and persons. They 
come from a deeper issue: the legal preference for the 
maximum of rigidity and control, even if this means 
compromising the public administration efficiency. Good 
management can and shall live together with limits and 
controls, but not with this maximalism. If we do not invert the 
priorities, there is not administrative reform capable of 
unlocking the public administration.”908 
 
 In resorting to the economic analysis of law, one may understand the practical 
consequences of a legal system that chooses to write laws with the prevalence of moral 
principles as criterion of legal validity and as tool to construe the meaning of rules and to 
create of causes of action. The option for an analytical constitutional text that employs, in its 
provisions, undetermined legal concepts, fundamental rights and principles—all understood, 
in most of contexts, as non-conclusive or prima facie norms—was important to allow better 
protection of some individual and social rights, but certainly has raised ambiguities and left 
difficult issues for future resolution by public administrators and by courts. 909  Since 
administrators do not have immunity—only judges and prosecutors do for negligence 
cases910—they, in fact, may run high risks in their day-to-day activities.  
                                                          
906 Id. Translation mine. 
907 Id. Translation mine. 
908 Carlos Ari Sundfeld, Chega de axé no direito administrativo, HUFFPOST (Jan. 26, 2017 9:02 PM), 
https://www.huffpostbrasil.com/car-los-ari-sundfeld/chega-de-axe-no-direito-
administrativo_b_5002254.html. Translation mine. 
909 See MELLO, supra note 160, at 29.  
910 Judges and Prosecutors only respond in their personal capacities in cases in which malice or fraud is 
proved. See e.g. Article 49 of Lei Complementar No. 35, de 14 de Março de 1979, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.], de 14.3.1979 (Braz.). See also S.T.F., R.E. No. 228.977, Relator Min: Néri da Silveira, 5.3.2002, 
DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA [D.J.], 12.4.2012 (asserting that judges are immune from being prosecuted and the damaged 
party must sue the state in order to recover damages; the state can, eventually, file a suit against the judge to 
recover damages paid to the harmed party if proved the judge acted with malice or fraud). 
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 Principles, as non-conclusive or prima facie norms, are similar to standards. They 
may be “vague; costly to administer because open-ended; and difficult to monitor 
compliance with by the court or other body that enforces the standard.”911 As Richard Posner 
also notes, “law’s vagueness […] create[s] a risk that legitimate conduct will be found to 
violate it.”912 So, vagueness can create an unintended deterrent effect “when the legitimate 
activity that is deterred is more valuable socially than privately.” 913  This unintended 
deterrent effect is exactly the consequence described by Fernando Guimarães above and is 
also pointed out by Carlos Sundfeld: 
 
“The consequences of failure and the consequences of legal 
uncertainty cannot fall into the administrator’s back. The 
administrator must be protected from the enforcement 
extremes. On the contrary, due to the fear of becoming a 
defendant in a proceeding, he crosses his arms and keeps 
waiting for retirement. Our public administration becomes 
even less effective. What law has to do is to multiply the 
incentives for the public action, and not create new risks for 
those who act, because these new risks generates 
accommodation and paralysis.”914 
 
 Zagrebelsky agrees with Posner’s remarks regarding rulemaking. He affirms that 
principle-based bottom-up jurisprudence is plastic and adaptable: 
 
“In relation to rules, the legally relevant elements in a case are 
established in a more or less determined way. In contrast, 
principles, as already suggested, yield no such determined 
path, with the result that the relevant elements of the law are 
determined on a case-by-case basis. This characteristic renders 
principle-based jurisprudence particularly plastic and 
adaptable, whereas jurisprudence by rules aims at a greater 
rigidity and fixity.”915 
 
 Empirical research would be necessary to understand the full extension of these 
problems. That is far more than the scope of this work. Nevertheless, I am certain that some 
of these criticisms and theoretical considerations of the concurrent problems in legal systems 
like the Brazilian are problems that may be associated with the possibility of moral criteria 
as condition of law validity. In fact, Posner’s comment, read in conjunction with 
observations made in (a) subchapter II.4.1., regarding the civil law legislation style and the 
status of vague norms in German law, in (b) subchapter II.5.5., with respect to the 
concretization of principles, especially under the neoconstitutionalism paradigm, may 
provide traces that Pedro Malan’s well-known phrase and that the administrative scholars’ 
observations are somewhat true. 
 Another example is Brazil’s approach towards disciplinary punishments, referred in 
subsection III.3.. Maria Di Pietro asserted that “in administrative law, vagueness prevails. 
                                                          
911 RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 748 (Wolters Kluwer 8th ed, 2011). 
912 Id. 
913 Id.  
914 Sundfeld, supra note 908. Translation mine. 
915 Zagrebelsky, supra note 26, at 647. 
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There are few infractions clearly described by the law, as it happens with ‘public employment 
abandonment’. Most of the infractions are left to administrative discretion when dealing with 
a concrete case; it is the sentencing authority that will frame the act as a serious fault, 
irregular proceeding, service inefficiency, public disobedience, or other infractions set forth 
in an undetermined manner by the statutory legislation.” 916  Therefore, this is another 
example of punitive norms that use standards for justifying decisions. Of course, the use of 
standards does not imply that all situations to which they should apply will be controversial. 
But it raises the possibility that controversy will exist, because the intent of writing standards 
is exactly to leave some situations open to be settled in a case by case manner. 
 The general use of standards, thus, may not only lead to inefficiency in governmental 
action, but also may raise fairness problems, because it runs counter to the values of certainty 
and predictability, values that are within Brazil’s political morality. In summary, it may catch 
the party by surprise. 917 Mauro Cappelletti takes this position:  
 
“Creative judges should never lose sight of this first 
‘weakness’ of law-making through the courts. Of course, it 
would not be easy for them to object that statutory law, 
whether codified or not, is itself never complete, never 
unambiguous, and never easily accessible to all. Difficulty of 
information is, in particular, a permanent obstacle to full 
access to the law in every legal system, especially for 
underprivileged persons and groups. Yet this problem must be 
seen—once again—as a matter of degree. Case law is arguably 
subject to that difficulty to a somewhat higher degree than 
statutory law.”918 
  
 Therefore, there is a risk that Brazilian law, in some cases, may treat the citizens in 
the same way described in Jeremy Bentham’s notorious metaphor: “It is the Judges [as we 
have seen] that make the common law: — Do you know how they make it? Just as a man 
makes laws for his dog. When your dog does anything you want to break him off, you wait 
till he does it, and then beat him for it.”919 
 Problems of vagueness of the law have an additional complicating aspect in systems 
like Brazil: the fact that concretization of rules and principles by judges look back to past 
events.920 Retroactive application of new creative court’s understandings of principles and 
rules are the rule of the system. That is why Zagrebelsky points out that in some areas of law 
this should be avoided: 
 
“In certain determined fields, [regulation by principles] is 
expressly excluded. That is predominantly the case in criminal 
law, where it is preferable that the legislator establish crimes 
and punishment through prospective and predictable rules.” 921 
 
                                                          
916 DI PIETRO, supra note 18, at 515. Translation mine. 
917 CAPPELLETTI, supra note 61, at 36. 
918 Id.  
919 Jeremy Bentham, Works of Jeremy Bentham in TAITS EDINBURGH MAGAZINE, at 609 (Edinburgh, 1836).  
920 Gustavo Zagrebelsky, see note 26, at 631. In tort law, Benjamin Zipursky mentions that retroactive law 
is a rule. See supra note 142. 
921 Id. 
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 As a matter of fact, even the word concretization—that is used to describe the 
interpretative work done by the judge regarding principles—discloses this possibility, since, 
according to scholars, the results are adopted “in conformity with, but not determinable by, 
the Constitution.”922  
 
V.3. The Interactionist View of Law 
 
 The American legal theorist Lon F. Fuller is mostly known in Brazil for the book The 
Case of the Speluncean Explorers,923 but his most important jurisprudential work is certainly 
The Morality of Law. Because the latter book was never translated into portuguese, it has not 
made its way into Brazilian jurisprudential thinking. Yet The Morality of Law provides an 
important analytical framework for thinking about how to traverse the difficulties that 
accompany open-textured and inclusive legal positivist systems. Fuller remarked that he 
wrote this book because of his “dissatisfaction with the existing literature concerning the 
relation between law and morality.” 924  
 Fuller starts The Morality of Law by drawing a distinction between the two types of 
moralities: the morality of aspiration and the morality of duty. The morality of duty lays 
down “the basic rules without which an ordered society is impossible, or without which an 
ordered society directed toward certain specific goals must fail of its mark.”925 The morality 
of aspiration is the “morality of excellence, of the fullest realization of human powers. [...] 
A failure to realize one or more of these powers would not be wrongdoing, it would be 
shortcoming or a failure to actualize potential.”926  
 After developing these concepts, Fuller presents his imaginary Kingdom, which is 
ruled by a fictitious King Rex, who, by making eight basic mistakes, ends up failing to make 
law: 
 
“Rex’s bungling career as legislator and judge illustrates that 
the attempt to create and maintain a system of legal rules may 
miscarry in at least eight ways; there are in this enterprise, if 
you will, eight distinct routes to disaster. The first and most 
obvious lies in a failure to achieve rules at all, so that every 
issue must be decided on an ad hoc basis. The other routes 
are: (2) a to publicize, or at least to make available to the 
affected party, the rules is expected to observe; (3) the abuse 
of retroactive legislation, which not only cannot itself guide 
action, but undercuts the integrity of rules prospective in 
                                                          
922 Brugger, supra note 33172, at 398. 
923 Fuller, supra note 309. 
924 LON F. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, rev. ed., 5 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).  
925 Id.  
926 Id. Fuller talks about the differences among imposing penalties—for violation of the morality of duty—
and granting rewards—for achieving the morality of aspiration: “[...] Nevertheless there is a great difference 
in the procedures generally established for meting out penalties as contrasted with those which grant awards. 
Where penalties or deprivations are involved we surround the decision with procedural guarantees of due 
process, often elaborate ones, and we are likely to impose an obligation of public accountability. Where awards 
and honors are granted we are content with more informal, less scrutinized methods of decision. The reason 
for this difference is plain. Where penalties and deprivation are involved we are operating at lower levels of 
human achievement where a defective performance can be recognized, if care is taken, with comparative 
certainty and formal standards for judging it can be established. At the level where honors and prizes become 
appropriate we see that there would be little sense, and a good deal of hypocrisy, in surrounding a decision that 
is essentially subjective and intuitive with the procedures appropriate to the trial of a law suit. Id. at 31. 
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effect, since it puts them under the threat of retrospective 
change; (4) a failure to make rules understandable; (5) the 
enactment of contradictory rules or (6) rules that require 
conduct beyond the powers of the affected party; (7) 
introducing such frequent changes in the rules that the subject 
cannot orient his action by them; and, finally, (8) a failure of 
congruence between the rules as announced and their actual 
administration.”927 
  
  Fuller, then, introduces the eight characteristics that a system of law should have to 
deserve being called law. The law should be “(1) general; (2) public; (3) prospective; (4) 
clear; (5) compatible with one another; (6) possible to obey; (7) stable; and (8) consistently 
applied.”928 These principles constitute “the inner morality of law” and are inherent and 
necessary to make a legal system possible. Without them, a certain legal system should not 
even deserve to be called a legal one for the author. Fuller does not think that non-compliance 
with few of these moral principles would automatically make a system non-legal. But he 
thinks that this may lead the system to fail and not endure. As Denise Meyerson notes: 
 
“Because it is not possible for citizens to obey rules suffering 
from procedural defects like these, these defects would be 
‘routes to failure’ in the enterprise of creating law […]. And 
a total failure in all of these ways would result in something 
that is not simply bad law but not law at all. Just as we would 
not describe something that is totally incapable of cutting as 
a ‘knife’, so we would not describe a system of rules which 
is totally incapable of guiding conduct as a ‘legal system’.”929 
 
 If the departures of the eight inner principles of law are so strong, at some point, the 
system will cease being law. That is what Fuller thinks happened with the Nazi legal 
system.930 
 Fuller’s theory was severely attacked by Hart931 because Fuller takes a natural law 
jurisprudence position—the author argues that these properties are not contingent, but are 
inherent to law, whereas Hart thinks that these principles only contribute to maximize law’s 
efficiency.932 Even if Fuller’s theory is philosophically wrong in describing what law is, his 
theory conveys an important message: it is likely that a legal system that has these procedural 
guarantees will have better chances to succeed in comparison to systems that disregard some 
or all of these requirements. In fact, systems in which rules (a) are enacted employing vague 
norms; (b) are issued with the purpose of affecting specific citizens of a community; (c) are 
                                                          
927 Id. at 39. 
928 KAVANAGH & OBERDIEK, supra note 430, at 93. 
929 MEYERSON, supra note 10 , at 42. 
930 Fuller states that: “[t]o me there is nothing shocking in saying that a dictatorship which clothes itself with 
a tinsel of legal form can so far depart from the morality of order, from the inner morality of law itself, that it 
ceases to be a legal system. When a system calling itself law is predicated upon a general disregard by judges 
of the terms of the laws they purport to enforce, when this system habitually cures its legal irregularities, even 
the grossest, by retroactive statutes, when it has only to resort to forays of terror in the streets, which no one 
dares challenge, in order to escape even those scant restraints imposed by the pretence of legality - when all 
these things have become true of a dictatorship, it is not hard for me, at least, to deny to it the name of law. 
Fuller, supra note 307, at 660. 
931 See supra note 553. 
932 HART, supra note 460, at 357.  
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drafted to retroactively punish citizens or to demand more than they can comply; and (d) are 
applied in an inconsistent manner and (e) are constantly changed; are not likely to succeed 
in the long run. As an example of the relevance of Fuller’s remarks, his defenders argue that 
both of the legal systems invoked by his critics to attack his theory—Nazi German and 
Apartheid in South Africa—did not endure for long. 933  
 These principles that, for Fuller, are inherent to the concept of legality, confer an idea 
of what law represents for the author. Fuller asserts that law should be understood as “the 
enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules.” 934 He insists that law 
should be viewed “as a purposeful enterprise, dependent for its success on the energy, 
insight, intelligence, and conscientiousness of those who conduct it, and fated, because of 
this dependence, to fall always somewhat short of a full attainment of its goals.”935 
 According to Kristen Rundle, “[w]hen Fuller speaks of law and its existence, he has 
in view a particular quality of relationship between the lawgiver and the legal subject, one 
that is reflected in the observance of his eight principles but which is not exhausted by them.” 
936 She adds that to gain a deeper appreciation for Fuller’s theory, it is crucial that we focus 
deeply on his “repeated references to the relationship of ‘reciprocity’ that a legal system 
constitutes and which signals the equal presence and responsibilities of lawgiver and legal 
subject alike, as well as his gestures to how the enterprise of lawgiving implicates a ‘sense 
of trusteeship’ and a ‘relationship with persons’.”937 
 Therefore, for Fuller, the legal system obedience to the eight principles of morality 
reflects a relationship of reciprocity and respect among the state (the lawgiver) and the 
citizen (the law’s subject).938 That is why his theory is called interactionist, as opposed to 
directional.939 
 
V.4. The Importance of Fuller’s theory 
 
 This work has shown that inclusive legal positivism is the theory that best captures 
the Brazilian legal system. Since inclusive legal positivism argues that the relationship of 
law and morals is merely contingent, but not inherent, I cannot side with Lon Fuller’s 
assertion that a system that does not observe his eight inner morality principles of law (or at 
least most of them) should not be considered law. As mentioned in subchapter III.2.1., I 
agree with Hart and believe that what matters for defining the existence of a legal system is 
the introduction of Hart’s secondary rules, with the purpose of solving problems of 
uncertainty, staticity and inefficiency. 940  The combination of primary rules—rules that 
impose obligations and duties—and secondary rules is the real “key to the science of 
jurisprudence,” as Hart observes.941 
 However, the fact that Fuller’s theory might be inappropriate to describe what the 
law is does not mean that it is not important to identify the goals that a system that aims to 
endure and to be fair—such as the Brazilian constitutional regime inaugurated after 1988—
should seek. 
                                                          
933 Paul Cliteur, Fuller’s Faith in Rediscovering Fuller, in ESSAYS ON IMPLICIT LAW AND INSTITUTIONAL 
DESIGN., 101 (Amsterdam University Press, 1999). 
934 FULLER. supra note 924, at 124. 
935 Id. at 145. 
936 RUNDLE, supra note 665, at 92. 
937 Fuller, supra note 307, at 660. 
938 Id. 
939 RUNDLE, supra note 665, at 122. She cites Neil MacCormick for making this claim.  
940 Id. at 92-94. 
941 Id. at 81. 
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 Additionally, it is important to stress that Hart is criticized by some scholars that 
claim that he did not ascertain the relevance of Fuller’s legal theory. Jeremy Waldron, in a 
powerful article entitled Positivism and Legality: Hart’s Equivocal Response to Fuller,942 
after carefully analysing various of Hart’s works, concludes that the British scholar 
demonstrated an apparent inconsistency when dealing with the concept of legality, which, 
in some degree, Waldron considers that might be a prerequisite of law. And, for Waldron, 
legality inevitably links morality and law, although not in the sense of observing “the 
demands of morality.”943 Hart, in Waldron’s opinion, did not elucidate if legality is a topic 
worthy of jurisprudential analysis.944 
 In the mentioned article, Waldron observes that Hart, in the quote below, 
acknowledges the importance of ‘principles of legality’, which are roughly what Fuller 
referred to as the ‘inner morality of law’:945 
 
“Law, however impeccable their content, may be of little 
service to human beings and may cause both injustice and 
misery unless they generally conform to certain requirements 
which may be broadly termed procedural (in contrast with the 
substantive requirements discussed above). These procedural 
requirements relate to such matters as the generality of rules 
of law, the clarity with which they are phrased, the publicity 
given to them, the time of their enactment, and the manner in 
which they are judicially applied to particular cases. The 
requirements that the law, except in special circumstances, 
should be general (should refer to classes of persons, things 
and circumstances, not to individuals or to particular 
actions); should be free from contradictions, ambiguities, and 
obscurities; should be publicly promulgated and easily 
accessible; and should not be retroactive in operation are 
usually referred as to the principles of legality. The principles 
which require courts, in applying general rules to particular 
cases, to be without personal interest in the outcome or other 
bias and to hear arguments on matters of law and proofs of 
matters of fact from both sides of a dispute are often referred 
as natural justice. These two sets of principles together define 
the concept of the rule of law to which must modern states 
pay at least lip service.”946  
 
 Waldron notes that these formal principles referred by Hart and by Fuller, combined 
with “the principles about the broad character of the procedures that should be used in their 
application,” 947  which Hart terms “principles of natural justice”, and Americans call 
“procedural due process,” are what is sometimes called “the rule of law.”948 The New 
Zealander author adds that Hart was not so modest about the term ‘principle of legality’, 
                                                          
942 Jeremy Waldron, Positivism and Legality: Hart's. Equivocal Response to Fuller, 83 NYU. L. Rev. 1135 
(2008). 
943 Id. at 1169. 
944 Id. at 1138. 
945 Id. at 1145. 
946 HART, supra note 442, at 114. 
947 Waldron, supra note 942, at 1145. 
948 Id.  
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when he criticized the English decision Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions,949 in which 
the House of Lords decided that the common law crime conspiracy to corrupt public morals, 
although not set forth in any statute, was still a crime in the U.K.. In the case, the defendant 
was convicted for publishing a catalog which listed the names, addresses and phone numbers 
of prostitutes with accompanying photographs:  
 
“[The House of Lords] seemed willing to pay a high price in 
terms of the sacrifice of other values for the establishment … 
of the Courts as custos morum. The particular value which 
they sacrificed is the principle of legality which requires 
criminal offences to be as precisely defined as possible, so 
that it can be known with reasonable certainty beforehand 
what acts are criminal and what are not.”950 
 
 I do not have the intention of evaluating whether Waldron’s claim against Hart 
regarding his response to Fuller is correct or not. My intention in citing Hart’s remarks was 
mainly to show that he also acknowledged the importance of the principles articulated by 
Fuller, if not to define the concept of law, at least to assure how to reach a better and efficient 
legal order. Fuller, as noted, identifies law as a purposeful enterprise, dependent for its 
success on the energy, insight, intelligence, and conscientiousness of those who conduct it. 
 The most impressive aspect of Hart’s acknowledgement is that it comes close to be 
a unanimous point among all authors referred in this work—the unequivocal importance of 
the principles of legality for law’s effectiveness. In making a claim of the existence of some 
logical connection between principles of legality and the concept of law, Waldron points out 
that the term is also relevant for John Finnis and Joseph Raz, although for different reasons 
than Fuller’s: 
  
“Laws are what principles of legality are designed to 
evaluate; perhaps principles of legality are (as John Finnis 
argues) principles for keeping legal systems in good shape; 
or principles of legality may be designed (as Joseph Raz 
seems to think) to remedy or mitigate evils that only law 
makes possible.”951 
  
 Ronald Dworkin also recognizes the importance of principles of legality and 
exemplify why some of them are part of his integrity concept. In the passage below, he refers 
to the need of fair notice in criminal law: 
 
“[…] But if reasons that argue against prosecution in one case 
are reasons of principle—that the criminal statute did not 
give adequate notice, for example—then integrity demands 
that these reasons be respected for everyone else.”952 
 
                                                          
949 Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 323 F.3d 1198,2003 U.S. App. 2003 Daily Journal DAR 3429. 
950 Id.  
951 Id.  
952 DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 436, at 224. 
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 In the article Political Judges and the Rule of Law, also commenting the English case 
Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions,953 Dworkin invokes that individuals have a moral 
right of “not to be punished except for committing a crime clearly published in advance”: 954 
 
“[…] It would then have been strenuously argued that 
individuals have a moral right, at least in principle, not to be 
punished except for committing a crime clearly published in 
advance, and that in virtue of that right it would be unjust to 
punish Shaw. […]”955 
 
 Therefore, although agreeing with Hart that the principles of legality are not 
conditions for law to exist, there is no doubt that a legal system that wants to be fair, just and 
more effective, like the Brazilian legal system after the 1988 C.F., must take these consensual 
moral remarks into account. These remarks are part of the country’s political morality. 
 The previous subchapter emphasized the problems that a system in which 
principles—and not unequivocal clear rules—play a good part in defining behavior. There is 
no doubt that this system may grant the Judicial branch a prominent role in the discovery and 
effective enforcement of individual and social rights but may also lead to unfair 
punishments—due to lack of fair notice—and unintended deterrence.  
 
V.5. Solutions for Legal Uncertainty 
 
 Throughout this work I have stated that the option for a system of top-down rules, 
instead of bottom-up principles, does not prevent uncertainty regarding the content of law. 
Even if one were to draft a rule to cover all possible situations, it is likely that new situations 
would arise and there would be doubts as to whether the rule should apply or not to the new 
case. Of course, the choice for rules in areas such as criminal or administrative punishment 
laws, for example, help to better orient conducts. But we need to remind ourselves that 
uncertainty is unavoidable due to our inability to anticipate the future. Hart makes this 
remark: 
 
“In fact all systems, in different ways, compromise between 
two social needs: the need for certain rules which can, over 
great areas of conduct, safely be applied by private individuals 
to themselves without fresh official guidance or weighing up 
of social issues, and the need to leave open, for later settlement 
by an informed, official choice, issues which can only be 
properly appreciated and settled when they arise in a concrete 
case. In some legal systems at some periods it may be that too 
much is sacrificed to certainty, and that judicial interpretation 
of statutes or of precedent is too formal and so fails to respond 
to the similarities and differences between cases which are 
visible only when they are considered in the light of social 
aims. In other systems or at other periods it may seem that too 
                                                          
953 Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 323 F.3d 1198, 2003 U.S. App. 2003 Daily Journal DAR 3429. 
954 RONALD DWORKIN, POLITICAL JUDGES AND THE RULE OF LAW in KAVANAGH & OBERDIEK, supra note 
430, at 208. 
955 Id. 
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much is treated by courts as perennially open or revisable in 
precedents, and too little respect paid to such limits as 
legislative language, despite its open texture, does after all 
provide. Legal theory has in this matter a curious history; for 
it is apt either to ignore or to exaggerate the indeterminacies of 
legal rules.” 956 
 
 Since Brazil, following the civil law tradition, adopts a declaratory theory of judging 
in which judges do not to create but merely declare the law, to avoid situations of unfairness 
that are caused by law’s unescapable uncertainty, it is essential to turn to important Anglo-
American law doctrines that deal with similar problems. These doctrines are not currently 
part of Brazil’s law, but certainly could help the country’s system escaping problems of 
sometimes not complying with some of Fuller’s inner morality principles.  
 These concepts are important because, as Hart puts, they help to circumvent “the 
oscillation between extremes and remind ourselves of our human inability to [at least 
sometimes] anticipate the future, which is at the root of this indeterminacy.” 957 These 
doctrines are, then, relevant due to the fact that they help to cure the problems pointed out 
by the Brazilian scholars in subchapter V.2. and they provide more respect for the Brazilian 
citizens in their reciprocal relations with the state. In Brazil’s current stage of law, none are 
well developed—save for the prospective overruling technique. 958 In this sense, if Fuller 
was right, by curing them, Brazil’s system has more chances of succeeding as least in a moral 
sense. 
  
V.5.1. Fair Notice, Vagueness and Overbreadth 
 
 The need of informing the citizen about the official rules of conduct is a concern 
present in Brazilian posited laws. Article 1 of the Introductory Act to the Brazilian Norms 
declares that, except otherwise provided, the law enters into force in the whole country after 
forty-five days of its official publication.959 Article 11 of Lei Complementar No. 95/98 sets 
forth that legal provisions shall be written with clarity, precision and logical order. For 
achieving precision, the law must “articulate technical or common language in a manner that 
permits the perfect comprehension of the law’s goal and allows that its text points with clarity 
the content and the reach the legislator wants to give to the norm.”960 The problem is that 
these attributes are not always obtained, and this is particularly troublesome when dealing 
with criminal and punishment norms, which affects the citizens’ liberties. As observed in 
subchapter III.5.4., regarding the requirements of legality and also of criminal legality, the 
publication of an abstract norm is generally considered by Courts to satisfy the constitutional 
moral requirement of nullum crimen sine lege (“no crime without law”). 
Due to the recognition of the consequences that vague criminal statutes may have 
in interfering with the citizens’ liberties in the U.S., the SCOTUS has held that the Due 
                                                          
956 HART, supra note 43, at 130-131.  
957 Id.  
958 See, e.g., S.T.F, R.E. No. 637.485/RJ, Relator: Min. Gilmar Mendes, 1.8.2012, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO 
ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e.], 21.5.2013 (Braz.). 
959 LEI DE INTRODUÇÃO ÀS NORMAS DO DIREITO BRASILEIRO [L.I.N.D.B.] [INTRODUCTORY ACT TO THE 
BRAZILIAN NORMS] art. 1. Translation mine. 
960 LEI COMPLEMENTAR no. 95, de DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U] de 27.2.1998, art. 11 (Braz.). 
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Process Clause demands that citizens have fair notice of the content of criminal laws.961 In 
this sense, the Court requires that the citizens shall be unequivocally informed of what is 
prohibited: 
 
“No one may be required, at peril of life, liberty or property, 
to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled 
to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.”962 
 
This precedent shows that the Court understands that law should have a guiding 
function, at least when life, liberty or property are at peril: 
 
“That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must 
be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it 
what conduct on their part will render them liable to its 
penalties is a well-recognized requirement consonant alike 
with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law. 
And a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an 
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must 
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application 
violates the first essential of due process of law."963 
 
 The SCOTUS has also ruled that “judicial enlargement of a criminal act by 
interpretation is at war with a fundamental concept of the common law that crimes must be 
defined with appropriate definiteness.”964  
 It is, then, established that “a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process 
Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct 
it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, 
what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case.” 965  As the Court notes, “the 
objection of vagueness is two-fold: inadequate guidance to the individual whose conduct is 
regulated, and inadequate guidance to the triers of fact.”966 In these cases, the application of 
the void for vagueness967 may hold the law unconstitutional or at least rule it inapplicable to 
                                                          
961 An excellent article on the issue is Theodore J. Boutros, Jr. & Blaine H. Evanson, The Enduring and 
Universal Principle of “Fair Notice”, 86 S. Cal. L. Rev. 193 (2013). I borrowed their citations of SCOTUS 
cases. 
962 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 455 (1939). 
963 Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
964 Pierce v. United States, 314 U. S. 306, 314 U. S. 311 (1941). 
965 Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402–03 (1966). 
966 Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964). 
967 Barron’s Legal Guides dictionary defines the void for vagueness doctrine as follows: “a criminal statute 
is constitutionally void for vagueness when it is so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily 
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. 269 U.S. 385, 391. A statute is void when it is vague either 
as to what persons fall within the scope of the statute, what conduct is forbidden, or what punishment may be 
imposed. ‘Due process requires that criminal statutes, administrative crimes, and common law crimes be 
reasonably definite as to persons and conducts within their scope and the punishment which may be imposed 
for their violation. In determining whether legislative, judicial or administrative definition is void for vagueness, 
the following inquiries are appropriate: (1) Does the law give fair notice to those potentially subject to it? (2) 
Does the law adequaly guard against arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement? (3) Does the law provide 
sufficient breathing space for First Amendment Rights?’ La Fave, Criminal Law § (5th ed. 2010). Use of this 
doctrine as a constitutional attack is based upon an assertion that the meaning of the statute in question is so 
uncertain and unclear as to render it void. The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that criminal 
statutes give reasonably certain notice that an act has been made criminal before it is committed. Every person 
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the case in which the meaning is clearly defined.968 “[T]he touchstone is whether the statute, 
either standing alone or as construed by the courts, made it reasonably clear at the time of 
the charged conduct that the conduct was criminal.”969 
Overbreadth, on the other hand, “is a term used to describe a situation where a 
statute proscribes not only what may constitutionally be proscribed, but also forbids conduct 
which is protected.” 970  Overbreadthness problems raise concerns because it may create 
chilling effects, making individuals “fearful of the possible or threatened application of laws 
or sanctions and subsequent prosecutions, whether or not successful, indirectly resulting from 
the exercise of those legitimate rights.” 971 
Fair notice concerns resemble Fuller’s ideas that laws should be clear, possible to 
obey and prospective. By curing vagueness and overbreadthness problems in law application 
and still applying the statute retrospectively, punishing the citizen, there is no doubt that there 
is a violation of what legality demands. To avoid these fairness problems, Brazilian law 
should develop doctrines of fair notice, void for vagueness and overbreadth. 
It is important to stress that the notion of fair notice has appeared in Brazilian law 
in some decisions. Although Article 11 of Lei Complementar No. 95/98 demands clarity of 
legal provisions, the official practice does not set aside rules that do not comply with it. 
An administrative proceeding that adopted a similar approach to fair notice notion 
was decided by the Tribunal Regional Federal da 4ª Região [T.R.F.-4]. The respondent was 
Judge Sergio Moro.972 In a criminal investigation, Moro had issued an order authorizing the 
police to monitor former President Lula’s telephone conversations. One of the captured 
audios was a conversation between Lula and the then President Dilma Rousseff. It could be 
concluded from that conversation that Dilma was appointing Lula to be her chief of staff, 
because she wanted him to evade Moro’s jurisdiction— the S.T.F has original jurisdiction to 
trial the president and the chief of staff.973 By removing the secrecy to this investigation, 
Moro disclosed the audios and the press published them. 
President Dilma’s attorneys filed a claim before the S.T.F. arguing that the Court’s 
original jurisdiction to trial had been offended by Moro, because only the S.T.F. could have 
made the conversation public, since the Court had original jurisdiction over her. The S.T.F. 
ruled that Moro’s decision was unconstitutional and declared it void.974 Several attorneys, 
then, filed a disciplinary complaint against Moro before the Inspector’s Office of T.R.F.-4. 
There was no debate as to whether Moro’s act had violated the C.F., because the S.T.F. had 
already asserted that he had. But the court decided not to punish Moro and upheld the 
Inspector’s decision that had dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the law did not 
provide fair notice and clear guidance to judges on that issue. The T.R.F.-4 observed that 
the S.T.F. had precedents that had held that the secrecy of personal communications was not 
                                                          
should be able to know with certainty when he or she is committing a crime.” Void for vagueness, BARRON’S 
LEGAL GUIDES LAW DICTIONARY (2016). 
968 See Bouie, 378 U.S., at 354. 
969 United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997). 
970 Overstock Book Company v. Barry, 305 F.Supp. 842, 851 (1969). 
971 Chill [Chilling Effect], BARRON’S LEGAL GUIDES LAW DICTIONARY (2016). The dictionary adds that 
“[i]n recognition of the chilling effect of statutes that may be constitutionally overbroad, a facial attack on such 
statutes is permitted by any person properly before the court even if he or she lacks personal standing to assert 
the facial invalidity of the statute because his or her own conduct falls squarely within some valid application 
of the statute.” Id. 
972 Judge Sergio Moro was the judge that convicted the former President Lula in the case mentioned in 
subchapter II.6; see note 395.  
973 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 102, I, c (Braz.) 
974 S.T.F., MC-Rcl. 23.457, Relator: Min. Teori Zavascki, 31.3.2016, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO 
[D.J.e], 26.9.2017 (Braz.). 
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an absolute right and that, in extraordinary cases, it could not be invoked as safeguard to 
illicit actions975 and concluded that: 
 
“[i]n this context, a judge may not be censored in adopting 
preventive measures to avoid obstruction of the Operation Car 
Wash Investigations. Only after the S.T.F. ruling (Claim No. 
23.457) Brazilian judges, including the respondent judge, have 
had clear and safe guidance with respect to the limits of the 
telephone communications secrecy in criminal 
investigations.”976 
 
 Therefore, the T.R.F.-4, by dismissing the claim against Judge Moro, examined the 
ability as to whether the state of the law before the S.T.F. ruling allowed the judge to clearly 
assert whether his act of removing the secrecy of then President Dilma and former President 
Lula’s communication was unlawful or not, and concluded that the judge had not had fair 
notice. This type of reasoning, although desirable, is, nevertheless, rare in the country and 
should be developed. 
 
V.5.2. Rule of lenity  
 
 The rule of lenity is an old common law rule of statutory interpretation. Eskridge 
defines it as: “[i]f the punitive statute does not clearly outlaw private conduct, the private 
actor cannot be penalized.”977 He adds that “while criminal statutes are the most obvious and 
common type of penal law, many civil statutes have been so classified by at least some 
jurisdictions.”978 
 In England, courts have long used the rule of lenity “vigorously for humanitarian 
reasons ‘when the number of capital offences was still very large, when it was still punishable 
with death to cut down a cherry-tree.’”979 In the U.S., the justification of the rule of lenity is 
commonly associated to fair notice and also to proving the intent requirement for committing 
a crime. “Although ignorance of the law is no defense to a crime, the inability of the 
reasonable defendant to know that his actions are criminal undermines the justice of inferring 
a criminal intent in some cases.”980 
 Eskridge points out that a third justification is separation of powers and cites the 
conclusion of an opinion written by the former Chief Justice John Marshall, in 1820: 
 
“After much debate, the Marshall Court adopted the 
proposition that Congress cannot delegate to judges and 
                                                          
975 The T.R.F.-4 referred to the S.T.F. precedent H.C. No. 70.814, Relator Min: Celso de Mello, 1.3.1994, 
DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e], 24.6.1994 (asserting that communications between prisoners 
serving sentence may be accessed by jail guards). 
976 T.R.F-4, P.A. Corte Especial No. 0003021-32.2016.4.04.8000/RS, Relator: Des. Rômulo Pizzolatti, 
23.9.2016, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e.], 29.9.2016. 
977 ESKRIDGE JR. ET. ALL, supra note 136, at 693. 
978 Id. 
979 Id. The authors mention that “among the statutes to which this canon has been applied are (i) statutes 
whose penalties include forfeiture; (ii) statutes providing for ‘extra’ damages beyond those needed to make the 
complaint whole, including punitive damages, treble damages, attorney’s fees, penalty interest (often part of 
the remedy under usury laws); (iii) statutes permitting revocation of a professional license or disbarment of 
lawyers; (iv) statutes against extortion or discrimination; (v) statutes declaring certain acts to be per se 
negligence; and (vi) others.” Id.  
980 ESKRIDGE JR. ET. ALL, supra note 136, at 693. 
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prosecutors power to make common law crimes, because the 
moral condemnation inherent in crimes ought only to be 
delivered by the popularly elected legislature. If the legislature 
alone has the authority to define crimes, it is inappropriate for 
judges to elaborate on criminal statutes so as to expand them 
beyond the clear import of their directive words adopted by the 
legislature. There is also a separation of powers concern that 
judicial expansion of criminal statutes, common law style, 
risks expanding prosecutorial discretion beyond that 
contemplated by the legislature.”981 
 
 The rule of lenity is an antique common law rule and has lost its relevance over the 
last years, since it has been revoked in many states, such as New York and California.982 
Nonetheless, according to Zachary Price, the rule has been revitalized in SCOTUS’ 
precedents over the last thirty years.983 
 It is far from the reaching of this work to propose a precise solution as to how the rule 
of lenity should be adopted by Brazilian law. Nonetheless, for reasons of fairness and due 
process, it is important that Brazilian judges and scholars begin considering to incorporate a 
similar approach when dealing with vague punishment norms.  
The rule of lenity does not seem to be present in other civil law countries, such as 
Germany—as shown in the works of Giacomolli and Aflen984—and as it may be perceived 
from the precedent below, in which former East German spies that performed activities on 
West Germany were punished based on a West German statute that became the unified 
country’s law: 
 
“The BVefG had to decide whether after reunification East 
German spies could be punished for their activities directed 
against the former West German state under previously West 
German criminal law which was now applicable to the unified 
state. Their activities (for example, eavesdropping and 
instructing agents in West Germany) had been conducted from 
the territory of former East Germany. They argued that the 
extension of former West German criminal law to former East 
Germany was for them a case of retroactivity because under 
former East German Law their activities had—naturally—
been lawful. The court rejected this argument. Under West 
German law their activities had been defined as criminal 
offences before they had been merely committed. Thus no 
                                                          
981 Id.  
982 Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 57, 58-59 (1998). Eskridge 
says that, “as of 2013, twenty-eight of the thirty-six states that have codified the rule of lenity have abolished 
or reversed the rule by statute.” ESKRIDGE JR. ET. ALL, supra note 136, at 695. 
983 Price writes: “[o]ne of Justice Antonin Scalia’s many contributions to Supreme Court jurisprudence was 
to revitalize the rule of lenity – the ancient maxim that ambiguous penal statutes should be construed narrowly 
in the defendant’s favor.” Zachary Price, The Court after Scalia: The Rule of Lenity, SCOTUS BLOG (Sep. 2, 
2016 2:14 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/09/the-court-after-scalia-scalia-and-the-rule-of-lenity/. See 
also Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 885 (2004) (arguing that 
“[t]he overbreadth of American criminal law is one of its most widely recognized problems and that a toughened 
rule of lenity could be one of the problem's most congenial solutions.”) 
984 See subchapter II.4.1. See also NIGEL FOSTER & SATISH SULE, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWS 339 
(Oxford, 4th ed, 2010). 
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legitimate expectations were violated. The spies had merely 
relied on the expectation that they would never be prosecuted 
for their activities as long as they were sheltered by their state 
which—unfortunately for them—had disappeared after 
reunification. Article 103 II GG was thus not applicable. This 
was not a case for retroactivity of criminal laws. However, the 
court acquitted some of the accused on the basis that a penalty 
would no longer be proportionate.”985 
 
 The fact that criminal and administrative punishment laws can be interpreted as to 
determine their scope—sometimes taking into consideration broad principles—must be 
accompanied by a humble reflection on the part of judges as to whether this interpretation 
could have been reasonably made by the affected parties in the case. An example of a 
criminal case where this approach was not even cogitated was the Ellwanger case, mentioned 
in subchapter II.5.6., in which the S.T.F., applying various principles including 
proportionality, ruled that the publication of a Holocaust denial book configured racism, a 
non-bailable and imprescriptible crime in Brazil. 986 The S.T.F. did well in settling the issue 
but did not acted properly at least in analyzing whether, after the great disagreement among 
the Justices, the defendant did or did not have fair notice due to the status of Brazilian law 
regarding the crime at that moment. 
 It is important to mention that, sometimes, this approach is adopted in cases in which 
public employees have received unlawful payments, but not due to their fault. The S.T.F., in 
the cases in which the scope of the law is controversial, the Court settles the issue, develops 
the law, rules whether the payment is unlawful or not, fixing a prospective criterion to be 
followed, but does not determine reimbursement because of good faith. 987  So the 
development of a rule of lenity doctrine would not be totally original and without any 
analogical precedential support. 
 As Hart asserted in Punishment and Responsibility: “[a]t present the law which makes 
liability to punishment depend on a voluntary act calls for the exercise of powers of self-
control but not for complete success in conforming to law. 988  He added that “[i]t is 
                                                          
985 Id. at 183. The case reference is BVerfGE92, 277—DDR-Spione (Ger.). The authors mention that “[t]his 
reasoning left some academics with doubts as to its justice whereas others were convinced by the court’s logical 
approach. The debate shows that although the idea of non-retroactivity of criminal laws is generally accepted, 
different interpretations of this principle are possible in times of changes affecting a political system—often 
because the topic itself is highly ‘political’ rather than a strictly legal one.” They add that “in a similar case 
concerning the soldiers shooting fugitives from the German-German border the court explicitly held that 
legitimate expectations based on non-retroactivity had to make way for basic event justice (Radbruch’s sche 
Formel).” Therefore, based on Radubruch’s works, the Court held East German border troops were punished 
for shots made before reunification. See BVerfGE 95, 96—Mauerschützen (Ger.). Id. at 271-272. 
986 S.T.F., H.C. 84.424/RS, Relator: Min. Moreira Alves, Redator para o acórdão: Min. Maurício Corrêa, 
17.09.2003, 17, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA [D.J.], 19.03.2004, 524 (Braz.). 
987 See, e.g., M.S. 31.294 AgR, Relator: Min. Dias Toffoli, 5.2.2018, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA ELETRÔNICO 
[D.J.e.], 6.3.2018 (asserting that if the public employee receives undue values in good faith, the initial term for 
reimbursement of the values shall correspond to the date in which he is notified of the act that held the payment 
unlawful).  
988 HART, H. L. A. PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 182 (Oxford, 
2nd, 2008). Hart concludes that “[i]f we contrast this system with one in which men were conditioned to obey 
the law by psychological or other means, or one in which they were liable to punishment or ‘treatment’ whether 
they had voluntarily off ended or not, it is plain that our system takes a risk which these alternative systems do 
not. Our system does not interfere till harm has been done and has been proved to have been done with the 
appropriate mens rea. But the risk that is here taken is not taken for nothing. It is the price we pay for general 
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illuminating to look at the various excuses which the law admits, like accident or mistake, as 
ways of rewarding self-restraint. In effect the law says that even if things go wrong, as they 
do when mistakes are made or accidents occur, a man whose choices are right and who has 
done his best to keep the law will not suffer.”989 
 
V.5.3. Qualified Immunity 
 
 Qualified immunity is a doctrine construed by the SCOTUS that holds that “[p]ublic 
officials are immune from [civil actions for deprivation of rights] suits […] unless they have 
‘violated a right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.’”990 For 
establishing the clearly established criterion, the SCOTUS holds that “an officer ‘cannot be 
said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s contours were sufficiently 
definite that any reasonable official in [his] shoes would have understood that he was 
violating it,.’” […] meaning that ‘existing precedent … placed the statutory or constitutional 
question beyond debate.” 991 
 The SCOTUS notes that “[t]his exacting standard ‘gives government officials 
breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judges’ by ‘protect[ing] all but the plainly 
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.992” It is also interesting that the Court 
adopts a humble criterion for examining whether an official broke the law. In case of police 
officers, the Court notes that it analyzes the “question from the perspective “of a reasonable 
officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight, […] allow[ing] for the 
fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances 
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary 
in a particular situation.”993 
 The adoption of qualified immunity does not prevent courts to impose forward-
looking relief such as injunctions and declaratory judgements and, therefore, to develop the 
law.994 But it is certainly an honest and humble approach that avoids unfair application of 
laws that are only made clear during the case adjudication. 
 In this sense, it resembles the interactionist view of law articulated by Fuller, because 
it respects the law subject by examining if the law giver effectively has complied with its 
burden to enact rules that are possible to obey, in a prospective manner. As the SCOTUS has 
held “[i]f judges thus disagree on a constitucional question, it is unfair to subject police to 
money damages for picking the losing side of the controversy.”995 
 Qualified immunity is also adopted for policy reasons: by providing legal certainty 
in regard to law compliance, the doctrine gives incentives to citizens to choose public careers. 
Also, by not making them worry so much about lawsuits in which they could lose their 
property, the doctrine aims that public servants develop their service more efficiently, 
avoiding the deterrence effects mentioned in subchapter V.2..996 
                                                          
recognition that a man’s fate should depend upon his choice and this is to foster the prime social virtue of self-
restraint. Id. 
989 Id. 
990 City and County of San Francisco, California, 575 US at 10. Citing Plumhoff, 572 U.S. ___ (2014). 
991 Id. Citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. ___, ___ (2011). 
992 Id. at 11. 
993 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-397 (1989). 
994 These observations were gently provided to me by Professor Abner Greene and I am thankful for them. 
See also, GREENE, supra note 880, at 164, 206-207. 
995 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999). 
996 GREENE, supra note 880, at 164, 206-207. 
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 A U.S. case similar to Judge Moro’s proceeding referred above, in which the doctrine 
was applied, was Wilson v. Layne,997 decided by the SCOTUS in 1989. Police officers were 
sued under their personal capacity because while executing a warrant to arrest, they invited 
a newspaper reporter and a photographer to accompany them. The warrant made no mention 
of such a media “ride-along.” The Court held that “[i]t was not unreasonable for a police 
officer at the time at issue to have believed that bringing media observers along during the 
execution of an arrest warrant (even in a home) was lawful.” It asserted that “the 
constitutional question presented by this case is by no means open and shut,”998 and that 
“[t]he state of the law was at best undeveloped at the relevant time, and the officers cannot 
have been expected to predict the future course of constitutional law.”999 
 Nonetheless, the SCOTUS concluded that “[i]t violates the Fourth Amendment rights 
of homeowners for police to bring members of the media or other third parties into their 
home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in the home 
was not in aid of the warrant’s execution.”1000 Therefore, it developed and settled the law on 
the case, giving notice to law subjects, as Justice David Souter pointed out: 
 
“Deciding the constitutional question before addressing the 
qualified immunity question also promotes clarity in the legal 
standards for official conduct, to the benefit of both the officers 
and the general public.”1001 
 
 It is important to clarify that I am not taking the position that there may not be 
problems with the adoption of a qualified immunity doctrine because that exceeds the scope 
of this work. I am just making the case that the doctrine has important arguments for fairness 
and, for this reason, is worth of analysis and, maybe, development in Brazil.1002 
 
V.5.4. Stare Decisis 
  
 In subchapter II.6. I mentioned that stare decisis is not a cultural tradition in Brazil 
and that only certain precedents have binding effect. I stated that the absence of a 
consolidated stare decisis doctrine makes the evolution of the law more complicated in the 
country.  
 Richard Posner writes that “[t]he body of precedents in an area of law can be thought 
of a stock of capital goods—specially a stock of knowledge that yields services over many 
years to potential disputants in the form of information about legal obligations.”1003 He adds 
that: 
 
“Deciding a case by applying a precedent economizes on the 
judge’s time and effort; he doesn’t have to rethink the issue in 
                                                          
997 Wilson, 526 U.S, at 618. 
998 Id. at 604. 
999 Id. at 605. 
1000 Id.  
1001 Id. at 609. 
1002 As a matter of fact, there is a Bill—Projeto de Lei do Senado nº 349/2015, introduced by Senator 
Antonio Anastasia—under analysis by Brazilian Congress—that intends to add the following article to the 
Introductory Act to the Brazilian Norms: “Art. 28. ;The public agent shall be held personally liable for his 
technical decisions and opinions in cases of malice or grave fault. § 1º. The decision or opinion based in general 
orientation, or in reasonable interpretation, in unsettled caselaw or doctrine, even if later does not prevail, shall 
not be considered grave fault.” Translation mine. 
1003 POSNER, supra note 911, at 743-744. 
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the case from the ground up. In addition, a precedent project a 
judge’s influence more effectively than a decision that will 
have no effect in guiding future behavior. This is a reason 
judges follow as well as make precedent and therefore why 
lawyers argue cases on the basis of precedent. If the current 
generation of judges doesn’t follow precedent, the next 
generation is less likely to follow the precedents of the current 
generation because the next generation’s judges are less likely 
to be criticized for not following their predecessors’ 
precedents.”1004 
 
 In addition to these concerns, two moral arguments have to be made. Stare decisis 
treats people equally and judges who have a practice of following precedents show 
humbleness about the power of individual reason. As Strauss observes “i[t] is a bad idea to 
try to resolve a problem on your own, without referring to the collective wisdom of other 
people who have tried and solved the problem.”1005 
 The consolidation of a stare decisis doctrine in Brazil—which has been advanced 
with the enactment of the new Civil Procedure Code, as mentioned in subchapter II.6.—is 
essential to allow citizens to understand what the law demands of them. If every judge is 
authorized to make its own interpretation of the broad C.F. text and statutes, guidance may 
always be compromised in Brazil, even if we adopt theories such as the rule of lenity and 
qualified immunity. As the SCOTUS, citing Benjamin Cardozo, observed “no judicial 
system could do society's work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it.”1006 
 
V.5.5. Prospective Overruling 
 
 Among the solutions mentioned in this subchapter, the only one that is well developed 
in Brazil is the prospective overruling technique. This is “the judicial technique by which a 
court—eager to overrule an outmoded precedent but reluctant to disappoint the expectations 
of the parties—applies that precedent in deciding the particular case before it but 
simultaneously announces that it shall consider the precedent as overruled in all future 
cases.”1007 
 An example of the application of this doctrine took place in the party loyalty case 
referred in item II.2.3.. As stated, most Chamber of Deputies’ members that had changed 
party affiliation before the S.T.F. decision did not lose their seats.1008 The Court held that the 
new interpretation would only apply to those who had switched after the date that the T.S.E. 
decided the first case which asserted the need for party loyalty in disagreement with the 
                                                          
1004 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S., at 609. 
1005 STRAUSS, supra note 876, at 41. 
1006 See text accompanying note 380. 
1007 Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Court, The Yale Law Journal Vol. 
71, No. 5 (Apr., 1962), pp. 907-951 
1008  S.T.F., MS No. 26.603-1/DF, Relator: Min. Celso de Mello, 03.10.2007, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA 
ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e.], 17.12.2009, 318 (Braz.). 
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previous S.T.F. precedent. 1009 This basically means that only representatives that changed 
their party after the first T.S.E. ruling could lose their seats.1010 
 
V.6. Nepotism Once Again 
 
 To provide a clear example of application of sanctions in a case decided under vague 
norms, I will once again resort to the nepotism cases, mentioned in subsection II.2.3. In those 
cases, the S.T.F. ruled that nepotism was unconstitutional within all three branches of 
government because it offended the principles of morality and impersonality (neutrality). In 
the concrete review case that was adjudicated by the Court, the Chief Prosecutor of the State 
of Rio Grande do Norte sought to annul the administrative appointment of a vice-mayor’s 
relative and did not request the application of any sanctions.1011 Therefore, the mayor was 
not punished, only the office’s appointment was declared void. 
 Nonetheless, due to these decisions, several lawsuits were filed to impose 
administrative improbity sanctions against politicians and public administrators who had 
appointed relatives to public offices before the S.T.F. decisions. Since, according to 
Brazilian social practices, judges do not make law, but only apply the law, technically there 
was no law creation in the case and the S.T.F. was merely concretizing the C.F. text enacted 
in 1988 when ruled nepotism unconstitutional. 
The two S.T.J. panels that adjudicate public law cases split regarding the issue. The 
First Panel ruled that appointments made before the S.T.F. decisions did not configure 
administrative improbity because there was no intent to violate the C.F., but only negligence: 
 
“[...] 5. In casu, the lower courts acquitted the defendants 
because they understood that nepotism does not characterize 
administrative improbity.  
6. The  defendant’s conduct is grave negligent, but it does not 
show the specific intention of harming the public treasury or 
gaining undue advantage, indispensable requirements for 
breaching the Lei de Improbidade Administrativa, especially 
considering that at the time the contracts were entered into 
(in the years 2005 and 2006), there was no law forbidding 
nepotism in such city, and the contracts were executed before 
the S.T.F. approved the Binding Precedent No. 13 (DJe Aug. 
29, 2008).”1012 
 
                                                          
1009 There are two statutory articles that are usually referred to when the theory is applied: (a) article 27 of 
Law 9.868, of 11 of November of 1999, states that “when declaring a law or a normative act unconstitutional, 
the Supremo Tribunal Federal, by a vote of two-third of its members, based on reasons of legal certainty and 
exceptional social interest, may restrict the effects of the declaration of unconstitutionality or decide that it shall 
only have effect after the case cannot be appealed or in any other moment determined by the Court.”; (b) article 
2, sole paragraph, of Lei No. 9.784, 29 de Janeiro de 1999, establishes that “in the administrative proceedings 
it shall observed, among others, the criteria of “interpretation of the administrative norm that better respects the 
public interest, being voided the retroactive application of a new interpretation.” 
1010 The case shows that, as a practical matter, the first court to overrule the S.T.F. decision was actually the 
T.S.E., but the High Court agreed with their new holding. 
1011 S.T.F., R.E. No. 579.951/RN, Relator: Min. Ricardo Lewandowski, 20.08.2008, 1876, DIÁRIO DA 
JUSTIÇA [D.J], 18.12.2009, 1883 (Braz.). An abstract review lawsuit was also adjudicated, the A.D.C. 12. See  
S.T.F, A.D.C. No. 12, Rel. Min. Carlos Britto, 20.08.2008, 1, DIÁRIO DA JUSTIÇA ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e.], 
17.12.2009, 1 (Braz.).  
1012 S.T.J., REsp. 1.193.248, Relator: Min. Napoleão Nunes Maia Filho, 24.4.2014, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO 
ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e], 18.8.2014 (Braz.). 
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 The S.T.J. Second Panel, on the other hand, ruled contrariwise and stated that the 
practice had always been forbidden by the principles of morality and impersonality, which 
are also reproduced in art. 11 of Law No. 8.429/1992 and asserted the existence of 
knowledge to break the law: 
 
“[...] 2. In the present case, the practice of nepotism is 
effectively configured and, as so, offends gravely the 
principles of the Public Administration, in special, the 
principles of morality and equality, being framed, in this 
sense, in art. 11 of Law No. 8.429/1992. 
3. The appointment of relatives to positions of confidence, 
even if has taken place before the publication of the Binding 
Precedent No. 13 of the [S.T.F.], configures an act of 
administrative improbity, which offends the principles of the 
Public Administration, as set forth in article 11 of Lei No. 
8.429/1992, being dispensable the existence of an explicit 
rule of any nature regarding the prohibition.”1013 
  
 An appeal filed in this second case, to a higher panel, is now pending.1014 Taking this 
split into account, I intend to answer in this chapter the question I wrote in the last phrase in 
subchapter II.2.1: should public administrators be punished for having committed an 
administrative improbity act because they made unconstitutional (immoral) appointments? 
Should the public administrator’s readings of the administrative morality clause be 
considered a plausible or a truthful reading of the C.F. text, independently of their beliefs or 
personal desires? 
 It is interesting to point out that the S.T.F, by affirming that it was grounding the 
banning of nepotism in the core of the morality principle, made in fact a positivistic reading 
of the principle, stating that it is apprehended as a morally incorrect practice within positive 
morality. 1015 The Court did not justify its decision based on what it thought to be the best 
reading of the C.F., but on the current status of the community’s apprehension of morality. 
The fact that, under the new constitutional regime, public positions are generally awarded 
through public competitive contests is seen as one of the main conquests of the C.F. in terms 
of behavioral change and democratization of the public jobs access and shows that the 
unconstitutionality could be understood as a matter of social fact. Therefore, the Court’s 
decision was justified.  
                                                          
1013  S.T.J., AgR-REsp. 1.362.789, Relator: Min. Humberto Martins, 12.5.2015, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO 
ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e], 19.5.2015 (Braz.). Other similar cases decided by the Second Panel of the S.T.J.: S.T.J. 
REsp. 1.643.293, Relator: Min. Herman Benjamin, 28.3.2017, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e], 
5.5.2017 (Braz.); S.T.J., REsp 1.499.622, Relator: Min. Humberto Martins, 24.2.2015, DIÁRIO DO JUDICIÁRIO 
ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e], 12.3.2015 (Braz.). 
1014 The technical portuguese name for this appeal is embargos de divergência. For checking the current 
stage of this appeal, see 
https://ww2.stj.jus.br/processo/pesquisa/?tipoPesquisa=tipoPesquisaNumeroRegistro&termo=201300093460
&totalRegistrosPorPagina=40&aplicacao=processos.ea. Last update: “04/07/201615:53 Conclusos para 
julgamento ao(à) Ministro(a) SÉRGIO KUKINA (Relator) com certidão e r. decisão retro.” 
1015 The term “positive morality" was used by Hart in the book Law, Liberty and Morality. This is a concept 
employed by John Austin. For Hart, positive morality is not the individual morality; it is the social morality, 
the morality of a social group that is socially integrated. It is the morality that in fact is accepted and shared by 
a certain group, which is capable to apprehend it as a matter of fact. See NEIL MACCORMICK, see supra note 
447, 63. 
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 However, it is clear that there was huge disagreement as to whether nepotism was or 
not forbidden. This disagreement existed both regarding (a) the compliance with the criterion 
of legality—if a statute was necessary to outlaw the practice or whether the C.F. principles 
were enough—and also (b) if the practice ran against positive morality. Although the S.T.F. 
held that nepotism violated administrative morality, even the Court of Appeals of the State 
of Rio de Janeiro had filed an amicus curiae brief sustaining the contrary argument.1016 So, 
with all this disagreement, it is questionable whether citizens had fair notice as to whether 
the practice was allowed or forbidden. The authoritative example provided by many 
members of the Judicial branch that incurred in nepotism communicated to the ordinary 
citizen that there was nothing wrong with the practice. Courts are generally regarded as “an 
authority on proper behaviour, and [citizens turn to them] […] in order to learn the way to 
behave.”1017 
 The S.T.F. ruling correctly developed the law by holding the practice unlawful. 
However, punishing officials, such as the Second Panel of the S.T.J. did, neglects the fact 
that the state—the lawgiver—did not comply with its obligation to enact clear rules and to 
provide proper guidance.  
 Justice Barroso was the lawyer that argued the case before the S.T.F.. In his book, he 
tells a very interesting story about social situations that happened after the case was decided. 
The frankness of the comments shows that, as a matter of social fact, the state of the law was 
not settled until the S.T.F. ruling: 
 
“Cases that have an impact on the popular belief and on 
particular interests generate different feelings and reactions. 
After the nepotism trials, I lived two opposing situations. In 
the first one, I attended a conference with a respected Court 
of Appeals Judge to talk about a case in which I was the 
leader counsel. After discussing the professional issues, the 
Judge walked me to the door and said: ‘I cannot thank you 
enough. Until days ago, my wife worked in my chamber and 
‘guarded’ my office. Well, now I am free of that external 
control.’ One week later, I made a speech in an event 
organized by a state court. During lunch, I notice that a young 
lady, who was very nice to everyone, stared madly at me. To 
resolve this situation, I went to her and asked: ‘What do you 
do?’. The answer came in a very mad tone: “until last week I 
worked for the Court of Appeals Judge ‘Jane Doe’, my 
mother. Now, thanks to you, I am unemployed.’ Life is full 
of ups and downs.”1018 
 
V.7. Chapter Conclusions  
 
 According to Hart, “all systems, in different ways, compromise between two social 
needs: the need for certain rules which can, over great areas of conduct, safely be applied by 
private individuals to themselves without fresh official guidance or weighing up of social 
issues, and the need to leave open, for later settlement by an informed, official choice, issues 
which can only be properly appreciated and settled when they arise in a concrete case.”1019  
                                                          
1016 See A.D.C. 12, case files, p. 93-130. 
1017 HART, supra note 43, 125. 
1018 BARROSO, supra note 27, at 393. 
1019 HART, supra note 43, 130. 
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 Brazilian jurists must understand that their system has opted to insert broad 
constitutional principles in the C.F. and has asserted that these principles must interact with 
rules in adjudication, due to the belief that judges may issue better decisions. The advantages 
of a system disposed in this way for the development of individual and social rights are 
unequivocal. Nevertheless, poor guidance may also be offered in some moments and this 
may be a problem in some areas, especially in criminal and in administrative law when 
punishments may be applied. 
 That does not mean that guidance problems and judge law-making will always exist 
when deciding based on principles. As Hart observed, it is important to distinguish The 
scholar notes that it is important to distinguish: [(a)] when applying rules to instances 
different that legislators considered or could have considered represents a deliberate choice 
or fiat of the interpreters from [(b)] when the inclusion of the new case under the rule is a 
natural elaboration of the rule, as something implementing a purpose which seems natural to 
attribute (in some sense) to the rule, rather to an intention of the law drafter.1020 There is no 
technical formula to give a precise general answer to this distinction and this will have to be 
done by judges in each case. Judges must have candor, humbleness, to understand this 
problem. This interactionist view, worrying about the relationship among lawgiver and law 
subject, although not essential to the existence of law, certainly makes it fairer and better. 
 As Mario Cappelletti points out “the creative adjudication is supposed to be 
retrospective, for a new doctrine applies also to situations which had occurred previously. 
Since it has retroactive effect, creative adjudication runs counter to the values of certainty 
and predictability, indeed, it is ‘unfair’, for it catches the party by surprise.”1021 But, as he 
adds, citing Lord Diplock, “[t]he rule that a new precedent applies to acts done before it was 
laid down is not an essential feature of the judicial process. It is a consequence of a legal 
fiction that the Courts merely expound the law as it has always been. The time has come, I 
suggest, to reflect whether we should discard this fiction.”1022 
 
  
                                                          
1020 Hart, supra note 431, at 627. 
1021 See CAPPELLETTI, supra note 61, at 37. 
1022 Devlin, supra note 62, at 16. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 H.L.A. Hart’s jurisprudential approach to law is unromantic and it does not provide 
us with all the answers we may desire about legal disputes. Hart’s positivistic conception 
admits that evil systems can still be considered legal systems. It acknowledges that, in some 
cases, judges will have nowhere to resort to and will have to come up with a discretionary 
decision that will innovate, bringing a new rule to the legal system. In being honest and 
realistic about what truthfully happens, about law’s limitations and about the fact that law 
does not necessarily have moral value—it may or may not have—, no wonder Hart’s theory 
is not the most attractive one for many scholars. 
 Nonetheless, as this work intended to do, demonstrating that Brazilians identify law 
in a similar manner as the inclusive legal positivists do is important for diverse reasons. It 
helps to answer criticisms as to whether moral argumentation should take part of legal 
reasoning and, if so, whether this is always the case. It helps to comprehend if judges are 
being activists or if they are simply doing what the legal system in the past decided they 
should now do. It permits showing that problems of guidance happen in any legal system, 
but that they can be greater in some systems, due to choices that are specifically made on 
law drafting and on law adjudication. Moral criteria in the rule of recognition can be 
controversial, can raise disagreement and may be only settled when legislators enact a statute 
or, in most times, when courts rule on the issue. In a civil law country, settling a controversial 
legal question can be even harder. 
 Lon Fuller was right when he argued that some basic moral qualities are necessary 
for a system to endure. His King Rex example showed that the system will probably not get 
very far without them. His only problem was to tie these efficiency qualities to the concept 
of law. Many systems of law will never solve these problems and persons will still be living 
under the rules of these systems. Not to call this law is unrealistic. Some of these problems 
may seem apparently solved at some point, but they may come back at a different time. His 
longed-for enterprise of morally subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules, 
therefore, can always be in danger. 
 In proposing an unromantic view of law, Hart keeps our eyes open for the legal 
system’s great achievements, but also for its worse defects. He shows that participants in the 
practice may accept and obey the legal norms as reasons for action, without endorsing 
them;1023 that bad laws may be part of the system and that good laws may not, and that, in 
many cases, you cannot blame the citizen for obeying the former and not the latter.  
 If there is candor and humbleness to acknowledge these issues and will to start 
thinking about law in this way, the Brazilian legal system may improve in a fair and just 
manner. Permanent evaluation of the law, as to whether it should be “respected, or reviled, 
renewed, revised or rejected,”1024 must be a constant goal. As Aristotle once said, “knowing 
yourself is the beginning of all wisdom.”1025 
 
  
  
                                                          
1023 See Bix, supra note 453. 
1024 Zipursky, supra note 46, at 1171. 
1025 See Aristotle, Aristotle Biography, https://www.biography.com/people/aristotle-9188415. 
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